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Abstract 
OPTIMAL RESPONSE IN DECISION MAKING: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
INVESTIGATION OF DECISION STRATEGIES 
Valerio Biscione. 
A decision process can be conceptually separated into a perceptual process and a decision strategy. The 
former includes all the different mechanisms that contribute to accumulate information relevant to the 
decision, whereas the decision strategy determines when enough information has been accumulated and 
a decision can be taken. Although perceptual processes have been extensively investigated in the last 
decades, decision strategies have received comparatively little attention. The main aim of this work is 
to fill this gap by analysing four decision strategies with two different experimental paradigms. We also 
focus on ancillary decision-making topics, such as the effect of stimulus intensity, foreperiod duration, 
payoff manipulation, and the response distributions in the rate domain. 
We initially performed a qualitative analysis of decision strategies by using a classic reaction time tasks 
on human participants while assuming the Drift Diffusion Model, one of the many models used for 
simple and fast decisions, as the perceptual process. We found that increasing the time of the trial does 
not have a relevant effect on the response, which is in contrast with some of the decision rules 
considered here. However, this approach is limited by the implicit assumption of a perceptual model 
that would result in different prediction for the decision strategies.  
We suggest the use of a different experimental design, called the EXACT Paradigm, which allows us 
to analyse decision strategies without having to assume any perceptual process. We tested the feasibility 
of such approach and applied it to several experimental studies, including a direct comparison with a 
classic reaction time task. Overall, two of the four decision strategies (modified Reward Rate and 
X 
 
Reward/Accuracy) appeared to model the data satisfactorily. We discuss several ways in which the 
EXACT Paradigm can be used for expanding our knowledge in the field of decision-making. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
As goal-oriented living organisms, competing with other living organisms in an environment with 
limited resources, we must face decisions in order to obtain the reward we long. We not only must be 
able to extrapolate information coming from a myriad of sensory sources, but we need to decide when 
enough information has been accumulated, and thus commit to a certain decision. As this competition 
has been going on since the beginning of life, it seems reasonable that we have gotten reasonably good 
at it. How good, exactly, is a question that scientists have tried to answer for the last hundred and half 
years, by measuring the speed and the accuracy of human responses for simple tasks. This investigation 
can be tracked back to 1849, when Helmholtz measured the speed at which a signal is carried along a 
nerve fibre (around 24.6-38.4 meters per second); around 1865, partly inspired by Helmholtz work, a 
Dutch physiologist named F. C. Donders became interested in measuring the speed of mental processes 
by using electric shocks to the right or left foot of human subjects. Participants were asked to press a 
key corresponding to the foot that had received the shock. In one condition participants knew in advance 
which foot was going to receive the electric shock, in the other they did not. In today’s terminology, 
this would correspond to a simple and a choice reaction time task. Donders found a difference between 
the two conditions of around 60 milliseconds, establishing for the first time a central tenant of cognitive 
psychology: simple reaction times are faster than choice reaction times. Based on Helmholtz and 
Donders contributions, W. M. Wundt established in 1875 the first formal laboratory for psychological 
research at the University of Leipzig, marking psychology an independent field of study. Much of the 
research in Wundt’s laboratory was concerned in confirming Donders’ findings on reaction time and in 
establishing that mental processes are measurable and quantifiable: the field of experimental 
psychology and mental chronometry was born.  
2 
 
While these and other researchers were collecting data about the speed of several mental processes, 
others were interested in how accurate these mental processes are, and the relationship between their 
speed and accuracy. This relationship was investigated by Woodworth (1899) and, around the same 
time, by Martin and Müeller (1899), for simple obligatory movements. This brought about the first 
experimental finding that the accuracy of a response increases with decreasing speed.  Subsequently, 
the study of Henmon (1911), in a discrimination task in which participants were asked to select the 
longest line amongst two possible options, found an orderly relation between the time and the accuracy 
of response. A decade later this result took the name of “speed-accuracy relation” (Garrett, 1922; for a 
review, see Heitz, 2014), before being then forgotten for the next three decades. At this point, the field 
of decision making started working on formulating a mathematical relationship between RT and 
accuracy, in the form of sequential sampling of information (Edwards, 1954; Audley, 1957; 1958; Stone, 
1960), using the sequential probability ratio test developed by Bernard (1946) and Wald (1948). In 
particular, Stone combined the speed-accuracy trade-off with the mathematics and optimality of the 
sequential probability ratio test developing a model known as random walk which made specific and 
testable predictions about response distributions. This model became extremely popular, mainly thanks 
to its ability to explain within the same framework both the speed and the accuracy of a response, 
whereas previous models could take into account only one or the other feature. From that point on, 
several variants of sequential sampling emerged (as discussed in Section 2.2). This corresponded to a 
massive improvement in our understanding of how the decision making process works in humans. 
However, these models, by themselves, did not offer a complete explanation of the decision making 
process: they provided us with a relationship between speed and accuracy, but they did not tell us how 
good we are in making a decision, because they are agnostic regarding what constitute a good decision. 
In other words: we know that some speed of responses will most likely correspond to some value of 
accuracy, but why do participants choose that speed or that accuracy? What rules are they using? And 
how good they are in following them? How these rules depend on the experimental conditions adopted?  
This problem has generally been investigated as an optimality problem. The concept of optimality 
in the study of human mind was not new. Philosophers and psychologist have long discussed the 
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possibility that people’s reasoning followed the rules of formal logic or probability theory (Braine, 1978; 
Holland, et al., 1986; Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  
However, we believe that this approach may lead researchers astray. Before investigating how good 
people optimize in reaction time tasks, we need to understand what does optimization mean in this 
context. Only by understanding what the objective function of the optimization process is we can then 
investigate how close human participants can get to it. Using a less formal terminology, we will refer 
to the objective function (the quantity the participants are trying to maximize) as the decision rule of 
the decision process.  
This problem was deeply investigated by Bogacz et al. (2006), which suggested four decision rules 
(called criteria for optimality in his works) that participants may seek to maximize by modifying the 
speed (or the accuracy) of their response depending on internal and external factors (motivation, reward, 
punishment, length of the task and so on). Some of these rules are function of the subjective value for 
a correct and incorrect response; some others are function of the total duration of a trial; some are 
function of both (see Section 2.6). This thesis is mostly built upon Bogacz et al. seminal work, and it 
focuses on the investigation of decision rules.   
The main aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of decision rules. We will tackle this 
problem from different sides. Firstly, we will use a qualitative approach to test some predictions of the 
decision rules (Chapter 4 and 5). We will use different types of sequential sampling models, comparing 
their predictions when necessary. This will help us understanding what are the components affecting 
the decision process, across different experimental designs. 
However, most of this thesis will be focussed on a new experimental framework for investigating 
decision mechanism and optimisation. We call this framework “EXACT Paradigm”, and its main goal 
is to investigate decision rules without having to assume any perceptual process (Chapter 6, 7 and 8). 
We will show several applications of such design, which allows us to answer more directly the question 
of what decision rules are used by participants. This will help us to investigate how well participants 
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can estimate experimental parameters, whether they are changing their estimation during the task, and 
whether they are most loss-aversive, or risk-seeking. The last experimental Chapter (Chapter 8) 
provides a comparison between the EXACT paradigm and the classic approach used in decision making, 
by also investigating the effect of different payoff on responses. 
Part of this work is connected to Piéron’s Law, a fundamental psychophysics law that links the 
intensity of a stimulus with the speed of response (Piéron’s, 1914, 1920, 1952, see Section 2.9 and 2.10). 
We will show that this rule, found in a myriad of different domains and experimental designs, is the 
result of the interaction between a speed-accuracy trade-off function and a decision rule. This approach 
predicts that, with the right experimental conditions, is it possible to break this relationship. In the later 
experimental Chapters we confirmed this prediction.  
Another topic touched in this work regards regularities in responses distributions. We found 
interesting regularities both in the response rate (which led us to formulate the Rate-Hypothesis, the 
idea that the brain compute the response in the rate domain, and then translate it with a mechanism that 
resembles mechanically a sequential sampling process, see Harris et al., 2014 and Section 2.4) and in 
the accuracy distribution (which we observed within the context of the EXACT Paradigm, see Section 
7.1).  These regularities may underpin more fundamental processes going on in the brain: we will 
discuss the feasibility of such approach, the implication in terms of decision rules and optimality, and 
possible future investigations.  
The field of optimality in perceptual decision making is relatively young, and only a few researchers 
have tackled the problem since it was first formulated by Bogacz et al. (2006). Plus, our approach 
diverges from the classic one as it aims to investigate optimality and decision rules by using a novel 
experimental design. As such, this must be considered an exploratory work, which goal is not to obtain 
clear answers to all our questions, but to open up different and possibly promising paths for further 
research.  
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1.1 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the background information that will be used throughout the thesis. Several 
sequential sampling models are discussed, focusing in particular on the Pure/Extended Diffusion 
Models. The LATER model and its connection to the Rate Hypothesis is presented. We introduce the 
concept of optimal decision making, discussing the work done in this area in the last decades, and 
present the four decision strategies used throughout this work, their similarities, differences, and the 
relationship that they have with the diffusion models. We then introduce the Piéron’s Law, one of the 
main phenomena of our investigation, and its connection with optimality models.   
In Chapter 3 we present the statistical methods used in the thesis. This includes the technique for 
data aggregation from different participants (Vincentizing); the technique to analyse the distributions 
in the Rate Domain (standardising method); the mathematical description of the Pure and Extended 
DDM, and of the LATER model, within the Simple and Choice RT paradigm; the mathematical 
formulation of the four decision rules, and the respective optimum response time and accuracy by using 
an exponential speed-accuracy function; the technique employed to fit distributions to these models 
(Nelder-Mead algorithm with Quantile Maximum Likelihood) and model selection (Akaike information 
criterion); the technique for fitting data points, like median RT across conditions (Weighted Least 
Square, modified Weighted Least Square) and model selection (a modified version of the Bayesian 
information criterion); the shift-detection method used for analysing response signals.   
Methods for analysis used for a particular experimental design, or deviation from the analysis 
exposed in this Chapter, are specified in the Method Section of the corresponding Chapter. 
In the first experimental Chapter, Chapter 4, we investigate the effect of foreperiod and different 
contrasts on a Simple RT paradigm. We use a brightness discrimination task to obtain Piéron’s Law, 
and analyse the behavioural result in terms of drift diffusion model and LATER model. We are 
particularly interested in checking what parameter in the diffusion model is affected by the foreperiod 
length, as this would imply different explanations in terms of decision mechanism taking place during 
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the task. We find that both non-decision time and threshold separation are affected by the foreperiod 
length, which is consistent with the idea that participant’s response follows an optimisation mechanism 
that depends on total trial time, as some of the decision strategies assume. Alternative explanations are 
also discussed. We analyse the distribution shape in the rate domain, finding that they appear normally 
distributed for the long foreperiod time condition, but deviates for shorter foreperiod conditions.  
In Chapter 5 we analyse more deeply the effect of total trial time on the accuracy of response for 
Choice RT. We first illustrate the relationship between increasing total trial time, accuracy, response, 
and threshold separation.  In order to separate motor preparation component due to stimulus 
predictability and optimization mechanism, we vary the length of one of two parts of the trial, the 
foreperiod part, and the response-to-warning-signal part. The study clarified the results from the 
previous Chapter and shows how participants were not changing their response due to the condition 
length, but only due to the stimulus predictability. This finding goes in contrast to several studies, and 
we discuss possible reasons for this. The analysis of the Rate Domain distribution is performed for both 
tasks, finding in most cases distributions that were overall Normal in the Rate Domain, with some 
caveats due to anticipations.    
In Chapter 6 we discuss the idea of conceptually dividing perceptual process and decision strategy. 
We suggest a solution in the form of a new experimental paradigm to analyse the decision strategy 
without having to rely on the perceptual process. We introduce a preliminary version of what we call 
“EXACT Paradigm”, which hardcodes the speed-accuracy function so that it is perfectly known by the 
researcher (but not by the participant). We discuss the design of such paradigm, the differences with 
Classic RT tasks, and the experimental predictions derived from our design, focusing in particular with 
the prediction regarding Piéron’s Law. We show the result of an experiment which investigates the 
viability of such paradigm and discuss how it could be improved upon.  
By slightly changing the design of the previous task we introduce, in Chapter 7, the EXACT 
Paradigm, which main difference consists of making the speed-accuracy function known to the 
participants in the form of an increasing gauge. The results of two experiments are analysed in this 
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Chapter. Both tasks are designed to resemble a Piéron’s Law task, by varying a parameter that mimics 
the stimulus strength. As a second factor, we varied the delay across trials in the first experiment and 
the starting point of the gauge in the second one. We found that one of the strategy (defined as ܴܴ௠ in 
the following Chapter) appeared to be the most successful model in accounting for the observations. 
Furthermore, we found that, as expected, with specified experimental condition, Piéron’s Law does not 
hold. We also suggest a new interpretation of the RT distribution that takes into account the accuracy 
distribution, which cannot be analysed in Classic RT task. The implications of this approach are 
discussed. 
In Chapter 8 we directly compare the result of an EXACT Paradigm with the result of a Classic 
RT paradigm, by varying the punishment/reward ratio in terms of points. Whereas in the EXACT 
Paradigm we found that participants were very responsive to the point feedback, the same cannot be 
said for the Classic RT task, where participants’ average responses did not appear to be affected by it. 
In the EXACT Paradigm, we found a clear departure from Piéron’s Law with high reward conditions, 
as predicted. In the Classic RT task, Piéron’s Law did not hold for the low performance group, which 
can be easily explained by taking into account different visual acuity. In both cases, we show how 
Piéron’s Law seem to be the result of an interaction between the speed-accuracy trade-off and a decision 
strategy. Finally, we perform the standard optimality analysis on the Classic RT paradigm, by using the 
Pure DDM as the perceptual model. In this case, the results were mostly dissatisfying. 
A summary of findings is presented in Chapter 9. We discuss the main empirical results under the 
light of optimal decision making models.  The possible reasons behind departure from expected decision 
model are discussed, including suggestions for possible future directions. A general overview of the 
contribution of this work to the field of decision making is provided.  
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Chapter 2  
Background Information 
 
The main aim of this work is to investigate the decision rules used in the decision making processes 
involved in simple tasks. To do that, we are going to apply concepts related to modern models of 
decision making. This Chapter will provide the necessary background needed to understand the research 
problem and its significance. Since their first formal introduction (Bogacz et al., 2006), decision rules 
have been investigated through the framework of sequential sampling models, analysed by means of 
reaction time (RT) tasks. After a brief description of RT tasks, we will present an overview of sequential 
sampling models, followed by a more detailed description of the drift diffusion model, which we will 
extensively employ throughout this work. We will then provide the information related to the Rate-
Hypothesis, another topic investigated in this work, and how the LATER model can be employed to 
test it. We will then describe the four decision rules tested in the present work, and their relationship 
with the parameters of the drift diffusion model. Finally, we describe an important phenomenon that 
relates reaction times with stimulus strength: the Piéron’s Law. We will describe its relevance in the 
context of optimality, and how the analysis of decision rules can shed a new light on the underlying 
mechanism generating Piéron’s Law.  
2.1 Reaction Time Tasks 
Historically, RT tasks have emerged as the standard paradigm to investigate the dynamics of 
decision making. Even though these tasks are extremely simplified when compared to real life situations, 
they are representative of many problems faced by living organisms in their natural environment. The 
nature of these tasks makes it possible to collect thousands of responses for a single participant in a 
short time, and thus allows reliable statistical analysis of rich datasets. There are many possible 
classifications of reaction time tasks, but the most useful for this work consists in distinguishing 
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between Simple RT tasks and Choice RT tasks (Luce, 1986). In a Simple RT task (also called detection 
tasks) the participant is asked to press a key whenever a stimulus appear, whereas in a Choice RT task 
participants have to choose between two or more alternatives. When it involves only two alternatives, 
we will define it as a Two-Alternative Force Choice (2AFC) Task (Bogacz et al., 2006).  In both cases, 
there are two types of designs commonly used: in the first type, the starting of each trial is indicated by 
a warning signal, with the stimulus (or the stimuli, if it is a Choice RT) appearing after some (constant 
or variable) time. The time between the warning signal and the stimulus/i is called foreperiod time 
(which effect will be deeply investigated in Chapter 4 and 5). After the participant’s response, there is 
generally another pause before the starting of the next trial, called response-to-warning signal interval. 
This design is illustrated in the top diagram of Figure 2.1. We will employ this design in Chapter 4 and 
5. The second way a RT task can be designed is by employing just one delay instead of two: in this case, 
after the response, the participant waits until the starting of the next stimulus onset: the participant 
response corresponds to the beginning of the next trial. In this case, we will refer to this delay as the 
response-to-stimulus interval (see bottom diagram in Figure 2.1). We will employ this design in Chapter 
8.  
When working with RT task, we are generally interested in the time of response and its accuracy. 
The time of response (the RT itself) can be divided into two components: a decision time, DT, and a 
sensory-motor component, ߬, such that ܴܶ = ܦܶ + ߬. The ܦܶ corresponds to all the time in which 
information about the stimulus is accumulated, whereas ߬ correspond to the time for non-decision 
components, such as stimulus encoding, motor response and so on (not all models employ the ߬ 
component, e.g. in the LATER model ܴܶ = ܦܶ, see Section 2.4). The total time for a single trial 
corresponds to ܦܶ + ߬ + ܦ, where ܦ corresponds to any delay in the trial that is not included in the 
response (for example, the response-to-stimulus interval or the foreperiod time). We also define ܦ௧௢௧ 
as the sum of the non-decisional component, so that ܦ௧௢௧ = ߬ + ܦ. The diagrams in the boxes in Figure 
2.1 illustrates the relation between these components for the two different design.  
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Figure 2.1.  
Diagram of the two possible designs for a RT task. The top diagram represents the design in which a warning signal 
corresponds to the beginning of the trial, a foreperiod (FP) time is used from the warning signal until the stimulus onset, and 
a response-to-warning interval (RWI) is used after the participant’s response. Note that RWI and FP may be random or constant. 
In the lower diagram we show an alternative design, in which only one delay is employed: the response-to-stimulus interval 
(RSI), from the participant’s response until the next stimulus onset. In this work we are going to use both types of designs. In 
the box we illustrate the connection and the definition between different part of the trials for the two design. ܦܶ corresponds 
to the decision time, ߬ to the sensory-motor component, ܦ to the delay of the trial (time that is not part of the response time), 
ܦ௧௢௧ to the overall non-decision time.  
 
In the past decades, several characteristics of RT responses have emerged to be particularly stable 
across a vast amount of tasks, designs, and sensory modalities. For instance (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; 
Luce, 1986; Mulder et al., 2010; Ratcliff, 2002; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011; Wagenmakers & Brown, 
2007), mean RT is shorter for easy task than for difficult task; mean RT is proportional to standard 
deviation; manipulation that increases the speed of RT also increases the proportion of errors; RT 
distributions are right-skewed, with skew increasing with task difficulty. A typical shape of a RT 
distribution is shown on the left panel of Figure 2.3.  
These features correspond to some law-like pattern that any model of decision making should take 
into account. Sequential Sampling Models have been extremely successful in explaining these patterns, 
as we will discuss in the next Section.  
2.2 Sequential Sampling Models for Reaction Times 
For decades RT tasks have been investigated using sequential sampling models (also called 
accumulator models, Luce, 1986). These models are unique in providing a way to understand both the 
speed and accuracy of responses within a common theoretical framework, whereas many models 
provide account for either RT (stage theory models, Townsend & Ashby, 1983; Sternberg, 1969) or 
accuracy (signal detection theory models, Green & Swets, 1966).  
The general idea is that, during a task, the observer accumulates information based on the presented 
signal(s) until a stopping rule is satisfied (Luce, 1986). As the time passes, more information is gathered 
and therefore more accurate decisions can be made, generating a trade-off between speed and accuracy. 
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Specific models differ in how the accumulation of information is modelled and what is the stopping 
rule. These models were originally used for both Simple and Choice RT, but recently they have almost 
uniquely been applied to Choice RT (see Forstmann, Ratcliff, Wagenmakers, 2016). The reason is that 
most of these models, when applied to Simple RT, cannot take into account the anticipations (responses 
before the stimulus onset and, thus, a type of incorrect responses), and therefore their explanatory power 
is greatly reduced. Nevertheless, most of their general structure is the same for both Simple and Choice 
RT task.  The mathematical formulation of these models for both Simple and Choice RT are presented 
in Section 3.4. 
Ratcliff & Smith (2004) proposed a useful classification of these models based on the number of 
accumulators, and the way the information is accumulated:  
 Multiple, independent accumulators, where the increase in the amount of evidence for each one 
of the N alternatives is accumulated independently by N accumulators; single accumulator 
where the information towards one alternative corresponds to information against the other 
alternative(s);  
 Continuous or Discrete flow of information across time  
 Constant or Decaying increment of accumulation of information across time  
 Stochastic or Deterministic nature of the accumulated information. 
Not all the combinations of these aspects have been implemented into a formalised mathematical 
model: for example, a model with decaying increment has been implemented only for continuous time 
and varying amount of evidence. Note also that the accumulator dependency classification loses its 
meaning when we use Simple RT, as a single alternative is used and thus, only one accumulator is 
generally assumed (e.g. Ratcliff & van Dongen, 2011). 
 One of the first models was developed by LaBerge (1962), for multiple choices RT task. It assumed 
that the evidence for each alternative is accumulated in independent “counters”, and the counter that 
first reaches a criterion determines the response. This model was not able to correctly predict the shapes 
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of RT distributions, and has been consequently followed by the Accumulator Models (models in 
discrete time and varying amount of evidence, Smith & Vickers, 1989; Vickers, 1970, 1978, 1979; 
Vickers, Caudrey, & Wilson, 1971), and the Poisson Counter Models (LaBerge, 1994; Pike, 1966, 1973; 
Townsend & Ashby, 1983).   These two models have been recently tested in comparison with diffusion 
models, and were not able to account for all the features of the empirical data (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
Another class of models based on stochastic accumulation of information was developed by Stone 
(1960) (see also Laming, 1968; Link & Heath, 1975; Link, 1975): the Random Walk Model, model in 
discrete time with varying amount of evidence and a single accumulator, which had several problems 
in explaining observations about RT distribution shape and accuracy (see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). The 
most recent developments have been focused on continuous time models, with the most successful 
example being the class of Drift Diffusion Models (DDM, Ratcliff, 1978, Forstmann, Ratcliff, 
Wagenmakers, 2016), in which a single accumulator in continuous time accrues a varying amount of 
evidence with a constant drift.  
2.3 Drift Diffusion Models  
There are two versions of the Drift Diffusion Models (DDM) mostly used in the literature: the Pure 
DDM and the Extended DDM (Bogacz et al., 2006). The mathematical description of these models will 
be presented in Section 3.4. Here we present an informal, intuitive illustration of these models. The 
Pure DDM is a continuous-time version of the Random Walk Model developed by Stone (1960) and 
Laming (1968). As any sequential sampling model, it assumes that a stochastic accumulation of 
information drives the decision. This information is gathered from one accumulator (the evidence 
towards one alternative counts as evidence against the other alternatives). The accumulator begins from 
a starting point which may be biased towards one of the alternatives and rises stochastically with a 
certain rate (drift rate) until a threshold is reached. If the task involves a choice between one of two 
alternatives (2 Alternative Forced Choice Task, 2AFC) than the model includes two thresholds, one for 
the correct and the other for the incorrect alternative. The drift pushes the accumulator towards the 
correct threshold but, being noisy, it can sometime hit the wrong threshold (see top panel in Figure 2.2).  
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The total RT for a single trial corresponds to the sum of decision time plus a residual component, ߬ 
(ܴܶ = ܦܶ + ߬). In terms of diffusion model, the ܦܶ is the time from the beginning of the accumulation 
process until one of the two thresholds is hit. The ߬ component includes all the time taken for non-
decisional components, e.g. stimulus encoding, memory access, motor response, which may take place 
before or after the decision process. We will refer to this value as “motor-sensory component”. It has 
been found to be equal to around 100-150ms for Simple RT and 200-300ms for Choice RT (Luce, 1986). 
The variability in the accumulation is assumed to be normally distributed, with mean ݀ and standard 
deviation ݏ. Changing in drift rate corresponds in changing in the difficulty of the task: for example, 
consider a random-dot motion paradigm. In this task, a number of randomly moving dots is presented 
on a screen. A percentage of these dots is moving consistently to a side of the monitor, and the 
participant is asked to indicate the side they are moving to. In this task the amount of information 
gathered for each time step can be manipulated by changing the percentage of dots moving coherently. 
With a high proportion of moving dots (easy task), the process is assumed to have a high positive drift 
rate and therefore the threshold is reached quickly, resulting in high accuracy and short RT. After 
repeated trials, the process noise will generate a skewed distribution, like ones observed in experimental 
data. With a difficult task (few dots moving coherently) the process has a low drift, taking more time to 
reach the correct thresholds and increasing the chance to hit the wrong threshold (resulting in an 
incorrect response). The threshold separation (distance between two thresholds in a 2AFC, and distance 
between threshold and starting point for Simple RT task), denoted by ܽ, is assumed to be under  the 
control of the participant, and generates the speed-accuracy trade off. If the thresholds are set to be close 
to the starting point, responses will be faster but less accurate (the signal may hit the wrong threshold); 
on the other and, threshold far away from the starting point results in more accurate, but slower 
responses.  The value ܾ (from 0 to 1) defines the bias towards one alternative, where values higher than 
0.5 represent a starting point closer to the correct alternative (e.g., in a random dot motion, when the 
direction of movement is more likely to be on one specific side). However, in our experiments there is 
no reason to believe that a bias is taking place, so we set ܾ = 0.5 for all Choice RT experiments. The 
DDM model will generate response distributions that are left skewed, with the skewness increasing 
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with increasing difficulty, and with mean RT proportional to standard deviation RT, all features 
observed in real datasets (e.g. Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007; Forstmann, Ratcliff, Wagenmakers, 2016). 
The top panel of Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of the Pure DDM. This model has been initially 
used for recognition memory (Ratcliff, 1978) and has been shown to accurately predict most accuracy 
and RT time measures. However, an important problem is that it predicts the same distribution of correct 
and incorrect RT (even though in different proportions), whereas it is often seen that this is not the case 
(Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff et al., 1999; Smith & Vickers, 1989). Until recently, the model had 
been set aside in favour of its extended version (discussed below). The new interest for optimum 
responses in terms of DDM brought it back as the standard model for RT (Bogacz et al., 2006, see 
Section 2.6 and 2.7). 
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Figure 2.2 
(Top) Pure Drift Diffusion Model for 2 Forced Choices Task. The process starts at a certain distance (܉ ⋅ ܊) from the threshold 
(܉). The information is noisy accumulated with a drift ܌ until one of the two thresholds are reached. Across trial, the drift ܌ is 
kept constant. The resulting RT distributions (in blue) are the same for both correct and incorrect response. A constant non-
decision time ૌ is added to the process. (Bottom) Extended Drift Diffusion Model for 2 Forced Choices Task. The process 
start at a point drawn from an uniform distribution (green rectangle) with a drift changing from trial to trial (and drawn from 
a Normal Distribution, in red). A random sensory-motor time (drawn from another uniform distribution, in orange), is added.  
This results in different distribution for correct and incorrect responses (in blue). 
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An accurate account of the relationship between response time for correct and incorrect decisions 
can be obtained by increasing the complexity of this model, obtaining the Extended Diffusion Model, 
illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 2.2. Three sources of variability across trials are added: the 
starting point, the drift rate and the residual time are now random variables which value fluctuates from 
a trial to another. The drift rate is usually assumed to vary across trial according to a Normal Distribution 
with mean ߦ and standard deviation ߟ, and generates incorrect responses that are slower than correct 
responses. The variability across trial in the starting point is uniformly distributed with mean ݖ and 
range ݏ௭, and allows the model to predict error responses that are faster than correct responses, but only 
on high levels of accuracy. These predictions match what found in empirical observations (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff et al., 1999; Smith & Vickers, 1988). Another strength is that this model does 
not generate errors that are slower than correct response in high-accuracy conditions and faster in low-
accuracy conditions, a pattern that has never been observed in RT tasks (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Finally, 
the non-decision time is assumed to vary according to a uniform distribution with mean ߬ and range ݏ௧, 
and it allows the model to generate distributions with different leading edge (steeper or smoother), as 
shown in Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon (2004). The extended DDM can account for an impressive 
amount of behavioural and neuroscientific data including lexical decision making (Ratcliff, Gomez, & 
McKoon, 2004; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008), recognition memory (Ratcliff, 
Thapar, & McKoon, 2004), effect of practice (Dutilh, Vendekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers, 
2009), reading impairment (Ratcliff, Perea, Colangelo, & Buchanan, 2004), simple perceptual tasks 
(Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, 2002; Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Most 
recently, the DDM has been analysed under the framework of neural firing patterns, suggesting a linking 
between the two. For example, Shadlen & Newsome (2001) found, in monkeys performing a saccadic 
2AFC task, that the time at which the firing rate in the lateral intraparietal area (which is related to gaze 
direction) reaches a fixed threshold, predicted the response (see also Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, 
Smith, & Segraves, 2007; Gold & Shadlen, 2002; Hanes & Schall, 1996; Schall & Thompson, 1999; 
Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). 
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 Regardless of the amount of research performed with the DDM, all the aforementioned studies 
were performed by using a Choice RT design. Applying Pure or Extended DDM to Simple RT means 
simply to assume one boundary instead of two. For the Extended DDM, this implies that a percentage 
of signals will never reach the threshold (as the drift may sometime be negative). To solve this problem, 
either signals with negative drifts are ignored altogether, or a simulated “signal deadline” may be used. 
Only few studies have used the DDM for Simple RT task. Ratcliff & van Dongen (2011) used the 
Extended DDM (with one boundary) to account for changes in RT to brightness level and sleep 
deprivation in a Simple RT task. A similar analysis was performed by Patanaik et al. (2014). The one-
boundary version of the Extended DDM was also used to model a simple driving task (Ratcliff & Strayer, 
2014). In these works, it has been noticed that the variability in the starting point (ݏ௭) does not appear 
to improve the goodness of fit, and is thus ignored (Ratcliff & van Dongen, 2011). As far as we know, 
the Extended DDM for Simple RT has been usually applied without any comparison with the simpler 
Pure DDM. This is peculiar, as the main reason for the Extended DDM to be adopted in the first place 
was to explain the difference between correct and incorrect distribution. In Simple RT there is no 
“incorrect” distribution, and thus the Pure DDM may be perfectly fit to account for the data.  
We finally note a general limitation of these models for Simple RT: neither the Pure nor the 
Extended DDM can account for anticipations. Recall that, for both Simple and Choice RT, and for both 
Extended and Pure DDM, the starting point of the sampling process corresponds to the stimulus onset. 
Whereas this seems reasonable for Choice RT, as the time preceding the appearance of the stimulus 
does not appear to give any relevant information to participants, it seems more arbitrary for Simple RT, 
as participants are probably basing their choice on the flow of time itself (as we will see in the 
experiment in Chapter 4). By starting the process at stimulus onset, the model cannot account for 
anticipation. We briefly discuss a solution for this issue in Section 4.4.  
2.4 Rate-Hypothesis and LATER Model  
It has been observed, within the context of saccadic eye movements, that the speed of saccades has 
frequency distributions that are remarkably close to the reciprocal Normal (Carpenter, 1981; Carpenter 
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& Williams, 1995; Reddi & Carpenter, 2000). That is, the reciprocal of saccade latencies (1/latency) 
has a near-Normal distribution (see Figure 2.3). This led Harris et al. (2014) to hypothesise that the 
brain is estimating a preferred rate of response for a given set of experimental condition, and the 
accumulation part of the aforementioned sequential sampling models is nothing else but a mechanism 
to convert rate in time. From this point of view, the skewed distribution in the time domain is an artefact 
of the decision process, whereas the generation of a Normal Distribution in the rate domain is the main 
goal of the decision process itself. This is a tempting hypothesis, especially considering that one of the 
decision strategies investigated in the literature (and that we are going to apply to our experiment) 
maximises the reward rate (Section 2.6).  
Several saccadic studies found that distributions are not perfectly Normal, but they usually present 
some very short responses that do not follow the main latency distribution (Carpenter & Williams, 1995; 
Noorani, 2014). These responses have been named ‘express latencies’ (Carpenter & Williams, 1995; 
Fisher & Boch, 1983; Fischer & Ramsperger, 1984), and they may possibly come from a different 
decision mechanism, for example one based on time estimation and not on perceptual process.  Similarly, 
fast responses have been observed for manual RT distributions as well (Ratcliff, 1993; Ratcliff & 
Tuerlinickx, 2002; Ulrich & Miller, 1994). These responses have also been called “non-integrative 
responses”, as they may be not the result of the sequential accumulation of information but of some 
other process involved in the decision making mechanism (Simen et al., 2009). As discussed in Section 
3.3, we used several strategies to take these extraneous responses into account when analysing the 
distributions in the rate domain.  
All the previous mentioned studies that found near-normality distribution in the rate domain have 
been based on saccades latencies. We have recently verified (Harris et al., 2014) that similar results 
hold for Manual Choice RT. In particular, by excluding severely truncated distributions we found a 
near-perfect Normal distribution in the rate domain, with a slight deviation in the tail (around the lower 
10% of responses), which is similar to the early responses found with saccades and deemed to be caused 
by the “express” saccades aforementioned.  However, investigation of rate domain has been generally 
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neglected for manual RT, and to the extent of our knowledge no study has been performed with Simple 
RT. In this work, we will analyse the rate distributions for both Simple and Choice RT, across different 
experimental conditions, in this way trying to find evidence for or against the Rate-Hypothesis. We will 
use two methods for doing this: aggregating participants together and computing the rate distributions 
will allow us to check whether distributions appear Normal in the rate domain (we will use the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for Normality, see Section 3.3). The second method involves fitting the 
LATER model to the data. 
The LATER model (Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic Rate) is a sequential sampling 
model in which a deterministic, constant accumulation of information drives the signal. More formally, 
at the stimulus onset, a decision signal S start rising linearly at rate ݎ from an initial level ܵ଴ until a 
threshold ்ܵ is reached. By assuming that the rate ݎ fluctuates from trial to trial according to a Normal 
Distribution with mean ߤ and standard deviation ߪ, we obtain ܴܶ distributed as ௌ೅ିௌబ
ః(ఓ,ఙ)
, where ߔ is the 
Normal probability density function. Within this model, the ‘express saccades’ would be explained as 
coming from another LATER decision process with a mean rate of 0 and very large ߪ (Noorani & 
Carpenter, 2011; Noorani, 2014). For mathematical details, see Section 3.5. 
Similarly to DDM, the LATER model can explain how latencies are affected by experimental 
instructions (e.g. speed vs accuracy changes the  ܵ௧ level, Reddi & Carpenter, 2000), or by stimulus 
strength (by changing the mean rate of accumulation ߤ, Carpenter, 2004). In contrast to the DDM model, 
the LATER model does not include a motor-sensory response added to the main decision time, as this 
would not result in a normal distribution in the rate domain.  
The LATER model is particularly suited for testing the Rate-Hypothesis, as it is a simpler version 
of the DDM that, mathematically, is bound to generate Normal Distribution in the rate domain. We will 
use this model to compare it with the results from the DDM. The LATER model has obviously less 
flexibility than the other models, so that it will, in general, provide a worst fit than the DDM. However, 
our model selection method (AIC, see Section 3.7) should tell us if this is balanced out by its simplicity. 
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This should provide some insight on whether the underlying decision process computes the response in 
time or rate domain. However, as we will see in Section 5.4.4, distinguishing between a Normal 
Distribution and a rate distribution generated by a DDM (with the right set of parameters) may be 
extremely difficult. Thus, observing a rate distribution is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
support the Rate Hypothesis.  
 
Figure 2.3 
Simulated Reaction Time distribution in time domain (left panel) with their peculiar left-skewed shape. It has been observed 
that by converting the response we obtain an approximately Normal Distribution (right panel).  
2.5 Other Sequential Sampling Models  
There are still three models that deserve to be mentioned: the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) , the Linear 
Ballistic Accumulator (LBA, Brown & Heathcote, 2008) and the EZ-diffusion model (Wagenmakers, 
van derMass, & Grasman, 2007). The O-U model adds to the DDM mathematical formulation a third 
term, linearly dependent on the value of the signal at time t, which allows the prediction of “risky” or 
“conservative” behaviour depending on the value of this added parameter. The Linear Ballistic 
Accumulator assumes multiple and linear accumulators which accumulate evidence for two or more 
responses. The starting point and average speed of each accumulator vary from trial to trial, similarly 
22 
 
to the Extended DDM, but the average speed is bounded to be positive, as only one threshold is present.  
A comparative study between LBA and DDM is presented in Donkin et al. (2011). The EZ-diffusion 
model is a model with a unique linear accumulator with two thresholds, and within-trial variability in 
the rate of accumulation. This model lacks the power to account for important empirical phenomena in 
the data (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). We decided to limit our analysis to DDM and LATER for these 
reasons: 
1) As seen above, the Extended DDM has been applied to a variety of task and sensory domain, 
and it always provided an excellent fitting to the real data. Its ability to fit almost all types of features 
of RT distributions is unmatched by other models.   
2) Even though the Pure DDM cannot take into account certain features of the response distributions, 
analytical solution for optimal responses for several decision strategies can be easily derived, which 
makes it an excellent model for investigating optimality in decision making. 
3) In this thesis, the LATER model is used not as an alternative sequential sampling model, but as 
a way to provide an additional test of the Rate Hypothesis. By fitting the LATER model, we directly 
compare its goodness of fit with the other two DDM models.  
2.6 Optimal Decision Making: Decision Strategies and Speed-Accuracy Function 
An important part of any sequential sampling model is the stopping rule (which corresponds to the 
decision thresholds in models such as LBA or DDM). Informally, the stopping rule can be seen as a 
way to implement the strategy that the participant uses in order to trade speed for accuracy. For example, 
in a difficult task, the participant may either decide to accumulate a large amount of information before 
responding (but spending a lot of time doing so) or, in the extreme case, responding at random, as fast 
as possible, in order to have more trials. By modifying the threshold, the participant can implement 
different stopping rules. But when to use one rule or the other depends on the exact form of the strategy. 
For example, it seems reasonable that participants should increase the threshold with higher punishment, 
in order to be more accurate. But by how much, exactly? And is this strategy always valid, or only for 
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a certain range of punishment values? Some other cases may be even less intuitive. For example, should 
the participants increase the threshold (accumulate more information and thus taking longer to respond) 
with longer trial length? The first systematic approach to the decision strategies was presented by 
Bogacz et al. (2006). In that theoretical work, four decision strategies (called “criteria for optimality”) 
were proposed, and have since then tested in the related works (Balci et al., 2011; Zackenhouse, Bogacz, 
& Holmes, 2010; Bogacz et al., 2010; Simen et al.; 2009). These decision strategies, which we will 
discuss and test extensively in this work, are: 
Reward Rate (RR): defined as the proportion of correct trial divided by the average duration 
between trials (Bogacz et al., 2006). Responses do not depend on the reward/punishment policy used in 
the task. 
Modified Reward Rate (ܴܴ௠): proposed by Bogacz et al. (2006) and Harris et al. (2014), is it 
defined as the proportion of total utility divided by the average duration between trials. Differently from 
ܴܴ, this decision rule takes into account not only the proportion of correct responses, but the incorrect 
ones as well, and scales them by the corresponding reward and punishment (in terms of subjective 
utility). Harris et al (2014) have hypothesized that the RR୫ may account for the observed normality 
distribution in the rate domain (Rate-Hypothesis, see Section 2.4). ܴܴ௠ is also an optimal strategy for 
tasks with fixed condition length. 
Reward/Accuracy (RA): the formal version of the COBRA theory of Maddox & Bohil (1998), 
formalised by Bogacz et al. (2006). It is a weighted differently between ܴܴ and accuracy, and it is also 
function of total length of the trial. In the original version by Maddox and Bohil (1998) it is assumed 
that participants attempt to maximize reward in the long-run, but places some importance on the 
response accuracy as well. Qualitatively, this decision rule is similar to ܴܴ௠, as they are both function 
of the total delay and depend on the emphasis on accuracy; quantitatively, ܴܣ generates different 
predictions, and in general is not an optimal strategy for tasks with fixed condition length, like ܴܴ௠.  
24 
 
Bayes Risk (BR): initially theorised by Wald and Wolfowitz (1948) in order to prove optimality for 
the Sequential Probability Ratio test, it assumes that decision makers seek to minimise the weighted 
sum of time and error rate, but without taking into account the total length of the trial; 
These decision rules describe what is the “quantity” that the participant is trying to maximise. Each 
decision rule is a function of time and accuracy, so that given a specific relationship between accuracy 
and time there is a unique time of responding which maximises it the corresponding decision rule. We 
call this optimum decision time ܦܶ∗. In order to respond optimally, participant should respond as close 
as possible to the maximization point. The relationship between speed and accuracy, the speed-accuracy 
trade-off function, is defined as ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ). Intuitively, the rate of increase in accuracy depends on the 
stimulus strength (in a 2AFC, on the difference between the two alternatives), so that higher stimulus 
strength corresponds to steeper increase. Depending on the perceptual mechanism assumed, ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) 
may also depend on the stimulus noise, the number of alternatives, or other experimental characteristics.  
Decision rules can be also function of two more parameters: the emphasis on accuracy ݍ and the 
total non-decision time ܦ௧௢௧ . Greater values of ݍ correspond to greater emphasis on accuracy (Bogacz 
et al., 2006, but note that ܴܴ is not function of ݍ, as only correct responses are taken into account), but 
the precise mathematical formulation is different with different decision strategies: with ܤܴ and ܴܣ, it 
describes the weighting between accuracy relative to speed, whereas in ܴܴ௠ it describes the subjective 
punishment to reward ratio, that is how much weight does the participant give to an incorrect response 
compared to a correct one. This can be affected by monetary rewards or verbal instruction, as we will 
see in Chapter 8. Increasing this parameter corresponds to an increase in the optimum response time. 
However, when coupled with different stimulus strengths, varying the ݍ parameter may generate the 
interesting phenomenon of “breaking” Piéron’s Law (see next Paragraph, Section 2.9, and Section 
2.10). Another parameter shared by ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ (but not ܤܴ) is ܦ௧௢௧, which corresponds to the 
time of the trial which is not decision time, that is, all the time that does not contribute to an increase in 
accuracy. We define ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ + ߬, where ܦ is any delay across trials (for example, the time between a 
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response and the next trial), and ߬  is the sensory-motor component. Like ݍ,  increasing ܦ௧௢௧ 
corresponds to an increase in the optimum response.  
Figure 2.4 provides a summary of the conceptual blocks needed to go from the speed-accuracy 
function to a ܦܶ∗ curve (defined as a series of optimum decision times given several values of stimulus 
strength). On the top row a simple speed-accuracy function ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) is shown. In this case we used an 
exponential function, similarly to the one used in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 (Equation 6.1). By increasing 
stimulus strength, the accuracy will increase faster in time. The middle rows panels show the value of 
each decision rule given time, and for different stimulus strength (by keeping the other parameters ݍ 
and ܦ௧௢௧ fixed). The red filled dot indicates the maximum value for that decision rule, at which time the 
participant should respond to maximize it. Note how the optimum decision time is 0 for very low 
stimulus strength, and then increases with increasing stimulus strength before decreasing again. The 
intuitive explanation is that with low stimulus strength there is no much information to be accumulated, 
so waiting would only waste (precious) time that could be used to perform more trial. With increasing 
stimulus strength, it starts to be convenient to accumulate information, until the stimulus strength 
become so high, and the accuracy increases so fast, that responses can decrease again. This relationship 
is consistent across ܴܴ, ܤܴ and ܴܣ, but it holds for ܴܴ௠ only for some combination of parameters, 
which makes this decision rule particularly interesting (see Section 2.10; this will be discussed in 
greater details in Section 6.1.4 and 6.1.5). The blue lines in the middle row panels connect the optimum 
decision time for several values of stimulus strength and a fixed set of experimental condition, and 
correspond to a single ܦܶ∗ curve. In the bottom row panel, we show a set of ܦܶ∗ curves for the ܴܴ௠ 
decision rule. The blue line shown here corresponds to the same ܦܶ∗ curve in the modified Reward 
Rate panel in the middle row. The other curves correspond to ܦܶ∗  curves generated by different 
experimental conditions (in this case, by increasing the punishment/reward ratio, ݍ). A similar ܦܶ∗ 
curve plot, for each one of the other decision rules, is shown in Figure 6.2.   
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Figure 2.4 
Speed-Accuracy function (Top Row) describe the relationship between speed and accuracy. As an illustrative example, we 
used an exponential function. The accuracy grows from 0.5 (50% of probability of being correct at chance level, with a 2 
alternative task) to 1. By increasing the Stimulus Strength we obtain a function that increases faster with time. Decision Rules’ 
value (Middle Rows) show the value of each decision rule in time, for a set of stimulus strength, based on the speed-accuracy 
function above. The red filled circles indicate the maximum value for each stimulus strength condition. This generates an 
optimum decision time (ܦܶ∗) curve (Bottom Row), in blue in the middle rows and in the bottom row. In the bottom row we 
also show how manipulating the emphasis on accuracy parameter affect the shape of the ܦܶ∗ curve. ܴܴ௠ = modified Reward 
Rate.  
In order to provide a quantitative analysis of the decision strategy, a precise formulation of the 
relationship between speed and accuracy (ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)) needs to be defined. ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) is usually believed 
to be a concave, monotonically increasing function, reaching 1 asymptotically, similar to the one we 
used in Figure 2.3 for the purpose of illustration (Luce, 1986). The usual approach is to use the 
relationship defined by the DDM (see Section 8.5.1), and base the decision rule predictions upon it. To 
the extent of our knowledge, only the Pure and Extended DDM have been used for this purpose. 
However, decision rules and DDM are two independent concepts, and, in principle, decision rules can 
be analysed using any ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ). The problem in assuming a particular sequential sampling model is 
that, as we have seen in the previous sections, there are a variety of possible perceptual mechanisms 
that have different mechanism and thus different ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ). With different perceptual mechanisms, the 
same decision rule generates different predictions. Therefore, when empirical observations and 
predictions do not match, is it not possible to say if it depends on the decision rule itself or on the 
perceptual mechanism assumed. Comparing several decision processes and sampling models can be 
extremely difficult and, even in this case, it is not possible to know whether the perceptual mechanisms 
used comprises the one employed by human participants. In Chapter 6, 7 and 8 we tackle this problem 
by developing a new paradigm in which decision strategies are analysed across several participants 
without having to infer any perceptual mechanism, but by “hard-coding” the perceptual mechanism 
within the experiment. This paradigm is referred as to the EXACT (EXogenous ACcumulation Task). 
In Chapter 8 we try to match experimental findings of the EXACT paradigm with a classic RT design, 
by fitting different decision strategies to the Pure and Extended DDM. In the method section of Chapter 
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8 we will also provide more mathematical details relative to the connection between the DDM and the 
decision strategies.  
2.7 Analysing the Decision Rules: Three Levels of Analysis  
A formal description of the mathematical methods for analysing the decision rules will be presented 
in the next Chapter and, for the DDM, in Section 8.1. Here we want to illustrate three different ways in 
which is possible to make inference about the decision rules used. At the first level, we have the 
qualitative description of the effect of decision rules on RT and accuracy by changing experimental 
conditions. For example, we know that by affecting the ܦ௧௢௧ (for example, by increasing the waiting 
time across trials), the decision rules ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ predict that both RT and accuracy increases. 
This is a very general description that does not require using any particular perceptual process, but it 
requires only some (very) general assumptions about the shape of the speed-accuracy function (in this 
case, that is monotonically increasing). In this way we can distinguish between different groups of 
decision rules (for example, those affected by ܦ௧௢௧, and those who are not).  
To get to the second level of description, we need to have a precise perceptual model process, which 
gives a relationship between RT, ACC and the process’ parameters. In this case we can predict that, for 
example, by increasing ܦ௧௢௧ we are going to observe an increase in RT, ACC, and a consequent increase 
in the threshold separation. This is the approach we are using in Chapter 4 and 5 (see Section 2.8 for a 
general description of the relation between parameter of the DDM and decision rules). The analysis will 
still be qualitative.  
To be able to obtain quantitative predictions we need an experimental design in which each 
condition generates distinctive error rates (third level of analysis). In this case we can not only estimate 
perceptual process’ parameters, but we can compare them with the theoretical optimum parameter with 
each decision rule. We are not only able to distinguish between different groups of decision strategies, 
but also between each decision strategy. This approach requires several assumptions, and entails fitting 
the perceptual model assumed, a procedure that can be complex and may introduce noise. We are going 
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to apply this method for the last experiment in Chapter 8. The risks of this approach are discussed in 
Chapter 6 and, from that point on, we will mostly employ a different methodology that allows a precise, 
quantitative estimation, without having to assume a particular decision process (the EXACT Paradigm).  
2.8 Drift Diffusion Model and Optimality  
One of the main goals of the present work is to find a way to properly separate the decision rule 
with the underlying perceptual process. We achieve this by using the EXACT Paradigm in Chapter 6, 
7 and 8. However, it is important to consider the implication of assuming the drift diffusion model as 
the perceptual model used by participants, as this is still a useful tool when investigating Classic RT 
observations. In Chapter 8 we will fit the results to the aforementioned decision strategies, and the 
mathematical details will be presented there. For the experiments in Chapter 4 and 5, however, the 
number of errors is not large enough for a quantitative analysis, and we have to resort to qualitative 
predictions, by relating the increase of DDM parameters to different experimental conditions.  
The basic DDM assumption is that the bias parameter (ܾ), drift rate (݀) and sensory-motor time (߬) 
are affected by the experimental design and are not under the direct control of the participant, whereas 
the threshold (ܽ) can be consciously changed according to experimental instruction/subjective utility 
payoff/change of strategy or other external or internal variables (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Recall that 
by increasing the threshold, the DDM generates responses that are slower but more accurate. We are 
now going to illustrate how participants can change the threshold for different sets of parameters in 
order to maximize the value described by the decision rule used. The first column of Figure 2.5 shows 
the non-monotonic relationship between threshold and drift rate. With low drift rate, there is no 
information available to be accumulated, and so it is convenient to guess immediately. As the drift rate 
increases, it becomes advantageous to accumulate information, and the threshold increases. With high 
enough drift rate, the signal dominates the noise, so that the threshold is lowered again until the decision 
can be made almost immediately (Bogacz  et al., 2006). This has a similar effect to the relationship 
between stimulus strength and RT illustrated in the bottom row of Figure 2.4. The second column of 
Figure 2.5 shows a monotonic dependence on non-decision time ܦ௧௢௧  (the total delay, including the 
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sensory-motor component, ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ + ߬), so that as ܦ௧௢௧ decreases towards zero, the optimal threshold 
also decreases toward zero (assuming that the parameter ݍ is less than one, so that the subjective reward 
is higher than the subjective punishment). As ܦ௧௢௧  increases, the optimal threshold value increases 
indefinitely. Similarly, for greatest emphasis on accuracy (ݍ), the optimal threshold grows indefinitely, 
as shown in the third column of Figure 2.5. In Chapter 4 and 5 we will vary the total trial time, therefore 
changing the parameter ܦ௧௢௧, and check whether the estimated threshold parameter changes accordingly. 
In Chapter 8 we will instead try to affect the emphasis on accuracy (ݍ) and, similarly, check whether 
this corresponds to an increase in the estimated threshold.  
 
Figure 2.5 
Optimum threshold for each decision rules (on the vertical axis) and different values of the Pure DDM parameters (indicated 
on top of each column), with the other parameters held fixed at ࡰ = ૚, ࡰ࢚࢕࢚ = ૛࢙, ࢗ = ૙. ૡ. Not that the relationship is 
monotonically increasing for the non-decision time ࡰ࢚࢕࢚ and the emphasis on accuracy parameter ࢗ, but non-monotonic for 
the drift rate ࢊ. ࡾࡾ = Reward Rate; ࡾࡾ࢓ = modified Reward Rate; ࡾ࡭ = Reward/Accuracy; ࡮ࡾ = Bayes Risk; Opt. = 
Optimum.  
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2.9 Piéron’s Law  
Piéron (1914; 1920; 1952) first described quantitatively the relationship between RT and intensity 
of the visual stimulus. This relationship took the name of Piéron’s Law and states that the mean RT 
decreases as a power law with increasing stimulus intensity ܫ.   
 ܴ݉ܶ =  ݇ܫିఉ +  ߛ  
Where ݇ and ߚ are scaling parameters that determine the slope of the function and ߛ is the intercept 
(Luce, 1986). Figure 2.6 presents some instances of Piéron’s Law with different ߣ and ߚ. During the 
last century, the law has been reported in many different domains, including brightness detection 
(Pieron, 1914), tone detection (Chocholle, 1940) taste detection of dissolved substances (Bonnet et al., 
1999), odour detection (Overbosch et al., 1989), heat detection (Banks, 1973), colour saturation 
(Stafford et al., 2011) simple and choice reaction times (Pins & Bonnet, 1996; 1997; 2000), go/no go 
tasks (Jaskowski & Sobieralska, 2004), Stroop conflict task (Stafford et al., 2011), two-choice dot-
motion perception task (Maanen et al., 2012), random-dot kinematogram (Reddi, Asrress, & Carpenter, 
2003). This law is so general that the stimulus intensity parameter should not be interpreted as the 
luminous intensity of a wavelength (as initially assumed by Piéron), by as a general stimulus strength, 
that is any stimulus feature that affects how fast the accuracy is accumulated.  
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Figure 2.6 
Different examples of Piéron’s Law. Changing the parameter ߛ corresponds in shifting the function up and down (dashed black 
lines), whereas changing the ߚ parameter corresponds to changing the slope of the function (coloured lines). ܴ݉ܶ = mean 
Reaction Time.  
 
There are three explanations to account for Piéron’s Law. Historically, this effect has been 
considered related to a physiological stimulus scaling (Nachmias & Kocher, 1970), but the ubiquity of 
so many paradigms and sensory modality has lead researcher to consider alternative explanations. For 
example, an information-theoretic approach derives Piéron’s equation from an optimal information 
process in sensory perception (Medina, 2009). Stafford and Gurney (2004) firstly proposed that Piéron’s 
Law may arise by an accumulator models. This hypothesis has been tested with the Linear Ballistic 
Accumulator by Donkin and Maanen (2014). The author used a “free” model (where the drift rate was 
freely estimated for each luminance level) and a linear model (linear relationship between drift rate and 
luminance level). The results suggested that the drift rate was not linearly related with the proportion of 
white pixels (for a brightness discrimination task) or angular distance (for a random-dot motion task).  
Similarly, Carpenter, Reddi and Anderson (2009) found that rates of accumulation in the LATER model 
were not linearly related to contrast levels. The overall conclusion is that Piéron’s Law was not simply 
the result of the rise-to-threshold architecture, but reflects a non-linear relationship between stimulus 
strength and stimulus representation (drift rate, in the accumulator model). However, we do not agree 
with this interpretation. Finding that some stimulus characteristic does not have a linear relationship 
with drift rate does not say, by itself, very much, as this would depend on the characteristic chosen. For 
example, Donkin et al. (2014) chose, for their brightness detection experiment, the percentage of white 
pixels. However, they could have chosen luminance, or contrast, or any other stimulus value describing 
its strength. It would have indeed been surprising if the percentage of white pixels, among the myriad 
of stimulus property, had a linear relationship with drift rate. The main point is that a rise-to-threshold 
model can, in fact, generate a Piéron’s shaped function with most monotonic stimulus-drift rate 
relationship. This does not imply that Piéron’s Law needs to reflect a different mechanism, or that it 
needs a different explanation. It implies that there is some unknown relation between the stimulus 
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characteristic we chose and the drift rate. We believe that, while Piéron’s Law can be in fact generated 
by a sequential sampling model, it is deeply connected with the decision rule used. 
2.10 Piéron’s Law and Optimal Response 
We noted that by applying one of the four decision rules to any monotonically increasing and 
concave speed accuracy function ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) we can actually obtain a series of optimum responses that 
matches Piéron’s Law. An illustration of this is shown in Figure 2.7, in which we used ܴܴ௠  as a 
decision rule and an exponential ܣܥܥ  (Equation 6.1). Note that Piéron’s Law matches the ܦܶ∗ 
curves for any stimulus strength only given some condition of the experimental design for ܴܴ௠ (left 
panel of Figure 2.6, the top curve can be fitted by a Piéron’s Law from the lowest values of the stimulus 
strength, to the highest). This condition regards the starting point of the ܣܥܥ(ܦ  function and the 
subjective punishment/reward parameter ݍ (this will be more formally discussed in Section 6.1.4 and 
6.1.5). When these conditions are not met for ܴܴ௠, and in any case for the other decision rules, Piéron’s 
Law matches the ܦܶ∗ curves only from a certain point on (after the maximum point) In Figure 2.6, we 
fitted two ܦܶ∗ curves of ܴܴ௠ and all the ܦܶ∗ curves from ܴܴ starting from an arbitrary point slightly 
over the maximum point of the curve. Piéron’s Law fit similarly well for ܤܴ and ܴܣ decision rules.  
  
Figure 2.7 
Fitting Piéron’s Law to optimum decision time (ܦܶ∗) curves for. The optimum decision time curves (black lines) for the 
modified Reward Rate (left panel) and the Reward Rate (right panel) are shown. Note that for the modified Reward Rate we 
can obtain a ܦܶ∗ curve that actually goes to infinity with low stimulus strength, as predicted by Piéron’s Law, and thus 
obtaining a perfect fit. For the other conditions, we can still obtain a reliable fit if we consider the ܦܶ∗ starting from a high 
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enough stimulus strength (in the panel, indicated by the blue circles). ݍ = emphasis on accuracy parameter; ܦ௧௢௧ = non-decision 
time = ܦ + ߬.  
In this work, we are going to see how Piéron’s Law results from applying one of the aforementioned 
decision strategies to a monotonically increasing speed-accuracy function. Intuitively, stronger stimuli 
will make accuracy increase faster, so that a certain level of accuracy can be reached faster (shortest RT 
with higher stimulus intensity). Piéron’s Law predicts that, with lower and lower stimulus intensity, RT 
will increase to infinity. On the other side, all the four decision strategies that we have mentioned predict 
that when the stimulus strength is too low, the best strategy is to respond faster (we stress that, with 
ܴܴ௠ , this is true only for a certain combination of parameters). This generates a non-monotonic 
relationship between RT and stimulus strength, which we will refer to as “non-Piéron’s shape”. The 
interesting point is that in all the myriads of Piéron’s-type experiments, this non-monotonic relationship 
has never been observed. Observing it would confirm that Piéron’s Law is not a pure physiologic 
mechanism, but is mediated by the decision strategy employed. Addressing this phenomenon will be 
one of the main focus of Chapter 7 and 8.  
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Chapter 3  
Statistical Analysis and Model Fitting 
 
In this section, we illustrate the methods used across most of the next chapters for analysing 
behavioural data and to perform model fitting/model selection. We will describe the mathematical 
formulation of the Pure/Extended DDM and the LATER model, and explain the routine used for fitting 
and for selecting the best model. The procedure for fitting a set of observations is also explained. Models 
or models’ details used uniquely in one chapter are introduced and explain in the chapter where they 
appear. Recording methods, details about participants, and materials will be presented in the method 
section of the corresponding experiment.  All studies received ethical approval from the local ethics 
committee. 
3.1 Behavioural Analysis.  
In all the following experiments, we calculated the effects of each condition on responses and, when 
possible, on accuracy. As shown in the diagrams in Figure 2.1, RT corresponds to the time between the 
stimulus (for Simple RT) or stimuli (for Choice RT) onset until participant’s response. We collected 
hundreds of responses for each participant, and the number of participants for each experiment ranged 
from 12 to 30. To obtain a summary description of responses for each condition we take the median RT 
for each participant and condition and calculate the median of these medians across all participants (we 
will refer to the resulting data points as mdRT). The reason to use the median is that it is less affected 
by outliers than the mean (Whelan, 2010). For the Classic RT tasks (Chapter 4, 5 and second part of 
Chapter 8) the ANOVA is performed on the rate median responses (which is obtained by calculating 
the median of 1/RT, for each participant and condition), as this appeared to be more close to a Normal 
Distribution (Spencer & Chase, 1996; Whelan, 2010). For the EXACT Paradigm (Chapter  6, 7, and 
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first part of Chapter 8), the median responses appeared reasonably Normally distributed, and thus the 
ANOVA is run directly in the time domain.  
For Chapter 4, 5 and 8 (second experiment), the accuracy for each condition is calculated by 
averaging the percentage of correct responses for each participant and each condition. In Chapter 6 and 
7, with the EXACT Paradigm, we will have a direct access to the accuracy value for each single response. 
In that case, we will use the same approach as with RT, by calculating the median of the median of the 
accuracy for each response, participant, and condition.  
For the experiment in Chapter 5 and onwards we used a point-based experiment, in which 
participants were asked to earn as many points as possible (points were exchanged for money). For 
these experiments we analysed the results of sub-groups of participants depending on their performance, 
by aggregating participants according to their score. The total score for each participant was calculated 
by summing the score for each condition. The whole participant set was divided into 3 groups based on 
the 3-quantiles (the lower [33%], the average [33%-66%], the top [66% to 100%] performance group) 
of the score distribution. Similarly to the aggregated participants, we analysed the three groups by 
calculating the median of the median response time/accuracy across the participants in each sub-dataset.  
3.2 Aggregating Distributions: Vincentizing Method  
The individual sample size presented in the experiments of this work is large enough for calculating 
summary statistics, but too small for distribution analysis of individual participants, which would 
require at least ~300 responses (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002). Therefore, in all our experiments, we 
decided to aggregate participants’ data. The main problem is that participants’ responses may easily 
come from different distributions (possibly, distributions from the same family, with different 
parameters). A simple data-aggregation may hide the original distribution family. For example, in 
Figure 3.1 we aggregate two simulated distributions from the same family (a skewed distribution 
generated by a DDM, similar to what found in real RT data) but with different parameters. The result 
is a bi-modal distribution, which obviously does not resemble the original DDM distribution.  
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Figure 3.1 
Showing how combining two distributions from the same family but with different parameters (blue and yellow) may result 
in a distribution that does not resemble the original distributions. In this case, we started from two distributions generated by 
a DDM process and end up with a bimodal distribution, that cannot be produced by a DDM.  
 
To overcome this problem several solutions have been proposed: Sternberg (1969) suggested the 
use of moments and cumulants to describe distribution shape; Ratcliff and Murdock (1976) assumed an 
explicit distribution shape, and obtained an aggregated distribution by averaging parameters estimated 
by individual participants. However, both these methods require a high number of observations for each 
participant and condition. Furthermore, assuming a particular distribution defeats the aim of model 
fitting. We used the Vincentizing Method proposed originally by Vincent (1912) and then applied on 
RT distributions by Ratcliff (1979), a non-parametric approach which retain shape information even 
with very small datasets (as small as 20 trials per participant). The method simply consists of computing 
RT quantiles for each participant and condition, and averaging these quantiles over participants to 
obtain group quantiles. The resulting quantiles represent a hypothetical “average” participant 
distribution. This method has been tested in Ratcliff work with three distributions (exponential, Weibull 
and logistic), and has been since then widely used and discussed (Logan, 1992; Andrews & Heathcote, 
2001; Genest, 1992; Madden et al., 1999; Penner-Wilger, Leth-Steensen, & LeFevre, 2002). As 
mentioned in Section 2.5, it has been seen that the distributions are sometime Normal in the Rate 
Domain (which means that they are Reci-Normal in the time domain, see Harris et al., 2014). Thus we 
tested the Vincentizing method on the Reci-Normal distribution as well, confirming that the method is 
appropriate for the analysis of this other family of distributions. In order to do that, we simulated a 
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dataset of 100, 1000 and 10000 trials from 12 different simulated participants. To generate the trials we 
used a Reci-Normal distribution. The parameters for each individual participant were generated 
randomly by following realistic parameter values. Once the data were simulated, we calculated the 
Vincentized distribution (we used 21 quantiles [0 0.05 … 1]) in the time domain and then plot the rate 
of that distribution. Figure 3.2 shows the result of this analysis for the dataset of sample size 100. It is 
clear that the Normal distribution shape is retained. We generated similar datasets based on alternative 
distributions (Exponential Gaussian and Inverse Gaussian), and we verified that these distributions in 
the rate domain were not similar to a Normal Distribution, as expected.  
 
Figure 3.2 
The figure show the result (in the rate domain) of applying the Vincentizing method to a set of Reci-Normal distributions. The 
Normality shape is clearly retained and thus this method seems appropriate for our analysis. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.5, numerous studies have observed a certain percentage of “contaminants” 
response, both short (express saccades) and long (which may be due to memory lapses). These responses 
may affect the power of model fitting. In order to address this problem, we excluded the extreme 
quantile bins so that the very short and very long RT would not be taken into account. Therefore we 
used 19 quantiles [0.05 0.1 0.95]. 
We concluded that the Vincentized method appears to be a reasonably good approach to aggregate 
participant’s distributions. When comparing Pure/Extended DDM and LATER model we will, therefore, 
use Vincentized Distributions. 
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3.3 Normality in the Rate Domain.  
The reason to employ the LATER model was to compare a model that generates Normality 
Distributions with DDM model, in order to test the Rate-Hypothesis (Section 2.4). Another way to test 
Normality is to check directly if the distributions appear Normal in the rate domain. The approach 
commonly used (e.g. Carpenter & Williams, 1995; Reddi & Carpenter, 2000) is to plot the distribution 
for each individual participant in the rate domain, generally on a probit plot so that, when the rate 
distribution is Normal, they sit on a straight line. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is generally used for 
testing for Normality. This approach is valuable when thousands of trials are collected for each 
individual participant. However, the power of the test decreases dramatically with reducing sample size. 
In our experiments the number of trials for each participant and each condition is too small to properly 
estimate the underlying distribution. Aggregating distribution with the Vincentizing method would 
make impossible to use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Therefore, to test for Normality in the rate 
domain, we used the method developed by Harris et al. (2014) work, which we call “standardised 
method”.  
3.3.1 Standardised Method   
The standardised method consists of the following steps: we computed the rate for each response 
(1/RT) for each participant and condition, then we standardised each dataset into z-scores. At this point 
all the responses have mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1, which allowed us to collapse all the data 
together (Harris et al., 2014). By using this method, the resulting distribution is a Normal Distribution 
if the original ones were normally distributed in the rate domain. In Harris et al. (2014) the truncated 
distributions are excluded, as they may distort the underlying Normal Distribution when aggregating 
across different participants. However, we did not find this to be a relevant problem for our studies, as 
even with the lower contrast level rate distributions appeared far away from zero. The presence of 
“express” responses, however, complicates this approach. When a few short responses are present in 
time domain, the corresponding rate distribution is a Normal distribution but with few outliers at very 
high rate (corresponding to the fast responses in the time domain).  When standardising, the high 
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standard deviation generated by the few high rate responses make the standardised distribution to be 
unnaturally shrunk (see blue line in Figure 3.3). The few outliers from these “contaminant” responses 
can thus hide the underlying Normal distribution. One solution would be to select a cut point and 
eliminate all the responses below that point. However, different conditions may have different cutting 
points, and the cut point choice may cut some real responses. When collapsing the data, this would 
result in a left skewed distribution and, again, the real Normal distribution could be distorted. In order 
to eliminate contaminant data, we developed the following method: for each rate distribution, we 
checked whether the standard deviation was ܺ time higher than the interquartile range (IQR). In any 
approximately Normal Distribution, this usually implies that few outliers are present. The algorithm 
keeps eliminating the highest data point from the distributions until the standard deviation is less than 
ܺ time higher than the IQR. The parameter ܺ determines the severity of the cutting procedure. By 
running several simulations (with Reci-Normal distribution, Exponential Gaussian, and Reciprocal 
Inverse Gaussian Distribution), we checked that this method worked properly in retrieving the original 
Normal Distribution from a contaminated dataset, and that when applied to a non-Normal distribution 
did not result in a Normal Distribution. We call this method STD-IQR and show an example in Figure 
3.3 (on the left, retrieved distribution from an original contaminated Normal distribution; on the right, 
retrieved one from a contaminated Exponential Distribution).  
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Figure 3.3 
In the left panel, the blue line corresponds to the result of the standardised method applied to a set of Reci-Normal Distribution 
obtained from simulated participants. Contaminant responses in the range of 0-200ms were added. The effect of these 
contaminants is to obtain a “peaked” shape distribution, as shown here. The yellow line shows the same standardised 
distribution with the STD-IQR method: the Normality shape is retained, as shown by the red dotted line (Normal Distribution 
fit). In the right panel the same method is applied to an Exponential Distribution with contaminants. Again, the standardised 
method results in a peaked shape. Applying the STD-IQR method does not result however in a Normal distribution (yellow 
line for the resulting distribution, red dotted line for the Normal Distribution fit), as expected.  
3.4 Pure/Extended DDM 
 In this work, we compare the LATER Model with two important accumulator models used in the 
decision-making field, the Pure DDM and Extended DDM. We will firstly present the mathematical 
formulation of these models, then we will describe the fitting and model selection procedure. For a more 
informal description see Section 2.3.  
The accumulator part of both the Pure and Extended DDM is described by a Wiener Process: 
 ݀ݔ = ݀ ⋅ ݀ݐ + ݏ ⋅ ܹ݀,                     ݔ(0) = 0  
Where ݔ(ݐ) is the accumulator value at time ݐ , ݀ݔ  denotes the change in ݔ  over a small time 
interval ݀ݐ, the constant drift ݀ ⋅ ݀ݐ represented the average increase of the accumulator towards the 
correct choice, ݏ ⋅ ܹ݀ represents Gaussian noise (mean 0, variance ݏଶ ⋅ ݀ݐ) (Bogacz et al., 2006, see 
Figure 2.2). Note that ݏ  is a scaling parameter: if changed, all the other parameters can be changed to 
produce predictions identical to those before the change (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002). For the Pure 
and Extended DDM we set  ݏ = 1.    
3.4.1 Simple RT  
For the Pure DDM with Simple RT corresponds to a Wiener Process with one boundary plus some 
shifting due to sensory-motor processing. The probability of hitting the boundary at time ݐ is found to 
be an Inverse Gaussian (Wald, 1947). Other processes that are not-decisional, such as stimulus encoding, 
memory access, motor response, are assembled in the parameter ߬, which is added to the accumulator 
stage, resulting in a RT distributed as a shifter inverse Gaussian:  
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ܴܶ(ݐ; ܽ, ߬, ݀, ݏ) = ݂(ݔ) = ൞
ܽ
ඥ(2ߨݏଶ(ݐ − ߬)ଷ)
݁ݔ݌ ൭−
൫ܽ − ݀(ݐ − ߬)൯ଶ
2ݏ(ݐ − ߬)
൱ , ݐ > 0
0, ݐ ≤ 0
 
In the Extended DDM with Simple RT we similarly assume a Wiener Process with Gaussian Noise 
with one threshold, and sensory-motor time added to it. Compared to the Pure DDM, this variant 
assumes variability across trials for several parameters. The drift rate changes from trial to trial 
according to a normal distribution with mean ݀ and standard deviation ߟ, and the sensory-motor time ߬ 
changes according to a uniform distribution with width ݏ௧. The distribution of RT for the Extended 
DDM with Simple RT has been found by Patanaik, Zagorodnov, Kwoh  and Chee (2014) to be equal 
to: 
݂(ݐ; ܽ, ߬, ݏ௧, ݀, ߟ, ݏ) = ൬
1
ݏ௧
൰ ൬ܩ ቀݐ − ߬ + ݏ௧2 ቚܽ, ݀, ߟቁ − ܩ ቀݐ − ߬ −
ݏ௧
2 ቚܽ, ݀, ߟቁ൰ 
Where  
ܩ(ݐ; ܽ, ݀, ߟ, ݏ)
= ቐ1 − ߔ ቆ
ܽ − ݀ݐ
ඥݐଶߟଶ + ݏଶݐ
ቇ + ݁ݔ ݌ ቆ
2ܽ݀ + 2ܽଶߟଶ
ݏଶ ቇ
ߔ ቆ−
ܽݏଶ + 2ܽݐߟଶ + ݏଶ݀ݐ
ݏଶඥݐଶߟଶ + ݏଶݐ
ቇ , ݐ > 0
0, ݐ ≤  0
 
3.4.2 Choice RT  
The Pure and Extended DDM for Choice RT are dissimilar to the Simple RT version in that they 
present two boundaries instead of one, reflecting the possibility of choosing one amongst two possible 
alternatives. For the Pure DDM, the RT distribution for the correct choice boundary (that is, the 
boundary in the direction of the mean drift) is equal to (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004b): 
ܴܶ(ݐ, ݎ = 1; ܽ, ߬, ܾ, ݀) =
exp ൬ܽ݀(1 − ܾ) − ݀
ଶ(ݐ − ߬)
2 ൰ 
 ܽଶ
  ݂ ቀݐ − ߬ܽଶ ቚܾ ቁ 
Where ݎ = 1 indicates the correct responses, and  ݂(ݑ|ܾ) is defined as  
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݂(ݑ|ܾ) = ߨ ෍ ݇ exp ቆ−
݇ଶߨଶݑ
2 ቇ
sin(݇ߨܾ)
ାஶ
௞ୀଵ
 
where usually the infinite summation is evaluated until convergence below an error bound (ߝ =
10ିଵ଴). Note that this is a defective distribution, meaning that its area is not equal to one, but to ݌(ݎ =
1|ݐ, ܽ, ߬, ܾ, ݀). The distribution of responses to the lower boundary (incorrect response) is  
ܴܶ(ݐ, ݎ = 0; ܽ, ߬, ܾ, ݀) = ܴܶ(ݐ, ݎ = 1; ܽ, ߬, 1 − ܾ, −݀) 
which is also a defective distribution. The sum of the area of the two distributions is equal to unity.  
The distribution of RT for the Extended DDM has no analytic formulation but has to be numerically 
computed (Ratcliff, McKoon, Van Zandt, 1999; Ratcliff, Tuerlinckx, 2002). 
3.5 LATER Model  
In the LATER model, a linear accumulator with drift rate ݎ starts from ܵ଴ and rises until reaching 
ܵ௧. The drift rate is normally distributed across trials, with mean ߤ and standard deviation ߪ (Carpenter 
& Williams, 1995). Therefore, the time for responding is given by (ܵ௧ − ܵ଴)/ߔ(ߤ, ߪ), where ߔ  is the 
Normal probability density function. The density function for this random variable, which corresponds 
to the distribution of RT, can be easily found by considering that the density of an inverse random 
variable ܻ = 1/ܺ, where ܺ is continuous with density function ݂(ݐ), is equal to ଵ
௧మ
݂ ቀଵ
௧
ቁ and the density 
of a random variable ܻ = ܿܺ where ܿ is a constant and  ܺ is continuous with density  ݂(ݐ) is equal to 
ଵ
|௖|
݂ ቀ௜
௧
ቁ . By setting (ܵ௧ − ܵ଴) = ܽ  (threshold distance to starting point) and applying the 
aforementioned properties, we obtain 
ܴܶ(ݐ; ܽ, ߤ, ߪ) =
ܽ
ݐଶ
ߔ ቀ
ܽ
ݐ
, ߤ, ߪቁ  
Here, we consider a slightly different version of this model: negative rates have a difficult 
interpretation, as they imply negative time of response (or infinite type of responding, depending on the 
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model interpretation). Therefore, we will substitute  ߔ(ݔ; ߤ, ߪ) with a left truncated (at 0) Normal 
Distribution, which probability density function is:  
ܴܶ(ݐ; ܽ, ߤ, ߪ) =
exp ൬− (ݐ − ߤ)
ଶ
2ߪଶ ൰
√2ߨ൫1 − Φ(−ߤ/ߪ)൯ߪݐଶ
 
where  Φ  indicates the Normal standard cumulative density function*. During this work, we will 
use this version of the LATER model. In term of Rate-Hypothesis, this implies that the computation of 
the decision process is done on the rate domain, according to a truncated at 0 Normal Distribution.  
3.6 Decision Rules and Optimum Decision Time with Exponential ࡭࡯࡯(ࡰࢀ) 
The mathematical formulation of each decision rules is shown in the left column of Table 3.1. ܦ௧௢௧ 
corresponds to all the trial time that is not decision time, that is: the time from a trial to another (called 
ܦ, for delay, and may correspond to the time from the participant response until the starting of the next 
trial, or to the beginning of the trial until the onset of the stimulus, etc.) plus the sensory-motor 
component ߬. See Figure 2.1 for a diagram of the relationship between ܴܶ, ܦܶ, ߬ and ܦ௧௢௧ .  The 
parameter ݍ is an “emphasis on accuracy” parameter (Bogacz et al., 2006): by increasing it, participants 
will weigh more accuracy than speed. For ܴܴ௠, the ݍ parameter can be more conveniently interpreted 
as the subjective punishment/reward ratio. See Section 2.6 for more details. 
In Chapter 6, 7 and 8 we use an exponential formulation of ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) (shown on top of Table 1.1) 
that we incorporated into the experimental task. The ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) defines the speed accuracy function: 
how accuracy increases with increase in decision time ( ܦܶ) , where accuracy is defined as the 
                                                     
 
* Note that, however, with most experimental conditions used in this work, the difference between these two versions is 
very small. When the parameters were fitted to Experiment 1, for example, the lowest ߤ was ~0.8 and ߪ was found to be 
0.15, resulting in a probability of negative rate of 4.8213e-08. 
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probability of a correct response. In this equation (see top of Table 1.1), ߣ corresponds to how fast the 
accuracy increases in time, and ߙ is the accuracy at the beginning of the trial, that is ܣܥܥ(0). For each 
decision rule, given a specific formula for ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ),  we can calculate the optimum by setting the 
derivative of each decision rule equal to zero and solve for ܦܶ. The solution for ܴܴ and ܴܴ௠ were only 
found in terms of the ܮܾܽ݉݁ݎݐ ܹ function, defined to be ܹ(ݖ) ݁ݔ݌[ ܹ(ݖ)] = ݖ (see Appendix).  The 
optimum decision time ܦܶ∗ given the exponential ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) are shown in the right column of Table 
3.1 
 
Table 3.1 Decision Rules and Optimum Decision Time for exponential ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) 
Decision Rules  Optimum decision time (ܦܶ∗), using 
 ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) = 1 + (ߙ − 1) ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) 
ܤܴ = −ൣܦܶ + ݍ൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)൯൧ 
ܦ ஻ܶோ∗ =  −
݈݊ ൬ 1ߣݍ(1 − ߙ)൰
ߣ
 
ܴܴ = ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)/(ܦܶ + ܦ௧௢௧) 
ܦ ோܶோ∗ = −ܦ௧௢௧ −
ିܹଵ ൬
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)
ߙ − 1 ൰ + 1
ߣ
 
ܴܣ = ܴܴ −
ݍ
ܦ௧௢௧
൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)൯ No Explicit Form 
ܴܴ௠ =
ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) − ݍ൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)൯
ܦܶ + ܦ௧௢௧
 
ܦ ோܶோ೘
∗ = −ܦ௧௢௧ −
ିܹଵ ൬
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)
(ߙ − 1)(ݍ + 1) ൰ + 1
ߣ
 
3.7 Distributions: Fitting Routine and Model Selection: QMLE, AIC  
When the Pure/Extended DDM or the LATER models are fitted to experimental data, we can make 
several assumptions about parameters restrictions. For example, let’s assume we have a Simple RT task 
where we use two different stimulus contrasts, dim and bright, and we want to test whether this has an 
46 
 
effect on some parameters of the Pure DDM, for example the drift rate ݀. In this case we want to 
compare two versions of the same models, one with free ݀ for the two contrast conditions, and the other 
one with fixed ݀. The version with free ݀ has 4 parameters: ܽ, ߬, ݀ଵ, ݀ଶ, whereas the version with fixed 
݀ has 3 parameters: ܽ, ߬, ݀. Each model version, together with the empirical (Vincentized) distribution, 
is given as an input to a Model Evaluation Routine. This minimization function is an extension of 
fminsearch.m in MATLAB, which employs the Nelder-Mead algorithm. This extension included the 
possibility to specify parameter bounds, which allows faster convergence. For the Pure and Extended 
DDM, we specified 0 as the lower bound for all parameters (no higher bounds were used). The 
minimization routine finds the parameters that minimize the summed Quantile Maximum Likelihood 
Function across all conditions (Heathcote et al., 2002; see also reply to Speckman & Rouder, 2004).  
This method is an extension of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for Vincentized 
Distribution: QMLE has been proved to be typically a little less biased and much less reliable than other 
commonly used method, such as Continuous Maximum Likelihood and MLE (Brown & Heathcote, 
2008). In the QMLE, we seek to maximize the quantity 
ܮ(ߠ|ܶ) ∝ ෑ ൭න ݂(ݐ, ߠ)݀ݐ
௤ොೕ
௤ොೕషభ
൱
ேೕ௠
௝ୀ௜
 
with respect to the transformed data ܶ = (ܰ, ݍො),  ݍො is a vector of quantile estimates and N is a vector 
of counts of the number of RTs that occur in each interquantile range. In order to avoid overflow, instead 
of maximizing ܮ(ߠ|ܶ) we minimized − ln ܮ(ߠ|ܶ).  Note that, generally, by using the vector count N, 
we are automatically adjusting the likelihood for error and correct distribution (errors are generally less 
than correct responses, and they have to be weighted accordingly).  The function ݂ is the probability 
density function for the model we are evaluating (in this example, the Pure DDM probability density 
function, shown above).  
The first version of this example, with two drift rates, is more flexible and thus will obviously fit at 
least as good as the second model. However, we desire not only to obtain a model with a good fit, but 
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a parsimonious model. To do that, we use a metric that penalized the model according to the number of 
parameters used: for doing that we use the Akaike information Criterion (AIC), computed as  
ܣܫܥ = 2݇ − 2 ln ൭෍ ܮ(ߠ௖| ௖ܶ)
௡
௖ୀଵ
൱ 
Where ݇ represents the number of free parameters, and the second part of the equation computes 
twice the natural logarithm of the sum of the likelihood values across all ݊ conditions, with the relative 
ߠ parameters and ܶ dataset for that condition. The preferred model is the one with the minimum AIC 
value. AIC gives a measure of the information lost for a model, dealing with the trade-off between 
goodness of fit, ܮ(ߠ|ܶ), and complexity of the model (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). It is useful for 
comparing models (or model variants) with different number of parameters, as it penalizes for the 
number of parameters.  
Note that by using this minimization routine we will obtain the AIC value, the summed likelihood 
across all conditions and the likelihood for each condition, so more fine model comparison for particular 
conditions in terms of goodness of fit can be also made.  
3.8 Data points: Fitting Routine and Model Selection: WLS, BIC 
In some cases we are not going to fit distributions but data point 
s, for example to check whether the change in mdRT across experimental conditions followed the 
prediction of a decision rule. The Fitting Routine used is exactly the same as the distribution procedure: 
we first established what are the free parameters across experimental conditions, generating if necessary 
different versions of the same model (which has now a functional relationship between experimental 
condition and observations). Each model version, with the observation dataset and standard deviation 
is given as an input to the Model Evaluation Routine. The modified ݂݉݅݊ݏ݁ܽݎܿℎ. ݉ find, for each 
model version, the parameters that minimize the summed Weighted Least Square (WLS) error across 
all condition. This is very similar to the Minimum Least Square Method, but takes into account the 
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standard deviation for each data point (which can calculate as being the standard deviation across 
median responses for each participant). The WLS is defined as  
ܹܮܵ = ෍
൫ݕ௜ − ݂(ݔ௜|ߠ)൯
ଶ
ߪ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
where n is the number of observation, (ݔ௜ , ݕ௜) is a dataset of observations, ߠ is the set of parameters, 
ߪ is the standard deviation for each data point. With this method, the deviation from an observation 
with low standard deviation will have a higher error than the same deviation in an observation with 
higher standard deviation.  
Once the parameters have been minimized for each model version, we proceed to the model 
selection, by selecting parsimonious model and thus penalizing for the number of parameters. To do 
that, we apply the modified Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978):  
ܤܫܥ = −2݈݊ ቌ
1
݊
 ෍ ܹܮ ௝
஼
௝ୀଵ
ቍ +
(݇ + 1)݈݊(݊)
݊
 
where ܥ indicates the total number of condition, ܹܮ ௝ܵ  is the WLS computed for a particular 
condition ݆, ݊ the total number of observations, and ݇ the number of parameters. Like AIC, the BIC 
compute the trade-off between the goodness of fit and the model complexity (Schwarz, 1978), and the 
preferred model is the one with the lower BIC.  
3.9 Response Signal Analysis: STARS 
We introduce the analysis of RT as response signals, in which each response is associated with the 
time it has been produced. We performed a Regime Shift Detection Analysis, usually performed in the 
field of ecosystem analyses to detect rapid change or reorganisation in the ecosystem. We used this 
measure to detect a change in the internal strategy used by the participants. Amongst several ways to 
analyse discontinuities in time-series (Easterling & Peterson, 1995; Lanzante, 1996) we chose the 
Rodionov (2004) sequential t-test analysis of regime shifts (STARS), an automatic procedure that does 
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not require data pre-processing, and detects shifts and provide the magnitude of the shifts even for short 
time series. As this technique is uncommon in the field of Psychology, we provide a short summary 
here and refer to Rodionov (2004) and Rodionov and Overland (2005) for further details. 
The method consists of defining a time window of size ݈, and establish  whether a data point is 
significantly different from the mean of the current regime by using the Student’s t-test: ݂݂݀݅ =
ݐඥ(2ߪଶ)/݈ where ݈ is the length of the time-series window (we set this equal to 7),  ߪ௟ is the averaged 
of the standard deviation calculated for each time-series within the window, and the critical level of the 
t-test was set to 0.05. A data points deviating more than ݂݂݀݅ to the mean of the current regime is 
marked as a potential change of shift.  Subsequent observation are used to confirm this hypothesis by 
calculating the regime shift index 
ܴܵܫ =  ෍
ݔ௜∗
݈ߪ௟
௖ା௠
௜ୀ௖
 
where ݉ = 0, … , ݈ − 1, ܿ is the index of the potential regime shift. RSI represents the cumulative 
sum of normalized deviations ݔ௜∗ from the average value of the current regime. If from ܿ to ܿ + ݉ (that 
is, for the window of size ݈ starting from the first deviation point ܿ), the RSI remains positive, then the 
point ܿ is marked as a new regime shift, and the search for a new regime shift starts at ܿ + 1. 
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Chapter 4  
Intensity and Foreperiod Effect on Simple RT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse the general effect of foreperiod on RT by using a Simple RT design and 
compare three models of decision making: the Pure DDM, Extended DDM and LATER model. In doing 
that, we will provide some qualitative evidence for some of the decision rules considered in this work.  
4.1.1 Literature on FP 
The foreperiod (FP) corresponds to the time between the disappearance of the warning signal and 
the appearance of the stimulus and provides a temporal frame of reference for the participant to prepare 
for responding (Niemi & Näätänen, 1981). The relationship between FP and RT has been analysed for 
decades (Luce, 1986), but more recently has been largely neglected. Most of the studies on FP uses 
Simple RT tasks (the literature for FP and Choice RT will be analysed in Chapter 5 when we will use a 
Choice RT task). During each block, the FP may be maintained constant or it may be varied according 
to a certain distribution. With variable FP (FP generated from a random variable which parameters vary 
across different blocks), the RT are generally longer than with constant FP (e.g. Bevan et al., 1965), 
and RT decreases monotonically with actual FP duration (Aiken & Lichtenstein, 1964; Drazin, 1961; 
Klemmer, 1956; 1957; Nickerson, 1965a,b). When variable, the FP is drawn from a particular 
distribution. The two most used distributions for the variable FP are the uniform and the exponential 
distribution. In this work, we used the exponential distribution, as it does not provide any information 
about the appearance of the stimulus as time flows (Luce, 1986, Elithor & Lawrence, 1955). This means 
that the probability of the stimulus appearing at time ݐ, given that it had not appeared in the past, is the 
same for every ݐ. However, it turns out that responses are not remarkably affected by the FP distribution. 
For both exponentially and uniformly distributed FP, it has been found that RT increases with higher 
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mean FP (Granjon, Requin, Durup & Reynard, 1973; Nickerons & Burnham, 1967; Karlin, 1959, Niemi 
& Näätänen, 1981) and RT decreases with actual FP duration (Näätänen, 1970; Hermelin, 1964). We 
suggest that the lack of difference between uniformly and exponentially distributed RT resides in a 
misconception about what the participant is estimating during a simple RT, which is not the probability 
that the stimulus occurs at each point in time (the hazard function) but the probability that the stimulus 
has appeared at some time in the past (the cumulative density function, ܲ(ܶ < ݐ)). In fact, in a Simple 
RT participants are usually awarded for responding to the stimulus onset as fast as possible. The 
participant continuously receives information about the status of the stimulus on the monitor screen 
(that is, if a stimulus is in fact there or not), but this information is weighted with the probability that 
the stimulus onset happened already sometime in the past (which is described by the cumulative density 
of the FP distribution). By taking this aspect into account, we can easily see how the RT for the 
exponential and uniform distribution presents the same patterns, since both distributions have a 
monotonically increasing cumulative density function.  This aspect of RT task will be briefly analysed 
in the following experiment.  
It is also interesting to consider how the number of anticipations varies with different FP. 
Unfortunately, data for anticipation are not always presented, probably because in these tasks 
anticipations are usually less than 5% of total responses and no analysis is possible (e.g. Green, Smith 
& von Gierke, 1983; Bernstein, Rose, & Ashe, 1970). 
4.1.2 Effect of FP on DDM and LATER Model. 
By using the Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) we can infer what part of the decision mechanism is 
affected by varying the FP. This has been mostly explored within the context of Choice RT (Bausenhart, 
Rolke, Seibold & Ulrich, 2010; Seibold et al., 2010; Jepma, Wagenmakers, &Nieuwenhus, 2012), but 
the same paradigm can be applied to Simple RT as well. The general question is: what parameters of 
the DDM are affected by varying the FP? Three different possibilities have been identified:  
1) FP affects the drift rate (the rate of accumulation of information, parameter ݀): higher temporal 
certainty (obtained with shorter FP) may increase participant’s attention towards the stimulus, and 
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therefore increase the accumulation rate (Grosjean, Rosenbaum & Elsinger, 2001). High drift rate 
corresponds to faster RT and higher accuracy (lower error rate).  
2) By affecting the sensory-motor component of response time (parameter ߬): participant may be 
more prepared to the stimulus onset with shorter FP (Rolke & Hofmann, 2007). Large ߬ corresponds to 
slower RT but no difference in accuracy (or error rate). This was found by Seibold et al. (2010) in an 
experiment with different FP conditions and different proportion of catch-trials and nogo-trials, and the 
result was again confirmed by Jepma, Wagenmakers and Nieuwenhus (2012) in a 2AFC letter 
recognition task with 2 FP conditions (0.3s and 2.5s). Surprisingly, they also found a decrease in 
accuracy with shorter FP in the condition where accuracy was stressed, which usually pinpoint to a 
difference in boundary separation instead (next paragraph). Their explanation for this drop in accuracy 
was that participants were starting sampling too early, therefore increasing RT but decreasing accuracy 
(see also Laming, 1968).    
3) by affecting the threshold separation (parameter ܽ), that is the stopping rule of the accumulator 
process, which would result in slower RT and higher accuracy (lower error rate). This is particularly 
relevant in terms of optimization. In fact, three out of the four decision rules we are considering in this 
work (ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ, but not ܤܴ) are function of the non-decision time (ܦ௧௢௧ , the delay between 
participants’ decisions). In this study, by increasing the FP, we are in fact increasing the total delay 
across responses. If participants are indeed employing one of the 3 decision rules, then an increase in 
FP should correspond to an increase in the threshold separation (as explained in Section 2.6, see also 
Bogacz et al., 2006).  
We test these three hypotheses for the first time with Simple RT. As explained in Section 2.3, 
although in a Choice RT different parameters affect both RT and accuracy, in a Simple RT only one 
choice is possible (the DDM has only one boundary so that it cannot produce incorrect responses). 
However, we will take into account the number of anticipations (responses before the stimulus onset), 
which will serve as a rough indication of accuracy.  
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As for the LATER model, to the extent of our knowledge, it has never been applied to manual 
Simple RT. The only two parameters that could possibly change are ܽ (that is, the threshold distance) 
and the rate of linear increment ݎ . According to Carpenter (2004), the contrast should affect the 
parameter ݎ, but the effect of FP on LATER parameters has not been investigated.  
4.1.3 Aim of Experiment 4.1  
The study in this Chapter was designed to investigate three main topics:  
1) Investigate the effect of FP in terms of RT and accuracy (by using the number of anticipations) 
in a Simple RT. As discussed above, the accuracy level is almost never reported for Simple RT, and the 
data are usually excluded from the analysis. However, this data can be useful to make predictions about 
the underlying mechanism taking place when manipulating the FP.  
2) Investigate the FP effect within the framework of the DDM and LATER model. The DDM has 
been applied to the FP effect only within the context of Choice RT. Investigating what parameter 
changes for Simple RT would either confirm previous findings or suggest a different mechanism for 
the two experimental designs. We compare a version with free threshold, free sensory-motor component, 
and a combination of both parameters free across FP conditions. The Extended DDM has been recently 
applied to Simple RT (Ratcliff & van Dongen, 2011; Ratcliff & Strayer, 2014). However, the historical 
reason to use the Extended version of the DDM is to take into account error responses (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Neither the Pure DDM nor the Extended DDM can take into 
account error responses (anticipations) in Simple RT, so using the Extended DDM in place of the 
simpler Pure DDM may be unnecessary. Note that LATER model and Pure DDM have the same number 
of parameters, whereas the Extended DDM model has, for the Simple RT paradigm, two additional 
parameters (ݏݐ and ߟ). As discussed above, LATER has been successfully used for modelling saccading 
responses to stimulus onset, but no comparison between these three models has been performed in the 
past. Plus, in recent years there has been a surge in the importance of the Pure DDM even for Choice 
RT (Bogacz et al., 2006; Balci et al., 2011; Moran, 2014; Simen et al., 2009) due to its optimality 
property, so the need for a comparison is compelling.  
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3) Investigate the rate distributions for the Simple RT task. The observation that distributions of 
responses are normal in the rate domain (Harris et al., 2014) for Choice RT suggests that what is actually 
computed by the observer is the rate of response, and therefore the DDM (or any similar rise-to-
threshold model) could be a mechanism to convert from time to rate (this is what we called the Rate-
Hypothesis, Section 2.4). The analysis of response distributions in the rate domain for a Simple RT has 
not been performed in the past.   
EXPERIMENT 4.1 
4.2 Methods 
Participants. 12 participants (5 females, 7 males) took part in the experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no known neurological conditions.  
Materials. All testing were conducted under constant levels of illumination. The stimuli were 
presented binocularly on a computer monitor on a PC running Windows XP, using the software E-
Prime (version 2.0.10). Participants were positioned 57cm from the monitor. The stimuli were luminous 
circles (2cm, ~2°) shown on a grey background (0.31 cd/m2).  The five levels of luminance followed an 
approximately geometrical series (0.42, 0.71, 1.21, 2.06, 3.50 cd/m2). These values were converted to 
Michaelson contrast (defined as  ௅ೞି௅್
௅ೞା௅್
, where ܮ௦  is the luminance of the stimulus and ܮ௕  is the 
background luminance) resulting in 0.15, 0.39, 0.59, 0.74, and 0.84. We used three different FP 
conditions: short, medium and long. Each FP condition was kept constant for each of the three blocks. 
During each block, the 5 possible stimuli were presented randomly. Each stimulus was repeated 60 
times. At the beginning of the block, the participants were dark adapted, and pauses were made between 
blocks of different FP. Each FP condition consisted of a minimum waiting time (0.4s) added to a number 
of millisecond drawn from an exponential distribution. Foreperiod values higher than 15s were excluded.  
The mean of the exponential distribution was 0.2s for the short condition, 0.6s for the medium condition 
and 2s for the long condition, leading to three different FP conditions with mean of, respectively, 0.6s, 
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1s and 2.4s. The mean FP (mFP) time was kept constant throughout each block. The mFP conditions 
were counterbalanced across participants. We did not use a timeout.  
Procedure. A white cross (2 cm) was presented on a black background at the centre of the screen. 
This was used as a fixation point. After 1 second, the cross disappeared and a white dot (1mm) appeared 
at the centre of the screen and remained at the centre during the whole trial. The disappearance of the 
white cross constituted the warning signal for the beginning of the trial. After the FP time, the stimulus 
appeared and stayed on the screen until the participant pressed the space bar (Figure 4.1). The 
participants were asked to press the spacebar as soon as the stimulus was detected. After the spacebar 
was pressed, the stimulus disappeared. If the participant pressed the spacebar before the stimulus 
appeared (anticipation response), a negative auditory feedback was provided and the trial started again; 
otherwise, a positive auditory feedback was provided. After the response, there was a delay of 1 second 
before the starting of the next trial. Each luminance level was randomly presented within a session. We 
recorded 60 RTs for each luminance level. Thus, we recorded 300 non-anticipation RT for each FP 
condition and a total of 900 non-anticipatory RT for each participant. A training session consisting of 
20 trials with a short FP was performed by each participant before the beginning of the experiment.  
 
Figure 4.1 
The flow of events in the study. 
 
Analysis. The analyses were performed as illustrated in Chapter 3.  In this study, we also include 
an analysis of the effect of FP duration (not to be confused with the mean FP for each block) on the RT. 
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In order to do this analysis, we proceeded as follows: we divided the FP distribution in 20-quantiles 
[0.05 0.1 … 1].  We associated each quantile with the RT included in the quantile range, so that for 
each quantile we obtained approximately the 5% of total responses for that condition. The average RT 
for each quantile was computed, resulting in 20 RT bins. The resulting average dataset can give us a 
visual representation of the relationship between FP duration and RT. To better understand the severity 
of this initial relationship, we fitted an exponential function in the form of ܴܶ = ߙ + ߚexp (ߛݐ) where 
ݐ corresponds to the midpoint of each bin. The function is evaluated only until the mean FP for each 
condition. To find the ߙ, ߚ and ߛ parameters we used a minimization routine on ܴଶ (we do not follow 
the convention detailed in Chapter 3 as, in this case, we are not going to compare different models, and 
ܴଶ gives a direct measure of goodness of fit).   
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Behavioural Responses 
The anticipation responses (2.7% of the total dataset) will be analysed in a subsequent section. For 
the remaining analyses, we excluded the anticipations. Figure 4.2 shows the median of median reaction 
times (mdRT) grouped across participants. The bar indicates ± 1 standard error. As expected, the mdRT 
decreased with increasing contrast. Using the median rate values (see Methods) on a repeated measure 
ANOVA revealed that the effect of contrast was significant, as expected (ܨସ,ସସ = 17.69, ݌ ≅ 0). The 
effect of mFP was also significant (ܨଶ,ଶଶ = 8.794, ݌ ≅ 0), but no significant interaction was found 
between FP and contrast levels ( ଼ܨ ,଼଼ = 1.576, ݌ = 0.144). Post hoc pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction revealed that each contrast level was significantly different from one another at 
ߙ = 0.05, apart from the first and the lowest and the second to lowest contrast condition (݌ = 0.101). 
All three mFP conditions were significantly different at ݌ < 0.01.  By looking at the figure, it is clear 
that increasing FP resulted in an increase of mdRT, whereas contrast decreased mdRT in a Piéron’s-
like fashion (Section 2.9). 
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Figure 4.2 
Resulting mdRT for the three different mFP conditions and the five contrast levels. Increasing contrast appear to decrease 
mdRT according to Piéron’s Law (red dashed line), whereas the effect of the mFP condition appears to be a shifting of the RT 
curve. 
 
We fitted Piéron’s Law (ܴ݉݀ܶ = ߛ + ݇ܫିఉ) on the aggregated data by assuming that ݇, ߚ or ߛ (or 
any combination of those, or none of them) were free to vary across FP conditions, and keeping fixed 
the remaining parameters. This resulted in testing 7 different model variants (Table 4.1). We compared 
the models by using the modified BIC for weighted least square (see Section 3.8). The best fitting model 
resulted to be the one with ߛ free across FP conditions (݂݀ 5). The BIC values for all models are 
shown in Table 4.1, and Table 4.2 shows the estimated parameters for the preferred model. We also 
fitted the data to the Luminance levels instead of the contrast level, which confirmed that the data 
followed Piéron’s Law and the best model was the ߛ free. 
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Table 4.1 Fitting Piéron’s Law Models          Table 4.2  Parameters for the best model 
Model BIC df  Model 3: ࢽ free 
݇ free -4.58574 5  BIC -6.026 
ߚ free -2.68943 5  ƩWLS 0.0123  
ࢽ free -6.02601 5  ࢑ 0.001 
݇ and ߚ free -4.10255 7  ࢼ 2.041 
݇ and ߛ free -5.93085 7  ࢽ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૙.૟࢙ 0.252 
ߚ and ߛ free -4.32684 7  ࢽ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૚࢙ 0.279 
݇, ߚ and ߛ free  -4.81213 9  ࢽ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૛.૝࢙ 0.323 
Intuitively, the ߛ parameter is connected with the sensory-motor component ߬ for the DDM, 
but we will see how things can be more complicated than that in future Sections. The linear dependency 
between contrast and FP suggests, furthermore, that the two experimental factors may affect two 
different components of the decision process. By using DDM fitting, we will be able to quantify more 
precisely these hypotheses. 
4.3.2 Fast Responses and Anticipations 
It is a common observation to find in these datasets a series of very fast responses which are usually 
assumed to be part of a secondary process, called “express saccades” (Fisher & Boch, 1983; Fischer & 
Ramsperger, 1984) in the literature of visual decisions (Section 2.4). In fact, we found a series of very 
fast responses in our distributions. The left panel of Figure 4.3, shows an example of a collapsed 
distributions across all participants, for the conditions with shortest FP and lowest contrast. This figure 
illustrates the presence of a small set of responses in the fast range that may not be part of the main 
distributions. Figure 4.3 (right panel) shows the percentage of fast responses (based on the left panel of 
Figure 4,3, we used ܴܶ < 0.2ݏ) for each condition. There was a strong and significant (ܨଶ,ଶଶ =
29.99, ݌ < 0.001) effect for mFP, but not for contrast. The number of fast responses may be connected 
with the predictability of the stimulus occurrence. This means that, as FP variance increase, we expect 
less and less fast responses, which is exactly what we observed. Note how the number of fast responses 
is extremely high in the shortest mFP condition, with the mean of 0.6s (0.4s of minimum waiting time 
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+ 0.2s of exponentially distributed time). The very low variability for this condition may have made 
possible for participants to treat this condition as a constant FP, thus anticipating the appearance of the 
stimulus (for this reason, in the next experiment, we will not employ the minimum waiting time of 0.4s). 
As we will see in Section 4.3.5, this high number of fast responses may mask the underlying distribution, 
and they may be the product of a different mechanism based on the flow of time (Ratcliff, 1993; Ratcliff 
& Tuerlinickx, 2002; Ulrich & Miller, 1994, see Discussion) 
 
Figure 4.3 
 (Left panel) Aggregated RT distribution for the short mFP condition and the lowest contrast level condition. The red circle 
indicated a cluster of very fast responses that appear to be separated from the main distributions and they may due to a different 
process, e.g. time estimation process. (Right panel) The average percentage of fast responses (ܴܶ < 0.2ݏ) for each condition. 
The blue line represents 1 standard error. There seems to be a non-linear decrease in the amount of fast responses as the mFP 
increases, with most of the fast responses obtained in the shortest mFP duration. 
 
It is also possible that the number of fast responses related to the number of anticipations (responses 
before the stimulus onset). The analysis of anticipations is particularly relevant because it underpins 
different effects in the underlying decision mechanisms, as we will see when fitting the DDM.  We 
calculated the average percentage of anticipations for the three mFP conditions and the five contrast 
conditions across participants (Figure 4.4, top panel). Note how, except for the fourth contrast condition, 
anticipations were always decreasing with higher mFP. We performed the same analysis by collapsing 
together across mFP and contrast conditions separately (see Figure 4.4 bottom panels, bars indicate 1 
standard deviation). There did not seem to be any pattern for different contrast level, whereas the 
percentage of anticipations seemed to decrease with decreasing mean FP, even though this difference 
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was not significant (ܨଶ,ଷଷ = 0.35, ݌ > 0.5).  We will return on the meaning of this analysis in the 
following Sections.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 
 (Top panel) Percentage of anticipation for each condition, with the blue line indicating one standard error. (Bottom panels). 
Percentage of anticipation aggregated across contrast level conditions and mFP conditions. The first does not appear to have 
any relevant effect, whereas increasing the mFP appear to decrease the percentage of anticipations. 
4.3.3 Foreperiod Duration and RT 
The effect of FP has been mostly investigated in terms of the effect of mFP length. However, it is 
interesting to understand what is the effect of the FP for each individual trials. The main point of this 
analysis is to infer how the information obtained from the flow of time itself before the appearing of 
the stimulus affects the related response (Näätänen, 1970). The results are shown in Figure 4.5.  
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Figure 4.5 
Relationship between FP duration and RT (not to be confused with the relationship between the mFP condition and RT) for each condition. Note how the panels are scaled differently. The red 
dashed line indicates the mean FP time for each condition. There is an initial decreasing relationship that appear to be stronger for the short mFP condition, and that we tried to describe with an 
exponential function (green line). 
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By visual inspection, it appears that there is an initial decreasing relationship between FP duration 
and RT, that saturates at around the mean of the FP condition (represented by a dashed red line in Figure 
4.5). The relationship appears to be less clear after the mean FP. Generally, the slope of the decreasing 
relationship seems to depend on the contrast used, with lower contrast conditions having a steeper 
decrease before settling to a steady state. To better understand this relationship, we tried to fit an 
exponential function in the form of  ߙ + ߚexp (ߛݐ)  . Even though by visual inspection the fitting 
appeared to capture the observatiosn (green line in Figure 4.5), the resulting  ܴଶ values were low, 
indicating a poor fit (Table 4.3) and it did not seem to be any relevant pattern between conditions and 
estimated parameters, apart from the value of ߚ (the asymptotic value) which unsurprisingly reflects 
the general findings about mdRT (highly mdRT with higher mFP).  
Table 4.3. ࡾ૛ values for the exponential fitting in RT-FP relationship 
ࡾ૛ Contrast=0.15 Contrast=0.39 Contrast=0.59 Contrast=0.75 Contrast=0.84 
Short mFP 0.494 0.366 0.580 0.775 0.193 
Average mFP 0.518 0.834 0.639 0.332 0.544 
Long mFP 0.178 0.567 0.715 0.358 0.617 
Even if it did not match an exponential fit, we believe that the initial decreasing relationship is likely 
connected with the motor preparedness depending on the flow of time and, as we claimed in Section 
4.1.1, it confirms that participants are estimating the cumulative distribution function of the FP so to 
get more prepared as time flows towards the mean of the FP distribution.  
4.3.4 Model Fitting 
By fitting the drift diffusion model we can have a more precise idea about what component was 
affected by mFP manipulations. In particular, it is relevant to understand whether the ߬ (sensory-motor 
component), the ߙ  parameter (threshold distance) or the ݀  parameter (drift rate) was affected by 
changing mFP (Section 4.1.2). We fitted the model to the one-boundary version of the Pure DDM and 
to the Extended DDM to the aggregated, Vincentized dataset (Section 3.4). We use 5 different variants 
of the model. For each of the following models, we set the parameter ݀ to be free to vary for each 
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contrast condition, as it is well established that stimulus strength affects the drift rate (e.g. Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Donkin & Van Maanen, 2014).  The models are presented in Table 4.4 (the bold Variant 
is the one which resulted in the lowest AIC value). A part for the ݀ parameter, all the non-specified 
parameters were kept fixed across experimental conditions. The same variants were used for the 
Extended DDM, with the addition of parameters ݏݐ and ߟ (variability in sensory-motor component and 
variability in the drift rate across trials), which were assumed to be fixed across experimental conditions. 
Table 4.4. Model variants used for the DDM 
Variant 1 Both ܽ and ߬ fixed across for all conditions 
Variant 2 ࢇ free for mFP conditions 
Variant 3 ߬ free for mFP conditions 
Variant 4 ߬ and ߙ free for mFP conditions 
Variant 5 ݀  free for mFP condition (and contrast) 
The LATER model was analysed in a similar fashion. To the extent of our knowledge, this was the 
first fitting of a LATER model to a Manual Simple RT task, so we did not know precisely what 
parameters were more likely to be affected by mFP conditions. On the other hand, it seemed clearly 
established (Carpenter, 2004) that contrast affected the ߤ parameter, so that we set this parameter to 
change across contrast conditions. The variants we used are shown in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5. Model variants used for the LATER model 
Variant 1 Both ܽ and ߪ fixed across for all conditions 
Variant 2 ࢇ free for meanFP conditions 
Variant 3 ߪ free for meanFP conditions 
Variant 4 ߤ changing for meanFP (and contrast) 
Note that one important difference between these models is that the LATER model does not have 
a ߬ parameter (which, if added, would not generate a Normal Distribution anymore, which is the main 
reason behind using the LATER model), and the ߪ parameter is left free to vary.  
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The fitting of the Pure and Extended DDM resulted in different preferred models. For the Pure 
DDM, the lowest AIC is obtained by Version 4 (ܽ and ߬ free), whereas the preferred Extended DDM 
and LATER model was Version 2 (which corresponded, for both, to the ܽ parameter free across mFP 
conditions). The lowest AIC value was obtained by the Extended DDM. The AIC values for all models 
are presented in Table 4.6. As the Table shows, the difference between the two DDM variants is very 
small, whereas the AIC value for the LATER model seems remarkably higher than the other two models 
(recall that lower values mean that the model is preferred according the AIC metric).  
Table 4.6. Fitting results for DDM and LATER model 
Pure DDM  Extended DDM  LATER model 
 AIC df   AIC df   AIC df 
Variant 1 1687.341 7  Variant 1 1730.838 9  Variant 1 1711.062 7 
Variant 2 1634.814 9  Variant 2 1624.151 11  Variant 2 1636.928 9 
Variant 3 1660.959 9  Variant 3 1644.601 11  Variant 3 1708.461 9 
Variant 4 1626.04 11  Variant 4 1633.022 13  Variant 4 1653.692 17 
Variant 5 1711.546 17  Variant 5 1740.187 19     
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Table 4.7 Best models’ parameters (Ʃ ℒ indicates the Likelihood sum across conditions) 
Variant 4 
(Pure DDM) 
 Variant 2 
(Extended DDM) 
 Variant 2 
(LATER model) 
AIC 1626.04  AIC 1624.151  AIC 1636.928 
Ʃ ℒ 802.0199   Ʃ ℒ 801.075  Ʃ ℒ  809.4638 
ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૙.૟࢙ 0.464  ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૙.૟࢙ 0.362  ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૙.૟࢙ 0.262 
ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૚࢙ 0.618  ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૚࢙ 0.575  ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૚࢙ 0.293 
ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૛.૝࢙ 0.812  ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૛.૝࢙ 0.765  ࢇ࢓ࡲࡼୀ૛.૝࢙ 0.326 
࣎࢓ࡲࡼୀ૙.૟࢙ 0.19  ࣎ 0.211  ࣆࢉୀ૙.૚૞ 0.82 
࣎࢓ࡲࡼୀ૚࢙ 0.202  ࢙࢚ 0.051  ࣆࢉୀ૙.૜ૢ 0.956 
࣎࢓ࡲࡼୀ૛.૝࢙ 0.202  ࢊࢉୀ૙.૚૞ 3.094  ࣆࢉୀ૙.૞ૢ 0.979 
ࢊࢉୀ૙.૚૞* 3.253  ࢊࢉୀ૙.૜ૢ 5.242  ࣆࢉୀ૙.ૠ૞ 1.008 
ࢊࢉୀ૙.૜ૢ 5.139  ࢊࢉୀ૙.૞ૢ 5.491  ࣆࢉୀ૙.ૡ૝ 1.012 
ࢊࢉୀ૙.૞ૢ 5.576  ࢊࢉୀ૙.ૠ૞ 6.132  ࣌ 0.152 
ࢊࢉୀ૙.ૠ૞ 5.823  ࢊࢉୀ૙.ૡ૝ 6.739    
ࢊࢉୀ૙.ૡ૝ 5.728  ࣁ 0.021    
The estimated parameters for the two DDM models are not so different, as shown in Table 4.7. The 
݀ parameter increases with increasing contrast, but the relationship is inverted for the last two drift rates 
with the Pure DDM, which may be due to random noise or saturation of stimulus strength. More 
interesting are the estimated ߬ parameters, which are very similar in the Pure DDM for the three mFP 
conditions (which were actually estimated to be identical with the last two mFP), establishing that the 
only relevant difference in sensory-motor component may be at most between the first and second mFP, 
and even in this case, the difference is very small  (around 10 ms) but enough to produce a relevant 
change in Likelihood and AIC value. Note also how the parameter ܽ is clearly increasing for both 
                                                     
 
* The “c” in this table stands for contrast level 
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versions, with estimated values not so dissimilar for one another. This clearly hints to an increase in 
threshold distance with increasing mFP, a finding that goes in contrast to what found previously (Jepma 
et al., 2012) with a Choice RT task, but it is however consistent with Posner et al., (1973), who found 
a speed-accuracy trade-off for different FP conditions. This will be analysed in details in the Discussion.  
The Vincentized distributions of RT are shown in Figure 4.6 (the red lines refer to the Extended 
DDM fitting, which provided the preferred fitting). For each condition, we plotted the mean, skewness 
and standard deviation averaged across participants. The effect of contrast and mean FP on standard 
deviation was not significant (contrast: ܨସ,ସସ = 2.508, ݌ = 0.055, mFP: ܨଶ,ଶଶ = 2.973, ݌ = 0.072), 
and their interaction was not significant either (଼ܨ ,଼଼ = 0.381, ݌ = 0.928). The usual decreasing in 
standard deviation observed with increasing stimulus intensity was not clearly observed in this case. 
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Figure 4.6 
Vincentized RT distributions for each condition. The red line corresponds to the fitting of the Extended DDM, in the variant with free ߙ conditions for each mFP condition. The other parameters 
are fixed for all the remaining conditions. In each panel, we indicate the average (across participants) value for the mean, standard deviation (std) and skewness of each distribution. 
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4.3.5 Rate Distributions 
As detailed explained in Chapter 3, distributions with very fast responses will result, in the rate 
domain with the standardising procedure, in a distribution with a peaked shape, not resembling the 
original, individual rate distribution. We have seen how this study is also affected by a number of fast 
responses (Section 4.3.2) which appeared to be dependent on stimulus predictability. To solve this 
problem without forcing the distribution to appear Normal in the rate domain, we used the STD-IQR 
method (Section 3.3). Figure 4.7 shows both original-standardised rate distribution (blue lines) and 
modified ones (with the STD-IQR method, yellow lines). Note that the most affected distributions are 
the ones in the short mFP conditions, corresponding to those conditions with most fast responses. On 
the other hand, the STD-IQR method did not eliminate any value for any of the distributions with the 
long mFP condition, which in fact had the lowest amount of fast responses. By applying the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with a critical level of ߙ = 0.01) we revealed that 6 distributions out of 15 
were not significantly different from a Normal Distribution. Four of these 6 distributions came from the 
long mFP condition. We also considered the effect of truncation: if a distribution is normal in the rate 
domain, it must be truncated at zero or near zero (Harris & Waddington, 2012). However, by inspecting 
individual rate distributions, we saw that all the distributions were clearly far away from zero, and 
therefore we did not consider truncation as a problem in our dataset.  
Overall, even though the LATER model did not provide the best fitting, the distributions still 
appeared approximately normal in the rate domain, at least with long mFP.  With medium and, more 
evidently, short mFP, the non-normality may be due to the fact that the distributions still contain 
contaminant responses, not eliminated by STD-IQR which may affect the distribution shape. The 
process is therefore still a mixture of a normal distribution and another component which becomes less 
and less active as mFP increases. Note that this component appears to be correlated with anticipations 
(which seems to be larger with short mFP, and decreasing with increasing mFP, as shown above), and 
it may be due to participant’s motor preparation to stimulus onset. See Discussion for further details.  
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Figure 4.7 
Aggregated and standardised rate distributions for each condition. The blue lines represent the original dataset, the yellow lines represent the dataset after STD-IQR method for cutting contaminant 
responses. Note that in the long mFP condition no contaminant is found, and the two lines overlap. In each panel there is indicated the amount of cut responses, and the result of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. For comparison, we plot a Normal Standard Distribution on each panel (red dashed lines).  
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4.4 Discussion 
As seen in the introduction, most of the literature on FP and DDM indicates that by changing the 
FP condition we are affecting the sensory-motor parameter ߬ (e.g. Jepma et al., 2012; Seibold et al., 
2010). We found a different and slightly more complex result: either the threshold distance ܽ (with Pure 
DDM), or both threshold distance and sensory-motor component ߬ (with Extended DDM), appeared to 
increase by increasing the mFP. Note that, even when ߬ resulted to be affected, it was only between the 
first two mFP conditions, as the second and third ߬ estimated values were equal.  One reason for the 
inconsistency between our results and previous studies’ may be due to the fact that other studies did not 
take into account mixed models, but only models where either ߬, ݀, or ܽ were affected. As explained in 
the introduction, an increase in ܽ would imply slower RT and lower accuracy, and this is precisely what 
we found in this study, even though the difference in accuracy (measured by using anticipations) was 
not significant. Interesting, Jepma et al. (2012) also found the same results, which is inconsistent with 
their finding that mFP affected ߬  (changing ߬  should not have any effect in accuracy), and they 
interpreted it as an early sampling of information.  
Our finding that ܽ is affected by mFP manipulation is particularly relevant in terms of decision 
strategy and optimality: if the participants are using ܴܴ௠, ܴܴ or ܴܣ (one of the decision strategies that 
are function of the total trial time), then by increasing the FP we expect an increase of the decision 
threshold which is exactly what we observed.  This appears to be a strong evidence for the hypothesis 
that participants are adjusting their response depending on the total non-decision time in the trial. 
However, this is not the only explanation. With Simple RT a change in the threshold separation has 
been sometime interpreted as a change in the prior probability of stimulus appearance (Carpenter & 
Williams, 1995). For example, ܽ may be directly connected with the predictability of the stimulus (that 
is, to the variance of the corresponding FP). In this case, shortest FP would correspond to lower variance, 
higher predictability, and thus high priors which results in low threshold separation ܽ. Thus, observing 
an increase in the threshold separation parameter is a necessary but not sufficient condition to support 
the optimality hypothesis for ܴܴ௠, ܴܴ and ܴܣ. In the next Chapter, we will use an experiment in which 
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we can clearly differentiate between an increase in response time due to stimulus predictability or to 
increased non-decision trial time.  
At face value, the Piéron’s fitting appears to contradict the results from the DDM estimation. If we 
follow the classic definition of the ߛ value as the “nonsensory factor” (Scharf, 1978) or the “irreducible 
minimum” (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954), then it seems to have a direct correspondence to the ߬ 
parameter in the DDM fitting. We believe this is not the case.  As the Piéron’s Law fitting suggests, 
different mFP conditions appear to affect uniquely the ߛ parameter, which should mean that ߬ increases 
with increasing mFP which is, however, not what we observed (either only ܽ or both ܽ and ߬ increased, 
depending on the model user). This result should not invalidate the previous one: the Piéron’s Law 
fitting is a much less powerful method to identify the stage affected by experimental conditions. 
Relevant to our topic of interest, it is not clear what Piéron’s Law parameter should be connected with 
the threshold parameter (it may even affect the ߛ parameter itself, or a combination of parameters). 
Moreover, the Piéron’s Law fitting procedures are typically complex (see Luce, 1986) and, with only 
few median data points (compared to the much more reliable distribution fitting for DDM), we think 
that it should be used just to confirm that contrast follows Piéron’s Law, and not to infer details of the 
decision process’ stages.  
In fitting the DDM, we also wanted to compare the Extended and the Pure DDM goodness of fit 
for the Simple RT dataset. In fact, the Extended DDM has been recently used on Simple RT (Ratcliff 
& van Dongen, 2011; Patanaik, 2014; Ratcliff & Strayer, 2014), but a comparison between it and the 
simpler Pure DDM was not provided. This seems particularly relevant, as the Extended DDM was 
initially adopted in order to explain different pattern for correct and error distributions, and it is not 
clear whether it is really useful to apply it in situations where no incorrect distribution is obtained. We 
concluded, for this study, that the different is extremely small, and, overall, both models provided 
roughly the same results: the variability across trials for drift rate and sensory-motor component (ݏ௧ and 
ߟ), which distinguishes the two models, were low. As we will see in the next Chapter, sometime the 
Pure DDM can even overcome the Extended DDM by providing a lower AIC value. This is interesting 
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as, in terms of optimality, the Pure DDM seem to be able to offer a valid and powerful account for RT 
and accuracy (Bogacz et al., 2010; Balci et al., 2011; Simen et al., 2009).   
This experiment also provided us with some tangential information that was not strictly related with 
optimality, but nevertheless added useful insights in the decision making process in Simple RT.  
The analysis of the relationship between FP duration and RT showed that RT decreases non-linearly 
(possibly exponentially, Figure 4.5) towards the mFP, in a way that matches the FP distribution itself. 
This shows how participants were more prepared (so to obtain shorter RT) as the cumulative distribution 
function increased. Note that this interesting relationship is not modelled by any of the sequential 
sampling models generally used in the decision making field, as they do not take into account the FP 
time. However, extending the model as to include the FP does not seem to be sufficient to model this 
phenomenon: we tried a simple model in which the starting point of the process was the beginning of 
the trial (and not the stimulus onset as usually done), and the accumulator consisted of white noise until 
the (simulated) appearance of the stimulus, whereupon the signal was noisily accumulated with a 
constant drift. Like our experiment, the stimulus onset time was drawn from an exponential distribution. 
However, this could not reproduce the FP duration and RT relationship found here. To reproduce this 
effect we had to add a moving boundary (by using a method similar to the one described in Drugowitsch 
et al., 2012), in particular, a decreasing boundary. This model would simulate a participant that willingly 
decreases the amount of information required before committing to a decision as time passes. Thus, this 
would simulate a participant that takes the FP into account. For example, during a condition with a very 
short FP, a participant that already waited for a long time would respond as soon as the minimum 
amount of information reaches his retina (as the probability that the stimulus appeared already is high). 
Is it conceivable that, when enough time passes, the participant would respond even though no 
information is provided, but purely based on the flow of time. With this approach, we could reproduce 
several patterns of the FP duration and RT relationship. It is easy to see how powerful this approach is, 
especially in explaining Simple RT, anticipations, relationship with prior beliefs and stimulus 
predictability. However, the developing of sequential sampling process with moving boundaries for 
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decision making is in its infancy, and a precise procedure would involve finding the optimum boundary 
for a set of optimality criteria by a dynamic programming approach, which is well beyond the scope of 
the current work. Even without developing such a complex model, we suggest the possibility that the 
effect of FP duration on RT may serve as a prediction for testing models in which the flow of time itself 
affects the response: the value of the accumulator is also function of time. Finally, we observed in this 
experiment, and even more remarkably in the experiment in the following chapter, a slight increase in 
RT after the mFP. It is possible that with very long waiting time, participants lost focus on the task, but 
up to now, we are not able to provide a more precise explanation.  
The analysis of the distributions of responses in the Rate Domain and the fitting with the LATER 
model gave us important information about the Rate-Hypothesis. Note that this is the first time that such 
analysis in the rate domain had been performed for Simple RT task. We observed that distributions 
were very close to a Normal Distribution for the long mFP condition, but they got progressively less 
Normal with shorter mFP. This could partly be due to the effect of fast responses, which we tried to 
contain by using the STD-IQR method, but some responses may still have contaminated the dataset. In 
both the saccadic and manual RT literature, it has been hypothesized that these responses are generated 
by a different mechanism (Noorani and Carpenter, 2011; Noorani, 2014; Ratcliff, 1993; Ratcliff & 
Tuerlinickx, 2002; Ulrich & Miller, 1994), and in this work we see how this mechanism appeared to be 
connected to the mFP condition. Fitting the LATER model, a model which generates Normal 
Distribution in the rate domain, provided us with a way to compare this simple model with the more 
flexible DDM. From the results, it appeared that DDM better accounted for the observations, as it had 
a lower AIC value than the LATER model. This general result could be due to contaminant responses 
in the first two mFP conditions, and in fact the summed log likelihood values for the long mFP was 
lower for the LATER than the DDM model. The Simple RT paradigm, with its high percentage of fast 
responses, and with the possibility for the participants to base their response on either stimulus 
predictability or stimulus perception, is probably unsuited for analyses in the rate domain, and thus we 
delayed a complete examination of the next Chapter.  
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Chapter 5  
Foreperiod and Reward-to-Warning Signal 
Interval 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, we analysed the effect of FP on RT for Simple RT in the context of optimal 
decisions. We used different mFP conditions as a way to manipulate the delay across trials. In this 
Chapter, we will use a different way to manipulate the total delay across trials, by either changing the 
mFP or the mean reward-to-warning-signal interval (mRWI). We will refer to the total, average delay 
across trials (coming from the sum of mFP and mRWI) as ܦ (as illustrated in Figure 2.1). This time we 
will use a Choice RT task, to allow a more direct comparison with similar studies in the literature.  
Whereas the effect of FP on Simple RT has been well documented (see previous Chapter), only few 
studies have analysed the same effect on Choice RT: Frowein and Sanders (1978) in a 4AFC found a 
clear difference in RT between two constant FP of 1.5s and 10.5s), with an increase of about 30ms and 
a slightly lower accuracy for the long FP condition. Vallesi, Shallice and Walsh (2006) found a similar 
increase in a 2AFC with 3 FP conditions (0.5s, 1s and 1.5 sec) but the accuracy obtained was not 
reported. Similarly, Rolke & Hofmann (2007) found reduced RT and increased accuracy following 
short FP. Conversely, the already mentioned work of Jepma et al. (2012) found that RT reduced by 
approximately 52 ms with shorter FP, (by using two constant FP: 0.3s or 2.5s), and accuracy slightly 
increased for the long FP condition, in the condition where accuracy was stressed. Thus, it appears that 
manipulating the FP exert a similar effect for both Simple and Choice tasks, at least in terms of RT, 
whereas the effect on accuracy is mostly undocumented or inconsistent across these few studies.  
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The effect of increasing the delay across trials ܦ in terms of optimal decision has not been 
investigated extensively. Recall, from Section 2.6, that 3 of the 4 decision rules used here are function 
of ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ + ߬ and that by increasing ܦ௧௢௧ we expect an increase of both RT and accuracy (in terms 
of DDM, this would result in an increase in the threshold separation ܽ). The design commonly used in 
these types of studies is illustrated in Figure 2.1, bottom diagram: upon participant’s response, the trial 
automatically start after a delay (response to stimulus delay, RSI). In this design, no warning signal or 
FP is used, and changing the delay across trials correspond to changing the mean RSI time (mRSI). 
Bogacz et al. (2010) used different RSI (ܦ=0.5s, 1s, 2,s) with fixed condition length (7 minutes in the 
first experiment, 4 minutes in the second).  In the first experiment they used a random dot motion task, 
finding a significant effect on accuracy, but not on RT.  In the second task (asterisk counting task) the 
effect on RT and accuracy was generally significant, but the difference in RT between the first and 
second condition was not. When participants were segregated according to their performance, the 
empirical RT and accuracy for the good performance group closely matched the theoretical predictions 
(this experiment will be discussed again in the Chapter 8, regarding quantitative optimality predictions 
with DDM). Simen et al. (2009) also manipulated the non-decision time by changing the RSI (ܦ =0.5s, 
1s, 2s) in a 2AFC random dot motion discrimination task. Both RT and accuracy significantly increased 
with increasing RSI, as predicted if participants were aiming at optimal performance. Also, by fitting 
the Extended DDM it was showed that the parameter affected by changing RSI was the threshold 
separation, as expected. In this Chapter we aim to test a similar prediction, but with a more complicated 
design, in which different decision components can be better distinguished. 
5.1.1 Separating Stimulus Predictability and Optimization 
In this Chapter we will conduct a qualitative analysis of optimality and, in particular, on the effect 
of the delay ܦ and sensory-motor component ߬ on RT. One of the hypotheses of the previous Chapter 
was that increasing the FP would affect the threshold separation for the DDM. This stems from the fact 
that, in the context of decision rules, the threshold separation is function of ܦ௧௢௧, which is the sum of 
the delay across trial ܦ and sensory-motor component ߬ (see Figure 2.1). We found that ܽ increased 
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with increasing FP (that is, by increasing ܦ). We also found a less strong (and inconsistent across the 
two versions of DDM) effect on the ߬ parameter. However, we mentioned the possibility that the 
parameter ܽ was not actually affected because of the decision rule optimization, but because it could 
have been affected by the stimulus predictability. For Simple RT, in fact, the starting point of the process 
may as well depend on the predictability of the stimulus itself, so that if a participant knows that the 
stimulus will appear very soon, the threshold will be lowered. In the previous experiment, this appeared 
to have an effect on the threshold separation, but it may as well have an effect on the sensory-motor 
component ߬. In the previous experiment there was no way to distinguish between whether the effect 
was due to stimulus predictability or to optimality adjustment due to longer trial length. To investigate 
this point, in this experiment we will try to distinguish between the two. We used the experimental 
design illustrated in Figure 2.1 (top diagram), in which the total delay is a sum of two delays in the trial, 
the FP and the RWI. The RWI corresponds to the time after the participant’s response, and before the 
next trial starts. The warning signal at the beginning of each trial clearly indicates the separation 
between the end of the RWI and the next trial. If participants were estimating the probability of stimulus 
appearance, this estimation would start from the warning signal, not from the response at the previous 
trial. That is, the estimation process would be uniquely carried out during the FP time. Thus, during the 
RWI, there should be no “estimation process” going on, and the RWI only contributes in increasing the 
total trial time. We ran 3 blocks in which the mean FP (mFP) increases (but keeping an equal, constant 
RWI), and 3 blocks where the mRWI increases (with an equal, constant FP). To keep the design similar 
to the previous experiment, the FP in the constant RWI conditions was drawn from an exponential 
distribution (we will call this factor variable FP) and, similarly, the RWI in the constant FP conditions 
are drawn from an exponential distribution (variable RWI condition). Thus, all throughout this chapter, 
the variable RWI condition corresponds to the condition with constant FP, and the variable FP condition 
to the one with constant RWI. The sum of the constant component and the mean of the variable 
component, plus other delay in the trial due to warning signal, will be referred as delay ܦ. Hence, we 
will have 3 ܦ conditions (a more detailed explanation will be provided in the Method section). 
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Note that this design is clearly different from the one used in the previous studies (Section 5.1). In 
these works, only one delay is used (the RSI), and thus varying it would possibly affect both the stimulus 
predictability and the decision rule’s value (due to changing in the total trial delay), making it impossible 
understand whether differences in RT and accuracy were due to one or the other effect.  
An important difference from the previous experiment regards the experiment duration: whereas in 
the previous experiment we used a fixed number of trials, here we used a fixed time instead. This little 
modification appeared to make people more aware of the reward maximization task and has been 
recently used to test differences in behaviour for different RSI (see Bogacz et al., 2010; Simen et al., 
2009).   
5.1.2 Predictions in terms of DDM Parameters, RT and Accuracy 
In fitting the DDM, we have numerous variants to choose from. In our design, where we changed 
the total trial delay ܦ in two ways (by using variable FP or variable RWI), several assumptions are 
possible. For example, we can imagine that increasing the mFP will affect the motor-sensory component 
߬  (due to stimulus preparation) and the threshold ܽ  (due to decision rule’s optimization), whereas 
increasing the mRWI will only affect the latter. However, many other assumptions are possible. We 
selected 9 different variants (valid for both the Extended DDM and the Pure DDM) which appeared to 
capture the most diverse effects that such design may have on the DDM parameters. In all these models, 
we assume that the drift rate ݀ is constant for all the conditions, as the stimulus is kept the same 
throughout the whole experiment. In order to summarize these variants, we use a matrix representation 
(Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). The Table 5.1 presents the organization of the matrix representation: each 
column represents a different ܦ condition (from left to right, ܦ = 1.6ݏ, 2ݏ, 3.4ݏ), and the two rows 
represent either the constant RWI (variable FP, top row) or the constant FP (variable RWI, bottom row) 
condition. Note that each ܦ condition is a sum of the constant delay plus the mean of the variable delay 
plus 0.5ݏ delay for the warning signal. Figure 5.1 shows the associations of the parameters with the 9 
variants used. As before, different columns correspond to different ܦ condition, and the two rows 
correspond to variable FP and variable RWI respectively. In each matrix within the figure, when a 
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parameter is shown within a cell, it means that a parameter is estimated uniquely for that cell. When the 
parameter is shown on top of a column, the parameter is assumed to be the same for all the cells in that 
column (that is, for the whole ܦ condition corresponding to that column), and similarly when it is placed 
on the side of a row, it means that it will be the same for all the cells in that row (that is, for the whole 
variable FP or variable RWI condition). For example, in Model 6 we assumed a different ߬ value for 
each ܦ condition in the variable FP, but the same ߬ value for every condition of the variable RWI. Plus, 
we assumed a different ܽ value for each condition. This would result in a model with a total of 11 
parameters (4 ߬, 6  ܽ and 1 ݀). 
 We will start by describing the models in which the threshold separation ܽ is not taken into account, 
and different conditions are deemed to affect only the ߬  parameter. This may happen because 
participants are not optimizing based on ܦ௧௢௧, and the ߬ parameter varies depending on other reasons, 
for example motor preparation. We chose three variants which capture most of the scenarios.  Model 1 
shows a version in which participants sensory-motor response depends uniquely on the ܦ  factor, 
irrespectively of ܦ  increasing because of the FP or the RWI. Conversely, in Model 2, ߬  depends 
uniquely on the variable FP-RWI factor, irrespectively of the actual length of the trial ܦ.  Model 3 
presents a more intuitive possibility, in which ߬ is function of the predictability of the FP (that is, it 
increases with increase variability of the FP). Thus, different ߬ are estimated for increasing mFP, and 
another ߬ is estimated for the constant FP used in the variable RWI condition. For all of these models, 
RT should increase with increasing ߬, but accuracy should not be affected.  
If participants are maximizing a decision rule that is function of ܦ௧௢௧  (equal to ܦ + ߬), then the 
threshold separation ܽ must change depending on both ܦ and ߬. This is implemented in Models 4, 5 
and 6, in which a different ܽ is used whether ܦ, ߬ or any combination of those are changed. For example, 
in Model 4 ܽ is assumed to vary for different ܦ conditions only, as ߬ is also varied for different ܦ 
condition, and no other ܽ parameters need to be assumed.  Instead, for Models 5 and 6, we need to 
estimate a different ܽ for each cell, as either ܦ or ߬ are varying. For any of these models, RT and 
accuracy should increase when ܽ increases.  
80 
 
Finally, we use variants that stem from the previous experiment, in which we observed that longer 
FP affected ܽ, but only weakly ߬. To test for this hypothesis, we use three more Models: 7, 8 and 9, 
which mimics the Model 1-3 for ߬, but with the parameter ܽ instead.  For these models, RT and accuracy 
should increase with increasing ܽ.  
Table 5.1 Organization of the study (D is the sum of constant delay, variable delay, and warning signal delay) 
 ࡰ = ૚. ૟࢙ ࡰ = ૛࢙ ࡰ = ૜. ૝࢙ 
   ࡯ࡻࡺࡿࢀ࡭ࡺࢀ ࡾࢃࡵ = ૙. ૞࢙ ݉ܨܲ = 0.6ݏ ݉ܨܲ = 1ݏ ݉ܨܲ = 2.4ݏ 
࡯ࡻࡺࡿࢀ࡭ࡺࢀ ࡲࡼ = ૙. ૞࢙ ܴܹ݉ܫ = 0.6ݏ ܴܹ݉ܫ = 1ݏ ܴܹ݉ܫ = 2.4ݏ 
 
 
1 ߬ଵ ߬ଶ ߬ଷ  2     3    
     ߬ଵ      ߬ଵ ߬ଶ ߬ଷ 
     ߬ଶ     ߬ସ    
              
4 ߬ଵ, ܽଵ, ߬ଶ, ܽଶ ߬ଷ, ܽଷ  5     6    
     ߬ଵ ܽଵ, ܽଶ ܽଷ   ߬ଵ, ܽଵ, ߬ଶ, ܽଶ ߬ଷ, ܽଷ 
     ߬ଶ ܽସ, ܽହ ܽ଺  ߬ସ ܽସ ܽହ ܽ଺ 
              
7 ܽଵ, ܽଶ ܽଷ  8     9    
     ܽଵ,      ܽଵ ܽଶ ܽଷ 
     ܽଶ     ܽସ    
 
Figure 5.1 
Illustration of the 9 different variants used for fitting the Pure DDM and the Extended DDM. Each cell indicates one 
experimental condition: the columns correspond to different ࡰ conditions, and the row to variable FP/variable RWI conditions 
(see Table 5.1). When a parameter is indicated on the side of a row or on top of a column, it indicates that that parameter is 
fixed across the whole row/column condition. When a parameter is within a cell, it indicates that the parameter is fixed within 
that condition, but varies on the other conditions. The drift rate parameter is always considered fixed across all conditions. 
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Extended DDM and Pure DDM will be tested an all the 9 variants, whereas the LATER model will be tested on the 7, 8, and 
9 variants (as it does not have the ࣎ parameter).  
5.1.3 Aim of Experiment 5.1  
1) The main aim of this experiment is to investigate the effect of different mFP and mRWI on 
accuracy, RT, and parameters of the diffusion model so that we can understand whether participants’ 
response is affected by the delay across trial, as predicted by several decision rules, and whether this 
effect is related to the stimulus predictability or to the effect on the value of the decision rule. 
2) In the previous study we observed a peculiar relationship between the FP duration and RT (Figure 
4.5). Here we analyse the same relationship in the context of Choice RT. The comparison between FP 
and RWI duration effect will allow us to check if the decreasing relationship found for FP reflects 
participants’ stimulus predictability estimation or a modification due to a decision rule affected by delay 
across trials.  
3) As before, we are interested in comparing 3 decision models: Pure DDM, Extended DDM, and 
LATER model. We are especially interested in the prediction of the DDM models, as they can give a 
precise indication with regards to what parameters changes with different conditions.  
4) Similar to the previous Chapter, we analyse the normality of distribution in the rate domain. For 
manual Choice RT, this has been done only once (Harris et al., 2014), in a remarkably different design. 
EXPERIMENT 5.1 
5.2 Methods 
Participants. 14 participants (9 males and 5 females) took part in the experiment. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no known neurological conditions.  
Materials. The testing was conducted under constant levels of illumination. The stimuli were 
presented binocularly on a computer monitor (Sony GDM-F520) using the software E-Prime (version 
2.0.10). Participants were positioned at 63 cm from the monitor. The stimuli were Gabor patches 
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(generated with MATLAB) presented in the middle of the screen. Each patch is a vertical sine-wave 
grating multiplied by a Gaussian windows function (ߪ = 0.08°), trimmed for values lower than 0.005. 
The spatial frequency was 4 c/deg and a contrast level was 0.2. The stimuli were presented within a 
grey square window (10 cd/m2) of 5 degrees/cm. The warning signal was a cross (3.5 degrees/cm) in 
the centre of the screen which appeared for 0.5s. The rest of the monitor screen was kept dark (~0 cd/m2). 
We used 3 variable-FP blocks and 3 variable-RWI blocks. In the variable FP block, the FP duration was 
drawn from an exponential distribution truncated at 10s with mean equal to 0.6s, 1s or 2.4s, depending 
on the block. In these blocks, the RWI was kept constant at 0.5s. Similarly, in the variable RWI 
condition the RWI was composed in the same way, and the FP was kept constant at 0.5s. The order of 
block presentation was randomized. Therefore, we obtained a total of 2x3 conditions: the first factor is 
the variable FP and variable RWI, the second is the average delay length of the trial (ܦ), in seconds, 
which corresponds to the sum of mRWI, mFP, and delay due to the warning signal (0.5ݏ). For example, 
with variable FP (or variable RWI) with mean 1s, the RWI (or the FP) was kept constant with length 
0.5s, and thus ܦ was equal to 0.5s (warning signal duration) + 0.6s (mean FP duration) + 0.5s (RWI 
duration) = 1.6 seconds. Similarly, the second ܦ condition length was 2seconds, and the third was 
3.4seconds . Note that in this experiment we did not use the minimum waiting time 0.4s (in the previous 
experiment this quantity was added to the variable part of the FP). This is done to avoid anticipations, 
as observed in the short mFP condition for the previous experiment. 
Procedure. The experiment is presented as a point game. Participants were explicitly told that they 
needed not to be as accurate or as fast as possible, but they needed to earn as many points as possible. 
Each participant was tested in each one of the six blocks. The order of each block was randomized, and 
each block lasted 3 minutes regardless of participant’s speed of responses. The trial started with the 
presentation of the warning signal, which disappeared after 0.5s, followed by a black dot, used as a 
fixation point. After the FP (variable or constant depending on the condition) the dot disappeared and a 
vertical line appeared within the grey window. At the same time the Gabor patch appeared on the left 
or on the right of the vertical line. In this way, the participants knew when the stimulus appeared and 
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had only to detect its location. Participants were asked to press the Z key for left and the M key for right. 
Upon their response, the vertical line and the Gabor patch disappeared and, after a constant or variable 
RWI time (depending on the condition), the next trial began.  A correct response was followed by a 
positive feedback sound, whereas an incorrect sound was not followed by any sound. Participants 
earned 1 point for a correct response, and lost 1 point for an incorrect one. At the beginning of each 
condition, participants were given 25 points. At the end of each condition, participants were informed 
about the total score for that condition. To increase motivation, participants were informed that a £10 
prize would be awarded to the participant that earned the most. Figure 5.2 shows a schematic 
representation of the flow of the trial, and Table 5.1 (above) summarizes the different conditions used 
in this study.   
 
Figure 5.2 
Illustration of the flow of the task. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Behavioural Responses 
The percentage of error responses was low (average across condition=2%, SE=0.8%). These 
responses were excluded from the main analysis and, as before, they will be analysed separately 
(Section 5.3.2). The results in terms of median of median RT (mdRT) are shown in Figure 5.3. We ran 
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a 2-way repeated measure ANOVA and found that both manipulating the variableFP-RWI condition 
and the ܦ  condition significantly affected the median rate (for the variableFP-RWI factor: ܨଵ,ଵଷ =
19.047, ݌ < 0.001, for the ܦ factor: ܨଶ,ଶ଺ = 9.334, ݌ < 0.001); the interaction was also significant 
(ܨଶ,ଶ଺ = 6.584, ݌ < 0.005). However, from the figure, it appeared that the delay had an effect only for 
the variable FP condition, which was confirmed by the analysis of variable FP and variable RWI 
conditions separately. The effect was significant for the variable FP condition (ܨଶ,ଶ଺ = 19.341, ݌ <
0.0001). Post-Hoc analyses revealed that there was a significant difference for short and long FP 
conditions, and medium and long FP conditions (both at ݌ < 0.0001), but not between short and 
medium  FP conditions (݌ = 0.5). As suspected, the effect of ܦ in the variable RWI condition was not 
significant (ܨଶ,ଶ଺ = 1.305, ݌ = 0.288). We also segregated the participants in three different groups 
according to their performance (Section 3.1), but this did not show any obvious pattern, apart for 
slightly faster responses for the good performance group. The effect of ܦ within variable RWI on mdRT 
was not significant in any of these sub-groups, whereas the effect of ܦ  within variable FP was 
significant for all of them (at ݌ < 0.001). This increase in mdRT for different delays only in the variable 
FP condition suggests that participants were actually affected by the stimulus predictability, and not by 
the general increase of delay across trial, contrarily to what the previous experiment suggested. In fact, 
if participants were affected by the total delay ܦ in the trial, we would expect an increase for both 
variable FP and variable RWI with increasing ܦ conditions. 
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Figure 5.3 
Each circle represents the median of median (mdRT) across participants, for each condition. The lines connect the 3 ܦ 
conditions for each variable FP/variable RWI conditions. The vertical blocks represent the frequency distributions of the 
median RT for each participant. Increasing the duration of variable FP seems to be really effective in increasing the mdRT, 
whereas increasing the mean duration of the variable FP does not seem to have any significant effect. 
5.3.2 Fast Responses and Error Responses 
As before, we analysed the number of fast responses (responses shorter than 0.2s). The results are 
shown in Figure 5.4, left panel. Note how, for variable FP, the number of fast responses was much small 
than in the previous Simple RT experiment. We believe this may be partly due to the fact that the Choice 
RT design used here did not encourage anticipations, and that we eliminated the 0.4s of minimum 
waiting time from the variable FP-RWI duration, and is therefore much more difficult to predict the 
occurrence of the stimulus. The increase of fast responses for variable RWI condition is expected, as in 
this condition the FP was constant and thus the stimulus onset is much easier to predict. The number of 
errors were averaged across participants and shown in Figure 5.4, right panel. There seems to be a 
slightly lower percentage of error for the variable RWI conditions. However, none of the comparison 
resulted to be significant. 
 
Figure 5.4 
 (Left panel) Percentage of error responses for each condition, averaged across all participants. (Right panel) Percentage of 
fast responses (responses faster than 0.2s), averaged across all participants. The blue bar indicates one standard error.  
 
From the analysis of these behavioural responses, it appeared that increasing the average trial time 
ܦ had, by itself, no relevant effect, as there is basically no change in RT with increasing mRWI. 
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Remember that the decision strategies ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ are all affected by the total non-decision trial 
time ܦ, and the effect should affect the percentage of errors as well. Participants however did not seem 
to be sensitive to this factor, which may lead us to conclude that participants were not using any of the 
aforementioned decision strategies. The change in RT when increasing variable FP may be explained 
by a decrease in the motor preparation, or by a difference in the starting point of the accumulated 
information (Jepma et al., 2012). By fitting the DDM, we will be able to give a more detailed account 
for these results.  
5.3.3 Model Fitting 
The Vincentized distributions with the mean, standard deviation and skewness averaged across all 
the participants are shown in Figure 5.5. We found a significant effect of variable FP\RWI condition 
(but not of ܦ) on the standard deviation (Fଵ,ଵଷ = 13.108, p = 0.003). Neither of the two conditions had 
any effect on the skewness of the distributions.  
We fit the 9 models presented in Table 5.2 with the Pure DDM and Extended DDM. We also fit the 
LATER model. As this latter does not have the ߬ parameter, we used the last three variants (Model 7,8 
and 9) shown in Table 5.2. The best fitting model, for both Pure and Extended DDM, was Model 3: this 
is the variant with different ߬  depending on the predictability (variability) of the FP. This model 
estimated four different ߬ values: three for the three exponentially distributed FP in the variable FP 
condition, and one for the constant FP in the variable RWI condition. The second best model, with a 
very similar AIC value, was the one with different ܽ for different FP predictability (Model 9). This is 
equivalent with the previous model, but with ܽ instead of ߬. Note how, in this case, the Pure DDM 
appeared to generate a preferable fitting (lower AIC) than the more complicated Extended DDM. By 
analysing Likelihood values for individual conditions, it is clear that the Extended DDM fits the data 
slightly better, but the higher number of parameters made this model less preferable compared to the 
Pure DDM. It is possible that the Pure DDM was favoured for the Choice RT due to the lack of error 
distributions, which may have been only properly fitted by the Extended DDM (Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2009). The difference appeared to be irrelevant for this particular experiment, as both models seem to 
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favour the same variants, that is to say that they point to the same underlying explanation. The Pure 
DDM fitting is shown on top of the distributions in Figure 5.5. AIC value for each variant are shown in 
Table 5.2, and estimated parameters for the best variants are shown in Table 5.3. In this Table, the 
parameter index is referring to the corresponding index in Table 5.2, so that, for example, ߬ଶ for Model 
3 refers to the value for condition with ܦ = 2ݏ and variable FP. Note how the estimated parameters for 
both Pure and Extended DDM strongly confirmed the idea that ߬ depends on the predictability of the 
FP, as their value closely follow the FP variability. In fact, ߬ increases with increasing mFP (which 
correspond to an increase in variance) during the variable FP condition. In the variable RWI, the unique 
estimated ߬ is lower than the lower ߬ in the variable FP condition, as in this case the FP is constant.  
The LATER Model, used as a way to test the Rate-Hypothesis and compare it with the DDM, 
appear to be able to reasonably account for the data. The best Model, in this case, is the same as the 
second preferred model for the DDMs. Note that the LATER model does not have a parameter ߬ to 
model for sensory-motor delay.  
Table 5.2 Fitting results for DDM and LATER model 
Pure DDM  Extended DDM  LATER model 
 AIC df   AIC df   AIC df 
Variant 1 670.7935 5  Variant 1 676.5152 8  Variant 7 670.9422 5 
Variant 2 650.7415 4  Variant 2 656.7119 7  Variant 8 651.5873 4 
Variant 3 647.7999 6  Variant 3 653.8526 9  Variant 9 649.4133 6 
Variant 4 673.0621 7  Variant 4 679.0051 10  
Variant 5 652.1912 9  Variant 5 658.2287 12  
Variant 6 656.0217 11  Variant 6 663.3461 14  
Variant 7 670.5116 5  Variant 7 676.1423 8     
Variant 8 650.636 4  Variant 8 656.6487 7     
Variant 9 648.6185 6  Variant 9 654.6275 9     
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Table 5.3 Best models’ parameters 
Variant 3  
(Pure DDM)  
Variant 3 
(Extended DDM)  
Variant 9 
(LATER model) 
AIC 647.8   AIC 654.628  
AIC 649.413 
Ʃ ℒ 317.9   Ʃ ℒ 318.313  Ʃ ℒ 318.7066 
ࢇ 1.746  ࢇ 1.64  ࢇ૚ 0.292 
࣎૚ 0.208  ࣎૚ 0.219  ࢇ૛ 0.309 
࣎૛ 0.227  ࣎૛ 0.239  ࢇ૜ 0.335 
࣎૜ 0.25  ࣎૜ 0.26  ࢇ૝ 0.267 
࣎૝ 0.18  ࣎૝ 0.19  ࣆ 0.84 
ࢊ 5.761  ࢙࢚ 0.012  ࣌ 0.141 
   ࢙ࢠ 0.058    
   ࢊ 5.646    
   ࣁ 0.106    
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Figure 5.5 
Vincentized RT distributions. The red line corresponds to the fitting model, which in this case was the Pure DDM with free ߬ 
only along different ܦ conditions for the variable FP condition. The different sensory-motor component (߬) for the top panels 
corresponds to shifting the estimated distribution on the horizontal axis, leaving the shape unchanged. Even though the shapes 
in the top panels’ distributions do indeed vary for different ܦ conditions, the fitting procedure found the model with free ߬ and 
free ߙ to less parsimonious (higher AIC) than the fitting with only free ߬, which was then preferred.  
5.3.4 Foreperiod Duration and RT 
As in the previous experiment, we analysed the relationship between FP-RWI duration and the RT 
(see Section 4.2). In this case, however, the plot of FP-RWI duration starts from 0 instead that from 
0.4s (as 0.4s was a constant time added to the random FP in the previous study). We obtained a very 
similar result as in the previous experiment, with a sharp decrease for the shorter FP, but with no 
decrease for variable RWI (see Figure 5.6). As before, the fitting of an exponential function was clearly 
poor (average ܴଶ for variable FP was lower than 0. 5, fitting not plotted). By inspecting the data, the 
strength of the decrease in the variable FP seemed to be strongly dependent on the ܦ conditions, with 
high ܦ having an almost flat relationship.  The general findings was similar to what found in the 
previous experiments: participants appeared to base their response on the variable FP, probably trying 
to estimate ܲ(ܶ < ݐ). This would have no effect for the variable RWI condition, where the FP is 
maintained constant. The slight increase we observed for the variable FP condition, after the mean FP 
in time, is present here as well. 
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Figure 5.6 
Relationship between FP duration and RT (three top panels) and RWI and RT (three bottom panels) for each ܦ condition. The 
red-dashed line indicates the mean FP (top panels) or mean RWI (bottom panels) for that condition. Note how the rightmost 
panels are differently scaled on the horizontal axes. We can see a decreasing relationship for the variable FP condition, but no 
clear relationship for the variable RWI. This is expected, if we consider that participant are basing their response on stimulus 
expectation (recall that for variable RWI the FP is constant).  
5.3.5 Rate Distributions 
As in the previous experiment, the rate distributions were analysed by applying the STD-IQR 
method so to eliminate very fast responses. Figure 5.7 shows the original dataset and the one (with 
STD-IQR), after standardising and aggregating across all participants. The method had the largest effect 
on the variable RWI conditions. This is to be expected: as we have observed in the previous Simple RT 
experiment, as the FP variability decreases, the number of fast responses increases, and here the FP is 
constant (no FP variability) in the variable RWI conditions. The original distributions presented the 
classic peak shaped and, when the fast responses are eliminated, they appear remarkably closer to a 
Normal Distribution.  Note that for the ܦ=3.4s condition in the variable FP case, the STD-IQR method 
did not exclude any point. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the null hypothesis for a standard 
normal distribution cannot be rejected (with α = 0.01) for any of the condition with variable RWI and 
for the longer mFP duration in the variable FP condition, meaning that the standardised rate distributions 
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for these conditions were approximately normal. This topic will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
Discussion (Section 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.7 
Aggregated and standardised rate distributions for each condition. The blue lines represent the original dataset, the yellow 
lines represent the dataset after STD-IQR method for cutting contaminant responses. In each panel, there is indicated the 
amount of cut responses, and the result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For comparison, we plot a Normal Standard 
Distribution on each panel (red dashed lines). The amount of contaminants appear to decrease with increasing ܦ conditions, 
but only for the variable FP condition. No contaminant were found for the ܦ = 3.4ݏ in the variable FP condition. For the 
variable RWI condition (constant FP) the amount of contaminants did not seem to be affected by the different RWI duration.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Differences between Simple and Choice RT  
The experiment presented in this Chapter was designed to clarify the relationship between 
increasing the non-decision time of the trial ܦ and the response obtained. This parameter is  particularly 
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relevant because is shared by three decision rules (ܴܴ௠, ܴܴ and ܴܣ) and it has a simple relationship 
with responses and accuracy (increasing ܦ corresponds to an increase in response and accuracy). The 
experiment from the previous study suggested that participants were optimizing one of those decision 
strategies, as the best DDM was the one with free threshold parameter ܽ, and it also corresponded to an 
increase in response time and a (non-significant) increase in accuracy. However, manipulating the FP 
means manipulating the predictability of the stimulus as well as total non-decision time, and we 
designed the current experiment to better distinguish between the two. 
In this experiment, we replicated the result found in the earlier study about the increasing effect of 
mFP on RT, but the effect completely disappeared with variable RWI. As before, increasing the mFP 
in the variable FP condition corresponded to an increase of RT. Unfortunately, the very small number 
of errors made it impossible to capture the relationship between increasing FP and accuracy. The 
estimated ߬ parameters for both models confirmed that participants based their response on the FP 
variability, and not on the total delay across trials. In the previous experiment, however, we found that 
higher mFP affected the parameter ܽ instead of ߬. What is the reason for this difference? We propose 
two explanations 
1) In Simple RT and Choice RT, the predictability of the stimulus affects different components, as 
the two tasks are actually based on two different types of decision. The main difference is that, at the 
starting point of the DDM accumulation for Simple RT (the stimulus onset), the participants have 
already had access to some information based on how much time has passed in the trial. In the Choice 
RT case, the stimulus onset correctly represents the beginning of the perceptual process itself, as no 
information can be used to make a decision before the stimulus appeared. Thus, in Simple RT, the 
threshold separation may be conveniently varied by the participants based on the prior probability, 
depending thus on FP variability (Carpenter & Williams, 1995). On the other hand, in Choice RT tasks, 
having waited for long does not give information about which stimulus is correct, and thus there is no 
reason to adjust the threshold separation. However, in this case, it is possible that increasing the 
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variability increases participant’s preparation to respond, and thus affects the ߬ parameter. The same 
effect in Simple RT, if present at all, would be masked by the large effect of threshold adjustment. 
2) Note how the AIC value is almost identical for the version with free ܽ and free ߬, both depending 
on FP variability. As estimation process are noisy and may depend on peculiarity of the dataset, when 
two AIC are so close is very difficult to strongly favour one instead of another. It is thus possible that 
different stimulus variability affects the ܽ parameter, instead of the ߬ as usually assumed. One way to 
clarify this point would have been by employing an experiment that produced more errors, so that the 
effect of variability and delay may have been analysed (recall that increasing ܽ corresponds in an 
increase on accuracy, whereas increasing ߬ does not).  
5.4.2 Delay and Optimality  
In Section 2.7 we identified 3 levels of analysis for investigating decision strategies. In this and 
previous experiment we operated, at the same time, on the first two levels, by investigating the effect 
on RT and accuracy, and by investigating the effects in terms of DDM parameters. Even though with 
limitation, this approach can give us some interesting insights about decision rules in RT tasks. The 
main point we learnt in these two experiments is that participants did not take into account the total 
delay across trials. This finding may seem to exclude the ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ decision rules, which are 
function of ܦ௧௢௧ (which, in turn, is equal to the sum of ܦ and ߬). This result conflicts with the previous 
literature. As seen in the introduction, both Bogacz et al. (2010) then Simen et al. (2009) found an 
increasing in RT, accuracy and ܽ parameter in Choice RT by increasing the RSI. By using the present 
paradigm, we can actually explain this inconsistency: these two works, in fact, did not distinguish 
between a delay that affects temporal preparation and a delay that does not. In practice, their RSI is 
similar to the FP in that it will affect more than just the delay across trials, but temporal preparation due 
to stimulus predictability as well. This point was not considered in the aforementioned studies. The 
researchers observed that ܽ was affected by increasing delay, and concluded that this was a sign that 
participants were employing a decision rule that is function of delay. However, the threshold separation 
may be affected by variability/temporal preparation. Observing an increase in ܽ  would thus be a 
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misleading proof that a decision-strategy adjustment is taking place. With the design proposed in this 
Chapter, we provided a much more insightful interpretation of the mechanism employed by different 
participants.  
Does the fact that participants did not use the delay across trial mean that ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ are 
decisively excluded by the pool of possible decision rules used, and we should thus only focus on the 
ܤܴ decision rule? We believe that this is not the case. As we will see in the following Chapters, both 
ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ provide an excellent fit in some experimental conditions, and they may be several reasons 
why participants did not seem to be sensible to delay modification (finding confirmed in the following 
experiments). We will touch this topic again in Chapter 7, Experiment 7.1. 
5.4.3 FP-RWI Duration and RT 
By comparing this experiment with the previous one, we learned that the Simple RT and Choice 
RT have several differences, but also some similarities. Firstly, in both paradigms, there was a tendency 
to produce faster RT with longer FP (we are not referring to the mFP, which produces slower RT, but 
to the real FP duration within each mFP condition). This seemed to be uniquely affected by the FP 
condition, as there was no difference for the variable RWI task (that is, different D conditions but 
constant FP). Since this phenomenon took place for both Simple and Choice RT, it may be due to the 
temporal preparation of the participant to the stimulus onset, which depends on the probability that the 
stimulus appeared already in the past: ݌(ܶ < ݐ). If this were true, we expect the relationship to be flatter 
with longer FP, and in fact this is what we observed by inspecting the dataset: for both Simple RT and 
Choice RT, there is an evident difference between ܦ = 3.4ݏ and the two smaller values (the difference 
between ܦ=1.6sec and ܦ=2sec is however less clear, see Figure 5.6).  Unfortunately, our method for 
measuring the strength of this relationship (by fitting an exponential distribution) did not seem adequate, 
as the ܴଶ resulted to be very low and the fitting unreliable.  
5.4.4 Normality in the Rate Domain: DDM Simulations 
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As in the previous experiment, we analysed the distributions in the Rate Domain in order to check 
whether they were approximately Normal. Original distributions presented a peak similar to the one 
observed for Simple RT, which appeared to be related to FP predictability: the peak is present for all 
the three variable RWI conditions (with constant FP) and it clearly decreases for the variable FP 
conditions. In the conditions with long mFP, the distribution does not present any fast response (no 
value was cut from the STD-IQR method) and it is clearly near Normal (Figure 5.7). The same results 
were obtained for the previous experiment, in which longer (less predictable) FP generated 
approximately Normal distributions. The LATER model, in this case, fitted approximately as good as 
the DDM model, in spite of the lack of the ߬ parameter. It appears, in fact, that the initial sensory-motor 
relationship may be as well modelled by the threshold separation (ܽ) parameter instead. The fitting of 
the LATER model in the previous Chapter was however remarkably poorer than for the DDM model. 
The results from these two studies can only be speculative: the fact that distributions appeared 
approximately Normal in the rate domain cannot be used as a definitive answer to the hypothesis that 
the brain computes the rate of response and then translate it in time (Rate-Hypothesis, Section 2.4). The 
main reason is that it may be very difficult to distinguish between a Normal distribution and a rate 
distribution generate by the DDM. It is believed (Ratcliff & Reddi, 2001) that a DDM can generate a 
“reasonably” Normal Distribution in the rate domain, but a deep investigation has not been performed 
yet. Of course, the distribution will mathematically not be Normal in the rate domain, but it is possible 
that with small sample a Kolmogorov Smirnov test may not exclude Normality. This is exactly what 
we tested. We ran a set of simulations with the Pure DDM and Extended DDM, for both the one-
boundary and two-boundary version (Simple and Choice RT). We simulated 15 participants and, in turn, 
varied each one of the parameters of the model: ܽ, ߬ and ݀ for the Pure DDM; ܽ, ߬, ݀, ߟ, ݏ௭ and ݏ௧ for 
the Extended DDM; but we did not use ݏ௭ (the variability across trials for the starting point), for the 
one-boundary version of Extended DDM, to replicate what normally done in the literature. When not 
changed, the parameters for each participant were drawn from a normal distribution (truncated at 0) 
which means that they were equal to the values shown in Table 5.4, with standard deviation equal to 
0.1 (this was done to simulate individual variations). The mean values used for each participant were 
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similar to the one found in the literature and in the present experiments. We run the simulation for 
different samples (ܰ = 20, 50, 100 and 200) corresponding to the number of simulated trial each 
participant performed in each condition. Each one of this simulation was repeated 30 times.  
Table 5.4 Values used in the DDM simulations 
Mean value parameters for the 
Pure/Extended DDM 
Range  
ࢇ 1.5 [0.2 … 5] 
࣎ 0.1 [0 … 0.4] 
ࢊ 2 [2 … 10] 
ࣁ 0.05 [0 … 0.2] 
࢙ࢠ 0.05 [0 … 0.2] 
࢙࢚ 0.05 [0 … 0.2] 
After we generated the results, we run the STDI-QR method, standardised and aggregated the 
distributions, and we ran the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We use the resulting p-value as a way to test 
distribution normality: higher value means that normality could not be excluded. Pure/Extended DDM 
for both Simple and Choice RT gave the same outcome: for ܰ = 20 and ܰ = 50, for the “reasonable 
parameter range” (that is, parameters usually found in the literature), the distributions appeared to be 
approximately Normal, so that a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test would not have rejected normality. For 
example, Figure 5.8 shows the results for the parameters of the two-boundary version of the Pure DDM. 
The results for the other parameters of both Pure DDM and Extended DDM are similar, both for the 
one and two boundaries versions. Figure 5.9 shows an example of the distribution shape in the rate 
domain for a certain parameter combination, in a two-boundary Pure DDM, for different sample size. 
A standard Normal Distribution is plotted on top. The distributions are generally slightly skewed on the 
right side, but the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not detect it when the sample size is too small, so that 
normality was not excluded in those cases. It seemed that the minimum sample size to detect non-
normality in DDM is between 100 and 200 trials. 
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Figure 5.8 
P-value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with aggregated and standardised rate distribution to a normal distribution, with 
varying parameter ܽ, ߬ or ݀. We used the Pure DDM and simulated 15 participants with 4 possible dataset size (N). When each 
one of these parameters were varied, the others were kept the same according to Table 5.4. We repeated each simulation 30 
times. The vertical bar on each line indicates one standard error. Each line measure, informally, how likely is that the resulting 
distribution may be mis-identified as a Normal Distribution. The dashed horizontal green lines in each panel indicate the ݌ =
0.005, the dashed horizontal red lines indicate ݌ = 0.001. Note that, with small sample from each participants, most of the 
parameters will bring a mis-identification of the RT distribution (blue and orange line). Whereas both ܽ and ߬ have a clear 
effect on the distributio nshape (increasing them will make the distribution less normal), the parameter ݀ does not seem to 
have a relevant effect on the shape of the distribution, at least with the chosen set of parameters. 
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Figure 5.9 
Typical resulting distribution from a set of simulated participants with parameters indicated in the left-most panel. Different 
panels indicate different sample sizes (N). Note that the sample size does not correspond to the size of the shown dataset, but 
to the size of the sample from each single participant (we used 15 simulated participants). The p-value indicated on each panel 
corresponds to the value obtained by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and corresponds to the probability that the sample is drawn 
from a Normal Distribution. Note how, by increasing the sample size, the distribution become clearly not normal and the test 
correctly detects it. However, with small sample size, like the one generally used in RT experiments, the test does not reject 
the null-hypothesis.  
 
To compare this simulated results with the empirical observation, note that the number of samples 
for each condition was 60 for Experiment 4.1, and 40-90 for the Experiment 5.1 (remember that in this 
latter experiment the time was fixed so that the number of responses depended on participant’s speed). 
According to our simulation, this sample size may not have been enough to differentiate between a real 
Normal Distribution and the distribution generated by a DDM.  We, therefore, tried to collapse together 
all the standardised distributions from the Simple RT experiment in the previous Chapter, in the long 
mFP condition (the one that was less affected by fast responses), in order to have a unique dataset of 
3600 observations and ran the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on this dataset. This results in a ݌ = 0.0239, 
meaning that the Normality can be rejected at ߙ = 0.05 but not at ߙ = 0.01. Again, this ambiguous 
results did not allow us to provide with a specific answer to the Rate-Hypothesis. The importance of 
the Rate-Hypothesis will be discussed again in the General Discussion in Chapter 9.  
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Chapter 6  
Preliminary EXACT Paradigm 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous two experimental Chapters, we have used a Classic RT paradigm to investigate the 
connection between experimental conditions (contrast, FP, RWI) and empirical behaviour, mostly in 
terms of RT distributions and accuracy. We have applied the two most successful sequential sampling 
models, the Pure and Extended DDM, and estimated the parameters of such models, in order to make 
inference about the decision strategy used by the participants. As explained in Chapter 2, we focused 
on 4 different decision strategies: Reward Rate (ܴܴ), modified Reward Rate (ܴܴ௠), Reward/Accuracy 
(ܴܣ) and Bayes Risk (ܤܴ). Three of these strategies are functions of the total non-decision time ܦ௧௢௧ , 
and we modified this experimental parameter by either changing the FP or the RWI. Whereas we had 
obtained some interesting results by merely looking at the RT and accuracy, most of the information 
about what decision stage is affected by different conditions is given by the estimated parameters, which 
depend on the sequential sampling model used (DDM in our case). In this and the following Chapter, 
we develop a way to investigate decision strategies without having to rely on any particular assumption 
about the underlying mechanism. In particular, this Chapter will focus on the introduction of a new 
experimental paradigm, which will be exploited more deeply in the next Chapters.  
6.1.1 Perceptual Process and Decision Rules 
Decision-making can be conceptually broken down into two components: a perceptual process and 
a decision rule. The perceptual process is the mechanism that accumulates information and thus 
increases accuracy in order to decide between different alternatives, whereas the decision is used to 
decide when enough accumulation has been gathered (enough accuracy has been reached) for the 
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desired outcome. These two components are related: a decision rule depends on the accumulated 
accuracy, which depends on the perceptual model. For this reason, decision strategies and perceptual 
process have always been analysed together and the perceptual model used usually is the DDM (mostly 
the Pure version, Bogacz et al., 2006; Simen et al., 2009; Bogacz et al., 2010; Zacksenhous et al., 2010; 
Balci et al., 2011; for a comparison between DDM and linear ballistic accumulator in optimality see 
Goldfarb et al., 2014; for a review see Holmes and Cohen, 2014).  The classic approach consists of (1) 
collect data from a classic RT experiment; (2) assume a perceptual model (DDM used almost 
universally); (3) based on the assumed perceptual process, test different decision rules (the most tested 
rules are ܴܴ and ܴܴ௠). We stress that the reason to assume a particular perceptual process is that it is 
necessary to have a way to relate the speed of response with the accuracy, that is, the speed-accuracy 
function ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ), where ܦܶ is the time of response in which an increase in accuracy is present (to be 
distinguished with the sensory-motor component, the part of the response in which no accuracy is 
accumulated). The ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) is assumed to be dependent on experimental conditions such as stimulus 
strength and number of alternatives. Some qualitative predictions can be made without assuming any 
perceptual model. For example, by assuming a simple, monotonically increasing ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ), we can 
predict that the RT and accuracy will increase by increasing average trial length, as done in previous 
experiments. However, to obtain quantitative predictions, an exact equation of ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) has to be 
found, and this is generally provided by the assumed perceptual process.  
This leads to a problem when the researcher is interested in the decision strategy: what perceptual 
process should be assumed? As we have seen in Section 2.2, there is a myriad of perceptual processes, 
and they all generate different ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) and, therefore, different predictions for different decision rule. 
When a decision rule appears not tocapture the empirical behaviour, the researcher is left to wonder 
whether this depends on the assumed perceptual process or on the decision strategy itself. Theoretically 
this problem could be solved by testing several perceptual models and check which one gives better 
results; however, given the high number of different models, and the fact that fitting them can sometime 
be a complicate process that involve choosing between several variants, this is rarely done in practice. 
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Moreover, it would always be possible to assume that an unknown perceptual process may give a better 
explanation for the data.  
6.1.2 The EXACT Paradigm: Preliminary Version 
For these reasons, we explored a new experimental paradigm in which there is no need to assume 
a perceptual model. The general idea is that the experimenter controls the speed-accuracy function 
(ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)) directly by “hard-coding” this function inside the experimental design. The participant is 
asked to press a key whenever she wants. A reward (in term of points) is given with probability 
ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ). We also introduce a punishment, given whenever the reward is not given. The participant’s 
accuracy will therefore not depend on an endogenous process that accumulates information (like the 
DDM assumed previously), but on the ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) function hard-coded within the paradigm: the task is 
an EXogenous ACcumulation Task (EXACT). The participant is informed that the accuracy function 
is always increasing, and thus waiting more increases the probability of obtaining a reward, but no other 
information about the ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) is given (that is, the participant does not have direct access to the 
speed-accuracy function used in the task). We also limit the length of the condition. In this way, the 
participant has to decide between waiting more to increase the probability of obtaining a reward 
(corresponding to lower probability of getting a punishment), but resulting in less trials, or respond 
quickly, which would correspond in a lower probability of getting a reward (higher probability of a 
punishment), but would also result in a higher number of trials available. Finally, a pause between trials 
can be used. By using this design, all the parameters of the decision rules that we considered can be 
experimentally varied. Note that, with this paradigm, we can actually calculate the optimal response to 
earn as many points as possible by using ܴܴ௠ and setting ݍ (one of the parameter of the ܴܴ௠, referring 
to the emphasis on accuracy) equal to the punishment/reward ratio used (in terms of points): ܴܴ௠ is 
the optimum strategy if the participants wants to earn as many points as possible. However, it is totally 
possible that participants subjective ݍ is different from the experimental ݍ. For example, participants 
may be very loss aversive, so they would have a strong emphasis on accuracy, or risk prone, and 
emphasize speed instead. In which case, if participants were responding according to ܴܴ௠ , their 
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response will be suboptimal in terms of point, but will be optimal in terms of the subjective ݍ that they 
were using.  
Note that, whereas for the DDM there is a distinction between ܦܶ (the part of the response in which 
accuracy increases) and ߬ (part of the response without increase in accuracy), and ܴܶ = ܦܶ + ߬, in our 
case this distinction lose its meaning, as the accuracy increases from the beginning of the trial until 
response, even during the sensory-motor processing part. Thus, ܦܶ = ܴܶ, and we will refer to the 
speed-accuracy function as ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) instead of ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ). Also, recall that the non-decision delay 
across trial, ܦ௧௢௧, is equal to ߬ + ܦ. In this paradigm the ߬ parameter does not have any meaning, and 
the delay across trial will be simply referred as ܦ (ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ).  
Recall from Section 2.7 that we distinguish 3 levels of analysis of optimal decision strategies, where 
we stress how quantitative prediction can be obtained only by assuming a particular perceptual process, 
but at the price of complex models and difficulty in the fitting process. By using this new paradigm, we 
can reach the same level of analysis, without having to fit any perceptual process, but by fitting the 
decision rules directly.  
6.1.3 Exponential Speed-Accuracy Function 
The main idea behind this paradigm is to hard-code the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function within the experimental 
design, so that the researcher does not have to infer it by assuming a certain perceptual model. Similar 
to the experiment in the previous Chapter, this paradigm is designed as a point game: upon keypress at 
time ݐ , the participant wins X reward points with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  and loses Y points with 
probability 1 − ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (in practice, X points are assigned with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) and, if the 
points are not won, the tokens are taken away instead), where ܴܶ is the time from the beginning of the 
trial until participant’s response. After a response, a pause may be inserted (to affect the parameter ܦ 
of the decision rule), and then a new trial starts. To model ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) we used a simple, monotonically 
increasing function, with enough flexibility to simulate the real ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) for several experimental 
designs:  
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 ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) = 1 + (ߙ − 1)exp (−ߣݐ) ܧݍ. 6.1 
So that 
ܴܶ(ܣܥܥ) = − ln ൬
ܣܥܥ − 1
ߙ − 1
൰ /ߣ 
Where ߣ controls how fast the function grows and ߙ is the value at ݐ = 0 (the probability of a 
correct response when no information is collected). Figure 6.1 shows several ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) functions with 
different ߣ and ߙ. These two parameters can be compared to different experimental designs in a classic 
RT task: different ߣ match to different task difficulty (by changing stimulus intensity, stimulus contrast, 
etc. where easier task corresponds to higher ߣ) whereas ߙ may be related to the number of alternatives: 
ߙ = 0.5 represents a 2AFC, ߙ = 0.25 a 4AFC (this interpretation is not free of ambiguity, as will be 
explained in Section 7.2). Note that with this formulation it is also possible to explore more complicated 
design, such as ߙ = 0.75, which in a classic RT task may be designed as a task with 4 alternatives and 
3 correct choices. For this chapter we set ߙ = 0.  
 
Figure 6.1 
The speed-accuracy function (ܣܥܥ(ܴ ) used for the preliminary EXACT Paradigm (Equation 6.1). Increasing ߣ corresponds 
to an increase in the steepness of the function, such that a certain level of accuracy is reached in less time. Increasing ߙ 
corresponds to a shifting of the starting point, which, informally, corresponds to changing the number of alternatives in a 
Classic RT task. 
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6.1.4 Prediction for Exponential ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) 
By knowing exactly the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function, we can easily calculate the prediction for each one of 
the four decision rules used in this work. This was presented in Section 3.6 and is reproduced here for 
convenience in Table 6.1 (note that, in this case, ܦܶ = ܴܶ and ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ).  
Table 6.1 Decision Rules and Optimum Decision Time for exponential ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) 
Decision Rules Optimum decision time (ܴܶ
∗), using 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) = 1 + (ߙ − 1) ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܴܶ) 
 
ܤܴ = −ൣܴܶ + ݍ൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)൯൧ ܴ ஻ܶோ∗ =  −
݈݊ ൬ 1ߣݍ(1 − ߙ)൰
ߣ
 
ܴܴ = ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)/(ܴܶ + ܦ) ܴ ோܶோ∗ = −ܦ௧௢௧ −
ିܹଵ ൬
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ − 1)
ߙ − 1 ൰ + 1
ߣ
 
ܴܣ = ܴܴ −
ݍ
ܦ௧௢௧
൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)൯ No Explicit Form 
ܴܴ௠ =
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) − ݍ൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)൯
ܴܶ + ܦ
 ܴ ோܶோ೘
∗ = −ܦ −
ିܹଵ ൬
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ − 1)
(ߙ − 1)(ݍ + 1)൰ + 1
ߣ
 
 
Each one of these rules (left column) specified what is the “value” to maximise for each ܴܶ, given 
a certain accuracy function. The optimum response time ܴܶ∗ is simply the time at which the value is 
maximized (right column of Table 6.1, see Appendix for derivation). Similar to what done Section 2.8 
where we analysed the predictions in terms of ܴܶ, accuracy and threshold parameter when the DDM is 
assumed, here we will analyse the prediction given the Exponential ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) in Equation 6.1.  The 
predicted optimum response (ܴܶ∗) values are shown in the left column of Figure 6.2, as a function of 
ߣ  for different parameters values, and the right column shows the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗)  value (the reached 
accuracy level upon optimal responding). There is a monotonic relationship between ܦ௧௢௧ , ߙ, ݍ  and 
ܴܶ∗.  The relationship with ߣ is more complicated: the optimum responses is 0 when ߣ is 0, as the 
stimulus does not give any information (the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) is flat). By increasing ߣ, the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) assume 
an increasing shape, so it become convenient to wait and accumulate information. After a certain point, 
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when the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function is very steep, and the participant can start responding faster. With ߣ 
approaching infinity, the accuracy reaches 1 instantly, and the optimum responses goes to 0. This is the 
general pattern for ܴܣ, ܴܴ and ܤܴ. However, as Figure 6.2 shows, for ܴܴ௠ the relationship is slightly 
more complex. For ܴܴ௠, in some particular conditions, ܴܶ∗ goes to infinity when ߣ goes to infinity. 
This happens when ߙ < ௤
௤ାଵ
 (see Appendix for proof). Coincidentally, the ܴܴ௠ is particularly relevant 
as it is the only criteria that maximizes the gain for a task (included but not limited to the EXACT 
paradigm) with a fixed task duration, in terms of subjective utility value (Harris et al., 2014). This 
property allows ܴܴ௠ to generate Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape (see next Section). We also notice 
the great similarities in terms of ܴܶ∗ between ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ. However, note how ܴܣ produce a very 
peculiar ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) shape.   
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Figure 6.2 
Optimal response time, ܴܶ∗ (left column) and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗) (right column) vs. ߣ for the four decision rules, with different 
parameters ݍ  and ܦ௧௢௧  . ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗) indicates the optimum level of accuracy that has to be reached upon responding to 
maximize a particular decision rule. The arrows indicate how the shape changes when the ܦ௧௢௧ or ݍ parameter is increased. 
The ݍ parameter represents the subjective punishment/reward ratio; the ܦ௧௢௧ parameter represents the total non-decision time 
of the trial (sum of experimental delay and sensory-motor component, (ܦ + ߬). Increasing ݍ or increasing ܦ௧௢௧ corresponds to 
an increase in the optimum response time (ܴܶ∗) and a consequent increase of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗). For the modified Reward Rate 
(second row from the top), two very different ܴܶ∗ shapes are produced with different combinations of ݍ and α (the starting 
point of the gauge). We refer to the shapes indicate by the black line as Piéron’s shape, the others as non-Piéron’s shape.  
6.1.5 Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s Shape with Exponential ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) 
We showed in Section 2.10 that ܴܴ௠, with some peculiar parameters, produces a relationship that 
is practically indistinguishable with Piéron’s Law. Recall that Piéron’s Law (Section 2.9) relates the 
stimulus strength with the mean RT (ܴ݉ܶ = ߛ + ݇ܫିఉ). Here, the stimulus strength can be interpreted 
as the ߣ parameter in Equation 6.1 and thus ܴ݉ܶ = ߛ + ݇ߣିఉ). However, for some ܴܴ௠ parameters, 
and for all the other decision rules, the relationship had a Piéron’s shape only if considered from a point 
further than the maximum of the ܦܶ∗ curve (Figure 2.5 and 2.6 in Section 2.10). Now that we have 
presented the mathematical formulation of the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) , we can more precisely specify what 
parameters need to be changed to produce Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s Law.  
In the Appendix, we show that when ߙ < ௤
௤ାଵ
,  ܴܴ௠  produces Piéron’s-shape curves, whereas 
when ߙ > ௤
௤ାଵ
, the relationship does not follow a Piéron’s Law for all level of stimulus strength ߣ: with 
very low level of ߣ the optimum response ܴܶ∗ decreases, and Piéron’s Law does not hold. For all these 
cases, a Piéron’s Law can still be fitted, if low values of ߣ are excluded (Figure 2.5).  This is particularly 
interesting, since in all the past experiments with Piéron’s Law focused on stimulus strength (see 
Section 2.9 for the literature on Piéron’s Law), the non-Piéron’s shape was never observed, even though 
is predicted with almost all experimental conditions and decision rules. Our framework can easily 
explain why this has never been reported, at least for ܴܴ௠: recall that ߙ may be interpreted as the 
number of alternatives (so that a 2AFC task corresponds to an ߙ = 0.5), and ݍ corresponds (for ܴܴ௠) 
to the subjective punishment/reward ratio. This means that, in a 2AFC task, the non-Piéron’s shape will 
be obtained when ݍ < 1, which means that the punishment would need to have a lower subjective 
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magnitude than the reward. This would require the researcher to give an extremely high reward, or 
decrease the penalty for incorrect responses. In all the Piéron’s studies, however, incorrect responses 
are highly penalized, and we believe that this is the reason why the non-Piéron’s shape has never been 
observed. In Chapter 7 we will see how, within the EXACT Paradigm, both shape can be generated by 
manipulating ߙ. In Chapter 8 we investigate the effect of manipulating ݍ with the EXACT Paradigm 
and compare it with a similar Classic RT paradigm to see if, as predicted by ܴܴ௠, we can produce 
Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape by varying ݍ.  
As a final remark, we stress again the fact that, though theoretically only ܴܴ௠  can produce a 
Piéron’s shape, observing such shape does not indicate uniquely that the participants are using ܴܴ௠: 
ܴܴ, ܴܣ and ܤܴ may also be fitted to Piéron’s Law, as until a certain point they may appear to increase 
with decreasing stimulus strength. It may be difficult to distinguish between a shape that is really 
growing to infinity when ߣ goes to 0, and a shape that keeps growing with extremely low values of ߣ, 
before decreasing suddenly. Observing a Piéron’s shape cannot be the definitive indicator that the 
ܴܴ௠ rule is employed, and a quantitative fit to the model is still necessary.  
6.1.6 Comparison with Classic RT Task 
The EXACT Paradigm can be interpreted as an abstract version of a Classic RT task. The use of 
the exponential, monotonically increasing ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), makes it possible to perform several comparisons 
between this and Classic RT tasks, and in fact several predictions are similar to the ones generated by 
a DDM. However, there are some relevant differences: firstly, the EXACT Paradigm does not allow a 
real choice between different alternatives. This means that investigating biases towards alternative is 
not possible (see Section 7.2). Secondly, according to most perceptual models, the process of increasing 
information is noisy, whereas in our case is a continuous increasing function, which make us lose some 
important phenomena, such as investigating errors that are slower than correct responses (e.g. Luce, 
1986, Ratcliff & McKoon, 2009, Leite, 2012): in our paradigm, on average, correct responses are always 
slower. In spite of these limitations, we still believe that this approach may lead to a better analysis of 
decision rules. Plus, these limitations are balanced by the possibility of having designs that are 
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impossible with Classic RT tasks: e.g. the already mentioned ߙ > 0.5 and the possibility of varying 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ). Furthermore, note how by using a standardised ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) we do not have to be worried about 
the noise introduced by different participants’ visual skills: even assuming the same ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function 
across different individuals, in a Classic RT brightness detection task, the same stimulus may produce 
different steepness (in terms of their accuracy functions) depending on different participants’ visual 
acuity (we are going to see this effect in the second experiment of Chapter 8). By using a standardised 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), we overcome the problem of individual differences in task skills/visual ability, and we can 
focus on the analysis of individual decision strategies. Finally, we want to stress how the EXACT 
Paradigm, despite being similar and comparable with Classic RT task, is not supposed to mimic exactly 
such tasks. The main aim of this paradigm is to provide an experimental framework to investigate 
decision rules. Thus, we do not deem the fact that some phenomena observed in Classic RT are not 
reproducible as an invalidating flaw for the EXACT Paradigm.  
EXPERIMENT 6.1 
Compared to the previous experiments, the study in this Chapter has to be seen like an “exploratory” 
investigation. Since we were using a new experimental design, our main focus was not only to test some 
particular hypothesis, but to see in general the feasibility of such design, how participants responded to 
it, and if it can be consistently applied to investigate complex decisions. We kept the design very simple 
by having two conditions in which we vary uniquely the delay. Similarly to the past Chapters, we are 
going to check whether participants change their response based on the average trial length (ܦ), and we 
do this by varying the time across trials. Also, as we used only two conditions, we refrain from fitting 
specific decision rules. More complex design, coupled with quantitative fitting, will be presented in the 
next Chapters. We are particularly interested in stability of responses, and if participants are generally 
responsive to different experimental conditions. We will discuss the limitations of this design and 
suggest an improvement upon it, which will be implemented in Chapter 7 and 8.  
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6.2 Methods 
Instructions. To better understand what type of instructions to use, we firstly ran a pilot version of 
this study in which the participant were told that they could press the key at any time, and a reward was 
given to them with a certain increasing probability and, when a reward was not given, a punishment 
was given instead. The reward probability corresponded to the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) presented in Equation 6.1, but 
they were not informed about the exact shape of this function. The problem with this approach was that 
participants often thought that the reward and punishment followed some complicate schedule that they 
had to learn (for example, they needed to response one time fast, the second time slow, alternatively, 
along all trials). In order to solve this problem, we tried to convey a different mental framing, by using 
different instructions: we told participants that an invisible stimulus appeared after some time, and that 
they had to respond whenever they thought the stimulus appear*. This design conveyed the idea that the 
more they waited, the more likely they were to obtain a correct response, without the presence of any 
hidden pattern. The idea was that, after several trials, and after obtaining several reward and punishment, 
they could learn the function that ruled the task. 
We recruited 30 (12 males, 18 females) participants to take part in this study. Each participant 
underwent 2 training sessions and one main experimental session. 
Training Sessions. In order to reinforce the idea that participant had to respond to an invisible 
stimulus, and not trying to figure out a random pattern concealed to them, we ran the first training 
session where a real stimulus was present.  In the first training session, lasting one minute, participants 
                                                     
 
* Note that giving a reward at time ܴܶ according to a probability specified by ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), or giving a reward for 
responses made after time ܺ randomly distributed according to ௗ஺஼஼(௧)
ௗ௧
, are exactly equivalent, as ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) can be seen as a 
cumulative distribution (in our, a cumulative exponential distribution). Thus, the design that we explained to them was 
mathematically equivalent to the one that we were using in the code. 
111 
 
were asked to respond to a stimulus (a circle appearing on the monitor) as fast as possible. The circle 
appeared randomly according to an exponential distribution with mean equal to 2.5seconds (ߣ = ଵ
ଶ.ହ
=
0.4, ߙ = 0). After the participant responded, the next trial began instantly (ܦ = 0). Overall, this was 
just a Simple RT task with a stimulus well above threshold. In this way, we tried to convince participants 
that the appearing of the stimulus was random and did not follow any complex pattern, as they thought 
in the pilot study. After this, in the second training session, we told participants that now the stimulus 
was not going to be visible (they had to estimate when it had appeared), and press a button when they 
think it had so. In this case we, set ߣ = 1, ߙ = 0.  Upon participant response, the reward was given 
(points assigned) with probability equal to ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), where ܴܶ was the time from the beginning of the 
trial until the response. When the reward was not given, the punishment was given instead (points taken 
away). For this training session we used a delay ܦ between trials of 1 second. This training session 
lasted one minute.  
Procedures and Materials. The main study was similar to the second training session: upon 
response, participants received a reward with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) , otherwise they received a 
punishment. As before, ߣ = 1, ߙ = 0. We used two delay conditions: ܦ = 0ݏ or ܦ = 2.5ݏ, and ran one 
12 minutes session for each condition. The reward and the punishment were set to 1 point, and each 
participant started each block with 25 points. With these parameters, if participants were trying to 
maximize the amount of point earned during each session, then the difference in RT between the two 
ܦ conditions should be of 0.8 seconds (calculated using the ܴܴ௠ function). We used a timeout of 10 
seconds, whereupon a punishment was given, but it was rarely reached by any participants. To increase 
incentive, the total amount of points earned was exchanged for money at the end of the experiment, at 
the rate of 2 points for 1 penny. If any participant went below 0 points, their score was set to 0. We also 
used a negative sound feedback when an error was made. The point earned or lost in the last trial was 
showed at all time on the screen (e.g. +1 or -1), along with the total score for each session.  These two 
numbers were shown in red if the last trial resulted in a punishment and in green if it resulted in a reward. 
The monitor also showed a progressing gauge aimed to help the participant to keep track of the passing 
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of time. The gauge was empty at the beginning of each trial, and filled up linearly with time, reaching 
its maximum at 10 seconds. The gauge did not have any relationship with the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (as in the real 
EXACT Paradigm, presented in the next Chapter). Finally, the screen also showed the time left in the 
session (in minutes). In the condition with ܦ > 0, from a trial to another we introduced a delay of ܦ 
seconds. During this delay, the gauge disappeared and a “Please Wait” writing appeared instead. All 
the other information stayed on the screen. An example of the monitor screen seen by the participant 
during a trial is shown in Figure 6.3. In this case, we can see that the trial started from some time (as 
the gauge is not completely empty), with 2 minutes left in the session, 23 points in total for this session 
and the last trial resulted in an error with a punishment of 1.   
 
Figure 6.3 
Illustration of what is shown to the participant on the monitor screen.  The gauge linearly (the green horizontal bar) increases 
with time until the timeout is reached. The red numbers indicate the outcome of the previous trial (on top) and the total score 
for the current condition (on the bottom). The number of minutes left in the condition is also indicated.  
 
Analysis. We calculated the optimum response for each condition, in which optimum is defined as 
earning as many points as possible. The optimum response ܴܶ∗ is obtained by calculating the maximum 
of ܴܴ௠ with ݍ = 1 (recall that, in ܴܴ௠, ݍ corresponds to the punishment/reward ratio, which in this 
experiments are both equal to 1). By applying similar reasoning, we can calculate the expected score 
given the optimum performance. As this is a probabilistic task, participants may sometime earn slightly 
more than the expected score. Given an optimum response ܴܶ∗, we can obtain the optimum accuracy 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗) by applying Equation 6.1.  
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We will analyse the response both in terms of RT and in terms of ܣܥܥ(ܴ  (the accuracy 
corresponding to participants’ response). For the RT, we calculated the median of the median of 
responses for each participant and each condition (mdRT). For the ܣܥܥ(ܴ , we calculated the median 
of the median of the accuracy for each response, participant and condition.  
6.3 Results 
We excluded one participant as a clearly uncooperative (his responses were extremely long, over 3 
standard deviations over the mean). For the remaining participants, we compared the optimum expected 
score (expected amount of point at the end of each condition, given that participants were actually trying 
to maximise the amount of point earned, see Methods above) for each one of the two conditions with 
the effective gross by each participant (Figure 6.4). Note that in the figure we add a horizontal noise to 
make easier to distinguish amongst different participant’s data points. Most of the participants appeared 
to be far away from the theoretical optimum for the first ܦ condition, but closer for the second condition.  
 
Figure 6.4 
The empty circles represent the points obtained for each participant for the two ܦ conditions. The filled circles represent the 
expected average score with optimum performance (calculated with ܴܴ௠). Noise on the horizontal axes is added to increase 
readability. Participants appeared to be responsive to the changing of the condition, but they were consistently sub-optimal.  
6.3.1 Response to Feedback 
Another way to analyse participant’s response to the task is to observe the change in their response 
after a punishment or after a reward. As the participants knew that the more they waited, the more likely 
they were to receive a reward, we expected a slowing down of RT after a punishment and a speed up 
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after a reward. For each participant and each condition, we calculated the difference between RT 
corresponding to the response after a reward and the previous RT, and compute the change to when a 
reward or punishment was received. The results show that, as predicted, there was an average speed up 
of responses of about 0.025seconds after a reward. By applying the same procedure to the responses 
after punishments, we obtained a slowing down of about 0.45 seconds. We did not found any relevant 
difference between the two ܦ conditions. The difference in absolute terms of the speed up compared to 
the slowing down can be due to the much higher number of obtained rewards than punishment: this 
made possible for the participants to adjust more finely the response after a reward, and more decisively 
after a (rare) punishment. 
It is possible that the change in response after a reward/punishment depended on the RT length 
itself. For example, a participant that is producing a series of very long RT, after a punishment, may not 
adjust her response as much as a participant which produced a series of very short RT. We ran this 
analysis by dividing the RT into 10 bins for each participant and calculated the average adjustment in 
response after a reward/punishment for each bin. The small number of punishments for some 
participants and some bin range made this analysis problematic. Furthermore, as different participants 
have different RT ranges (and the bin were calculated respectively to each participant’s range of 
response), the analysis for the reward was also difficult to interpret. By visual inspection of individual 
participant’s change of response across different time bin, we could not detect any interesting pattern. 
It appears that either a more sophisticated approach is needed here, or participants were not actually 
adjusting their response based on the speed of the response itself.  
6.3.2 Response Signal Analysis 
As this was an exploratory study, we were interested in checking the stability of responses along 
each one of the two conditions. Firstly, we analysed the RT and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) for each participant and each 
condition along the time of the trial (we call this time series the response signal). Not only the results 
were remarkably variable from a participant to another, but they were variable also within participants. 
For example, the top panels of Figure 6.5 shows a fairly stable response signal (in terms of RT 
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and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)) for ܦ = 0ݏ, with a small non-linear trend when ܦ = 2.5ݏ. However, bottom panels of 
Figure 6.5 show a very different pattern, with participant suddenly shifting response speed for ܦ = 0ݏ, 
and following a more complex strategy for ܦ = 2.5ݏ. There are several different trends and complex 
patterns in the dataset obtained in this study.  We applied the sequential t-test analysis of regime shift 
by using the STARS method (Rodionov and Overlan, 2005, see Chapter 3 for Methods) which returns 
the regime shift index for each participant and each condition, indicating the number of shifts in the 
time series and the magnitude of those shifts (scaled by the standard deviation). This gives us an idea 
of how often participants changed their strategy and how stable their response was. We can then 
compare these values with those from the Classic RT experiment and from the other EXACT paradigm 
studies (in the next Chapters). Note that we applied STARS on the RT, but applying to the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) 
led to very similar results. Figure 6.5 shows the position in time and the magnitude of the detected 
regime (magenta lines). By visual inspection it appears that STARS correctly classified the response 
time for both signals, detecting less than 5 shift changes for each session in the top panels of Figure 
6.5a and many more for the signal in the bottom panels of Figure 6.5.  
The result of this analysis revealed that there were many more changes of strategy for the ܦ = 0ݏ 
condition (average num. of detected shift index across individuals was 11.23, STD=4.454) than for the 
ܦ = 2.5ݏ condition (with an average of 5.66 shift index, STD=2.630). The magnitude of the shift 
(calculated by averaging the absolute value of the SI grouped across all participants) was more variable, 
with a mean of 0.72 and 0.82 and a STD of 0.69 and 0.81 (for ܦ = 0ݏ and 2.5s, respectively).  
116 
 
 
Figure 6.5 
Response Signal for two selected participants, for the two conditions. The blue lines represent the response in terms of RT 
(left vertical axes), the orange lines represent the response in terms of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (right vertical axes, see Equation 6.1 for the 
relationship between RT and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)). The blue dots on the lines correspond to error responses. The magenta lines are the 
result of STARS method, and they represent the detected shifting in strategy. The top panels refer to a participant with relatively 
stable response signal, whereas the bottom panel show a participant with trends, and frequent and sudden shift of strategies.  
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Figure 6.6 
Response Signal (in terms of RT) for a typical participant in Experiment 5.1 (blue lines). The magenta lines correspond to the 
outcome of the STARS method, indicating the detected shifts in the response. Comparing this figure with Figure 6.5, it is clear 
that in the experiment in the present Chapter there is a higher amount of response shifting.  
 
Note that these response signals are very different from what we obtained with the Classic RT tasks 
in the previous Chapter, as those were almost uniquely stable, without any particular trend or rapid shift. 
This was again confirmed by the STARS method applied to the signal for the experiments in 
Chapter 4 and 5, which detected on average less than on shift for each participant and condition, with a 
magnitude of the shift lower than 0.5 (Figure 6.6 shows a typical participant from Experiment 5.1).  
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Note that the STARS method revealed information about number and magnitude of shifts in the 
response signal, but does not tell us anything about the presence of trends/pattern in the time series. By 
visual inspection of the data, we were not able to notice any general pattern, as participants’ strategies 
looked too different from one another to draw any sensible conclusion. Therefore, we tried to collapse 
the data together. We divided the condition length (in seconds) in 20 bins (from 0 to 720 seconds) and 
calculated, for each participant, the average response within that bin. We then averaged the responses 
across all participants. In Figure 6.7 we show the result of this analysis for both conditions, where the 
shaded area represents one standard deviation. We fitted a simple linear model to the data and calculated 
the correlation values. There is indeed a clear decreasing relationship between time on the trial and RT, 
but only for  ܦ = 0ݏ condition (݌ < 0.005). This may indicate that, at the beginning of the trial, 
participants started with some prior expectation about the trial parameters, and then slowly adjusted 
their response in light of the real experimental parameters. In our case, for example, participants may 
have expected a delay across trial higher than ܦ = 0ݏ, and then they had to adjust their response to 
correct for it. Note that, by running the same analysis on the Classic RT tasks in Chapter 4 and 5, we 
did not find any trend.  
 
Figure 6.7 
General trend for the Response Signals (in term of RT), obtained by averaging the binned responses in time (see text for 
details). The red lines correspond to a linear fit with slope indicated in the figure (ߚ). There is a significant correlation between 
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time and response time only for the first ܦ condition, as indicated by the asterisk in the left panel. The shaded area represents 
one standard deviation. 
 
We also ran a similar analysis on the standard deviation, calculating the mean RT for each bin, we 
computed the standard deviation. This analysis can reveal whether participants were decreasing their 
variability along length condition.  For both conditions we found a negative, weak correlation between 
time in the condition and standard deviation of the response, meaning either that participants were not 
adjusting their response along the duration of the experiment, or that the condition did not last enough 
for getting their response on a steady state. 
6.3.4 Effect of Delay Across Trials 
The results in terms of median of median RT (mdRT) and accuracy of response (ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)) are 
shown in Figure 6.8 (blue lines). The median RT and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) distribution for each participant is 
shown vertically. Participants appeared to increase their RT with increasing ܦ  but the difference, 
calculated on the median RT was not statistically significant (ܨଵ,ଶଽ = 2.108, ݌ = 0.157). Similarly, the 
effect on accuracy of response was not significant (ܨଵ,ଶଽ = 1.936, ݌ = 0.175). The optimum response 
(calculate based on ܴܴ௠ with ݍ = 1) is shown for comparison (red crosses).  The theoretical difference 
in terms of RT between the two ܦ conditions is 0.8 seconds, whereas we observed a much lower 
difference of only 0.18seconds. The optimum score is close to the empirical one for the ܦ = 2.5ݏ 
condition, but not for ܦ = 0. For ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), the theoretical difference is 0.1, the empirical one is ~0.02. 
Recall that we have observed, in analysing the collapsed trends, that participants were slowly adjusting 
(decreasing) their response for ܦ = 0. This could be a possible reason why no significant difference 
was observed between the two conditions. We took that into account by eliminating the first N trials 
from the dataset to see how the mdRT and median ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) changed after the initial period. We varies 
N from 20 to 100 in steps of 20, and the results are plotted as black lines in Figure 6.8. As expected 
from the trend analysis, the mdRT and median ACC(RT) for the ܴܵܫ = 0ݏ slightly decreases, whereas 
for ܦ = 2.5ݏ it remains more stable. However, by running an ANOVA on these modified dataset, the 
median RT were still not significantly different for the two conditions.  
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Figure 6.8 
Median of median RT (mdRT) (left panel) and median of median ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (right panel) for the two ܦ conditions (blue 
circles, the blue lines connect the two conditions). We overimposed vertically the frequency distribution of the median RT for 
each participant (blue blocks). The red circles represent the optimum response (calculated with ܴܴ௠). Even though there is a 
change for both RT and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), the increase is not significant. In particular, the response for the ܦ = 0ݏ is significantly 
higher than the optimum response. We iteratively cut initial responses to take into account any possible learning period, but 
this did not seem to make any relevant difference (black lines). 
 
We grouped the 30 participants in three classes according to their performance (poor, average and 
good Performance, corresponding respectively to the worst third, the middle third, and the top third in 
terms of point earned). Similarly to the collapsed results, for each one of the performance group mdRT 
appeared to increase with increasing D, but again the difference was not significant for any of the three 
groups (Figure 6.8., for the poor, average and good performance respectively ܨଵ,ଽ = 0.082, ݌ = 0.781, 
ܨଵ,ଽ = 0.523, ݌ = 0.488 , ܨଵ,ଽ = 3.335, ݌ = 0.101). Unsurprisingly, the group that performed best 
(earned the most point) also had faster RT in all conditions (Figure 6.9).   
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Figure 6.9 
Median of median RT for each performance group. Similar to the grouped responses in the previous Figure, the ܦ condition 
appear to increase the responses, but the effect was not significant. As expected, better performance groups corresponded to 
faster responses. The red crosses indicate the optimum responses calculate with ܴܴ௠. 
 
We were also interested in analysing the distributions to check similarities with Classic RT 
paradigm. Similar to distribution in the Classic RT tasks, the response distribution with ܦ = 0ݏ was 
slightly skewed on the right (however, the skewness value is much lower in this case than in Classic 
RT paradigm: compare it with distributions in Figure 5.4). Despite the non-significance of mdRT 
between the two ܦ conditions, the distributions for the ܦ = 2.5ݏ condition and the distribution for the 
ܦ = 0ݏ condition appeared clearly different: the latter did not present almost any skewness (Figure 
6.10). Difference in time distributions will be discussed in Section 7.10.  We analysed the distribution 
in the Rate Domain in order to compare it with the distributions obtained with the Classic RT design. 
Although the distributions in time domain were not extremely different with what normally observed 
(at least for the ܦ = 0ݏ condition), the distributions in the rate domain were remarkably different to 
what normally observed in Classic RT tasks, and they were very dissimilar to a Normal Distribution 
(see Figure 6.11). Also, applying the STD-QRI method did not affected much the distributions (this is 
a further proof that this method does not generate a Normal Distribution if the original distribution is 
not normal). 
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Figure 6.10 
Vincentized RT distributions for the two ܦ conditions. As in the distributions for Classic RT tasks, the distributions for this 
paradigm appeared slightly skewed on the right side, but only for the ܦ = 0ݏ condition.  
 
 
Figure 6.11 
Aggregated and standardised Rate Distributions, before and after applying the STD-IQR method for eliminating contaminant 
data (blue and yellow line respectively). The dashed red line indicates a Standard Normal Distribution. Conversely to what 
obtained in the previous Classic RT experiment, here the responses are clearly not-Normal Distributed.  
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6.4 Discussion 
The result of this preliminary experiment taught us several important aspects of this new paradigm. 
Firstly, responses are much more variable in this paradigm than in Classic RT tasks, with sudden 
shifting and complex patterns. However, this may be because participants had to estimate the correct 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) shape, which may be an extremely difficult task. In the next Chapter, with the complete 
version of the EXACT Paradigm, we are going to explicitly show the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) on the screen so that 
participants do not have to estimate it. In doing so, we will obtain more stable response (however, as 
we will see, these will still not be as stable as the responses from a Classic RT task).  
Also, participants reported that they found the negative sound feedback extremely annoying. It is 
possible that this contributed in making their response more loss-aversive, increasing the size of 
adjustment for punishment, and decreasing the difference across the two ܦ  conditions. 
We did not notice any significant effect of ܦ on responses, confirming previous studies’ results. 
The pattern was however in the expected direction, with responses that increased with increasing delay 
across trial. This was also true for each individual performance group. Is it possible that participants 
were adjusting their optimization response based on ܦ , but in a much lower degree than expected, so 
that the difference did not resulted to be significant. However, as found in the previous Chapter, the 
difference in responses across difference ܦ conditions may be due to difference participant's temporal 
preparation, which may be lowered by higher ܦ  conditions. This implies that participants are not 
changing their response based on an optimization process, or that the optimization process is not 
function of the delay across trial. We reached a similar conclusion based on experiments in previous 
Chapters.  
Another relevant difference regards the rate distributions, which looked extremely different than 
those from a Classic RT task. As Chapter 7 and 8 will confirm, this is a stable feature of the EXACT 
Paradigm: whereas RT distributions look reasonably similar to Classic RT tasks (even more with next 
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studies), rate distributions are very dissimilar from what we observed in the previous experiments, that 
is: they are not approximately normal, in any of the several experimental conditions. The reason behind 
this may lie in the variability of the speed-accuracy shape across trials. In this paradigm, the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) 
is supposed to be the same across all trials for a certain condition, regardless of participant's real 
accuracy. However, in Classic RT tasks, if we take attention lapses, or noise in the sensory system into 
account, we see how ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  may slightly vary from a trial to another. A fluctuating ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), 
coupled with some decision strategy, may be the reason of normal distribution in the rate domain (see 
Harris et al., 2014).  
Note that in this exploratory experiment, we deemed unnecessary to proceed with a complete fitting 
routine for the four decision strategies: by having only two conditions, most of the decision rules 
produced a perfect fit, with very small differences from one another, so that comparing the model 
seemed meaningless. In the next Chapter, when employing several conditions within the context of the 
complete EXACT Paradigm, we will be able to test quantitative prediction and compare more precisely 
the goodness of fit of each one of the four models, in order to exploit the power of the paradigm itself: 
being able to fit precise quantitative prediction without having to assume any perceptual process. 
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Chapter 7  
The EXACT Paradigm 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, we introduced a new experimental design in which the increase in accuracy 
did not depend on a participant sensory perception (as usually happens in Classic RT task) but is hard-
coded into the experimental design, and perfectly known by the researcher. The main feature of this 
paradigm was that the speed-accuracy function (ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)) was kept hidden to the participant. The 
results from this study revealed that the responses were much noisier than Classic RT task, and they 
may present trends, conversely to responses coming from Classic RT tasks. We believe that such noisy 
responses and trends depended on the fact that participants were continuously trying to estimate the 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function and, at the same time, trying to adjust the response in order to find the optimal 
response. This resulted in frequent, sudden strategy shifting for most of the participants, or slow but 
steady trends for some others. Hiding the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function not only makes responses more complex, 
but it also seems an unnatural feature. In fact, it is commonly believed that in Classic RT experiments 
participants base their response on the perceived accuracy, which they may have at least partially access 
to (Bogacz et al., 2006). Therefore, in the EXACT Paradigm that we present in this chapter we made 
sure that participants also had access to the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), by showing a graphic representation of it on the 
monitor in the form of a progressing gauge. As in the previous Chapter, the name comes from the fact 
that the accumulation of information is exogenous to the participant (EXogenous ACcumulation Task). 
As before, we show on the screen only the minimum information required to perform the task: the points 
earned/lost in the previous trial (setting the colour equal to red if corresponded to a punishment, or green 
for a reward), the total score for the session, the time left in the condition in minutes, and a progressing 
gauge. Note that in the previous version we also had a progressing gauge which however was used to 
help participant to track the time spent in each single trial (Figure 6.3). In this case, the gauge is used 
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to represent the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) directly: it is empty when ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) = 0, is full at ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) = 1, it starts at 
a point equal to ߙ (for example, with ߙ = 0.5, it starts half full) and it grows depending on ߣ, following 
the exponential formula described in Equation 6.1 (and reproduced in this Chapter in Section 7.3).  
Since we use an exponential ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), the gauge is fast at the beginning and slowing down at the end, 
theoretically reaching unity at infinite time. As before, participants were asked to response (by pressing 
a key on the keyboard) whenever they wanted to, and received a reward with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), or 
a punishment otherwise. After the response and a delay, the trial started again (the gauge is reset).  In 
Figure 7.1 we show two examples referring to an experiment design with ߙ = 0.25, meaning that the 
gauge started a quarter full at time 0 (the beginning of the trial). The gauge represented in the figure 
fills up following the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) with ߣ = 1. On the left, we show the gauge at the beginning of the trial, 
whereas on the right is the gauge after one second. The top part of the figure represents exactly what is 
shown to the participant at each time. On the bottom part we show the corresponding ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function. 
The blue line in the bottom part of the figure corresponds to the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) with ߣ = 1, that is the one 
used for the gauge on the top panel. The red dashed line shows the accuracy level at that point in time. 
For example, after 1 second the accuracy will be around 73% (see intersection between red dashed line 
and blue line in the bottom-right side of the Figure 7.1). The other ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) with different ߣ are show 
for comparison. For example, by using ߣ = 0.5, the gauge would fill up slower, and to reach the same 
level of accuracy it will take 2 seconds (see the intersection between the dashed red line and the orange 
line in the bottom-right side of the Figure).  On the other hand, with ߣ = 2.5, the gauge will reach 73% 
after 0.4 seconds (intersection between red dashed line and green line in bottom-right side of the Figure).     
In the version presented in the previous Chapter, participants reported to be especially annoyed by 
negative sound feedback. We believe that this would result in an unwanted increase of subjective 
punishment, such that participants would become more loss-aversive. We desired participants to be 
affected mostly by the punishment and reward in terms of points, and thus we eliminated, for this and 
the following EXACT studies, any sound feedback altogether. 
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Figure 7.1 
 (Top) Each square represents what a participant see on the monitor during two different type of the experiment: at the 
beginning of the trial (left panel) and after 1 second (right panel). The green gauge corresponds to the value of the speed-
accuracy function, ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), indicated in Equation 6.1 and plotted on the bottom panels.  See text for details.  
 
Note that the mathematical formulation of the decision strategies and the predictions discussed in 
Chapter 6 are exactly the same for this design (Section 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.1.5).  
Another advantage of the EXACT Paradigm is the possibility of analysing the accuracy obtained 
for each response directly (which corresponds to the positional response along the gauge), and thus 
making possible analysing the distribution of accuracy. In fact, in Classic RT task, analysing the 
accuracy may be extremely troublesome, as hundreds of responses are needed in order to obtain a single 
value of accuracy for each condition. Other techniques group accuracy for each response bin within 
each condition (Luce, 1986), but they are rarely used as requires a very high sample for each response 
bin, which is often difficult to have. With the EXACT Paradigm, we can obtain accuracy directly from 
each the response.  
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7.1.1 Organization of the Chapter 
In this Chapter, we aim to investigate thoroughly all the different facets of this new experimental 
paradigm, by manipulating three parameters to check what is the results on participants’ behaviour and 
what decision rule can best account for participants’ responses. As we saw in Section 3.6, each decision 
rule has at most 4 parameters: ߣ, ܦ, ߙ, ݍ. In this Chapter we investigated the prediction of manipulating 
ܦ and ߙ. To increase the number of conditions in each experiment (as this allows us a more precise 
fitting in terms of theoretical behaviour), for each experiment we also manipulated the level of ߣ, 
corresponding to different steepness of the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) function (and thus speed of the gauge, see Figure 
6.1 and 7.1). In the next Chapter, we investigate the effect of manipulating the “emphasis on accuracy” 
parameter ݍ, and compare those results with a Classic RT task with a comparable payoff matrix. 
In the first Experiment of this Chapter, we manipulated the ܦ parameter by increasing the average 
delay across trial (ܦ conditions). This will test the same prediction as in the previous Chapters, that is: 
increasing ܦ will correspond to an increase in RT. We focus again on this prediction because it is a 
counterintuitive prediction that would provide a strong support to the idea that participants were 
optimizing their response based on the total trial time. We have already seen in previous Chapters how 
this idea does not seem to hold in Classic RT (and in the previous version of the EXACT Paradigm). 
We investigated this idea in this Chapter as well, with a more complex design that allowed us a 
quantitative comparison of decision rules.  
In the second experiment, we investigated the most interesting prediction generated by the ܴܴ௠ 
decision rule, that is the possibility of observing Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape of responses 
depending on the combination of ߙ and ݍ values (see Section 2.10 and Section 6.1.5). In particular, we 
manipulated the ߙ parameter, that is the starting point of the gauge (in a classic RT experiment this 
corresponds to manipulating the number of alternatives), by using 2 values ߙ level combined with 4 ߣ 
levels, and keeping ݍ fixed. The similar relationship is investigated in Chapter 8, and then compared 
with a Classic RT task.  
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EXPERIMENT 7.1 
7.2 Stimulus Intensity, Delay, and Piéron’s Law 
In terms of optimal response, we have already shown that by increasing ܦ we expect an increasing 
in ܦܶ∗ (now defined as ܴܶ∗). For different ߣ, the shape of increase in shown in Figure 7.2 for ܴܴ௠ 
(see Figure 6.2 for all decision rules). We refer to each one of the curve connecting the same ܦ condition 
across different ߣ condition as the ܴܶ∗ curve. In Figure 7.2 the ܴܶ∗ is calculated by computing the 
optimum response for ܴܴ௠. Similarly, the result for other decision strategy is simply to increase the 
ܴܶ∗.   
As we discussed before, the parameter ߣ establish how fast the speed-accuracy function increases 
in time and can thus be considered as the “strength” of the stimulus. This correspondence make it 
possible to compare the ܴܶ∗ curve with the Piéron’s Law function. As we explained in Section 2.10, 
Piéron’s Law can be fitted for any decision strategies, if the initial fitting point is selected to be higher 
than the maximum point of the ܴܶ∗  curve (Figure 2.6). This leads to the question of what set of 
parameters of the Piéron’s function is affected when varying the parameter ܦ. To answer this question, 
we ran several simulations. We used a similar approach to the one we are going to use for real data: we 
used the ܴܶ∗ corresponding to 10 equally spaced values for each value of ܦ, and we fitted the Piéron’s 
function for each function, considering ߣ  equivalent to stimulus strength ( ܴܶ = ߛ + ݇ߣିఉ ). We 
assumed that ݇, ߚ or ߛ (or any combinations of those, plus a condition where no parameter changed 
across trials) were free to vary across ܦ conditions, resulting in 8 different models. The best fitting 
(lower BIC) was given by the version with ݇ and ߚ free to vary across experimental condition. The 
goodness of fit for each curve was close to perfect (ܴ ≅ 0.999). The estimated ߙ  values where 
increasing (from 0.4 to 2) and the estimated ߚ values where decreasing (from 0.697 to 0.673) with 
increase in ܦ. The estimated ߛ was 0.083. This result is particularly interesting: by numerical simulation, 
it is clear that the ܴܶ∗ for each decision strategies will tend to 0 as ߣ tend to infinity. However, by 
estimating Piéron’s Law only up to a certain value of ߣ, the fitting procedure will not be able to capture 
130 
 
this feature (which, if correctly captured, would return ߛ = 0), returning instead a value of ߛ that is 
similar to what normally obtained in the literature (e.g. Pins & Bonnet, 1996; Bonnet et al. ,1999; 
Mansfield, 1973). 
7.3 Methods 
20 participants (8 males, 12 females) took part in the experiment. The experimental setup was 
almost identical to the one presented in the previous Chapter, with the major difference being that the 
gauge now represented ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), and no sound feedback was present. Participants were shown a 
progressing gauge starting at some point (defined by the parameter ߙ) and increasing in time according 
to ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) = 1 + (ߙ − 1)exp (−ߣݐ) (presented initially in Equation 6.1, Section 6.1). On the top left 
of the screen some information were given to the participants: the amount of point earned/lost in the 
previous trial, the total score for the current session, and the time left in the session in minutes. If the 
previous trial resulted in a loss, the points were displayed in red, otherwise in green (see top part of 
Figure 7.1: in the black bold square we show exactly what the participants saw on their monitor, 
excluding the red dashed line). There was no sound feedback. Each participant started with 25 points at 
the beginning of each condition. 
 In the previous Chapter, care was needed to ensure that participants believed that there was no 
secret pattern or a particular schedule in according to which the reward and punishment were given. We 
used a training session similar to a Simple RT task, and then a training session with what we suggested 
to be an invisible stimulus. Here this was not necessary, as participants clearly saw the gauge increasing. 
We did use a practice session to get them accustomed with the task. In the practice session, after the 
beginning of the trial, participants were asked to press the CTRL key to respond, whereupon a reward 
was given with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), otherwise a punishment was given. In this practice session, we 
used punishment and reward equal to 1 (ݍ = 1), a delay equal to 1 seconds, ߙ = 0.5 (gauge starting 
half full at the beginning of the trial) and ߣ = 1. After the response and the delay, the gauge was reset. 
The practice session lasted 1 minute.  
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After the practice session, the real experiment started. We used three ܦ conditions, with a delay of 
0.1s, 1s and 2.5seconds, and 3 ߣ conditions: 0.5, 1 and 5, whereas the parameter ߙ was fixed to 0.5 (bar 
half full at the beginning of the trial). The order of presentation of ܦ was randomized. Once the ܦ 
condition was randomly chosen, all the ߣ conditions were performed (in random order) for that ܦ, 
before proceeding to the next ܦ. At the beginning of each ܦ session, there was a 30 seconds practice 
session (with ߣ = 1) so that participant could get accustomed with the delay across trial. Each session 
lasted 3 minutes, with a total experimental time of about 30 minutes. Participants were informed that at 
the end of the session points were exchanged for money, at the rate of 1 pence for each 2 points. 
Analysis. We used the Weighted Minimum Least Square method (see Section 3.8) to fit the four 
decision rules (ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠, ܴܣ and ܤܴ). Note that, compared to a normal estimation routine in a Classic 
RT Paradigm (for example, when estimating the parameter of a DDM, as we have done in Chapter 4 
and 5), here we knew exactly what were the real experimental parameters. However, it is conceivable 
that participants based their responses on estimated values which may have been close but not exactly 
the same to the real experimental parameters. In fitting the decision rules, we used several variants by 
assuming that different combinations of parameters were being estimated by the participants. Therefore, 
we distinguish between the real experimental parameters (ߙ, ݍ, ߣ, ݀) and the estimated ones, which we 
indicate with a hat (ߙො, ݍො, ߣመ, መ݀). The estimated parameters for a particular condition are indicated by using 
a subscript. For example, ߙොఈୀ଴.ହ is the estimated ߙො parameter for the ߙ = 0.5 condition. This parameter 
is expected to be close to ߙ. When no subscript is used, it means that the parameter is the same across 
all experimental conditions.  
In order to take into account discrepancy between the experimental parameter set ߠ  and the 
subjective estimated ߠ෠ we propose to use a loss function in which an additional component is added to 
the Weighted Least Square Error. This component penalizes for the distance between real and subjective 
experimental parameters by using a Normal Kernel:  
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where n is the number of observation (for a single condition), N is the number of parameters for a single 
condition, ߠ෠ refers to the set of subjective parameters, ߠ to the set of experimental parameter, and ߱ is 
the weight given to the deviation from real parameter (set to 1 for this experiment). The second part of 
the equation is applied to the set ܵ of parameters ߠ. In this experiment, we calculate the deviation for 
all parameters, but in the next Chapter we will calculate the deviation only on a subset. We call this 
measure modified WLS (mWLS). Note that ߪ here refers to the standard deviation of the observation 
of an experimental condition, whereas ߪఏೕ refers to the standard deviation of the kernel for each ߠ 
parameter. In particular, we used a standard deviation of 3 for ߣ, 1 for ߙ,  3 for ܦ and 5 for ݍ. These 
values may be deemed to be quite permissive. The reason is that, by trying several combinations of 
these parameters, we noted that the parameters converged to approximately the same results, given that 
the standard deviation values were high enough to obtain a mWLS value higher than 0 (otherwise 
numerical limitations of the ݂݅ݐ݉݅݊ݏ݁ܽݎܿℎ function would not have led to good parameter estimation). 
As before, we selected the best variants by considering the number of parameters by using the ܤܫܥ 
value (Section 3.8).  
For the analysis of accuracy distributions, analysing individual distribution was not feasible, as in 
some conditions the sample size was too small. Aggregating distributions was a possible solution but 
complicated by the fact that accuracy distributions are truncated from ߙ to 1.  The approach adopted 
was similar to the one used by Harris et al., 2014, for the assumed truncated Normal Distribution. The 
idea is to exclude distributions that show severe truncation, and aggregate the others by standardising 
them. We defined distributions with severe truncation as those whose two standard deviations were not 
inside the truncation limits of  ߙ and 1. 
Note about terminology. We distinguish between the condition name, the parameter name, and 
the subjective parameter estimation: in this first experiment, we use different delay condition, which 
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we call ܦ  conditions. In terms of decision rules, they affect the ܦ  parameter. We assume that 
participants have their own subjective parameter estimation (including subjective estimation for the 
parameter ܦ), which we call ܦ෡, ߙො and so on.  
7.4 Results 
The optimum average score calculated assuming that participants were trying to earn as many points 
as possible, compared with the empirical score, is shown in Figure 7.2. Participants score (open circles) 
seem close to optimum average score (closed circle), except for the ܦ = 0.1ݏ condition, especially with 
higher ߣ. The reason for this difference may be due to the fact that, for this condition, the optimum 
theoretical response time was quite fast (~0.172seconds), and participants settled for a slower RT.  Until 
now we have never assumed that participant had a cost in responding related to how fast the response 
was, and this has been only rarely investigated (Drugowitsch et al., 2012). However, it seems reasonable 
that participants may decide to earn less in exchange to have a more relaxed response time, even though 
is difficult to be more precise than that as we do not know the relationship between speed and cost. This 
will be further discussed in Section 7.5 and in the General Discussion in Chapter 9.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 
The empty circles represent the points obtained for each participant for each condition. Different ܦ conditions correspond to 
different colour. The filled circles represent the expected average score with optimum performance (calculated with ܴܴ௠), 
with a line connecting the same ܦ conditions. Noise on the horizontal axes is added to increase readability. Participants 
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appeared to be responsive to the changing of the condition, but they were consistently sub-optimal, especially for the higher ߣ 
and the ܦ = 0.1ݏ condition. This is probably due to the fact that an optimum score can be only obtained by generating very 
fast responses.  
7.4.1 Response Signal and Response to Feedback 
As before, we analysed the stability of responses. In the previous experiment, we saw that the 
average number and magnitude of shift index for each condition was much higher than in a Classic RT 
design (Figure 6.5 and 6.6). We hypothesised that the reason was to be found in the fact that participants 
did not have access to ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) and needed to estimate it, forcing them to go through a more intense 
explorative phase. The number of shifts was, in fact, remarkably reduced in this experiment (compare, 
for example, the ܦ = 0ݏ  condition of the previous experiment with the ܦ = 0.1ݏ condition of the 
current one). However, these values are still much higher than those showed in Classic RT task (which 
contains usually around one shifting per condition, as shown in Figure 6.6). The number of shifts 
averaged across participants for each condition is shown in Table 7.1. An example from a typical 
participant is shown in Figure 7.3.  
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Table 7.1 Average shift index for each condition 
 ࣅ = ૙. ૞ ࣅ = ૚ ࣅ = ૞ 
ࡰ = ૙. ૚࢙ 4.4375 5.125 4.8125 
ࡰ = ૚࢙ 2.875 3.1875 2.4375 
ࡰ = ૛. ૞࢙ 1.5 1.625 1.5 
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Figure 7.3 
Response Signal for a typical individual, for each condition. Each row corresponds to a different ܦ condition (from the top to 
the bottom, ܦ = 0.1ݏ, ܦ = 1ݏ, ܦ = 2.5ݏ). The blue lines represent the response in terms of RT (left vertical axes), the orange 
lines represent the response in terms of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (right vertical axes, see Equation 6.1 for the relationship between RT and 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)). The blue dots on the lines correspond to error responses. The magenta lines are the result of STARS method, and 
they represent the detected shifting in strategy. With this version of the EXACT Paradigm participants clearly produces 
responses that are more stable and have less shifting (compare with Figure 6.5).   
 
We used participants’ shift index values for each condition as an input to a repeated measure 
ANOVA, finding that only the ܦ conditions significantly affected the amount of shifting (for RSI: 
ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 46.512, ݌ < 0.0001 , for ߣ: ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 6.5, ݌ = 0.06).  If participant already know ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) 
because is shown to them, what is the reason for the change of strategy? It is possible that, even though 
participants know ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), they still need to proceed by trial and error to find the optimum that 
maximizes their decision rule. The reason why it appeared to depend on ܦ (with some non-significant 
dependency on ߣ, at least for the ܦ = 0.1ݏ condition), may be that with low ܦ participants have the 
chance to perform many more trials, and therefore they are more willing to use some of these trials for 
exploring different strategies. Note that we also measured the magnitude of the shift, which did not 
appear to be affected by different conditions (average shift magnitude across all condition was equal to 
0.79).  
Despite this relatively high shifting values, the response signal appeared to be fairly stable: by 
aggregating signal responses in bins and calculating the correlation across trial length for mean and 
standard deviation of the response (similar to what done in the previous experiment), we did not find 
any significant trend in any of the conditions. As noted before, the lack of changing of standard 
deviation implies that participants were not adjusting the precision of their responses, at least not during 
the few minutes given to them. 
We did not find any relevant difference in the way participants adjusted their response after 
punishment or rewards. On average, participants slowed down of about 0.3seconds after a punishment 
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and speeds up of about 0.02 seconds after a reward, with negligible differences amongst different 
conditions. As before, we found a much more remarkable effect of punishment than rewards, which 
may be due to the fact that there were many more rewards and thus a finer adjustment was possible.  
7.4.2 Effect of ࡰ and ࣅ on RT and ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) 
The results in terms of mdRT and accuracy of response ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) are shown in Figure 7.4 for the 
six experimental conditions (lines in the Figure connects different ߣ conditions across the same ܦ 
condition). The optimum response (calculated with ܴܴ௠) for each different condition is also plotted in 
the figure (circles with black edges).  The plot in terms of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) is equivalent to showing at what 
point on the bar, on average, participant responded. This plot tells us something important about the 
paradigm, that is: participants were not merely pointing to the same spatial point on the bar, but they 
were actually changing optimum point based on experimental parameter. In fact, due to different speed 
of the bar for different ߣ, if participant were merely aiming at the same accuracy (that is, at the same 
position on the gauge) for different ߣ conditions, we would have still observed a decreasing shape in 
RT for higher ߣ, but we would have also observed a flat line on ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ). In our dataset, however, we 
observed an increasing trend in ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  which confirmed that participants were adjusting their 
strategy according to experimental conditions.  
As expected, changing ߣ had a clear effect of changing the mdRT (ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 38.842, ݌ < 0.0001). 
Even though changing ܦ appeared to slightly increase mdRT, this effect did not reach significance 
(ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 1.902, ݌ = 0.167).  The effect on accuracy of response mimicked the result for median rate, 
in that only ߣ  had a significant effect on accuracy ( ߣ: ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 26.99, ݌ < 0.0001 and ܦ: ܨଶ,ଷ଴ =
2.5, ݌ = 0.099). Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that all the three ߣ 
conditions were significantly different from each other at ݌ < 0.0001 , whereas none of the ܦ 
conditions were significantly different from each other. Segregating participant according to their 
performance did not appear to make any relevant difference.  It was also clear that participants’ RT 
were far away from optimum response, as they were all very similar across the three ܦ conditions, being 
faster for the long ܦ condition and slower for the fast ܦ condition. 
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Figure 7.4 
The right panel filled circles indicate the median of median of responses (mdRT) across individuals for each ܦ  and ߣ 
condition. The bars on the circles correspond to 1 standard error. The mdRT within the same ܦ conditions are connected with 
a line. The circles with the black edges correspond to the optimum response for each condition. The red dashed line corresponds 
to a the best fitting of a Piéron’s Law. In this case, only one line was used as the best model resulted to be the one without any 
variation in parameters across different ܦ conditions. The right panel shows the corresponding values in terms of median of 
median ܣܥܥ(ܴ . 
 
We also analysed the results in terms of individual participants. Whereas the ߣ factor was very 
consistent across different participants, the ܦ effect was more variable, sometime producing slower 
responses, sometime faster, sometime unchanged. This result is consistent with results from the 
previous Chapters: the delay across trial has a negligible or null effect (however, see Section 7.5 for 
other possible explanations). 
 We fitted the aggregated results to Piéron’s Law. Different models were generated by assuming 
݇, ߚ or ߛ (or any combination of those) free to vary across ܦ conditions, and compared them with the 
modified BIC for mean least squares which takes into account the number of parameters. The best fitting 
model was the one with no parameter free across ܦ  conditions, which confirmed the small effect 
obtained by different ܦ conditions (red dashed line in Figure 7.4). Similarly to what obtained with 
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simulations (see Section 7.2), we found a ߛ value equal to 0.01 (Table 7.3). The main point of this 
fitting procedure was to confirm that a Piéron’s shape can be replicated in the EXACT Paradigm (as 
predicted), which lead the possibility that Piéron’s Law is not an artefact of the perceptual process (as 
sometime argued, see Stafford & Gurney, 2004) but a result of a simple decision rule strategy with a 
monotonically increasing ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) . Moreover, the fact that we were able to reproduce a Piéron’s Law 
confirmed the similarities between this experiment and a Classic RT task.   
Table 7.2 Piéron’s Law Model                     Table 7.3 Parameters for the best model 
Model BIC df  Model 1  
No free  -5.58142 3  BIC -5.58142 
݇ free -4.69314 5  WLS 0.0048 
ߚ free -3.06478 5  ࢑ 1.099 
ߛ free -4.62256 5  ࢼ 0.714 
݇ and ߚ free -4.38543 7  ࢽ 0.01 
݇ and ߛ free -5.12028 7  
ߚ and ߛ free -1.60171 7  
݇, ߚ and ߛ free  -2.3892 9  
7.4.3 Fitting Decision Rules  
We fitted the Decision Strategy by taking into account the distance between the estimated 
parameters and the experimental ones (see Methods, Section 7.3). Each one of the four decision 
strategies (ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠, ܴܣ and ܤܴ) was evaluated with two different versions: in one, the estimated 
parameter ܦ෡ was allowed to vary across different delay conditions (ܦ); in the other version, ܦ෡ was fixed 
across the two conditions. In this way, we could test whether the same parameter ܦ෡  was used for 
different ܦ conditions, as other results seems to indicate. Note that for ܤܴ we used only one variant, as 
this decision strategy did not use the parameter ܦ at all. The results agreed with the previous Chapters’ 
result: the variants with the lowest BIC was ܴܴ௠ with fixed ܦ෡ across experimental conditions (Table 
7.3 and Figure 7.5). Note that the ܴܴ௠ with free ܦ෡ for each ܦ condition is the second to best model, 
and in fact it obtained the lowest modified WLS value but it was penalized for the number of parameters 
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(8 against 6 of the other variants). The worst model was ܴܴ with free ܦ෡ parameter. Table 7.4 shows the 
BIC and modified WLS value for each model and variants, whereas Tables 7.5 shows the resulting 
parameters for the best model, the ܴܴ௠ variants with fixed ܦ෡.  
Table 7.4 Results for the decision rules fitting 
 
BIC df 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࡰ෡) -1.8647 8 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࡰ෡) -1.95996 6 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࡰ෡) -1.72593 8 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࡰ෡) -1.69524 6 
࡮ࡾ 1.785779 5 
ࡾࡾ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࡰ෡) 1.919916 7 
ࡾࡾ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࡰ෡) 0.233448 5 
 
Table 7.5 Best models’ parameters (ƩmWLS is the sum of the modified WLS across conditions) 
ࡾࡾ࢓(ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࡰ෡)  ࡾࡾ࢓(ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࡰ෡) 
BIC -1.865  BIC -1.96 
ƩmWLS 0.1549  ƩmWLS 0.22954 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૞  0.613  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૞  0.438 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૚  1.156  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૚  0.829 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૞  5.556  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૞  4.73 
ࢻෝ  0.485  ࢻෝ  0.491 
ࡰ෡ ࡰୀ૙.૚  0.372  ࡰ෡   0.384 
ࡰ෡ ࡰୀ૚  0.632  ࢗෝ  1.177 
ࡰ෡ ࡰୀ૛.૞               0.652    
 ࢗෝ   1.337    
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Figure 7.5 
Median of median RT, the same as plotted in Figure 7.5. The white circles show the expected values with the ܴܴ௠ model with 
estimated parameters (see Table 7.5) 
 
It is interesting to note that, in both cases, the ݍ parameter is higher than 1, meaning that participants 
put much more emphasis on accuracy than on speed. In terms of ܴܴ௠, this means that the subjective 
value of punishment was estimated to be higher than the subjective value of the reward: in other words, 
participants were generally loss-aversive. Furthermore, the estimated ܦ෡ values for the ܴܴ௠ with free ܦ෡ 
were, as expected, all very close to each other. This confirmed what we found by running the ANOVA 
on the dataset: the difference between ܦ conditions is small or non-existent. Note how, in this case, a 
qualitative prediction (the first level of analysis we discussed in Section 2.7), would have led in 
believing that the ܤܴ model was indeed a viable alternative, has it predicts no effect with varying ܦ 
conditions. Instead, fitting the model revealed that the ܤܴ fitting is indeed a poor model for this task.  
7.4.4 Distribution Analysis 
The Vincentized distributions in time domain for each ߣ and ܦ condition are shown in Figure 7.6. 
Mean, standard deviation and skewness were calculated by averaging these statistics across all 
participants. Distributions appeared right skewed, as usually found in classic RT experiments, but the 
skewness is much lower than what found in Classic RT (for example, compare with Figure 4.6 or Figure 
5.5). We found a very strong effect of ߣ (but not ܦ) on standard deviation (for ߣ: ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 4.594, ݌ ≅ 0, 
for ܦ : ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 0.605, ݌ = 0.552), and a non-significant effect on skewness for both ߣ  and ܦ  (for 
ߣ: ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 0.512, ݌ = 0.605, for ܦ: ܨଶ,ଷ଴ = 0.813, ݌ = 0.453). Consistently with what found in the 
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previous Chapter, the distributions in the rate domain did not appear close to a Normal distribution, 
which was confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which rejected normality for all distributions 
 
Figure 7.6 
Vincentized RT distributions for each condition. Increasing ߣ corresponds to a steep decrease on standard deviation. 
 
An interesting point of this paradigm regards the possibility of analysing the accuracy distributions, 
which corresponds to the positional response along the gauge. The ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  distributions, after 
standardising (see Method in this Chapter) and aggregating across participants are shown in Figure 7.4. 
Cutting the severely truncated distributions, however, did not produce a relevant difference (blue lines 
correspond to the original dataset, yellow line to the modified one). We ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for normality, and it resulted that 5 distributions out of 9 were not significantly different to a Normal 
Distribution (at statistical level of ߙ = 0.01). Note that for the Distribution that most diverged from 
normality (with ܦ = 1ݏ and ߣ = 5) we also found the most severe truncation value (12 datasets were 
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excluded for that condition). It is however difficult to conclude anything with confidence with this 
dataset, so we postpone a more detailed discussion to Section 7.10. 
 
Figure 7.7 
Aggregated and standardised accuracy distributions, before and after excluding the severely truncated distributions (blue lines 
show the original dataset, yellow line the modified one, and the red dashed line corresponds to a Standard Normal Distribution). 
On each panel, the number of excluded distributions is indicated (N), and the result of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
normality.  
7.5 Discussion 
Using this complete version of the EXACT Paradigm resulted in having participant perform a 
simple task in which they had complete information about the ܣܥܥ(ܴ  at each time step, obtaining 
therefore more reliable measures of behaviour. This also resulted in more stable response signals, with 
less shifting in strategy and no relevant trend across conditions.  Moreover, using a more complicated 
design with two factors (ߣ and ܦ) allowed us to fit more precisely the decision strategies to participants’ 
144 
 
ܴܶ. Altogether, these results hinted to the fact that participants are spending less time in estimating the 
correct ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) and more time in finding the best strategy to maximize the decision function. 
In this study, we also introduced a new way of analysing the results by computing the accuracy 
distribution. With the EXACT Paradigm, we have simultaneous access to ܴܶ and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), and we 
can therefore make theoretical prediction about the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) distribution. There is, in fact, no reason 
but practical ones about why we should base most of our analysis on the ܴܶ distribution. In fact, 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) appear approximately Normal distributed (at least for those conditions in which not too many 
datasets were cut due to sever truncation), which may pinpoint to the important fact that participants 
may aim to some special value of accuracy, and ܴܶ are a simple by-product of this computation. Even 
though in this experiment the analysis of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) did not lead to any univocal conclusion, it opens up 
the possibility of analysis in new directions that are not possible in a Classic RT (see also Section 7.10). 
This experiment confirmed the results of the previous Chapter: participants do not appear to vary 
their response depending on the total trial time ܦ. Despite this result, the best strategy still resulted to 
be ܴܴ௠, which actually does take into account a parameter ܦ. What are the possible explanations for 
that? 
1) Participants were poorly estimating ܦ෡ . This is the interpretation given by other authors 
(Zacksenhouse, Bogacz, & Holmes, 2009), but it seems hardly applicable in this case, where the 
estimated ܦ෡ is 0.384 and the real one is as high as 2.5seconds. Furthermore, the experiments in previous 
Chapters appear to disconfirm this hypothesis. 
2) Participants were not using the delay across trial value at all, and the parameter ܦ within ܴܴ௠ 
should be interpreted as related to some other experimental factor. This is important, as in this case 
ܴܴ௠ lose its meaning of being the optimal strategy, but become a unknown variable that participants 
were using to take a decision. 
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3) Participants were using and estimating the ܦ parameter, but the section of the trial they were 
using to do so did not correspond to the whole trial duration: they were using a different “epoch” for 
maximizing their response (see General Discussion in Chapter 9) 
4) Participants were using a standard value for ܦ, and changing it only when it was convenient.  In 
our experiment, by using the real ܦ condition as the ܦ෡ parameter, the total expected score with optimum 
ܴܶ∗ was calculated to be equal to ~804 points (summed across all 6 conditions). By using the estimated 
ܦ෡ values for the free ܦ෡ and ܴܴ௠ strategy (0.37s, 0.63s and 0.65s) the total score was equal to 791. This 
difference is not extremely large and, for our experiment, participants may have decided that it was not 
worth to compute different optimum responses for different delays when the difference in terms of 
expected reward was not so high. Unfortunately, this possibility was not considered beforehand, as an 
experiment with high gross differences with different ܦ conditions may have been designed to rule out 
or confirm this explanation. 
EXPERIMENT 7.2  
7.6 Stimulus Intensity and Starting Point 
In this experiment, we investigated the effect of different ߙ values on responses, by also varying 
the difficult of the stimulus ߣ in order to obtain different ܴܶ∗ curves. In terms of EXACT Paradigm, ߣ 
represents the rate of accumulating accuracy in time, and ߙ represents the accuracy at the beginning of 
the trial. In a Classic RT task, ߣ is related with the difficulty of the task, whereas the interpretation of ߙ 
is more problematic. This could in fact be interpreted as the number of response alternatives (that is, 
ܰ = 1/ߙ) or as the probability of each stimulus (in a multiple-choice task) to be the correct one. In 
Classic RT paradigm, these concepts are related, as by increasing the number of alternatives we are 
automatically decreasing the probability of each stimulus to be the correct. The relationship between 
the number of response stimuli and the corresponding RT has been analysed countless times (for a 
review, see Luce, 1986), the main finding corresponding to the fact that mean RT increases 
logarithmically as the number of alternatives increases (Hick’s law, see Hick, 1952; Merkel, 1885). On 
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the other hand, the relationship between mean RT and stimulus probability is less clear, as previous 
literature usually uses too few data points to allow any fitting. The results nevertheless suggested an 
increasing non-linear relationship between mean RT and stimulus probability (e.g. Simen et al., 2009; 
Drazin, 1961). However, drawing a direct parallel between the ߙ used in the EXACT paradigm and 
these other two experimental variables may be misleading. Firstly, by changing the probability of 
correct response in a 2AFC task, we can obtain only values from 0.5 to 1, as this values are 
complementary with the other stimulus probability (decreasing one will increase the other, so that 
values lower than 0.5 will result in values higher than 0.5 in the alternative).  On the other hand, by 
varying the number of alternatives we can only test probability values from 0 to 0.5: values higher than 
0.5 can be achieved only by having less than 2 alternatives, and is not clear how to accomplish this in a 
choice task. This could be accomplished by a completely different design: for example,  ߙ > 0.5 may 
be obtained by using N alternatives with at least ܰ/2 correct choices. The problem with this approach 
is that it seems likely to have an effect also on the rate of stimulus accumulation. For example, for ߙ =
0.5 we need to have 2 correct stimuli out of 4 alternatives; with ߙ = 0.75 we set three 3 stimuli out of 
4. By changing the number of stimuli we increase the amount of information accrued at each time step, 
and therefore we affect the speed of increasing accuracy in time. Therefore, in a Classic RT task we 
would need different designs to test ߙ from the range of 0 to 1, and this would have slightly different 
interpretation too. Instead, with the EXACT Paradigm we can more freely change the ߙ parameter 
within the 0-1 range, by using the same design, without affecting the rate of accumulation of information. 
One of the main aims of this experiment was testing the prediction of the ܴܴ௠ decision rule of 
obtaining Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape by varying the starting point (ߙ) of the gauge (Figure  7.7, 
see also Section 2.10 and Section 6.1.5). In particular, we used two ߙ values (0.25 and 0.75) coupled 
with 4 ߣ conditions in order to obtain a ܴܶ∗ curve for each ߙ condition. Note that, to the best of our 
knowledge, the peculiar non-Piéron’s shape has not been observed in the past. Recall from Section 
6.1.5 that a non-Piéron’s shape is obtained whenever ߙ > ௤
௤ାଵ
 . By setting the emphasis on accuracy 
parameter ݍ equal to 1, we expected to obtain a non-Piéron’s shape for ߙ > 0.5. However, we have 
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noted in the previous experiments that participants tended to set their subjective ݍ value higher than the 
experimental one (possibly because they are loss-aversive). Therefore, in order to observe the non-
Piéron’s shape, we adjusted ߙ accordingly. We opted for using ߙ = 0.75 and, symmetrically, ߙ = 0.25 
for the condition that predicted the Piéron’s shape. As we will see, if participant were perfectly 
estimating all the parameters and were trying to maximize the amount of points earned (by having ݍ =
1) this would result in ܴܶ∗  always equal to 0 for all ߣ conditions when ߙ = 0.75, which may be 
physically unreachable by participants. We do not deem this to be a problem since, as said, participants 
will most likely use a higher ݍ, which would result in a slower, and less problematic, ܴܶ∗.  
 
Figure 7.8 
Several ܴܶ∗ curves for different parameters of the ܴܴ௠ decision strategies. Note how, with some parameters combination, the 
curves goes to infinity when ߣ goes to 0 (set of curves indicated by the thick black line).  
 
This study allows us to apply the EXACT Paradigm in order to understand the effect of changing 
alternatives in terms of response signals, response distributions, and accuracy distributions. Furthermore, 
it will allow us to understand difference across several performance groups, and to distinguish between 
different decision strategies used by participants, both in the aggregated dataset, that in the grouped one. 
7.7 Methods 
We recruited 20 participants (17 females and 3 males) to take part in this experiment. The 
experimental setup was almost identical to the one used previously: we used a short training session 
(ߣ = 1, ߙ = 0.5) to get participants accustomed with the task. Participants saw a progressing gauge 
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starting at ߙ and increasing in time according to ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) presented in Equation 6.1, and they were 
instructed to press the CTRL whenever they wanted to request a reward. A reward of 1 point was given 
with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (when a reward was not given, a punishment was given instead, that is 1 
point was taken away). After the response, we showed a delay (white screen with a writing saying 
“Please Wait”) and then the trial started again (the gauge was reset). On the screen, participants had 
information about the amount of points earned-lost in the previous trial (red if lost, green if earned) and 
the total amount of point for that condition (see Figure 7.1). Each participant started with 25 points. As 
before, points were exchanged for money (2 points=1 penny). Each participant underwent 2x4 
conditions: the starting point was set to either ߙ = 0.25 or ߙ = 0.75, meaning that at the very beginning 
of the trial the chance of receiving a reward was equal to ߙ and the change of receiving a punishment 
was equal to 1-ߙ. We used 4 different gauge speeds ߣ = 0.16, 0.33, 1, 2 (higher ߣ corresponding to a 
faster increase of the gauge).  Each condition lasted 3 minutes. Before the starting of each ߙ condition, 
participants underwent a short training session with ߣ = 1 and ߙ equal to the value of the condition. 
The experiment was organized so that participants performed all ߣ conditions for a certain ߙ before 
performing the ߣ conditions for the other ߙ (the order of ߙ and ߣ was randomized for each participant). 
We used a fixed delay ܦ across conditions of 0.5 seconds, and we did not use any timeout. To increase 
motivation, participants were informed that the participant who earned the most points would receive a 
£10 Amazon Voucher.  
7.8 Results 
7.8.1 Response Signal and Behavioural Responses 
By comparing the individual total score for each condition (Figure 7.8) we saw that, with ߙ = 0.25, 
most of participants’ total score (empty circles) systematically increased with increasing ߣ, and they got 
closer to the total expected reward. With ߙ = 0.75, the total expected reward (that is, the optimum 
response for ܴܴ௠ by assuming participants are maximizing the number of point earned) was always 
equal to 205, as the optimum ܴܶ∗ is equal to zero in this case (and the optimal accuracy is always 
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ܣܥܥ(0) = 0.75). Note that an increase in participant’s score did not necessarily corresponds to higher 
RT, as this increase may be simply due to higher ߣ which results in more trials.  
 
Figure 7.9 
The empty circles represent the points obtained for each participant for each condition. Different ܦ conditions correspond to 
different colour. The filled circles represent the expected average score with optimum performance (calculated with ܴܴ௠), 
with a line connecting the same ߙ conditions. Noise on the horizontal axes is added to increase readability. As in the previous 
experiment, participants are consistently sub-optimal, especially with the ߙ = 0.75 conditions.   
 
The analysis of response signal by using STARS method on each participant and each condition 
resulted in similar results as in the previous experiment. The average number of shifts index across 
participants are reported in Table 7.6. There was a significant difference only between different ߣ levels 
(ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 16.187, ݌ < 0.0001), even though the values for ߙ = 0.75 were slightly higher (apart from 
the last ߣ). The values were consistent with the previous experiment, and the increase seemed to be due 
to the higher number of trials due to shorter responses with higher ߣ and higher ߙ, which thus resulted 
in more trials and more chances for participants to change their strategy.  
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Table 7.6 Average shift index for each condition 
 ࣅ = ૙. ૚૟ ࣅ = ૙. ૜૜ ࣅ = ૚ ࣅ = ૛ 
ࢻ = ૙. ૛૞ 0.65 1.4 2.6 3.7 
ࢻ = ૙. ૠ૞ 2.1 2 4.1 3.4 
By aggregating response signals across participants, we could not observe any significant trend. We 
also calculated the change in standard deviation and, again, no significant trend was detected with this 
methodology. Therefore, similarly to the previous experiment, it appeared that using a visible ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) 
mitigated the issue found in Chapter 6 about the high number of change of strategies and the presence 
of trends, making the results more like those obtained through a Classic RT task.  
The results in terms of mdRT are shown on the left panel of Figure 7.9 (left), whereas results in 
terms of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  are shown on the right panel of Figure 7.9. As explained before, changes in 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) for two different conditions is a good indicator that participants were actually sensible to the 
change of conditions, and were not just responding at the same gauge position (this could not be 
observed by uniquely looking at the RT responses, as responding at the same ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) position would 
result in decreasing ܴܶ when ߣ is increasing). The optimum response ܴܶ∗ and the optimum accuracy 
ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗) for each condition are represented by blue circles with black edges (for ߙ = 0.25) and 
orange circles with black edges (for ߙ = 0.75). Note how the optimum response was always ܴܶ∗ = 0 
for ߙ = 0.75, which corresponds to ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗) = 0.75. The effect of both ߣ  and ߙ  conditions on 
median RT was significant (for ߣ: ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 42.291, ݌ ≅ 0 , for ߙ: ܨଵ,ଵଽ = 45.762, ݌ ≅ 0 ) and their 
interaction was also significant ( ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 17.95, ݌ ≅ 0 ). Post hoc pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction showed that each ߣ condition was significantly different from each other (݌ <
0.0001). Similarly, the effect of both ߣ and ߙ  conditions on accuracy of response was significant 
(ߣ: ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 27.695, ݌ < 0.0001 , for ߙ: ܨଵ,ଵଽ = 17.476, ݌ < 0.001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
(by applying Bonferroni correction) showed the accuracy for each ߣ  condition was significantly 
different from each other at ݌ < 0.0001 (a part from the third and fourth ߣ  condition, where ݌ =
0.454).  
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Figure 7.10 
The circles indicate median of median RT (left panel) and median of median of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (right panel). The bar indicates 
one standard error. The circles with black edges indicate the optimum responses, calculated with ܴܴ௠. The red dashed line 
corresponds to the Piéron’s Law function fitted only on the ߙ = 0.25 condition, as the ߙ = 0.75 clearly does not follow 
Piéron’s law. Note how the optimum responses for the ߙ = 0.75 condition are equal to 0 (orange circles on the left panel) 
which corresponds to an ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) of 0.75 (on the right panel). 
 
With ߙ = 0.25 the obtained mdRT were very close to the optimum expected reward, and they 
follow a Piéron’s shape, as expected, which was confirmed by fitting the Piéron’s function on this 
condition (ܴ~ = 0.99). The estimated values for the Piéron’s function (ܴܶ = ߛ + ݇ߣିఉ) were ݇ =
1.45, ߚ = 0.8 and ߛ = 0.2. Most interesting was the peculiar shape obtained with ߙ = 0.75, which 
corresponded to the non-Piéron’s shape expected with high level of ߙ (Figure 7.7). Note that this was 
not an artefact of averaging across different condition, as this shape was actually observed in most 
participants (15 out of 20 participants). Such strategy, counterintuitive and never observed in Piéron’s 
Law-type experiment, has been reproduced here, which implies that participants were indeed using an 
optimum decision strategy which can take into account different starting points.  
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7.8.2 Fitting Models to Aggregated Data  
We fitted several variants of the decision strategies to the observation. Even though by looking at 
the data is obvious that the ߙ condition had a relevant effect in the dataset, we still compared a model 
with free or fixed ߙො across ߙ conditions. The results, in terms of both BIC are shown in Table 7.7. The 
estimated BIC values with fixed ߙො (Table 7.8) are much higher compared to the version with free ߙො. 
We can conclude that, as expected, manipulating the starting point ߙ had a remarkable effect on ߙො 
parameter. 
Table 7.7 Results for the decision rules fitting (free or fixed ࢇෝ) 
 
BIC df 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢻෝ) -0.55746 8 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢻෝ) 2.356767 7 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢻෝ) -0.12927 8 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢻෝ) 2.350711 7 
࡮ࡾ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢻෝ)  1.205431 7 
࡮ࡾ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢻෝ) 2.350593 6 
ࡾࡾ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢻෝ) 1.84737 7 
ࡾࡾ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢻෝ) 2.199422 6 
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Table 7.8 Best models’ parameters 
ࡾࡾ࢓(ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢻෝ)  ࡾ࡭(ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢻෝ) 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૚૟     0.322  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૚૟  0.788 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૜૜    0.574  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૜૜ 1.219 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૚        1.901  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૚ 2.052 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૛         3.176  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૛ 4.087 
ࢻෝࢻୀ૙.૛૞ 0.29  ࢻෝࢻୀ૙.૛૞ 0.286 
ࢻෝࢻୀ૙.ૠ૞ 0.749  ࢻෝࢻୀ૙.ૠ૞ 0.824 
ࡰ෡           1.028  ࡰ෡  0.389 
ࢗෝ            2.202  ࢗෝ 1.964 
The best model was ܴܴ௠. The estimated parameters (shown in Table 7.8) for this model were 
reasonably close with the real parameter. The ݍො value was twice the experimental ݍ, which corresponds 
to a great emphasis on accuracy, meaning that participants were clearly loss-aversive. Furthermore, ߣመ 
values were slightly overestimated, ܦ෡ was estimated to be close to 1s instead of the 0.5s used, and the 
ߙො values were very close to the experimental ones. Generally, the model appears to capture the data 
without needing to use highly different experimental values. However, ܴܣ provided a similarly good 
model, with also reasonable parameters (Table 7.7), and a fitting that is almost as good as the fitting for 
ܴܴ௠ (see Figure 7.8 for a comparison). In Figure 7.10 it is possible to see how ܴܣ provided a better fit 
for ߙ = 0.25, ܴܴ௠  a better one for ߙ = 0.75.  
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Figure 7.11 
Median of median of responses, with the two best-fitting models (white circles and red asterisks). 
We also tried a different model, by varying ݍො across ߙ conditions, as it is possible that participants 
adjusted their subjective weighting parameter according to the experimental condition. In particular, 
according to the “fourfold pattern of risk attitudes” in prospect theory (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992), 
when they were in a “high reward probability” mindset (that is, when ߙ = 0.75), they may have had a 
more loss-aversive behaviour (corresponding in setting a high ݍො). We therefore used a version of 
ܴܣ, ܴܴ௠ and ܤܴ with free ݍො across ߙ conditions, and we compared it with the fixed ݍො estimated before. 
Note that ܴܴ does not have the ݍ parameter.  The results are shown in Table 7.9. In all these models, 
the parameter ߙො is left free to vary across ߙ conditions.  
Table 7.9 Results for the decision rules fitting (free or fixed ࢗෝ) 
 BIC df 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢗෝ) -0.55746 8 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ) 0.570953 9 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢗෝ) -0.12927 8 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ) 0.205938 9 
࡮ࡾ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢗෝ)  1.205431 7 
࡮ࡾ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ) 1.334914 8 
ࡾࡾ 1.84737 7 
As expected, allowing ݍො  to vary across ߙ  conditions provided a better WLS value. For each 
decision rule, the ݍො pattern across the two conditions was clear: ݍො was remarkably higher than 1 with 
ߙ = 0.25 condition, and slightly lower than 1 with ߙ = 0.75 condition, meaning that participants were 
giving more weight to the reward than to the punishment in the latter case. However, ܴܴ௠ with fixed 
ݍො again provided the best mWLS value, as the estimated ݍො where too different from the experimental 
value of 1 (for ܴܴ௠, these values were 4.13 and 0.79 for ߙ = 0.25 and ߙ = 0.75 respectively). How 
relevant was this difference clearly depends on the penalty we set for deviating from real experimental 
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parameters, and is therefore open to interpretation. Again, ܴܣ with free ݍ provided a similar good fit, 
whereas the other two functions provided an extremely poor fit.  
To summarise, varying ߙ had a large effect on the response, and a model with fixed ߙො  cannot 
account for the observation. The best model appeared to be ܴܴ௠, and the estimated ݍො value was much 
higher than the experimental one. It is unclear whether participant used different ݍො  for the 2 ߙ 
conditions, as both versions provided a good account for the data. If this is the case, participants 
generally gave more weight to the punishment during the ߙ = 0.25 condition, and more weight to the 
reward during the ߙ = 0.75  condition, which is opposite of what expected from the Tversky & 
Kahnemann (1992) fourfold pattern of risk attitudes.  
7.8.3 Analysis of performance groups 
By dividing the dataset into three groups based on performance (i.e. point earned, see Section 3.1) 
we noticed a clear pattern (see Figure 7.11). Participants in the best performance group were faster, 
allowing them to obtain a higher reward with the ߙ = 0.75 condition, where the optimum was ܴܶ∗ =
0. It appeared that participants in the other group were not just slower, but they may actually have 
different, subjective parameter estimations. In fact, if they were trying to reach ܴܶ∗ = 0 without being 
able to do so for motor limitation, their response in the ߙ = 0.75 condition would always be equal to 
their fastest response for that condition. Instead, their response followed a precise pattern, (a monotonic 
increasing one for the poor performance condition and a non-monotonic one for the medium 
performance group). This may be due to a more loss-aversive behaviour, which could correspond to a 
high ݍො value, as we will confirm when fitting the dataset.  
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Figure 7.12 
Median of median RT for each performance group (circles connected with lines), with optimum responses (circles with black 
edges) and best fitting model (white circles). For each performance group, the best fitting model resulted in being ܴܴ௠. 
 Interestingly, participants in the best performance group were faster even when this was not optimal. 
To measure that, we take the Euclidian Distance ට∑ ൫ܴ݉݀ ௜ܶ,௝ − ܴ ௜ܶ,௝∗ ൯
ଶ
௜,௝  where the index 
݅ corresponds to each ߣ, and ݆ to each ߙ condition. The results are shown in Table 7.10.  The Good 
Performance group, even though was much closer to the ܴܶ∗ for the ߙ = 0.75 condition (as clearly 
seen from the figure), was more far away from the ܴܶ∗ of the ߙ = 0.25 condition than the other two 
groups.   
Table 7.10 Euclidian distance from optimum response 
 Poor Perf.  Medium Perf. Good Perf. 
ࢻ = ૙. ૛૞ 1.354 0.9587 2.365 
ࢻ = ૙. ૠ૞ 6.402 2.2047 0.502 
 
Fitting the decision strategies to performance groups provided some insight. We fitted ܴܴ, ܴܴ௠, ܴܣ 
and ܤܴ, but we excluded ܴܴ and ܤܴ as their fitting was always much poorer than the fitness for the 
other two. The preferred model (both in terms of BIC, mWLS, and WLS) was ܴܴ௠ for all performance 
group, even though ܴܣ performed approximately the same for the poor and the average performance 
group (Table 7.11). There was also a slight decrease of the ݍො in groups with higher performance, for 
ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ with the first two performance groups (Table 7.12). This means that participants in the 
higher performance group may have given more weight to speed compared to accuracy (for the ܴܣ 
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decision rule) or they may have decreased their subjective level of punishment/reward ratio (for ܴܴ௠), 
which would explain the totally different strategy they used (see top Figure 7.11).  
Table 7.11 BIC value for each performance group 
BIC 
 Poor Perf. Medium Perf. Good Perf. 
ࡾࡾ࢓ 0.12144 0.677505 0.072034 
ࡾ࡭      0.12447 0.815835 0.608339 
 
Table 7.12 Estimating ࢗෝ values for each performance group 
ࢗෝ values 
 Poor P.  Medium P. Good P. 
ࡾࡾ࢓ 2.409 2.205 1.812 
ࡾ࡭    1.594 1.428 1.859 
We conclude from this analysis that the difference between participants in different performance 
rules may reflect their subjective weighting parameters and, possibly, the strategy used. However, ܴܣ 
is a peculiar strategy because, even though does not maximize the number of earned points, is it a 
weighted sum of ܴܴ  and accuracy (Bogacz et al, 2010). Unfortunately, the dataset for individual 
participants was not large enough to allow individual fitting of the data.  
7.8.4 Distribution Analysis 
The Vincentized distributions are shown in Figure 7.12, with the respective mean, standard 
deviation and skewness on each panel (note the different scale of the axes). As expected, most of the 
distributions presented a right-skewed shape, similar to what obtained with Classic RT paradigm (but 
the skewness was generally lower than for Classic RT distribution). Both ߣ and ߙ appeared to have a 
significant effect on the standard deviation (for ߣ: ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 32.336, ݌ ≅ 0, for ߙ: ܨଵ,ଵଽ = 5.872, ݌ =
0.026 ) and a significant interaction ( ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 5.899, ݌ < 0.001 ). The ߙ  condition appeared to 
significantly affect the skewness ( ܨଵ,ଵଽ = 16.479, ݌ < 0.001) , but ߣ  did not ( ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 0.749, ݌ =
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0.528). The rate of response was not normally distributed (by standardising and aggregating results 
from individual participants, both with and without using the STD-IQR method), confirming the results 
of Experiment 6.1 and 7.1.  
 
Figure 7.13 
Vincentized distributions of responses for each condition. Note the different scales on the horizontal axis. As we found in the 
previous experiment, the standard deviation consistently decreases with increasing ߣ, apart for the condition with the lowest ߣ 
and ߙ = 0.25.  
The accuracy of response was analysed by standardising and collapsing across all participants, both 
with the complete dataset and by excluding the most severely truncated distributions (see Methods in 
this Chapter, Section 7.3). In this case, the effect of modification appeared to be very mild (apart from 
two distributions in the ߙ = 0.75 condition). Most of the distributions were approximately normal as 
observed in the original dataset as well.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality did not reject the 
hypothesis of normality distribution for any distribution at significance level ߙ = 0.01 (Figure 7.14) 
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Figure 7.14 
Distributions of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) responses. The blue lines correspond to the original dataset, the yellow lines to the dataset after the 
severely truncated individual distributions were eliminated. The number of eliminated datasets is shown in each panel (N). 
The result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality is also shown in each panel, with the red-dashed lines corresponding 
to a Standard Normal Distribution. 
 
This is consistent with the previous experiment and suggests, as we discussed previously, that at 
least in this paradigm participants were basing their response on the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), and it is tempting to 
speculate that something similar may happen with Classic RT as well. This will be discussed more 
deeply in the general discussion of this chapter (Section 7.10).    
7.9 Discussion 
In this study, we examined some of the prediction generated by coupling the exponential ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) 
with the decision strategies that participants may use to maximize their subjective reward. Whereas in 
the first experiment of this Chapter we focused on the effect of different delay across trials on RT and 
accuracy (have already investigated in previous Chapters), in this section we tackled a new problem by 
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investigating the effect of changing the ߙ parameter, which corresponds to varying the starting point at 
the beginning of the trial. This EXACT Paradigm proved to be a powerful resource for this analysis, as 
it allowed to vary ߙ from the whole range 0-1, without affecting other parameters. The participants were 
clearly responsive to different ߙ, producing ܴܶ∗ curves that appeared to be in line with our predictions. 
In particular, low and high value of ߙ produced a Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape, respectively. We 
also observed the Piéron’s shape in Experiment 7.1 and this study confirmed that Piéron’s law was the 
result of the combination of a speed accuracy function (which establishes the shape of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)) and 
a maximization strategy (which establish at what point the accumulator of information must stop and 
the decision can be made). This contrasts with the idea that Piéron’s law is a side-effect of the perceptual 
mechanism, as claimed by Stafford & Gurney (2004) within the context of DDM (see also Donkin & 
Van Maanen, 2014). The non-Piéron’s shape, predicted by the model but not observed in the previous 
literature (neither in the context of Piéron’s Law experiment or in the context of studies with different 
alternatives), shows us that participant can approximate complex decision strategies in order to 
maximize their reward.  
By fitting the results to decision strategies, we had a better insight into participants decisions’ 
mechanism. The optimum decision strategy was found to be ܴܴ௠ , similar to previous study. For 
different performance group, the values obtained with ܴܣ  were similar to ܴܴ௠ . The ݍො  value was 
consistent across different participant’s group and ܴܣ and ܴܴ௠ strategies: it was generally higher than 
experimental value of 1 used and it was lower (but still higher than 1) in better performance groups. 
The relationship between performance and estimated ݍො value considering the current literature will be 
more deeply investigated in the next experiment.   
7.10 General Conclusions 
In this Chapter, we explored several features of the new version of the EXACT Paradigm. 
Compared to the investigation in design in the previous Chapter, here we employed a study in which 
participants were completely aware of their accuracy in time, and could make choice accordingly 
without having to estimate it. We obtained a clear improvement in the quality of the dataset compared 
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to the previous set of experiments: participants’ median responses were less spread out, there was much 
less response shifting and there was no relevant trend along conditions. Furthermore, by using several 
values of ߣ we could obtain several ܴܶ∗ curves that we could fit with the decision strategies.  
The main point of this Chapter was to show that optimality in RT tasks can indeed be measured 
without having to assume a particular perceptual process, by using an experimental setup that resembles 
a Classic RT tasks. The EXACT Paradigm could be used to investigate several other aspects of 
behaviour: the response to sound feedback (by following participants reports, this should influence how 
loss-aversive they behave, and possibly have an effect on the ݍ parameter), the response to different 
speed-accuracy function shapes, the behaviour when ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  fluctuates from a trial to another, 
instead than being equal across the whole experimental condition, as we assumed here. The effect of 
feedback on participants’ responses will be thoroughly investigated in the next Chapter, by also 
providing a comparison with a Classic RT task.  
In terms of optimality, we have again confirmed that participants were not basing their response on 
the delay across trials. We suggested in Section 7.5 different interpretations for this. We stress again 
the importance of fitting data quantitatively in order to understand which decision strategy appears to 
be more likely used by participants: in fact, judging solely by the lack of effect of the delay ܦ, we would 
have concluded that participants were using the ܤܴ strategy, as it is the only one among the four 
considered which is not related to trial time. However, ܤܴ fitting appeared unequivocally poor, whereas 
the ܴܴ௠ model appear to be the preferred model. 
 This is not completely consistent with the results of Bogacz et al., (2010). In his study the 
participants were divided into 3 performance groups (Bottom 10%, Middle 60% and Top 30%), and the 
computed likelihood suggested that ܴܣ was the most successful model in accounting for the data (this 
was particularly strong for the bottom 10% of the participant, where ܴܣ was 43 times more likely of 
ܴܴ௠ in generating the data). Both ܴܣ  and ܴܴ௠  where much more likely than ܴܴ . In our first 
experiment ܴܴ௠ was always the preferred model, but the fit for ܴܣ was also good. Unfortunately, this 
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is the sole study in which different decision strategies were compared (for example, Simen et al., 2009, 
used only ܴܴ; Balci et al., 2011, compared ܴܴ and ܴܴ௠, but not ܴܣ), and therefore it is difficult to 
draw a definitive conclusion based on these results. 
As we discussed previously, the ܴܴ௠ is a particularly interesting model, as in most experimental 
conditions it can be considered the rule that maximizes the participants’ subjective value. This rule 
seems to apply even when an explicit punishment is not provided, by assuming that participants have 
some internal, subjective punishment that makes them want to avoid incorrect responses. However, 
ܴܴ௠ is the optimal rule only in task with fixed condition duration. When the duration is variable and 
the number of trials is fixed, the optimum response according to ܴܴ௠ is to wait for an infinite amount 
of time, which is absurd. It is possible that, with variable condition duration, participants were using a 
different strategy (for example, adding a cost to waiting, similar to what assumed in Drugowitsch et al., 
2012), or assuming some arbitrary condition length. This remains untested. 
Finally, in this Chapter, we suggest a novel way of analysing the accuracy distribution. We observe 
how accuracy appeared to be approximately Normally distributed, which suggest that participants were 
actually be basing their response on some particular accuracy values, fluctuating around it. In this 
interpretation, the RT distribution shape is a by-product of normality distributed accuracy value. In the 
EXACT task accuracy is defined between ߙ and 1, and in a Classic RT with 2 choices the lower 
boundary is 0.5. This implies that, depending on the mean accuracy position that participant choose, the 
resulting distribution may be more or less truncated. The resulting RT shape can be found to be equal 
to:  
 ܴܶ(ݐ; ܴܶ∗, ߣ, ߙ)
=
߶(1 + (ߙ − 1) exp(−ߣݐ) , ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗), ߪ)(1 − ߙ)ߣ exp(−ߣݐ)
૖(1, ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗), ߪ) − ૖(ߙ, ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗), ߪ)
 
ܧݍ. 7.1 
Where ߶ is the normal probability function and ઴ (bold) is the cumulative normal probability 
function. Note that the distribution of RT is function of the optimum response ܴܶ∗ , and of the 
corresponding accuracy, ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗). Thus, it depends on the decision rule used. 
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For the exponential ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ), this correctly results in a right skewed distribution. Also, the RT 
distribution depends on the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) parameters ߣ and ߙ, as shown in Figure 7.14. For increasing ߣ or 
ߙ the RT distribution become less spread and the mean decreases (fast responses), which is exactly 
what we observed for our distributions (see Figure 7.6 and 7.12). At least for ߣ this is what we expect 
intuitively also for Classic RT, as higher ߣ corresponds to higher stimulus intensity. For ߙ, is difficult 
to compare this with observed distributions, as we are not aware of any paper in which a comparison 
between distribution from task with different alternatives is reported.  
This Accuracy-Hypothesis can be tested empirically, by calculating the accuracy distribution for 
each participant fitting a truncated normal on it, and then obtaining the resulting RT pdf through 
Equation 7.1. Unfortunately, the study was not designed to test this prediction, and the sample size of 
individual participants is too small to allow such procedure. Our method of aggregating participants is 
useful when checking general distribution shape, but distribution truncation, and the expected 
variability in mean across participants, did not allow us to use this method for fitting RT empirical 
distributions (recall that we standardised accuracy distributions before aggregating them together). It 
would be also extremely interesting to test this hypothesis in Classic RT paradigm. However, as we 
have mentioned in the introduction, this is extremely troublesome, as Classic RT tasks do not allow a 
direct measurement of ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ). 
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Figure 7.15 
Possible explanation for the right-skewed distributions in the time domain, which would be generated by the Normal 
Distribution in the accuracy domain. The upper left panel show three distributions with the same ߣ (with ߣ = 0.5) and three 
different values of ߙ, whereas the bottom left panel showing three distributions with the same level of ߙ = 0.5 and three levels 
of ߣ. The mean of the Normal Distribution is calculated to be ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗), with the ܴܴ௠ decision rule. Note that, on the 
accuracy domain, ߙ  correspond to the lower truncation point of the accuracy distribution. Different values of ߣ  and ߙ 
correspond to different ܴܶ distributions.  
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Chapter 8  
 
Payoffs Effect for the EXACT Paradigm and 
Classic RT Task 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, we explored the capability of the EXACT Paradigm. The main aim of this 
Chapter is to compare it with a Classic RT task by investigating the effect of payoffs on RT and accuracy. 
Both experiments were organised similarly to the previous EXACT Paradigm task: we varied the 
difficulty of the trial (by changing the ߣ for the EXACT Paradigm and the stimulus contrast for the 
Classic RT task) and the weighting parameter ݍ. In this way we were able to obtain different ܴܶ curves.  
As we already discussed, even though the parameter ݍ can be generally seen as an “emphasis on 
accuracy” parameter, recall from Section 2.6 that this parameter have slightly different interpretation 
for different decision rules: it corresponds to the ratio between the cost of error over the cost of waiting 
for ܤܴ; the subjective utility for an incorrect response over the subjective utility over a correct response 
for ܴܴ௠ (punishment/reward ratio); the cost of error (scaled by total trial time) and the weight given to 
reward rate for ܴܣ. In both the EXACT Paradigm and Classic RT task, we decided to follow the 
interpretation of the ܴܴ௠ decision rule, and modify the punishment to reward ratio by changing the 
number of points the participants gain or lose when a correct/incorrect response was made. The first 
reason behind that is that, in previous studies, ܴܴ௠ has been shown to be the strategy that could fit 
experimental observation better, even across different performance groups. Secondly, the interpretation 
of the parameter ݍ within the ܴܴ௠ is much clearer than within the ܴܣ or ܤܴ, as it is directly connected 
with the reward and punishment used, which is easy to manipulate. Nevertheless we will not exclude 
these other two models from our analysis in fitting the experimental data. In fact, we believe that 
manipulating the punishment/reward ratio may still have an indirect effect on the ݍ parameter for the 
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other decision rules, as it is affecting the emphasis on accuracy. As we have seen in Section 2.8, the 
general effect of increasing ݍ in terms of DDM is to increase the optimal threshold, as higher threshold 
increases accuracy.  
8.1.1 Payoff Matrices 
There are several ways in which payoffs can be used to affect behaviour. Participants may be 
differentially rewarded according to their reaction times, by giving trial by trial feedback, or different 
payoffs may be used for different stimulus-response combinations. (e.g. Luce, 1986; Snodgrass et al., 
1967; Saslow, 1968, 1972). The way payoffs are organised in a task can be summarised through payoff 
matrices, like those used in Table 8.1, where A or B represents the correct alternative (in a 2 choices 
task), and a or b represents the participant’s choice. For example, the cell corresponding to A/a indicates 
the feedback given for a correct response to the alternative A; the cell B/a indicates the feedback given 
for an incorrect response, with B being the correct alternative. There are two main types of payoff 
matrices. The first type regards matrices used when the aim is to affect the response bias. This is the 
case when the rewards and punishment are given such that participants will favour one alternative 
instead of the other, as shown in Table 8.1 (Type 1). For example, by setting the sum of the feedback 
for A/a and B/a higher than the sum for A/b and B/b we can bias the participants towards the response 
“a”. We define matrices of Type 2 those used to affect the speed-accuracy trade-off, by giving 
unbalanced feedback for correct and incorrect responses: in Table 8.1 (Type 2), we usually set Y below 
0, so that an incorrect response corresponds to punishments (however, both positive and negative values 
could be used). 
Table 8.1 Three types of payoff matrices 
Type 1 A B  Type 2 A B  EXACT ࢁ > ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) ࢁ < ࡭࡯࡯(ࡾࢀ) 
a X Y  a X Y  R X Y 
b Z W  b Y X  
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The third matrix in Table 8.1 corresponds to a possible representation of the matrix for the EXACT 
Paradigm. In this case, U is a random number drawn from a Uniform Distribution. If this number is 
higher than ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) for a participant response (R), a feedback X is given, otherwise a feedback Y is 
given. By noticing that ܷ > ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) corresponds to a correct response, and ܷ < ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) to an 
incorrect one, we can see that this matrix is equivalent to the Type 2 matrix. However, the EXACT 
Paradigm cannot be used to test prediction for “biased” responses (Type 1). In order to have our result 
consistent with the EXACT Paradigm study presented earlier, we are going to use the type of payoff 
matrix represented in Table 2.  
Most of the studies focused on the response bias, using, therefore, the first type of payoff matrix 
(Diederich & Busemeyer 2003; Diederich, 2008; Liston & Stone, 2008, Simen et al., 2009 [exp.3], 
Krajbich, Armel & Rangel, 2010; Milosavljevic et al., 2010). Within this type of payoff matrix, when 
applied to sequential sampling models, three hypotheses have been formulated (Diederich & Busemeyer; 
2006): the bound-change hypothesis assumed that participants change their threshold bias (the distance 
between the starting point and the threshold of the sequential sampling model) by setting the starting 
point of the process closer to the alternative with higher reward. The Drift-Rate-Change hypothesis 
assumed that the drift rate for each alternative depends on the sum of evidence accumulated and value 
for that hypothesis. Finally, the two-stage-process (Diederich, 2008) suggests that the task may be seen 
as a multi-attribute decision problem, with two stages: first deciding the payoff and then the stimulus 
evidence. It turned out that this last model provided the best account for the data. However, in a similar 
experiment, Leite (2012) has shown how both a two-stage diffusion model with a shift in drift rate and 
a single-stage diffusion model with shifts in starting point could account for the data, and the two models 
were so similar that it was not possible to choose between them. 
After the theoretical presentation of Bogacz et al. (2006), researchers have focussed their attention 
on optimum performance with biased alternatives (two alternatives, see Type 1 matrix in Table 8.1). 
Within the context of pure DDM, this allowed much more precise predictions: estimated starting point 
of the process was predicted to be closer to the more rewarded alternatives, the average RT should be 
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shorter and accuracy lower for that response, and large reward asymmetries with sufficiently short delay 
across trials should generate a non-integrative response (that is, a response corresponding to the biased 
rewarded alternative, as fast as possible, and with accuracy at chance level). Simen et al. (2009) tested 
these assumptions, by using a 2AFC random-dot motion task with 3:1 reward/punishment ratio, finding 
that the predictions were satisfied for most of the participants.  
Even though the studies based on matrices of Type 1 have been investigated across different 
frameworks (e.g., for a signal detection approach, see Maddox & Bohil, 1998), a systematic 
investigation for matrices of Type 2 does not exist. This is not to say that these types of payoff are not 
used: in several cases, we found that they have been implemented in the design as a way to discourage 
people from committing mistakes and/or anticipations, by using monetary punishment (e.g. Briggs & 
Blaha, 1969) or some other types of negative feedback.  (Jones et al., 2013). This procedure is so 
common that, coupled with the (according to what we observed) inherently participant’s risk-avoidance, 
the subjective value of the punishment appears to be almost always much higher than the value for the 
reward.  
In one of the few studies where a matrix of Type 2 was used (Blank et al., 2013), by using a 
perceptual decision task and three different punishment levels, it has been found that higher punishment 
appeared to increase the accuracy of response, but strangely not RT, which is difficult to explain in 
terms of DDM. In fact, increase in accuracy can be due to higher drift rate or higher threshold, but this 
would correspond to slower or faster RT, respectively. It also found that there was a different for the 
10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the behavioural effects defined as “punishment – no-punishment 
condition” in accuracy, finding a negative value for the low percentile and a positive for the high 
percentile, suggesting that, in some participants, punishment impaired performance, whereas in others, 
it improved it.  
Instead of using different payoff matrix, Balci et al. (2011) analysed how the ݍ parameters changes 
along with training. They found that it decreases from 0.8 to 0.2, corresponding to an increase in 
subjective reward and a decrease in the normalized threshold for the Pure DDM. Bogacz et al. (2010) 
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found that the estimated value of theݍ parameter was connected with the performance of the participants, 
with lower ݍ values corresponding to higher performance (more details about these experiments will 
be given in the second study of this Chapter).  
8.1.2 Relationship between ࢗ Parameter and ࣅ and the Corresponding ࡾࢀ∗ 
The relationship between the ݍ parameter across different ߣ on the corresponding ܴܶ∗ is similar to 
that observed with ߙ, as these two parameters are related. This relationship has already been discussed 
informally in Section 2.10, and in more detail in Section 6.1.5 (see also Figure 2.5). Theoretically, with 
ߙ = 0.5 participants’ response should assume a Piéron’s shape whenever punishment is higher than 
reward, and a non-Piéron’s otherwise. In particular, recall that for ܴܴ௠ we obtain a non-Piéron’ shape 
(for different values of ߣ) whenever ߙ > ௤
௤ାଵ
. With ߙ = 0.5, this is true whenever ݍ < 1 (reward higher 
than punishment). In these cases, Piéron’s Law fits the data well (ܴଶ ≅ 0.999).  We found that the best 
Piéron’s variant for these ܴܶ∗ curves was the one with free ݇ and ߚ with both ݇ and ߚ increasing with 
increasing ݍ, and a ߛ = 0.12. Is interesting to note that, even though mathematically the function goes 
asymptotically to 0 with increasing ߣ, this is not captured by the Piéron’s fitting when value of ߣ up to 
10 are used (when we fitted a simulation with value ߣ as high as 100, the correct ߛ = 0 was estimated), 
which may lead to assume that a similar mechanism may be going on in observed human RT. We 
obtained the same results with varying ߙ, which resulted in a ߛ = 0.083 (Section 7.2).  
When the subjective punishment/reward ratio is exactly equivalent to the amount of points 
given/taken, then is predicted that the participants will generate a non-Piéron’s shape whenever the 
points given for a correct responses are higher than the point taken for an incorrect one (ݍ < 1). 
However, as we discussed previously and observed in the previous study, it appears that participants 
are normally loss-avoiding, which corresponds in giving more value to the punishment and therefore 
having a subjective ݍ value generally higher than 1. We also believe that this is one of the reasons the 
non-Piéron’s shape has not been observed in Piéron’s-like experiment. To reverse this loss-avoiding 
strategy, we need rewards that are much higher than the corresponding punishment, as the exact 
mapping between points and subjective ݍ value is not known.  
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8.1.3 Organization of the Chapter 
One of the main aims of the final two experiments was to investigate the effect of manipulating the 
punishment/reward ratio. In particular, we wanted to test the prediction about Piéron’s and non-Piéron's 
shape with EXACT and Classic RT task, and to compare the results across both experimental designs. 
In a Classic RT Paradigm, apart from testing the Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s law prediction, we also 
tested for different decision strategy by assuming the DDM as the perceptual model used. We made 
several assumptions about the estimated threshold, reaction time, error rate, etc. As this is not relevant 
for the EXACT Paradigm, we will discuss these predictions both intuitively and mathematically in the 
Introduction and Method section for the next experiment (Section 8.6 onwards).  
EXPERIMENT 8.1 
The first experiment we investigated the effect of varying the punishment/reward ratio by using the 
EXACT Paradigm. The design was similar to the one used in the previous Chapter.  
8.2 Methods 
We recruited 31 participants (14 males, 17 females) to take part in this experiment. A gauge was 
shown on the screen, along with the points earned or lost for the last trial (in green if earned, in red if 
lost). The gauge increased in time according to Equation 6.1, which established the speed-accuracy 
trade off ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ). Participants were asked to press CTRL whenever they wanted to, whereupon a 
reward was given with probability ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ). When a reward was not given, a punishment was given 
instead. After each participant’s response, we set a pause of 0.5 seconds (ܦ = 0.5ݏ) and then the trial 
started again (the gauge was reset). See Figure 7.1. We kept ߙ = 0.5, meaning that the gauge started 
half full at the beginning of each trial. We used 4 different gauge speeds (ߣ = 0.16, 0.33, 1, 2, higher 
ߣ corresponding to faster increase of the gauge) and 3 different ݍ  conditions. We indicated the ݍ 
conditions by referring to the punishment/reward used, thus ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
, ଵ଴
ଵ
, ଵ
ଵ଴
. For each ݍ condition, we 
ran all the ߣ level (blocked, in randomized order) before proceeding to the next ݍ condition. However, 
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the first ݍ condition was always set up to be ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
, in order to get participants accustomed with the 
paradigm on a balanced level of punishment/reward, whereas the other two ݍ  conditions were 
randomized.  Before each ݍ condition, participants performed a short training with the corresponding ݍ 
value and ߣ = 1. Before each session an example of the progressing gauge was shown. Each session 
lasted 2 minutes. Participants started each session with 100 points. Each participant was paid £4 for 
their participation plus an amount of money depending on their performance (25 points=1 pence).  
8.2.1 Predictions in terms of Optimum Response 
Note that the optimum response time (by using ܴܴ௠) calculated using the experimental ݍ does not 
result in a smooth shift between Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape as in Figure 6.2 (reproduced here as 
Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1 
Several ܴܶ∗ curves, generated by increasing the value of ݍ (the emphasis on accuracy parameter). Note that some of these 
curves go to infinity with ߣ going at zero (indicated by the black straight line), depending on the combination of ݍ and ߙ 
parameters. 
Instead, the optimum ܴܶ∗ generates a Piéron’s shape for ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ
 and = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 . For ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
 the ܴܶ∗ 
curve is equal to 0 for all ߣ but the last one, in which is ܴܶ∗ ≅ 0.1ݏ, for ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
 (very high reward), as 
shown in Figure 8.2. A clear non-Piéron’s shape like the one observed in the simulation can be obtained 
by using a less rewarding condition, for example ݍ = ଵ
ହ
. The reason we did not chose this value was 
that, based on what found on previous experiment, and after having ran several pilot participants on this 
172 
 
study, we concluded that participants gave generally a higher weight on the punishment. Therefore, 
using ݍ = ଵ
ହ
 may not be rewarding enough to generate a non-Piéron’s shape (as this ݍ condition may 
correspond to a higher subjective punishment/reward ratio, even higher than ݍ = 1 if participants were 
not very loss-aversive). We therefore used an even lower ݍ that it would allow us to obtain non-Piéron’s 
shape. As we will see, things are more complicated as the shape will depend on the performance of the 
participant.  
 
Figure 8.2 
The three different ܴܶ∗ curves (in black) obtained with the three levels of punishment/reward ratio used in the experiment. 
The red dots indicate the ܴܶ∗ values for the ߣ used in the experiment (ߣ = 0.16, 0.33, 1, 2). Note that the optimum time to 
respond for the ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
 condition is equal to 0 for the first three ߣ conditions.  
8.3 Results 
We analysed the total score for each participant/condition and compared it to the theoretical average 
score assuming that participants were trying to earn as many points as possible (Figure 8.3).  In the ݍ =
10/10 and ݍ = 10/1 conditions participants appeared to earn approximately the same amount of point 
as predicted by the theoretical average score. For ݍ = 1/10, instead, they consistently earn less point 
than the average optimum, due to the fact that they are slower than the theoretical optimum response 
(which is ܴܶ∗ = 0 in this case). As in the previous study, it is possible that participants did not reach 
the optimum score as they were not able to reach such short RT, or it was deemed to be inconvenient 
(producing so fast RT may have a cost, as we observed in Section 7.4). Another possibility is that 
participants were using a very different estimate for ݍ. As before, note that an increase in participant’s 
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score does not necessarily corresponds to higher RT, as this increase may be simply due to higher ߣ 
which resulted in more trials. 
 
Figure 8.3 
Empty circles indicate the total score for the whole experiment for each individual participant, whereas circles with black 
edges (connected with a line for each ݍ condition) correspond to the expected points obtained by using the optimum response. 
For the ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ
 and ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 conditions participants are mostly close to expected scores, whereas they are clearly sub-optimal 
for the ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
 condition. 
8.3.1 Response Signal Analysis, Trends, and Feedback Adjustment  
The analysis of the number and magnitude of shifting of responses in each condition by using the 
STARS method (Section 3.9) did not present any relevant surprise: the number of shift was fairly stable 
at around 2 per condition with a slight but not significant increase for higher ߣ conditions, and a slight 
and non significant decrease for higher ݍ conditions; the average magnitude of the shift equalled 0.821, 
without any significant trend for different conditions.  
By aggregating response signal across participants, we noticed the presence of several trends across 
ݍ conditions. In particular, there was a fairly consistent, decreasing trend for the ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ
 condition and 
an increasing trend for the ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
 condition. The trend for the ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 condition was, instead, less 
consistent across ߣ conditions (see Figure 8.4). 
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Figure 8.4 
Aggregated response signal across participants for each condition. Significant correlations are indicated on each panel by an 
asterisk. A linear function is fitted on each panel (red line), with ߚ indicating the slope of the line.  
 
It appeared that participants were adjusting their response along each session, based on the ݍ 
condition. In particular, they became slower in time with the high punishment conditions, and faster 
with the high reward conditions. Is it possible that participants started with some prior value of ݍො which 
is close to ݍ = 10/10. Participants may adjust their estimate ݍො based on the feedback during the session. 
In spite of this, the analysis of the change in standard deviation across condition revealed again no 
correlation: participants were adjusting their response, but their response was not getting less sparse as 
time goes on. Of course, these analyses were limited by the very short length of each condition, and it 
is possible that a reduction in standard deviation may be observed with longer sessions. 
The analysis of adjustment of responses after punishment or reward did not produce, again, any 
surprise, by confirming the results from the previous studies: adjustment in response after rewards was 
remarkably smaller than adjustment after punishment (change after rewards was almost 0, whereas 
average change after punishments was ~0.025s).  Moreover, as predicted, adjustment (after punishment) 
were higher with higher punishment/reward ratio (average of 0.006s, 0.015s, 0.025s for the conditions 
ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
, ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 and ݍ = 10/1 respectively (the results were, however, non-significant).  
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8.3.2 Effect of ࢗ and ࣅ Condition on RT and ACC(RT) 
The results in terms of median of median RT (mdRT) and accuracy of response (ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)) are 
shown in Figure 8.5 for each ݍ condition. The optimum response for each condition is also shown 
(circles with black edges). Notice that for ݍ = 1/10  the optimum response was always ܴܶ∗ = 0 
(resulting in ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) = 0.5), except when ߣ = 2, in which case the optimum response was roughly 
0.1ݏ. Both ߣ and ݍ affected significantly the median RT (for ߣ: ܨଷ,ଽ଴ = 57.805, ݌ < 0.0001, for ݍ: 
ܨଶ,଺଴ = 58.794, ݌ < 0.0001). We also founded a significant interaction between the two: (ܨ଺,ଵ଼଴ =
21.858, ݌ < 0.0001).  The effect of ߣ  and ݍ  condition was similarly significant on ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) (for 
ߣ: ܨଷ.ଽ଴ = 74.066, ݌ < 0.0001, for ݍ: ܨଶ,଺଴ = 79.469, ݌ < 0.0001). Conversely to Experiment 7.2, 
where we were similarly investigating Piéron’s and non-Piéron’s shape, the interaction was in this case 
not significant (ܨ଺,ଵ଼଴ = 1.535, ݌ = 0.169). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons by applying Bonferroni 
correction revealed that both mdRT and ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ)  were significantly different for each ߣ  and ݍ 
condition ( ݌ ≅ 0 ). Overall, participants appeared to be responsive to manipulating the 
punishment/reward ratio by changing both time of response and accuracy (positional response along 
the gauge).  Compared to the optimum theoretical response, participants were faster with the high 
reward conditions (ݍ = 10/1), and slower with the high and balanced punishment conditions (ݍ =
1/10and ݍ = 10/10 respectively). This suggests a complicated relationship between experimental and 
subjective punishment/reward ratio, which will be analysed in the model fitting section.  
176 
 
 
Figure 8.5 
The circles connected with lines indicate the median of median RT for each condition (left panel) and corresponding ܣܥܥ(ܴ  
(right panel). The circles with black edges corresponds to the optimum response. The red-dashed lines correspond to the 
Piéron’s Law fitting, with a different Piéron’s function for each ݍ condition. 
 
We fitted Piéron’s Law by assuming that ݇, ߚ, ߛ, any combination of those (or none of them) were 
free for each condition, thus comparing 8 different models. The model with lower AIC was the one with 
݇  and ߚ  free to vary across ݍ  conditions (Table 8.2). In particular, both ݇  and ߚ  were found to be 
increasing across increasing ݍ conditions (Table 8.3). This matches the predictions generated by our 
simulation (see Section 8.1.2). The fitting is shown as a dashed red line in Figure 8.5.  
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Table 8.2 Fitting Piéron’s Law Models          Table 8.3 Parameters for the best model 
Model       BIC df  Model 1  
No free  1.286628 3  BIC -2.85043 
݇ free -1.58119 5  ƩWLS 1.4358 
ߚ free 0.98539 5  ࢑ࢗୀ ૚૚૙
 0.283 
ߛ free 0.8117 5  ࢑ࢗୀ૚૙૚૙
 1.224 
݇ and ߚ free -1.52056 7  ࢑ࢗୀ૚૙૚
  2.55 
݇ and ߛ free -1.43845 7  ࢼࢗୀ ૚૚૙
  0.427 
ߚ and ߛ free -0.16903 7  ࢼࢗୀ૚૙૚૙
  0.473 
݇, ߚ and ߛ free  -1.20063 9  ࢼࢗୀ૚૙૚
  0.674 
    ࢽ  0.148 
The goodness of fit in terms of ܴଶ  was equal to 0.702, 0.779  and 0.98  for ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
, ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 and ଵ଴
ଵ
 
respectively. As expected, the RT fits poorer and poorer with Piéron’s Law as ݍ increases, which is 
consistent with the idea that at high ݍ the optimum decision strategy assumed a non-Piéron’s shape. 
However, the results were not as clear as expected. In particular, we observed a slight decreasing trend 
with ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
, but not with ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ
. Compare the empirical data with the simulation generate in Figure 
8.1 and 8.2). We do not observe a clear decrease for the lower ߣ value, like the one observed when 
manipulated the starting point (ߙ) in the previous Chapter. By looking at individual differences, we 
observe that some of the participants have this inflection points, and some do not.  
8.3.3 Model Comparison for Aggregated Data  
We fitted the ܤܴ, ܴܣ, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܴ model to the aggregated data in Figure 8.5 by penalizing the 
fitting based on the distance between experimental parameters (ߣ, ݍ, ݀  and ߙ) and subjective ones 
(ߣመ, ݍො, መ݀ , and ߙො). We used the same procedure as in the previous Chapter (see Section 7.3).  We firstly 
compared, for each model, a version with free ݍො or fixed ݍො (ܴܴ does not have a ݍ parameter, so it can 
only be compared with the other models, not with a different version of itself). Each variant with fixed 
ݍො was remarkably worst (in terms of both BIC, sWLS and mWLS) than the variant with free ݍ (Table 
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8.4). This was not surprisingly as the fixed ݍො models consisted of just one ܴܶ curve which is compared 
with the three observed ܴܶ curves. As a further check, we also compared these models with a variant 
with fixed ݍො and free ܦ across ݍ conditions: this gave some freedom to the ܴܴ model and allowed us 
to check whether the punishment/reward ratio really affected the ݍ  parameter and not some other 
parameters, like ܦ. As expected, the fitting for these new variants were in all cases extremely poor, with 
BIC values higher than 6. Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that varying the 
punishment/reward ratio effectively affected the ݍො parameter. 
By comparing models with free ݍො, it is interesting that the best model appeared to be ܴܣ instead of 
ܴܴ௠ as found in the previous Chapters. The fitting in terms of WLS for ܴܴ௠ appears to fit the data 
reasonably well, as shown in Figure 8.6, but some estimated values were unreasonably different to the 
respective experimental values (see estimated values in Table 8.5). For example, ܦ෡ wass estimated to 
be equal to 1.823s, much higher than the experimental value of 0.5ݏ. Compare this with the more 
reasonable estimate of 0.821ݏ obtained with ܴܣ.  However, both models captured the increasing in the 
ߣመ parameter across increasing ߣ conditions, and the increase in ݍො  across increasing ݍ conditions. For 
ܴܴ௠ , the estimated ݍො  were always higher than 1, which implies that participants were weighting 
punishment more than accuracy. With ܴܣ, the interpretation of the ݍො parameter is similar:  ݍො values 
lower than 1, obtained with ݍ = 1/10 (high reward condition) and ݍ = 10/10 (balanced condition) 
indicates a higher weight on reward rate, whereas values higher than 1, obtained with ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ
 (the high 
punishment condition) indicates a higher weight on accuracy.   
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Figure 8.6 
Median of median of responses, as shown in the previous figure, with the two best model shown with white circles and red 
asterisks. 
 
Table 8.4 Results for the decision rules fitting 
 BIC df 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ) 0.637083 8 
ࡾࡾ࢓ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢗෝ) 2.13685 7 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ) -0.50024 8 
ࡾ࡭ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢗෝ) 2.141933 7 
࡮ࡾ (ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ)  1.242078 7 
࡮ࡾ (ࢌ࢏࢞ࢋࢊ ࢗෝ) 2.03323 6 
ࡾࡾ (࢔࢕ ࢗෝ) 2.0944 7 
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Table 8.5 Best models’ parameters 
ࡾࡾ࢓(ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ)  ࡾ࡭(ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋ ࢗෝ) 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૚૟   0.299  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૚૟  0.703 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૜૜  0.378  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૙.૜૜  0.843 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૚  0.963  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૚  1.661 
ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૛  2.224  ࣅ෠ࣅୀ૛  2.585 
ࢻෝ  0.698  ࢻෝ  0.459 
ࡰ෡   1.823  ࡰ෡   0.821 
ࢗෝࢗୀ ૚૚૙
  1.219  ࢗෝࢗୀ ૚૚૙
  0.199 
ࢗෝࢗୀ૚૙૚૙
  2.568  ࢗෝࢗୀ૚૙૚૙
  0.749 
ࢗෝࢗୀ૚૙૚
  7.068  ࢗෝࢗୀ૚૙૚
  5.685 
 
8.3.4 Analysis of Performance Groups  
By grouping participants based on their performance, we can shed some light onto these results 
(Figure 8.7). We firstly confirmed that, as expected, the good performance group was on average faster 
than the medium performance group, which was, in turn, faster than the poor performance group. 
However, the good performance group was slower than the other two groups in the condition with ݍ =
ଵ଴
ଵ
 and lower ߣ, which is also a better strategy as the optimum point is, in that condition, extremely high 
(~19 seconds).  Interestingly, the group with poorer performance presented clearly the non-monotonic 
shape for both the ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 and ݍ = ଵ
ଵ଴
 conditions, and not for the ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ
 condition, as expected. 
However, the same non-monotonic shape was not clearly present in the other two performance groups. 
From our dataset is not possible to establish if this is due to a difference in the strategy (or in the 
estimated parameters) used by the participants in a certain performance group, or it depended on a noisy 
dataset.  
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Figure 8.7 
Median of median RT for different performance group (circles connected with lines), optimum response time obtained with 
ܴܴ௠ (circles with black edges) and best fitting model (white circles). Note that the best fitting model is ܴܴ௠ for the Poor 
Performance group, and ܴܣ for the other two groups.  
By fitting different performance groups, we observed that the preferred model (in terms of modified 
WLS, WLS and BIC) was ܴܴ௠ (with free ݍො) for the poor performance group, and ܴܣ (again with free 
ݍො) for the other groups. The ܤܴ and ܴܴ model performed very poorly and thus they are not reported 
(see Table 8.6) Even though the ܴܴ௠ model did not provide the best fit, it was still reasonably good 
and the estimated parameters were close to the experimental ones. The ݍො parameters for the ܴܴ௠ in the 
poor performance group were estimated to be always higher than 1. The fitting for the ܤܴ model was 
consistently worse across the performance groups and, for both ܴܣ and ܴܴ௠ models, the ݍො values were 
always increasing for increasing ݍ condition (as shown in Figure 8.8). Even though, for both ܴܣ and 
ܴܴ௠ condition, better performance groups appeared to have estimated ݍො closer to the experimental one, 
we could not detect any pattern along different performance group: that is, the group with worst 
performance did not appear to be on average more risk aversive than the other groups, but it just appears 
to have internal punishment/reward ratio which differs from the experimental punishment/rewards, 
which led to poor performance (compare for example the green and blue lines for the three ݍ conditions 
in Figure 8.7).  
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Table 8.6 BIC value for each performance group 
BIC 
 Poor Perf. Medium Perf. Good Perf. 
ࡾࡾ࢓ -0.8968 0.0556 -0.3533 
ࡾ࡭      -0.7852 -1.1799 -0.8311 
 
 
Figure 8.6 
Estimated ݍො values for each performance group, for the two best fitting decision strategies, ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ. The figure also 
shows the experimental ݍ values for comparison (white circles).  
8.3.4 Distribution Analysis 
The Vincentized distribution of response (Figure 8.8) showed a similar trend found in the previous 
EXACT paradigm experiment. In particular, the standard deviation appeared to be clearly affected by 
different ߣ  and different ݍ  (for ߣ: ܨଷ,ଷ଺଴ = 29.546, ݌ ≅ 0 , for ݍ: ܨଶ,଺଴ = 17.382, ݌ ≅ 0) . The 
interaction also resulted to be significant (ܨ଺,ଵ଼଴ = 6.442, ݌ ≅ 0).  The skewness was affected by the ݍො 
conditions (ܨଶ,଺଴ = 26.569, ݌ ≅ 0)  but not by the ߣ  conditions (ܨଷ,ଽ଴ = 1.883, ݌ = 0.138 ).  The 
peculiar shape obtained with some condition (e.g. ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 and ߣ = 0.16 ) reflected the difference 
strategy adopted by different groups. We will compare these distributions with the distributions 
obtained by the similar Classic RT experiment in the next section. Similar to what observed in previous 
EXACT experiments, even though most of the distributions presented a slight positive skewness (but 
negative few cases), this was clearly not as big as the skewness observed in Classic RT task.  
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Figure 8.7 
Vincentized RT distributions for each condition. As observed before, the standard deviation appears to be consistently affected 
by the ߣ value, whereas the skewness is affected only by the ݍ conditions.  
 
Similarly to what found in the previous EXACT experiments, the distribution in the rate domain 
did not appear to be normal, even after applying the STD-IQR method (Figure 8.9, possible reasons for 
this are presented in the general conclusion of the previous Chapter, Section 7.10). We then investigated 
the shape of the accuracy distributions, by calculating the aggregated and standardised ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) for 
each condition in order to obtain an estimation of the accuracy distribution. Eliminating severely 
truncated dataset resulted in slightly better distributions, but the difference was not remarkable. Note 
how from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test it resulted that 9 out of 12 datasets were not significantly 
dissimilar from a Normal distribution (at ߙ = 0.01). This is consistent to what found in the studies 
presented in the previous Chapter (see Section 7.10).  
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Figure 8.8 
Aggregated, standardised accuracy distributions for each condition, with the original dataset (yellow line) and the dataset after 
excluding severely truncated distributions (blue line). The number of excluding dataset is shown in each panel (N). The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (on the modified dataset) result is also shown on each panel.   
8.4 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of varying the punishment/reward ratio within 
the framework of the EXACT Paradigm. First of all, participants were extremely sensitive to change in 
ݍ, showing that their decision mechanism was actually dependent on the punishment/reward ratio. We 
also observed that, as with high ݍ the aggregated responses were equivalent to Piéron’s Law. Increasing 
the value of the reward made the responses faster, and the Piéron’s Law relationship broke down. The 
non-monotonic shape observed with ߙ condition (Figure 7.7) was not as clear in this case, at least for 
the aggregated dataset. However, when dividing across different performance groups, participants in 
the poor performance group clearly exhibited the non-Piéron’s shape that we predicted.  
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The EXACT Paradigm could be used to examine the ݍො variability along a session as done by Balci 
et al. (2011), but the short length of our condition did not allow us to perform this analysis. Instead, we 
could only observe that participants in different performance groups used different ݍො value, but the 
analysis was not extremely revealing, as no relevant pattern was found. 
An interesting surprise in this experiment was to observe how the ܴܣ decision rule was able to 
account for the data better than ܴܴ௠. As we explained, ܴܴ௠ provided a good fit, but the estimated 
parameters were very different than the experimental ones, and thus our metric (mWLS) penalized it. 
Of course, this penalty depends on the different parameters that we used for the kernel function in the 
mWLS, and also on the weight that we gave to the difference between real and estimated parameters. 
We interpret this difference with caution, and consider both ܴܴ௠  and ܴܣ as reasonable models in 
fitting the observations. This was even clearer when we observed the inconsistency across several 
performance groups, where sometime the ܴܣ, and sometime ܴܴ௠, appear to provide the preferred fit. 
To make things more complicated, notice that both ܴܣ and ܴܴ௠ are decision rules depending on the 
total delay condition which, as we have observed consistently across this work, it does not appear to 
affect the response. Remember that whereas ܴܴ௠ is the decision rule that maximizes the reward rate of 
a condition, ܴܣ is a more arbitrary rule used to weight differently speed and accuracy. A general 
analysis of different decision rules used across EXACT experiments will be provided in the last Chapter 
(Section 9.2).  
EXPERIMENT 8.2 
 
In the previous experiment, we investigated the effect of varying the punishment/reward ratio 
(corresponding to the parameter ݍ for ܴܴ௠) across different ߣ levels, observing that in the condition 
with higher punishment we clearly obtained a Piéron’s-shape curve for mdRT, whereas in the other 
conditions this was not true. As we discussed in Section 2.10, we believe that Piéron’s law is not simply 
a function of the perceptual process used (Stafford & Gurney, 2004) but it is mediated by the decision 
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rule as well. This is what we have seen within the context of the EXACT paradigm, in which the 
parameter ߣ  has been interpreted as the stimulus strength. Piéron’s law has been observed across 
myriads of sensory domains and across different experimental designs, so it seems very peculiar that 
this resides in idiosyncrasy of the used experimental designs.  
Even though the EXACT paradigm is a good approximation of a Classic RT experiment, it has 
some differences (Section 6.1.6), and therefore it is important to explore this hypothesis within the 
context of a more standard Piéron’s Law experiment.  Furthermore, in this experiment we employed a 
more classic approach to investigate decision rules used by participants, using quantitative predictions 
of responses for each decision strategy, based on the DDM (see Section 2.7). This approach is limited: 
avoiding any assumption about the underlying perceptual process was the main point of introducing the 
EXACT Paradigm. It would be however interesting to compare the results of this study to the results of 
the previous Chapter, and with the findings from the literature. 
Starting from the theoretical paper of optimal decision making (Bogacz et al. ,2006), some authors 
have tested the predictions generated by different decision rules in the context of DDM. Some of these 
studies have already been discussed in previous Chapters, for example within the context of changing 
the delay across trials (ܦ). We are going now to discuss in details all the works with DDM and optimal 
strategies. The approach in analysing optimal decision consists in comparing the optimal threshold with 
the empirical one (fitted for each individual participants) and to compare the predicted ܦܶ (decision 
time, function of ܣܥܥ, or ܣܥܥ and ݍ, depending on the decision rule) generated by each decision rule. 
The series of ܦܶ for each ܣܥܥ and ݍ is sometime referred as Optimal Performance Curve (OPC). The 
optimal threshold ܽ∗  is found by using the relationship between ܦܶ  and ܣܥܥ  (the mathematics is 
presented in the Method of this Chapter, Section 8.7), and requires estimating the parameters of the 
DDM ݀ (drift rate) and ߬ (sensory-motor component) and, for some decision rule, it is also function of 
ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ + ߬ (ܦ௧௢௧ is the total non-decision time in a trial, ܦ is the experimental delay in a trial) and ݍො 
(emphasis on accuracy, which needs to be estimated). Once we obtain the optimal threshold ܽ∗ we can 
compare it with the estimated one. We show several OPC in Figure 8.10. Optimal threshold and OPC 
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are clearly related, as deviation from optimal thresholds corresponds to deviation from the OPC. 
However, optimizing decision rules generates other qualitative predictions related to accuracy and RT. 
For example, increasing delay across trial corresponds, for ܴܴ௠, ܴܴ and ܴܣ, to an increase in the 
threshold, which results in an increase in accuracy and decrease in RT (see Section 2.8 for an informal 
discussion, and Section 8.7 for mathematical details). 
Simen et al., (2009) firstly tested the optimal decision boundary predictions given by ܴܴ in a task 
with different reward to stimulus intervals (RSI, first experiment) different bias (second experiment) or 
different payoff matrix (third experiment). Both experiments consisted of 2AFC with a random-dot-
motion task with twelve 4-mins blocks. RT and ACC consistently increased with increasing RSI, but 
RT was higher than predicted. Higher RSI conditions appeared to affect the threshold value, but this 
was consistently higher than the optimal threshold. The data from experiment 2 confirmed that 
participants set their threshold higher than usual, but also obtained qualitative results that were 
consistent with participants optimizing ܴܴ with different bias. Finally, the third experiment explored 
biased response, and found that participants were able to adjust their behaviour within a single session 
in order to qualitatively match the prediction of ܴܴ. However, in this session as well, participants’ 
estimated threshold were sub-optimally large than predicted ones. Note that this is very different from 
our manipulation: Simen et al. manipulated the response bias, that is the amount of reward obtained for 
one or the other correct response, whereas we are focusing on the amount of reward obtained for a 
correct response and lost for an incorrect one (referring to Table 8.1, they were using a matrix of Type 
1, whereas we used a matrix of Type 2). 
 Bogacz et al., (2010) analysed three different decision rules: ܴܴ௠ , ܴܣ and ܴܴ , by using two 
experimental designs:  random dot motion task and asterisk counting. For both experiments, the RSI 
was varied across sessions. The main finding was that the threshold consistently increased with 
increasing RSI (resulting in an increase in accuracy and RT). However, it was found that participants 
on average set their threshold much higher than optimum predicted by ܴܴ and, similarly, their DT was 
higher than the one predicted by OPC. Using ܴܣ and ܴܴ௠ decision strategies resulted in more precise 
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better predictions in terms of DT. This was especially interesting considering that, in the task, incorrect 
responses were not explicitly penalized.  Both ܴܣ and ܴܴ௠ provided a better fit than ܴܴ for the three 
performance groups in which the sample was divided, but ܴܣ provided a much better results the ܴܴ௠ 
for the bottom 10% participants.  
These results, showing how participants set their threshold sub-optimally large, were partly backed 
up by Balci et al. (2011) which, in a random-dot motion experiment with different coherence levels, 
compared ܴܴ௠  and ܴܴ . It was found that, while participants appeared to favour accuracy at the 
beginning of the task (with ܴܴ௠ providing the best fit), they decreased or eliminated this emphasis with 
training, therefore favouring ܴܴ after many sessions (recall that ܴܴ corresponds to ܴܴ௠ with ݍ = 0). 
This effect interacted with signal quality.  
So, whereas the results from Balci et al. suggests that ܴܴ௠ (with a decreasing and vanishing ݍ) 
may fit better, Bogacz et al. (2010) found that ܴܣ provided the best fit and Simen et al. found a good 
fit between prediction and observation by only using ܴܴ. These mixed results suggest that the decision 
strategy may interact in complicated way with experimental setups and designs.  
Summarizing, the optimization approach within the DDM framework has been investigated by  
using several approaches: changing the alternative bias (Simen et al. 2009), the RSI across trial (Bogacz 
et al., 2010), the stimulus strength (by changing the motor coherence in a random-dot-motion task, 
Bogacz et al., 2010; Balci et al., 2011; Simen et al., 2009) and the reward bias (Simen et al., 2009). 
However, investigating the outcome for different punishment/reward ratio has yet to be done. The main 
reason is that the other manipulation clearly corresponded to manipulating a parameter within the 
theoretical model of DDM and decision strategies, where, as discussed in Section 8.1, the parameter ݍ 
is not clearly mapped to the punishment/reward ratio for all decision strategies, but it corresponds to a 
general “emphasis on accuracy”.  
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8.5 Methods 
Participants. 20 participants (10 males, 10 females) took part in the experiment. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no known neurological condition. The study received 
ethical approval from the local ethics committee.  
Material. The experiment was a 2AFC task in which participants had to identify in which side of 
the monitor a Gabor Patch appeared. The study was conducted under constant levels of illumination. 
The stimuli were presented binocularly on a computer monitor (Sony GDM-F520) using the software 
E-Prime (version 2.0.10). Participants were positioned at 63 cm from the monitor. The stimuli were 
Gabor patches presented on the left or on the right of the centre screen. Each patch was a vertical sine-
wave grating multiplied by a Gaussian windows function (ߪ = 0.06°), trimmed for values lower than 
0.005. The spatial frequency was 4 c/deg. The stimuli were presented within a grey square window (10 
cd/m2) of 5 degrees/cm. The rest of the monitor screen was kept dark (~0 cd/m2). We used the 4 different 
contrast levels: 0.035, 0.050 0.1 0.2. Participants obtained X points for a correct response (reward) and 
lost points Y for an incorrect response (punishment). The amount of points lost or earned depended on 
the ݍ condition, which specified the punishment/reward ratio. We used 4 ݍ conditions: ଵ
ଷ଴
, ଵ
ଵ଴
, ଵ଴
ଵ଴
, ଵ଴
ଵ
 
(from the more rewarding, to the most punishing).  
Procedure. The experiment was presented as a point game, and participants were asked to earn as 
many points as possible. After instruction and a short training session (30 seconds for each contrast 
level, with ݍ = 10/10) the main session started. A black dot presented in the middle of the grey square 
window was used as a warning signal, and was presented for 0.75 second (foreperiod, FP), after which 
a vertical line appeared on the screen and, at the same time, a Gabor Patch appeared on one of the side 
of the line, within the grey square. Participants were instructed to press the key “q” or “o” depending 
on the side of appearance of the stimulus. After responding, the patch and the vertical line disappeared 
and the screen showed the score for the trial (eg. “+10”, “-30”) and the total score for that session for 
0.75 seconds (reward-to-warning signal interval, RWI). There was no audio feedback. Each trial lasted 
2 minutes regardless of participant’s performance.  For each ݍ condition, we ran all the contrast levels 
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(blocked and in randomized order) before proceeding to the next ݍ condition. We always ran ݍ = ଵ଴
ଵ଴
 as 
the first ݍ condition. At the end of the experiment, the points were exchanged for money, with the 
exchange rate of 60 points=1 penny. This unfavourable exchange rate is balanced by the fact that, across 
the whole experiment, participants obtained thousands of points. See Figure 8.10 for an illustration of 
the flow of the task.  
 
Figure 8.9 
The flow of time for the task. 
 
Analysis. We fitted the distribution uniquely to the Pure DDM. We have seen in the previous 
Classic RT Experiment (Chapter 4 and 5) that the Pure DDM provided a reasonably fit by using also 
fewer parameters, which results in a lower AIC. Although the Extended DDM may provide a better fit 
in some situations, the analysis in terms of optimal decision has not been found to be amenable to formal 
analysis (Bogacz et al., 2006), and numerical simulations are sometimes used. Noisy estimation of 
parameters and parameter inflation makes this approach difficult (Simen et al., 2009). There is also 
another reason why we do not apply the Extended DDM to quantitative optimal performance analysis: 
it has been shown (Drugowitsch et al., 2012) that the optimum boundary for a DDM with noisy drift 
rate (which is used by the Extended DDM) is not a constant one, as usually assumed, but a non-linear 
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decreasing one (see also Moran, 2014). It is, therefore, misleading to conduct optimality analysis with 
the Extended DDM with constant boundaries, and a moving boundary model should be employed, 
which is however beyond the scope of the present work.  
8.5.1 Optimal Threshold and Optimal Performance Curve 
The relationship between decision strategies and DDM parameter is presented in Chapter 2, Section 
2. 8. By assuming the Pure DDM, an optimum threshold and the optimum DT can be found for each 
decision rule. Note that in Bogacz et al. (2006), where this relationship was presented for the first time, 
ܽ was equal to the distance between the starting point and the threshold, whereas in our work ܽ is the 
distance between the two boundaries. To switch from one definition to another we used ܽ஻ = ܽ(1 − ܾ), 
where ܽ஻ is the threshold distance to starting point (as defined in Bogacz et al., 2006), ܽ is the distance 
between the two thresholds, ܾ is the bias (note that in the present work, the bias parameter is always set 
at 0.5, meaning that no bias is assumed between the two alternatives). This allow us to define the 
accuracy function as  
ܣܥܥ = 1 − ቆ ଵ
ଵାୣ୶୮ቀమ೏ೌ(భష್)
ೞమ
ቁ
ቇ   
and 
 ܦܶ = ௔(ଵି௕)
ௗ
tanh (ௗ௔(ଵି௕)
௦మ
) 
The optimum threshold for the decisions strategies can be easily found by substituting ܣܥܥ(݀, ܽ) 
and ܦܶ into the decision strategy equation and calculate the derivative with respect to ܽ (Bogacz et al., 
2006; Bogacz et al., 2010). This usually results in transcendental equation which must be estimated 
numerically. 
Reward Rate. For ܴܴ, the optimum normalized threshold ܽ∗ must satisfy 
exp ቆ
2݀ܽ(1 − ܾ)
ݏଶ ቇ
− 1 =
2݀ଶ
ݏଶ ቆ
ܦ + ݐ଴ −
ܽ(1 − ܾ)
݀ ቇ
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Which solution can be computed numerically. The family of optimum thresholds for different ݀ 
reaches its maximum at the point where  ܽ(1 − ܾ)݀ = ݏଶ (ݏ is set to 1 in this work). 
By using the relationship between ܣܥܥ, ݀, ܽ  and ܾ  above we can compute the Optimum 
Performance Curve which describes the relationship between ܣܥܥ and RT: 
ܴ ோܶோ∗ =  (ܦ + ߬) ൮
1
(1 − ܣܥܥ) log ቀ ܣܥܥ1 − ܣܥܥቁ
+ ൬
1
2ܣܥܥ − 1
൰൲
ିଵ
+ ߬ 
(slightly rearranged from Bogacz et al., 2006). Recall that ܦܶ can be easily found: ܦܶ = ܴܶ − ߬. 
This shape is presented in Figure 8.11.  Note that for computing this curve we only need to estimate the 
߬  parameter from the DDM, whereas ܣܥܥ  is behaviourally observed and ܦ  is an experimental 
parameter.  This is the decision rule we were less focused on, as it does not take into account the 
punishment/reward ratio and it seemed unlikely to account for tasks with different payoff matrices. Note 
that we can rearrange the terms so that ஽்
஽೟೚೟
= ݂(ܣܥܥ), where ܦܶ = (ܴܶ − ߬). This implies that, having 
computed ܦܶ for each individual participant, it is possible to pool data across participants and task 
conditions, irrespectively of task difficulty, timing, or individual differences.  
 
Figure 8.10 
Optimum decision time (ܦܶ ∗) curves given a certain value of accuracy, for each decision strategy.  
 
Bayes Risk. The optimum threshold for the BR decision rule has been found by Edwards (1954) to be 
the value that satisfies the expression: 
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ݍ2݀ଶ
ݏଶ
−
4݀ܽ(1 − ܾ)
ݏଶ
+ exp ൬−
2݀ܽ(1 − ܾ)
ݏଶ
൰ − exp ൬
2݀ܽ(1 − ܾ)
ݏଶ
൰ = 0 
Which has a unique solution (Bogacz et al., 2006). With ݍ = 0 (no emphasis on accuracy, only on 
ܦܶ) the optimum threshold is zero. The optimum response time is found to be  
ܴ ஻ܶோ∗ = ݍ ቌ
(2ܣܥܥ − 1) log ቀ ܣܥܥ1 − ܣܥܥቁ
2 log ቀ ܣܥܥ1 − ܣܥܥቁ −
1
ܣܥܥ +
1
1 − ܣܥܥ
ቍ + ߬ 
(slightly rearranged from Bogacz et al., 2006). Note that the optimum response is not function of 
the total trial time. Is it, however, function of the parameter ݍ, which establish the emphasis on accuracy.  
The curve for ܦ ஻ܶோ∗  (equal to ܴ ஻ܶோ∗ − ߬, as presented in Bogacz et al., 2006) for several parameter sets 
are shown in Figure 8.10.  For these and the following functions, note that we can rearrange the terms 
so that ஽்
஽೟೚೟
= ݂(ܣܥܥ, ݍ) (as in Bogacz et al., 2006).  
Reward Rate Modified and Reward\Accuracy. Similarly, the optimum threshold for ܴܴ௠ has to 
satisfy the following equality: 
 
2݀ܧ
ݏଶ(ܧ + 1)ଶ +
2݀ݍܧ
ݏଶ(ܧ + 1)ଶ
(ܦ + ߬) + ܽܶ݀
+
൬ܶ݀ −
ܽ(1 − ܾ)(ܶଶ − 1)
ݏଶ ൰ ቀ
1
ܧ + 1 +
ݍ
ܧ + 1 − 1ቁ
ቆ(ܦ + ݐ଴) +
ܽܶ(1 − ܾ)
݀ ቇ
ଶ = 0 
Where ܧ = ݁ݔ݌ ቀଶ௔ௗ(ଵି௕)
௦మ
ቁ and ܶ = ݐܽ݊ℎ ቀ௔ௗ(ଵି௕)
௦మ
ቁ, which results on an optimum response equal 
to: 
ܴ ோܶோ೘
∗ = (ܦ + ߬)(1 + ݍ) ቌ
1
1 − ܣܥܥ −
ݍ
ܣܥܥ
݈݋݃ ቀ ܣܥ1 − ܣܥܥቁ
+
1 − ݍ
2ܣܥܥ − 1
ቍ
ିଵ
+ ߬ 
For Reward\Accuracy, the optimum threshold has to satisfy 
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ቀ 1ܧ + 1 − 1ቁ ቆ
ܶ
݀ −
൫ܽ(1 − ܾ)(ܶଶ − 1)൯
ݏଶ ቇ
ܨଶ
+
2݀ܧ
ݏଶ(ܧ + 1)ଶܨ
+
2݀ݍܧ
(ܦ + ݐ଴)ݏଶ(ܧ + 1)ଶ
= 0 
 
With ܧ and ܶ defined as above, ܨ = (ܦ + ߬) + ௔(ଵି௕)்
ௗ
, and the optimum response is equal to 
ܴ ோܶ஺∗ = (ܦ + ݐ଴)
ܩ − 2ݍඥܩଶ − 4ݍ(ܩ + 1)
2ݍ
+  ߬ 
With ܩ = ଵ
(ଵି஺஼஼) ୪୭୥ቀ ಲ಴಴భషಲ಴಴ቁ
+ ଵ
ଶ஺஼஼ିଵ
. Note that both these decision rules are function of the delay 
across trial ܦ and the emphasis on accuracy parameter ݍ, the first being and experimental parameter, 
whereas the latter must be fitted to the observations. Note that the interpretation of these parameters is 
the same as the one illustrated in Chapter 6: ݍ is equivalent to the punishment/reward ratio for ܴܴ௠ and 
to the weight of accuracy (scaled for the total delay ߬ + ܦ) against the weight for ܴܴ  for the ܴܣ 
decision rule. It is very common the literature to consider only values of ݍ lower than 1, as for values 
higher than 1 and for the decision strategy ܴܴ௠ , not all values of ACC are well defined (Zackenhouse 
et al., 2009; Bogacz et al., 2010). However, we have observed as participants are generally loss aversive, 
and thus weight accuracy much more than speed.  Plus, the estimated values of ݍ  in the EXACT 
experiment were almost uniquely higher than 1. Thus it seems unreasonable to consider only values 
lower than 1. By considering any ݍ > 1  we are saying that, sometime, participants will never reach 
some low level of accuracy (because, for example, the penalty is very high) when they respond 
optimally (see Figure 8.10). In fitting, we have the problem of deciding how to fit the observed DT for 
ACC that do not have any associate DT. We decide to give the high penalty by pretending that those 
responses were 10 seconds afar from optimal response. 
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8.6 Results 
8.6.1 Signal Analysis and Response to Feedback 
We firstly analysed the result in terms of signal of response, by using the STARS method in the 
same way as done with the EXACT Paradigm. We found that the average number of shifts in the signal 
was lower than 1, and the magnitude of the shifting was also, on average, lower than 1.  The response 
signals in this experiment were slightly more stable than the one in the EXACT Paradigm, where there 
were on average 2 shifts per signal, with approximately the same magnitude. This increased stability 
across condition is confirmed by the analysis of aggregated patterns of response for each ݍ condition. 
In the EXACT experiment we found several trends, depending on the ݍ condition, whereas here we 
found no significant trend in any condition. Overall, this confirmed what we expected from previous 
results: participants in Classic RT task do not appear to adjust significantly their response across 
condition. Is it however possible that participant did not have enough time to adjust their response, as 
session length was kept short (2 minutes). In Balci et al., (2011), where participants performed 13 5-
minutes session of dot-motion discrimination task, RT decreased across session, which was interpreted 
as a steady decrease in the emphasis on accuracy.  
The results in terms of median of median RT (mdRT) are shown in Figure 8.12.  We ran a 2-way 
repeated measure ANOVA and found that manipulating contrast significantly affected median rate 
(ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 41.160, ݌ ≅ 0), but manipulating the punishment/reward ratio ݍ did not reach significance 
(ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 3.475, ݌ = 0.022). The interaction between the two factors was not significant (ܨଽ,ଵ଻ଵ =
1.30, ݌ = 0.240 ). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that each 
contrast condition was significantly different from each other (݌ < 0.005), a part from the lowest with 
the second to lowest contrast. A similar pattern was found for the effect on accuracy (contrast: ܨଷ,ହ଻ =
66.677, ݌ < 0.0001, ݍ: ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 1.562, ݌ = 0.209).  
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Figure 8.11 
 (Left panel) Median of median of responses (circles connected with a line). One Piéron’s function is fitted to all ݍ conditions 
(red dashed line). The Piéron’s function is fitted only from the second contrast condition onwards. (Right panel) Median of 
estimated accuracy for each participant.  
 
Even though the results are not significant, it appears from the plot that for some conditions the 
mdRT followed a Piéron’s shape, and for the rewarding condition it followed a non-Piéron’s shape (see 
the non-monotonic shape obtained for the low contrast levels). Comparing this results with the results 
from the previous study (Figure 8.4), it appeared that here participants were not really sensitive to 
changing in the payoff matrix.  
We fitted Piéron’s Law to the data. However, since some of the ݍ conditions appeared to have an 
inflection point with the lowers contrast condition, we fitted Piéron’s Law only on the results with the 
contrast equal to 0.035 0.05, and 0.1. We allowed the parameter ߙ, ߚ or ߛ or any combination of these 
parameters to be free across ݍ conditions, and we fitted the function by minimizing the weighted least 
square. The preferred model was calculated by applying a BIC criterion for least square. The preferred 
model resulted to be the one with no free parameters across ݍ  conditions (BIC=-4.0328, ݂݀ = 3), 
confirming the lack of effect of payoff conditions. The one-line fit is shown in Figure 8.12 (red dashed 
line).  
By visual inspection of median RT for individual participants, we noticed that several participants 
median RT had a non-Piéron’s shape, with the inflexion point at the second contrast level. For most of 
them the difference across ݍ condition did not seem remarkable, so that when the peculiar non-Piéron’s 
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shape was present, it was present for all ݍ conditions. We can better understand the result by grouping 
participant according to their performance.  We can see a clear difference between mdRT across 
difference performance group in Figure 8.13.  
 
 
Figure 8.12 
Responses and accuracy for each performance group. Each bar indicates one standard deviation.  
 
Responses for the participants in the poor performance group clearly followed the non-Piéron’s 
shape, whereas participants in the other two groups followed the more classical Piéron’s shape. The 
effect of ݍ appeared to be small and was non-significant for any of the performance group.  Moreover, 
participants in the good performance group were faster than participant in the medium performance 
group. Why only participants in the poor performance group generated the non-Piéron’s shape, 
regardless of the contrast level? In terms of decision rules, participants in the poor performance group 
may be wrongly estimating ݍ, ݀, or may have a slowly-increasing speed-accuracy function than the 
participants in the other two groups because, for example, they may have poorer vision. As we explored 
in the previous Chapters, changing ݍ, ݀ or ߙ can effectively change the shape of the ܴܶ∗. However, 
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when the ݍ and ݀ is increased (or ߙ is decreased) the result is to switch from a non-Piéron’s shape to a 
Piéron’s shape, but then keep increasing ݍ or ݀ (or keep decreasing ߙ) would result in a further increase 
in ܴܶ , not in a decrease like we observe between the good and the average performance group. 
Therefore, a change in ݍ, ݀, or ߙ, cannot explain the difference between the performance groups. A 
change in ߣ, however, can: assuming that participants in the poor performance group had poorer vision 
is the only way to obtain the pattern within our framework. The exact relationship can be obtained only 
by knowing the real speed-accuracy function. However, an intuitive explanation, simulated by using 
the exponential ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) and for 4 ݍ values (0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95) and  ܦ௧௢௧ = 1.5ݏ is provided in 
Figure 8.14. We assumed that participants can be divided in 3 groups based on their visual acuity. 
Participants with better vision can extract more information from the stimulus,  and thus may have a 
subjectively higher stimulus strength than the other groups: this is associated with lower RT and a 
Piéron’s shape RT curve. On the other hand, participants with poor vision will experience a weaker 
stimulus strength, and thus they will be on the left side of the decision curve, within the inflection point, 
generating a non-Piéron’s shape. 
 
Figure 8.13 
Illustration of a model explaining the different RT curves for difference performance groups. It shows a hypothetical optimum 
response (ܴܶ∗) curve and three possible ranges of vision. Participants with a poor vision (red area) will perceive a weaker 
stimulus strength than participants with a good vision (blue area).  
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8.6.2 Distribution and Model Fitting  
The Vincentized distributions are shown in Figure 8.14 with the respective mean, standard deviation 
and skewness averaged across participants for each condition. As expected, standard deviation tended 
to strongly decrease with increasing in contrast (this appeared to be significant, ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 55.519, ݌ ≅ 0), 
whereas skeweness appeared to increase (this was also significant, ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 7.610, ݌ ≅ 0).  The effect 
of ݍ  on standard deviation and skewness was, however, not significant. (ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 3.19, ݌ = 0.03 ;  
ܨଷ,ହ଻ = 0.319, ݌ = 0.811).   The effect of contrast on the standard deviation was consistent with the 
effect of ߣ found in the EXACT paradigm. As for the skewness, in the previous works ߣ was not  found 
to be significantly connected with the skewness distribution, whereas here the contrast appeared to have 
an increasing effect on it. One reason could relate to the fact that ߣ was fixed across trials, whereas in a 
Classic RT the noisy stimulus strength will produced more skewed distributions. 
The analyses of optimality performance with aggregated data has been performed and discussed by 
Simen et al. (2009). We fitted the aggregated (with the Vincentizing method) data with 10 quantiles. 
We used aggregated participants (regardless of the advantage given by analysing individual results) 
because for some participants the responses for an individual session were as low as 25, and the average 
response number was 50, too low for obtaining a reliable estimate of parameters. Note that, as in the 
previous Chapter, we used the Quantile Maximum Estimate Method, which scales automatically for the 
error proportions (see Section 2.3). We allowed the parameter ݀ to vary across contrast conditions. We 
then compared four different models: with ܽ or ߬ allowed to change across individual conditions, with 
both ܽ and ߬ allowed to change across ݍ conditions, and with no parameter (but ݀) allowed to change 
across conditions (see Table 8.6).  
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Table 8.7 Model variants used for the DDM 
Variant 1 Free ߬ for ݍ conditions 
Variant 2 Free ࢇ for ࢗ conditions 
Variant 3 Free ܽ and ߬ for ݍ conditions 
Variant 4 Nothing free 
In this way, we can estimate whether there was an effect on the distribution of the ݍ conditions, and 
what parameter did it affect. Interestingly, in spite of the lack of significance between ݍ conditions and 
mdRT, the best model was given by the one with free ܽ across different ݍ conditions, with slightly 
increasing threshold values with increasing punishment (increasing ݍ), as shown in Table 8.7. This 
implies two things: 1) changing ݍ  condition may not have a big effect on mdRT, but it affected 
distributions (and proportion of errors) enough to be significant when fitting the pure DDM; 2) changing 
the ݍ condition had an effect on the speed accuracy trade-off, as the effect on threshold suggested. The 
effect on ݀ was, as expected, increasing with increasing contrast. However, the estimated parameters 
also revealed that the changing in ݍ was not particularly remarkable (see Table 8.8), and not always 
increasing with increasing ݍ. The resulting fitting is shown on the distribution in Figure 8.15.  
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Table 8.8 Model fitting results    Table 8.9 Best Model’s parameters 
Pure DDM  Variant 2 (Pure DDM) 
 AIC df  AIC 43192.81 
Variant 1 47160.11 9  Ʃ ℒ 43174 
Variant 2 43192.81 9  ࢇࢗୀ ૚૜૙
  1.932 
Variant 3 49188.8 12  ࢇࢗୀ ૚૚૙
  2.241 
Variant 4 44488.13 6  ࢇࢗୀ૚૙૚૙
  2.236 
    ࢇࢗୀ૚૙૚
  2.453 
    ࣎  0.196 
    ࢊࢉୀ૙.૙૜૞  0.221 
    ࢊࢉୀ૙.૙૞  0.668 
    ࢊࢉୀ૙.૚  2.658 
    ࢊࢉୀ૙.૛  4.769 
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Figure 8.14 
Vincentized RT distributions for each condition, with the obtained Pure DDM fitting shown on each panel.  
8.6.3 Comparison with Optimum Response 
We firstly calculated DT in two different ways. Firstly, we assumed that there was no relevant 
difference across ݍ conditions. We pooled all the participants’ mean response together, regardless of ݍ 
or contrast condition, and divided the possible range of ACC (0.5 to 1) in 10 equal intervals. For each 
interval, we calculated the mean normalized DT (ܦܶ = ܴܶ − ߬, where ߬ is estimated to be 0.196s). For 
random chance, participants sometime obtained an Accuracy that was lower than 0.5 in some conditions. 
We excluded these values from the analysis (7% of total data). The result is shown in Figure 8.16 (the 
bar corresponds to one standard deviation). 
To fit the data we used the same procedure used in the previous Chapter to fit mdRT to optimal 
response curve for each decision strategy. As before, we assumed that participants’ estimation of the 
delay across trial ܦ௧௢௧ = ܦ + ߬ (with ܦ equal to 1.5, that is the constant RWI equal to 0.75 plus the 
constant FP equal to 0.75) may have slightly deviatet from the real estimation, and the weighted least 
square measure was modified accordingly to take this into account. We used the same modified WLS 
employed in the previous Chapter. We found that the weight parameter ߱ of 1 was too permissive, 
allowing deviation from the real ܦ parameter as high as 10 seconds, and thus we increased it to 1.5, 
which resulted in deviation in the range of 1 second. Note that we will refer to the estimated ܦ௧௢௧ value 
as ܦ෡௧௢௧. For ܴܴ, this was the only parameter to fit. For ܴܴ௠, ܴܣ and ܤܴ we also fitted the ݍ parameter. 
For this initial set of analyses the results are shown in Figure 8.16 (red lines). Resulting BIC values for 
each decision strategy is shown on Table 8.9, whereas Table 8.10 shows the estimated parameters for 
each decision strategy. The results were, generally, unsatisfying, as none of the decision rules’ 
predictions resembled the observed shape. 
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Figure 8.15 
Mean DT across participants binned for different levels of accuracy. Bars correspond to one standard deviation.  The red lines 
correspond to the resulting fitting for the four decision strategies.  
 
Table 8.10 Results for the decision rules fitting   
 
BIC df 
ࡾࡾ 1.41078 1 
ࡾࡾ࢓ -0.66781 2 
ࡾ࡭ 0.06340 2 
࡮ࡾ -0.36914 2 
 
 
Table 8.11 Estimated parameters 
 ࡾࡾ ࡾࡾ࢓ ࡾ࡭ ࡮ࡾ 
ࢗෝ    - 0.954 1.056 15.135 
ࡰ෡ ࢚࢕࢚  2.806 2.243 2.199 - 
We supposed that this may have been due to our method of collapsing participants that used different 
strategies and thus tried other grouping methods. Firstly, we repeated the same analysis by separating 
data according to the ݍ  conditions, but there was not much difference between ܦܶ  for different 
ݍ condition (as observed before).  
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Similar to what done in the previous Chapter and in Bogacz et al. (2010), we separated the 
participants according to different performance. We fitted the DDM to each performance group (we 
excluded the errors in these cases, as their number was too small). The results were difficult to interpret: 
for the poor performance group, the best DDM variant was the one with varying threshold separation ܽ 
across different ݍ conditions, which meant that these participants were actually adjusting their response 
according to how much reward and punishment they were expecting to get. Surprisingly, for the other 
two performance groups, the three variants gave roughly the same AIC results, meaning that there was 
not much difference in the fitting power of the three models, and participants may have slightly adjusted 
߬, ܽ, or none of them (the model with both ߬ and ܽ free to move across ݍ condition resulted in a very 
high AIC value due to the higher number of parameters). The estimated parameters for these models 
were also roughly the same.  
The interpretation of these different ߬ values was most problematic. For the poor performance 
group, ߬  (for the model with free ܽ  across ݍ  conditions) was equal to 0.05s. This must not be 
particularly surprising, especially considering Figure 8.13, which hints to the fact that participants in 
the poor performance group were using the constant trial delay (ܨܲ + ܴܹܫ) to estimate the onset of the 
stimulus, and responded in a non-integrative way (that is, without accumulating any information). For 
the other two performance groups, ߬ slightly varied across different model variants, and even with free 
߬ across ݍ conditions the values oscillated within a range of only 40 ms. We took the average of these 
measurements resulting on an estimated ߬ of 0.16 seconds for both medium and good performance 
groups. The resulting ܦܶ for each performance group is shown in Figure 8.17, and the AIC fitting in 
Table 8.8, showing ܴܴ௠ is the preferred model for medium and good performance, whereas ܴܣ is the 
preferred model for the poor performance group. Some cautions must be used in interpreting these 
results:  the ܦܶ did not resemble the inverted U-curve shape predicted by all decision rules. For the 
poor and medium performance groups we observed a decrease on the extreme values of accuracy, but 
overall the responses were very noisy and, as a result, the fitting of the decision strategy was not really 
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revealing. The reason for this generally unsatisfying fitting will be investigated in the Discussion 
Section.  
  
Figure 8.16 
Mean DT curves for each performance group, with the corresponding best DT curve fitting for each decision strategies. None 
of the observed results appears to be close to the expected optimum DT. 
 
Table 8.12 Fitting results for each performance group 
BIC values 
 Poor P.  Medium P. Good P.  
ࡾࡾ 5.04881 2.510413 2.355007 
ࡾࡾ࢓ 1.566364 0.089207 0.7473 
ࡾ࡭ 1.150535 1.406435 0.824595 
࡮ࡾ 1.822022 1.172989 0.183615 
8.6.4 Rate Distribution Analysis  
The rate domain distributions are shown in Figure 8.18. We already analysed the Rate Domain 
Distributions for Classic RT experiments in Chapter 4 and 5 and found that in most cases it followed a 
Normal Distribution. We applied the same analysis to this dataset. The blue lines represent original 
distributions, whereas the yellow lines represent distributions after elimination responses that did not 
belong to the original distribution (we used the STD-IQR method, as explained in Section 3.3). 
However, the number of cut data points did not appear to produce a relevant difference for most 
distributions. Compare, for example, this plot with that in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.7), where the distributions 
were remarkably “peaked” due to anticipatory responses produced for the Simple RT task. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test ( ߙ = 0.01) applied to the modified dataset, revealed that for 11 distributions 
206 
 
out of 15 the normality hypothesis could not be rejected. Note that the distributions that most deviates 
from Normality were those with very low contrast, regardless of the ݍ condition. The contrast level 
used here is also much lower than the one used in previous Chapters, and the distributions with the 
lowest contrast levels are also those with the most degenerated shape. As shown above (Figure 8.13), 
several participants had very fast responses with low stimulus contrast, which may hint to the fact that 
they were basing their response mostly to the FP length (so to respond soon after the stimuli appeared), 
and thus generating distribution that are a mixture of two different processes, similar to what we 
observed in Chapter 4. However, this is only a speculative hypothesis, and it will be discussed in the 
General Discussion.  
 
Figure 8.17 
Aggregated and standardised accuracy distribution, before (blue) and after (yellow) applying the STD-IQR method. The red-
dashed lines correspond to a Standard Normal Distribution.  
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8.7 Discussion 
The double aim of this work was to verify that non-Piéron’s shape was actually possible within the 
context of a Classic RT experiment; to investigate the effect of different punishment/reward ratio; to 
analyse the response in terms of optimality by assuming the Pure DDM model. The non- Piéron’s shape 
was effectively observed, but in a different context than predicted. We expected to observe Piéron’s 
shape for three of the four ݍ conditions (with balanced, high, and very high punishment), and a non-
Piéron’s shape for the condition with higher reward, whereas we observed it for the poor performance 
group, across all ݍ conditions. Some participants were effectively using a non-integrative strategy (that 
is, responding randomly as stimulus onset, without accumulating any information), apparently in an 
unrelated way with the ݍ condition, but likely due to their poor vision (that is, for them the lowest 
condition was difficult enough to make convenient to generate a non-monotonic shape of response). 
This in fact shows that, with the right experimental conditions, it is possible to obtain a non-Piéron’s 
shape with a Classic RT task, even though the “right experimental conditions” were not those predicted. 
Different ݍ  conditions resulted in mdRT that were not statistically different from each other. 
However, in fitting the distributions, it appeared that the DDM using different ܽ  for different ݍ 
conditions was the preferred model. This hinted to the fact that the effect of ݍ was very weak, and only 
appeared in the response distribution, not in the mdRT. Even so, the difference across estimated ܽ was 
really low, and not always increasing with increasing ݍ. The most likely cause was that participants did 
not really put much weight on the points earned or lost, as the exchange rate between points and money 
was not considered favourable. Therefore, participants possibly used a unique (subjective) 
punishment/reward value, which was not considerably affected by the point system used. A replication 
with a more motivational exchange rate might test this possibility. 
Finally, the optimality analysis in the context of DDM was clearly unsatisfying, for both aggregated 
and individual participants, providing with DT curve across accuracy level that did not resemble the 
inverted U shape expected in this case. In the other two works in which the optimal DT were computed 
(Bogacz et al., 2010; and Balci et al., 2011) the aggregated results did not show, similarly to our results, 
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a clear pattern. In Bogacz et al., a satisfying inverse U-shape was obtained for the top 30% and middle 
60% performance; in Balci et al., when the data from the most extreme conditions were excluded, and 
only for the most advanced sessions (that is, after more than half an hour of training), the pattern of DT 
could be fit satisfactorily. It is possible that our sessions were too short to obtain a clear pattern, and 
participants were still varying their response in order to adjust the speed-accuracy trade-off. However, 
the time series analysis performed above did not result in any relevant pattern, which implied that 
participants were not slowly adjusting their response (inspection of individual responses also confirmed 
that). Another possible problem may reside in the aggregate analysis across ݍ conditions, which may 
have mixed results from different strategies. The plot in Figure 8.12 shows that the difference across ݍ 
conditions was (on average) very limited, so this possibility also seems unlikely. It was not possible to 
conduct an analysis on the results segregated by ݍ conditions, as this resulted in too few data points, 
often having no entry for some level of accuracy. Another possibility is that, by fitting aggregating 
distributions, we missed relevant differences amongst participant’s non-decision time, ߬ , which 
therefore resulted in badly scaled ܦܶ. However, our approach is not new (e.g. Simen et al., 2009), and 
it is preferred when dealing with several participants which produced less than one hundredo of trials 
for condition. Furthermore, by using a flexible ܦ෡௧௢௧ estimation, we should have been able to take into 
account slightly misestimation of ߬. One of the main points of the present work was to suggest the use 
of an experimental design, the EXACT Paradigm, in which participants’ strategy can be analysed 
regardless of the perceptual model used. The unsatisfying results in this study, coupled with the mixed 
results in the literature, strengthen this point.  
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Chapter 9  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
9.1 Summary of findings 
The study of optimality has exerted a crucial impact on research, affecting significantly in the last 
decades the study of human behaviour, especially through economic and ecology. In this work, we 
approached the problem of optimality by trying to understand what optimal strategy is used by human 
participants in simple, fast decisions, mostly revolving around two alternatives. We limited our analysis 
to 4 strategies and, during the course of our exploration, we investigated several topics related to the 
wider field of decision making.  
The first part of this work has been devoted to a single, but revealing, aspect of optimisation: that 
is the prediction that participants change their response based on the total duration of the condition. 
This non-intuitive prediction was actually supported by the previous literature (Bogacz et al., 2010; 
Balci et al., 2011; Simen et al., 2009). 
We started by using a qualitative approach for Single and Choice RT task, showing how important 
is to employ the correct experimental paradigm. In particular, whereas the Single RT task in Chapter 4 
appeared to support previous findings, the experiment in Chapter 5 provided a convincing rebuttal of 
this hypothesis, and also clarified the reason for alternative results in the literature. We realised that the 
previous experiments, by changing the RSI time, were affecting the stimulus variability and its 
connection to motor preparation, and thus the effect on participants was not the result of an optimisation 
strategy based on the RSI.  
In Chapter 6, we tackled the problem of investigating several decision rules by basing the analysis 
on some perceptual model, which could be limiting or misleading. We suggested a new experimental 
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design in which participants were asked to trade between speed and accuracy in a similar way they have 
to do during a Classic RT task, but by using a speed-accuracy function that is perfectly known by the 
researcher. We found in this Chapter that, whereas this approach appeared powerful, the lack of 
information about the real ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) made the response extremely noisy, which seriously affected the 
analysis. Therefore in Chapter 7 we employed a new version of this paradigm by showing the ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) 
directly to the participants. We tested again, with this new paradigm, the hypothesis of delay effect on 
responses, confirming previous Chapters’ results. We also suggest a different explanation, that is: 
participants started with an estimated ܦ௧௢௧ which is the same across different delay conditions, and they 
changeed it only if this has a relevant effect in terms of profit. It is possible that, for our experiments, 
participant did not deem necessary to change their ܦ௧௢௧ estimation, as this would not have resulted in a 
much higher utility. We did not explore this but strongly suggest it as a topic in a future study. 
The next two studies (the last in Chapter 7 and the first in Chapter 8) we used the EXACT Paradigm 
to explore participants’ strategy across several experimental conditions. These two studies, together 
with the last, comparative, Classic RT study, served two main purposes: analysing the decision rules 
used by participants and how they can be affected by experimental parameters, and investigate the effect 
in terms of Piéron’s law.  
9.2 Decision Rules and Optimality  
The findings for the decision strategies were not easy to interpret. We generally found that the ܴܴ௠ 
and the ܴܣ decision rules provided the best fit, with a slight preference for ܴܴ௠. It seems clear that the 
ܤܴ models could not account for the data; on the other hand, the ܴܴ model is a simplified version of 
ܴܴ௠, and it could fit the data only when the subjective punishment was low enough, but not in any 
general situation. Both ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ were been proposed by Bogacz et al. (2010) as a way to weight 
speed and accuracy. ܴܴ௠ has an easy interpretation, as it is the strategy that maximizes the profit in 
terms of subjective utility given a task with fixed experimental time, but the ܴܣ does not, as it is an 
arbitrary function that weight differently accuracy and reward rate (Bogacz et al., 2006). Incidentally, 
both strategies are function of ܦ௧௢௧ , which is peculiar, since we have clearly observed that participants 
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did not change their behaviour based on the trial length alone. This hints to the alternative suggested 
above: participants may vary their response depending on ܦ௧௢௧ , but they vary it only when it is 
economically convenient, otherwise they use a default value. Another option, suggested in Section 7.5, 
could be that the parameter ܦ௧௢௧, used in both strategies, may have a different interpretation that the one 
usually suggested, and may thus not be related to total trial time. Finally, it is possible that participants 
are indeed using ܴܴ௠ to maximize the reward rate, but that they are only considering a limited part of 
the trial (that is, they are using a different “epoch”), in which ܦ௧௢௧ is computed.  However, these two 
last options both imply that ܴܴ௠ would lose its simple meaning as a rule that maximizes the reward 
rate for the trial. Another problem is that discrimination between ܴܴ௠ and ܴܣ may not be simple, as 
these decision strategies predict similar responses for similar parameters. By comparing our results with 
the previous work (see Section 8.1) we realize that a clear difference between these two decision 
strategies cannot be easily drawn.  
Why understanding the rules employed by human participants is so complex? We identified 3 main 
points:  
1) Participants may change the parameters of their decision rules during the task itself. We have 
had several hints of this process. Participants may start with a default estimate of the parameters, and 
adjust them slowly along the session. We observed trends which seemed to suggest an adjustment 
towards a particular set of parameters (for example, see Figure 8.3). Furthermore, it has been observed, 
by using a design with several sessions (Balci et al., 2011) that at least one parameter, ݍ, appeared to 
decrease with practice. Participants may change their parameter due to better estimation (which seems 
the more likely possibility for ߣ) or modification of internal state (for example, by becoming less averse 
to punishment, and thus decreasing ݍ). 
2) Different participants may use different parameters/decision rules. By aggregating participants, 
we basically estimated the parameters for an average participant, which may be misleading about the 
true participants’ parameters. We tried to take this problem into account by separating participants into 
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performance group, but an individual analysis was not possible due to the small sample size for some 
conditions. This problem became even more serious when considering that different participants may 
use totally different strategies.  For future studies, we suggest to conduct experiments with much larger 
sample size for each participant. 
3) Over-estimation of Optimum Response Time (Bogacz et al., 2006). The characteristic 
asymmetric decision strategy curve may lead to many more losses when the optimum response is 
underestimated than overestimated, and participants are thus biased towards overestimation. This would 
produce RT that are higher than the optimum response ܴܶ∗  and, thus, have higher accuracy. This 
process would cause misleading parameters fitting, for example resulting in a higher ݍ that the one 
estimated by the participant. Taking this aspect into account involves calculating the optimum response 
giving the participant’s noise estimation (Balci et al., 2011). Note that the same effect can be obtained 
by simply assuming that participants’ response is intrinsically noisy: in this case as well, participants’ 
best strategy would be to slightly increase the mean of their noisy response. The details of this 
hypothesis are highly speculative, and clearly more research about the threshold adaptation has to be 
done before this aspect can be fruitfully included in future analysis (see also Simen, Cohen & Holmes, 
2006). To give an example of how this would affect optimum response estimation, in Figure 9.1 we 
assumed that the ܴܶ∗ estimation is normally distributed* and, with different types of noise (ߪ), we 
calculated the optimum response time by using the decision rule ܴܴ௠. With ߪ = 0 the ܴܶ∗ is exactly 
the maximum of the decision rule, as we have assumed in this work. With higher ߪ the optimum shifts 
on the right. For now, we noticed that ignoring these facets may lead to slightly incorrect parameter 
estimation.   
                                                     
 
* Note that, even if the ܴܶ∗ estimation is based on a Normal Distribution process, the resulting ܴܶ distribution may still 
have the classic right-skewed shape, depending on the method used to adjust the response to find the optimum ܴܶ∗. 
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Figure 9.1 
Optimum average response (ܴܶതതതത∗) for different values of response noise (coloured circles). Note that, as the noise increases, 
the optimum average response will shift on the left, meaning that participants need to be slower, and their average reward is 
going to be smaller.  
 
For EXACT Paradigm, these represent the main problems. For the Classic RT task, we have a 
further problem of choosing the correct perceptual model (see Chapter 6 for discussion). Another 
complication comes from the fact that it has been shown that, for the Extended DDM, a model with 
linear boundary may actually be not optimal for maximising several decision strategies (ܴܴ and ܴܴ௠ 
included), and a moving boundary must be used instead (Drugowitsch et al. 2012). Including a moving 
boundary adds a high level of freedom to the model, and makes it remarkably more complex. For our 
qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 and 5, we deemed a linear DDM a sufficient descriptive model, but 
clearly for any quantitative analysis this does not suffice. The analysis of optimality clearly depends on 
the development of this new type of sequential sampling models.  
Finally, we must consider the possibility that other strategies may be used by participants. We have 
considered four decision rules that have been suggested several times across the literature. However, it 
is possible that participants may be using more complex strategies not taken into account here. For 
example, participants may base their response on a non-linear cost of waiting (Drugowitsch, 2012); the 
effect of the punishment/reward ratio may be modelled in a much complex way, especially by 
considering that participants may give different value to different punishment/reward absolute value, 
conversely to what assumed here.  
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9.3 Piéron’s Law 
In the last two Chapters, we designed the experiments such that one of the factors was always ߣ, 
which can be seen as corresponding to stimulus strength in a Classic RT task. This allowed us to perform 
studies that resembled Piéron’s-type experiment. One point of this approach was to show the similarity 
between the EXACT Paradigm and the Classic RT task. However, the most interesting peculiarity of 
this approach was to obtain what we called a non-Piéron’s shape with some experimental conditions, a 
shape that has not been observed in a century of RT experiments. Both experiments are clearly 
successful in generating both Piéron’s and non- Piéron’s shape by changing the parameter ܽ and ݍ 
(starting point and punishment/reward ratio). The Classic RT task also generated non-Piéron’s shape, 
but only for the participants in the poor performance group. We suggested that participants from this 
group may actually have a poorest vision which would result in a weaker subjective stimulus strength 
which would produce the observed non-Piéron’s shape.  
Showing that Piéron’s Law does not hold for certain experimental conditions has important 
psychological implications. This relationship between stimulus strength and response time has been so 
ubiquitous that is normally considered one of the main psychophysical regularities, and it has seen as 
the result of the neural activation of the visual system. For example, Stafford and Gurney (2004) and 
Stafford, Ingram and Gurney (2011) suggested that Piéron’s Law may be generated by a sequential 
sampling model (they used a Linear Ballistic Model, but the same prediction holds with all the major 
sequential sampling models). Another approach is the Ising Decision Maker, derived from a stochastic 
Hopfield network (Verdonck and Tuerlinckx, 2014). However, such models cannot, by themselves, 
explain the non-monotonic relationship that we have observed in Experiment 7.2 and 8.1, and 8.2. 
By showing that Piéron’s Law can easily be broken, and specifying when this happens, we showed 
how even this phenomena, considered purely physiological, are in fact mediated by participants’ 
decision rules. We are not claiming that visual activation does not have a role here: in fact, the stimulus 
strength clearly affects the speed-accuracy function, which is employed by participants to estimate the 
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decision rule value. What we claim is that the observed response can only be deeply understood by 
taking into account the decision rule in which the physiological response is applied.  
9.4 Rate-Hypothesis and Accuracy-Hypothesis 
Finally, during this work, we have investigated two important phenomena: the rate of response and 
the accuracy of response. The first regularity, that is that the distributions of response rate are 
approximately Normal, arose in the literature of saccadic response and it has been confirmed for Manual 
Choice RT (see Section 2.4). As for the accuracy distribution, we noticed for the first time in 
Experiment 7.1, only within the context of the EXACT Paradigm, that it was also Normally distributed. 
The fact that a regularity in the accuracy distribution may have been overseen by previous researcher is 
not surprising, as accuracy distributions may be difficult to compute.  
For the Rate Domain Hypothesis, first suggested by Harris et al. (2014), we refer to the hypothesis 
that the decision making process is taking place in the Rate Domain instead of the time domain. The 
DDM and other sequential sampling processes would be interpreted as a way to convert from rate to 
time domain. The LATER process is the “pure” version of this assumption, as it starts from a Normal 
Distribution in the rate domain and generates a Reci-Normal Distribution in in time domain. We have 
shown how this hypothesis is very difficult to prove as it is generally difficult to distinguish between a 
distribution in the rate domain generated by a DDM and a pure Normal Distribution in the rate domain 
(see Section 5.4). Nevertheless, we observed for both Simple RT and Choice RT (Chapter 4 and 5) that 
the responses in the rate domain were in fact approximately Normally distributed, but with some 
consistent deviations that may be due to anticipatory processes/stimulus estimation. The deviations 
were present specifically when the FP was short (or constant), hinting that participants were sometimes 
basing their estimation on the FP itself instead that on the perceptual process. The LATER model, on 
the other hand, was compared with the DDM. The latter appeared to provide a better distribution fit. 
Overall, we believe that the information gathered in this work did not provide strong support to the 
Rate-Hypothesis, and more work is clearly required. 
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An important result that we believe deserve to be explored more consistently is the regularity found 
by analysing the distribution accuracy. We realised that participants may indeed compute their response 
based on a particular value of accuracy that they wish to maintain, and the produced RT is only a sub-
product of such accuracy. We showed by simulations (Section 7.10) how this could explain several 
distribution features. This is an extremely simple model which takes distance from a sequential 
sampling type of model and obviously requires much more investigation. This regularity has been 
consistently found across our EXACT experiments, but an analysis on Classic RT is yet to be performed. 
This analysis can be very complicated, and requires probably thousands of trials, but could be possible 
with an experiment designed just to extrapolate this information. Finding normally distributed accuracy 
distributions would be such a peculiar coincidence that would most likely hint to some more 
important mechanism underlying the decision process. Note that, by introducing this 
assumption, we are not suggesting any radical change to the optimisation process adopted until 
this moment: participants may compute the optimum response (in time) given a decision 
strategy. They will then respond based on the accuracy around that point, and this accuracy 
may be in fact normally distributed. Note that the RT probability density function suggested in 
Section 7.10 (Equation 7.1) is in fact function of the optimum response time ܴܶ∗  and the 
accuracy related to it, ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ∗). Noisy estimation of the accuracy, or motor noise, or any 
other normally distributed process, would then take place on the accuracy domain.  
Why is this assumption so relevant? The main point regards to the fact that, as discussed in Section 
6.1.1, perceptual models and decision rules are two separate components, and they can, in fact, be 
analysed separately. This is exactly what we did by employing the EXACT Paradigm. Once we 
conceptually accept this separation, we can then consider alternative models for generating the RT 
distributions, and they may not be sequential sampling models. In this case, assuming that participants 
were responding so to maintain a certain level of accuracy would automatically imply that a right 
skewed distribution will be generated in the time domain. This is a new, simple explanation for RT 
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distribution which does not employ any sequential sampling model, but only a certain ܣܥܥ(ܴܶ) shape 
and a decision rule.  
Part of this thesis has to be considered exploratory: as we proposed a new paradigm, it opens up 
several possibilities for further research with an in-depth investigation of few of them. Understanding 
how humans make decisions is a difficult endeavour, even when we limit our analysis to simple and 
fast decisions as the one performed in reaction time tasks. It sometimes appears necessary to employ 
novel experimental designs that can help us shed some light onto the intricate landscape of decision 
models and decision strategies. The key point of this work was to show the limit of the current approach 
with Classic RT task and to suggest a possible solution in terms of the EXACT Paradigm. Exploration 
of this novel design gave us new information about the decision strategies employed in human 
perception, but this will clearly require further investigation. By suggesting new directions for 
increasing our knowledge of decision making, we hope to have provided a relevant contribution to the 
field.  
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Appendix 
Derivation of Optimum Response ۲܂∗ for the four decision rules 
For each decision rule, we describe the steps to derive the corresponding t∗ for the exponential 
speed-accuracy trade-off function: ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ) = 1 + (α − 1)exp (−λDT). To find the maximum point 
in each decision rule, we set the derivative with respect to t equal to 0 and solve for t. 
For  ܤܴ = −ൣܦܶ + ݍ൫1 − ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)൯൧, the derivative is  
 ߲ܤܴ
߲ܦܶ
= −1 − ߣݍ ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ)(ߙ − 1) = 0    (A1) 
and hence:  
 
ܦ ஻ܶோ∗ =  −
݈݊ ൬ 1ߣݍ(1 − ߙ)൰
ߣ
.    (A2) 
Applying L’Hopital’s rule, we found that when ߣ → 0  then ܦ ஻ܶோ∗ → 0  and when ߣ → ∞  then 
ܦ ஻ܶோ∗ → 0.  
For  ܴܴ = ܣܥܥ(ܦܶ)/(ܦܶ + ݀) the derivative is  
 ߲ܴܴ
߲ܦܶ
= −
1 − ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) (ߙ − 1)
(ܦܶ + ܦ௧௢௧)ଶ
−
ߣ ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) (ߙ − 1)
ܦܶ + ܦ௧௢௧
= 0 
   (A3) 
Rearranging:  
 (1 + ߣݐ + ߣܦ௧௢௧) ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) = −
1
ߙ − 1
 
   (A4) 
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and setting :  
 ݔ = −ߣܦܶ − ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1    (A5) 
   
we obtain ݔ ݁ݔ݌(ݔ + ߣܦ௧௢௧ + 1) =
ଵ
ఈିଵ
 or  
 
ݔ ݁ݔ݌(ݔ) =
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)
ߙ − 1
    (A6) 
We can now express this relationship in terms of Lambert W function , which is defined as 
W(z) exp[ W(z)] = z.  Therefore  
 
ݔ = ܹ ቆ݁ݔ݌
(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)
ߙ − 1 ቇ
    (A7) 
which we can substitute back to (A5) to obtain 
 
ܦ ோܶோ∗ = −ܦ௧௢௧ −
ܹ ൬݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)ߙ − 1 ൰ + 1
ߣ
    (A8) 
As the Lambert W function is a multivalued function, we need to establish which branch we are 
referring to. Note that to obtain ܦ ோܶோ∗ ≥ 0  we need W(⋅) ≤ −1 − λD୲୭୲ . Since λ, ܦ௧௢௧ ≥ 0 , then 
W(⋅) ≤ −1 and therefore the function is limited to its lower branch, Wିଵ. With ߣ → 0 RR become 
ఒ
஽்ା஽೟೚೟
 and the maximum is reached when ܦܶ = 0.  
We were not able to obtain an explicit form for RA, not even in terms of Lambert W.  
For ܴܴ௠ =
஺஼஼(஽்)ି௤൫ଵି஺஼஼(஽்)൯
஽்ା஽೟೚೟
 the derivative is equal to  
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 ߲ܴܴ௠
߲ܦܶ
= −
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) (ߙ − 1) + ݍ ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) (ߙ − 1) + 1
(ܦܶ + ܦ௧௢௧)ଶ
−
ߣ ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) (ߙ − 1) + ߣݍ ݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦܶ) (ߙ − 1)
ܦܶ + ܦ௧௢௧
 
   (A9) 
Which maximum DT can be found by setting this derivative equal to zero. By rearranging terms, 
we obtain: 
 (ߣܦܶ + ߣ݀ + 1) ݁ݔ݌ (−ߣܦܶ) = −
1
(ߙ − 1)(ݍ + 1)
 
   (A10) 
As before, we set ݔ = −ߣܦܶ − ߣ݀ − 1 , so that we can express x in terms of Lambert W function:  
 
ݔ = ܹ ቆ
݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)
(ߙ − 1)(ݍ + 1) ቇ
    (A11) 
Leading to 
 
ܦ ோܶோ೘
∗ = −ܦ௧௢௧ −
ܹ ൬݁ݔ݌(−ߣܦ௧௢௧ − 1)(ߙ − 1)(ݍ + 1) ൰ + 1
ߣ
 
   (A12) 
For the same argument as before, we know that for DTୖ ୖౣ
∗  to be positive the function W is limited 
to its lower branch, Wିଵ. When ߣ → 0 ܴܴ௠ become 
ఈ(ଵା௤)ି௤
஽்ା஽೟೚೟
 which maximum depends on the sign of 
the numerator. It is ܦ ோܶோ೘
∗ = 0 when ߙ > ௤
௤ାଵ
, ܦ ோܶோ೘
∗ = ∞ when ߙ < ௤
௤ାଵ
, undetermined when α =
୯
୯ାଵ
.  
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Decision Making and Rate of Reward 
Valerio Biscione, Christopher M. Harris 
Centre for Robotics & Neural Systems and Cognition Institute, Plymouth University, 
Plymouth, UK 
ABSTRACT 
It is widely accepted that human reaction times (RT) can reveal important information about 
the way we make decisions. It is commonly accepted that for simple decision a response is 
made when the accumulation of information reaches a threshold. In the present work we 
analyze the frequency distributions of the RT in order to understand how responses are made 
and, in particular, if responses are mediated by a decision mechanism whose purpose is to 
maximize the reward. We suggest that the important element that human beings are trying to 
maximize is not the reward per se, but the rate of reward, that is the reward per unit time. We 
conducted an experiment where we varied the intensity of the stimulus and the foreperiod 
time (which is the time between the start of the trial to the occurrence of the stimulus). We 
compared our result with other decision-making models and we showed how our 
experimental results are easy to understand within the framework of a reward-rate 
maximization mechanism and how this can provide new insight in the decision-making field 
for human beings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the 6th Annual Plymouth University School of Psychology Conference. Plymouth. 2015. 
(Oral Presentation) 
Rate Domain Distributions in Simple Reaction Time Task  
Valerio Biscione, Christopher M. Harris 
Centre for Robotics & Neural Systems and Cognition Institute, Plymouth University, 
Plymouth, UK 
ABSTRACT 
Background. It is widely accepted that human reaction times (RT) can reveal important 
information about decision strategies for “all-or-none” type of responses. During the past 
decades several models have been proposed to describe and predict mean RT and RT 
distributions and, amongst them, sequential sampling models are the most successful in 
accounting for data for simple and two-choice tasks.  RT distributions are usually positively 
skewed which are often modelled as an Inverse Gaussian (the first passage time of a 
stochastic Wiener process) or an Ex-Gaussian. However it has been found that latency 
distribution of saccades are very close to the Reciprocal Normal, meaning that they are 
normally distributed in the rate domain. This represents a challenge for most stochastic rise-
to-threshold models, since these models can only achieve normality in the rate domain with 
implausible parameters. We have already observed, in a previous study, the normality of the 
distribution in the rate domain. In that experiment we used a two-forced choice paradigm 
with an easy/difficult condition and an accurate/urgent instruction sets. We now investigate 
the possibility to find similar results with a simple RT paradigm, exploring the relation 
between the foreperiod (FP) time and the Piéron’s Law in the rate domain. 
Methods. In this experiment (12 subjects, 3 blocks of 250 trials) we varied the FP time and 
the luminance of the stimuli. The participants were asked to press a button as soon as they 
saw the stimulus (a circle). We used 3 FP conditions (0.6, 1, and 2.4 seconds) and 5 
luminance levels (0.42, 0.71, 1.21, 2.06, 3.50 cd/m2). 
 
Discussion. We discuss several problems of the rise-to-threshold models and how a 
Reciprocal Normal Distribution is not consistent with stochastic rise to threshold models. We 
propose a simple optimality model in which reward is maximized to yield to an optimal rate 
and therefore an optimal time to respond, exploring the connection between this model and 
the speed-accuracy trade-off. We also show how Piéron’s Law naturally arises from this 
model. Our key claim is that the main goal of the human decision process in simple decision 
tasks is to maximize the rate of reward.  
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How to Investigate decision-making in humans? 
Valerio Biscione, Christopher M. Harris 
Centre for Robotics & Neural Systems and Cognition Institute, Plymouth 
University, Plymouth, UK 
ABSTRACT 
Whether and in which conditions humans’ decision making is optimal in 
reaction time tasks has been a long discussed question in the psychological field.  
The topic is affected by a vague definition of optimality, and by a lack of 
experimental paradigm designed to investigate the problem. Most of the models 
proposed in the past decades have focused their attention on perceptual tasks, 
where participants are asked to choose as fast as possible between two or more 
stimuli. These studies mostly ignored what strategy was used by the participants. 
However, we believe that a different approach could be employed: we introduce 
a novel paradigm in which participants are asked to make a decision and gain a 
reward by responding to a task which does not contain any perceptual cue. This 
allows us to analyse the strategy employed without making any assumption 
about the perceptual mechanism. We discuss how this paradigm could improve 
our knowledge about the decision strategy used by humans, and we present 
some preliminary results that show how the participants were trying to optimize 
the rate of reward from trial to trial.  
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CONNECTING PIÉRON'S LAW, THE FOREPERIOD EFFECT AND  
DISTRIBUTION SHAPES IN A SIMPLE REACTION TIME TASK 
 
Valerio Biscione1,2, Christopher M. Harris1,2 
1School of Psychology, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK 
2Centre for Robotics and Neural Systems and Cognition Institute, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In a recent study on choice reaction time (RT) (Harris et al., 2014), we found that rate (reciprocal of RT) 
was near-normally distributed, which led us to propose a decision model based on maximizing the reward 
rate (the Rate Model). We also suggested a connection with two well-known phenomena in experimental 
psychology: Piéron’s Law and the foreperiod (FP) effect. Piéron’s Law describes the empirical 
relationship between mean RT and stimulus intensity as a power function. The FP is the time from the 
start of the trial until the appearing of the stimulus, which usually has the effect of increasing the mean 
RT. In this work we tested the Rate Model by using a simple reaction time design. Twelve subjects were 
tested for three blocks of 250 trials each. We varied the FP time and the luminance of the stimuli. The 
participants were asked to press a button as soon as they saw the stimulus (a luminous circle on a black 
background). We used 3 FP conditions (0.6, 1, and 2.4 seconds) and 5 luminance levels (0.42, 0.71, 1.21, 
2.06, 3.50 cd/m2). As expected, the relationship between RT and stimulus intensity followed Piéron’s 
Law. We also found that longer FP induced longer mean RT. Fitting a different Piéron’s function for each 
FP condition showed that the effect of the FP was a shift in the Piéron’s curve. Overall, the distributions 
were approximately normal in the rate domain. The goodness of fit increased with the long FP conditions, 
whereas the different luminance levels did not have any impact on the normality shape of the 
distributions. We adapted the original model to account for simple RTs, and were able to fit the model to 
our data to take into account Piéron’s Law, the FP effect of shifting the Piéron’s curve, and maintain 
approximately normal distributions in the rate domain (reciprocal RT).Our main claim is that the goal of 
the human decision process in simple decision tasks is to maximize the rate of reward. We discuss the 
connections between our model and other recently proposed models for simple RT tasks. 
 
Keywords: Piéron’s Law, Foreperiod, Reward Rate, Simple Reaction Time 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
 The measurement of reaction/response times (RTs) has been a major paradigm in the study of 
human behavior and decision-making for over a century (Luce, 1986). The two main experimental 
designs are simple and choice RTs tasks. In the latter, a participant is asked to make a choice between two 
or more stimuli according to experimental instruction after stimuli onset . In the simple RT (SRT) task the 
participant is asked to respond to the stimulus onset, usually as fast and/or as accurately as possible. Most 
models have focused on how RT distributions and accuracy depend on experimental parameters, and have 
assumed a stochastic accumulation of evidence towards one alternative or another (Ratcliff and Rouder, 
1998). An alternative approach is examine the strategy that participants use to decide when to stop 
collecting information and produce a response (Harris et al., 2014). We have found that in a choice RT 
task, the rate of response (1/RT) followed approximately a normal distribution, as has also been 
previously found for saccades (Carpenter, 1981; Carpenter and Williams, 1995). We therefore proposed 
that RTs maximized the rate of response. This model also makes some predictions about the effect of the 
stimulus intensity and the foreperiod time (the time from the start of the trial until the occurrence of the 
stimulus, FP). In this study we explored the rate distributions in a simple RT task to see if they are also 
near-normal. We also varied stimulus intensity and the foreperiod time to test the predictions of the rate 
model.  
 
It has been known for long time that the intensity of the stimulus (I) affects the mean RT (mRT) 
according to a power function with negative exponent plus a constant, and has become eponymously 
known as Piéron’s Law (1952): mRT=αI-β+γ, where α is a scaling factor, β is a parameter depending on 
the type of stimuli used and γ is the asymptotic value reached when I → ∞. Piéron’s Law seems to hold 
for choice as well as simple RT (Pins and Bonnet, 1996; van Maanen et al., 2012).  FPs provide a cue to 
the time of stimulus onset, and are known to affect RTs. When the FP is constant, RTs increase with FP. 
When the FP is variable, however, the relationship becomes more complicated: the RTs are generally 
longer, but also depend on the particular FP distribution (Niemi and Näätänen, 1981). We investigated 
this relationship by using an exponentially distributed FP, which does not give any information about the 
occurrence of the stimulus at time t given that it did not occur before.  
  
  
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants and Stimuli 
 12 participants (5 females, 7 males) took part in the experiment. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no known neurological conditions. All testing were conducted under 
constant levels of illumination. The stimuli were presented binocularly on a computer monitor. 
Participants were positioned 57cm from the monitor. The stimuli were luminous circle (2cm) shown on a 
dark background (0.31 cd/m2).  The five levels of luminance followed an approximately geometrical 
series (0.42, 0.71, 1.21, 2.06, 3.50 cd/m2). Each participant was tested in three blocks. During each block, 
the 5 possible stimuli were presented randomly. We used three different FP conditions: short, medium 
and long. Each FP condition consisted of a minimum waiting time (0.4s) added to a random tiem drawn 
from an exponential distribution. FPs longer than 20s were excluded.  The mean of the exponential 
distribution was 0.2s for the short condition, 0.6s for the medium condition and 2s for the long condition, 
leading to three different FP conditions with mean of, respectively, 0.6s, 1s and 2.4s. The mean FP time 
was kept constant for each block. The FP conditions were counterbalanced across participant.  
 
2.2 Procedure 
A white cross (2 cm) was presented on a black background at the centre of the screen. This was 
used as a fixation point. After 1 second, the cross disappeared and a white dot (1mm) appeared at the 
centre of the screen and remained on the centre during the whole trial. The disappearance of the white 
cross constituted the warning signal for the start of the FP. After the FP, the stimulus appeared and stayed 
on the screen until the participant pressed the space bar. The participants were asked to press the spacebar 
as soon as they detected the stimulus. If the participants pressed the spacebar before the stimulus appeared 
(anticipation response), a negative auditory feedback was provided and the trial was repeated. Otherwise 
a positive auditory feedback was provided after the spacebar was pressed. We recorded 50 RTs for each 
luminance level. Thus, we recorded 250 non-anticipatory RTs for each session, and a total of 750 non-
anticipatory RTs for each participant. A training session consisting of 20 trials with a short FP was 
performed by each participant before the start of the experiment. 
 
3. Results 
We calculated the median reaction times (mdRT) across all the 12 participants for each stimulus 
intensity and FP condition. The median of the reciprocal of a random variable is the same as the 
reciprocal of the median (the mean does not have this property). As expected, the mdRT decreased with 
the increase of stimulus intensity (F4,44=3.68, P=0.013). The mdRT increased with longer mean FP 
condition (F2,22=10.24, P<0.001), as shown in Figure 1, left. No interaction was found between FP and 
stimulus intensity. We fitted a different Piéron’s Law function for each FP condition using the method of 
least squares. The estimated parameters are shown in Table 1. Figure 1, right, shows the relationship 
between the mdRT and FP condition for each luminance level. In this case, the relationship appeared to 
be logarithmic. This was confirmed by a minimum least square fitting which resulted in high values of R2 
(Table 2). 
 
Figure 1. On the right, the aggregated mdRT for all the 12 participants against the 5 luminance levels of 
the stimuli, for the 3 FP conditions. On the right, the same mdRT against the 3 FP condition for each one of the 5 
luminance levels. 
 
 
Table 1. Estimated parameters for the Piéron’s Law (mdRT=αI-β+γ) for each FP condition. 
 
 α β γ R2 
FP=0.6s 9 2.02 254 0.96698 
FP=1.0s 6 2.72 281 0.98688 
FP=2.4s 20 1.25 317 0.99354 
 
Table 2. Estimate parameters for the relationship between FP and mdRT (mdRT=k log(FP)+c) for each luminance 
level. 
 
 0.42 cd/m2 0.71 cd/m2 1.21 cd/m2 2.06 cd/m2 3.50 cd/m2 
k 46 53 48 49 40 
c 338 297 290 283 283 
R2 0.92 ~1 0.9938 0.9936 0.9985 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the rate of response for each condition, aggregated across the 12 subjects using the 
standardization method. 
 
 
We analysed the distribution of RTs in the rate domain (1/RT) using the standardization method (Harris et 
al., 2014). We grouped the distributions for all the participants. The result is shown in Figure 2. We fitted 
the Normal distribution for each one of the 15 cells in the rate domain (3 FP condition x 5 different 
luminances) using a maximum likelihood method approach (black solid line) 
 
4. Discussion 
  
4.1 Piéron’s Law 
 The exponent, β, parameter usually found for Piéron’s Law in studies in which the luminance of 
a stimulus is varied is much smaller than the value that we estimated (i.e., Mansfield, 1972, reported 
β=0.3). We explain this peculiar result by noticing that in our experiment the background luminance was 
higher than in previous studies (0.31 cd/m2 against 0.001 cd/m2), and therefore the contrast 
stimulus/background in our experiment was much lower than in other studies. High exponents have also 
been found in Pins and Bonnet (1997, 2000), where the lowest scotopic ranges provided the higher 
exponent. It is possible that the exponent of the Piéron’s function is actually affected by the contrast of 
the stimuli, and not by the sensory modality as previously assumed.  Further studies are required to 
investigate this point.  
 
4.2 Distribution shape 
 We have a previously found in a choice RT task (Harris et al., 2014) that the distributions in the 
rate domain were approximately Normal. In the present study we use the same approach to verify if the 
near-Normal distribution shapes can be found in a simple RT task with different stimulus intensity and FP 
conditions. When the mean FP is long the fit with a normal distribution is close to perfect, and the 
distribution shape does not seem to be affected by the stimulus intensity. However, the fitting gets 
progressively worse as the mean FP length gets shorter. The FP condition seems to affect the shapes in a 
non-trivial way that is different for choice RTs. In a choice RT task the FP does not affect the probability 
of being correct: even if the participant can estimate when the stimulus is going to occur. In a simple RT 
task with a variable FP, the flow of time itself can give information about the occurrence of a stimulus, 
even when an exponential distribution is used. In the next section we will show a modified version of the 
Reward Rate Model that can take into account the FP effect. 
 
5. The Reward Rate Model for Simple Reaction Time Tasks 
 
The fact that the RT distributions were approximately normally distributed in the rate domain for 
choice RT suggested that the neural computation could be actually carried on in the rate domain (Harris et 
al., 2014). We proposed a Rate Model in which the rate of reward is maximized. For each trial, we define 
the gain in subjective utility for a correct response by P>0, and the loss by M>0. The expected gain 
therefore depends on the probability of being correct at time t Ĝ(t)=Pp(t)-M(1-p(t)).  The expected rate of 
gain is Ȓ(t)=Ĝ(t)/(t+d) where d is the delay across trials. The optimum time to respond (t*) corresponds to 
the point when the derivative of Ȓ(t) is 0, and can be found numerically. The result will depends on the 
shape of p(t). In our previous work, we used a simple monotonically increasing function asymptotically 
approaching unity: p(t)=1-exp(-λt), where λ is a parameters defining how fast p(t) grows (this parameter 
was used to model different difficulty conditions or different stimulus intensity). However, the results of 
this study showed us that the FP condition has a peculiar effect on the response. In particular, it changes 
the  factor of the Piéron’s Law. We show that, by choosing an appropriate formula of p(t), the Rate 
Model still holds. For the present study we consider a p(t)  that depends on both stimulus intensity and FP 
condition: p(t)=(1-exp(-λpt))(1-exp(-λft)), which is simple product of two exponent functions, where λp 
and λf are two accelerating factors of time, the first depending on the stimulus intensity, the second 
inversely related with the FP. Figure 3, left and centre panels, show some numerical simulations with 
several values of λp and λf. The centre panel shows how the optimum responds is clearly similar to 
Piéron’s Law with different γ depending on the value of λf. Assuming that λp fluctuates normally across 
trials, the model can generate distributions that are near-Normal in the rate domain or slightly skewed on 
the left side, which is similar to what we found in our observations. In Figure 3, right panels, we fit the 
model to the experimental data by assuming that the mapping between λp and λf and the physical values 
of the stimulus intensity and FP condition followed Steven’s Law, that is λp=α1Iβ1  and λf=α2FPβ2. The 
effect of the stimulus intensity (Figure 3, right-top panel) and of the FP condition (Figure 3, right-bottom 
panel) can be explained by the model.   
 
Figure 3. Top-left panel: the proposed p(t) with different values of λf, which is assumed to be inversely related to FP. 
Bottom-left panel: the resulting rate of reward (R(t)) function. The vertical dotted line on both figures indicate the 
optimum time to respond, t* that maximized the rate of reward. Centre panel: the resulting shape of the optimum t* 
with different λp parameter, which is assumed to be related to the intensity of the stimulus, and λf. Right-panels: 
experimental data fitted with the Rate Model and Piéron’s Law: luminance against mdRT (right-up panel) and FP 
conditions against mdRT (right-bottom panel).  
  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 The effect of stimulus intensity and foreperiod length on RT has been studied for long time. 
However, the interaction between the two has been largely unexplored. We connected these phenomena 
with the peculiar fact that RT distributions in the rate domain are normally distributed. This observation 
holds only partially for simple RT, in which only long FP produced near-Normal distributions in the rate 
domain. We showed that the Rate Model is also applicable within the framework of simple RT tasks by 
choosing an appropriate p(t) depending on both FP and RT in order to take into account the FP effect on 
distribution and on stimulus intensity.  
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Abstract 
 
We can divide the decision-making process into two components: 1) the mechanism and neural machinery 
by which an event is triggered, and 2) the strategy by which the mechanism is employed to solve 
behavioural/cognitive decision problems. Most of the decision-making models proposed in the past few 
decades have conflated these two components by assuming that the mechanism constrains and determines 
behavioural outcomes (RT distributions etc.), as exemplified by the diffusion model. Only more recently 
has a strategic view been considered (such as maximizing rate or reward). In this work we explore an 
alternative way to study the strategy component in human decision-making. We introduce a novel paradigm 
in which a participant is asked to make a decision and gain reward by responding to a task which does not 
contain any perceptual cue (such as a stimulus onset in a typical RT experiment). We ran several 
experiments and explored decision strategies proposed in the literature (Bayes Risk, Reward Rate, 
Reward/Accuracy). We found that participants were appearing to optimize reward rate. We explain some 
individual differences among participants by referring to a modified reward rate strategy. We also discuss 
the connection between this task and some classic perceptual tasks. We conclude that focusing on the 
decision mechanism per se is not enough to understand human decision making, and that a strategic view 
is necessary.  
  
Keywords: Optimization, Reward Rate, Speed-accuracy trade-off 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Human decision making is one of the most studied processes in the field of human science, and 
has drawn attention from many fields: psychology, neuroscience, computer science, mathematics, biology 
and economics. Most work has focused on answering one or more of the following questions: what are the 
components of a decision making process?  If the decision process is driven by a maximization mechanism 
(as is usually assumed), what is the objective function that is maximized? Given a certain optimization 
mechanism and a certain objective function, how good are human in reaching the optimum strategy? In this 
study, we introduce a new approach to answering these questions. 
 The most common experimental approach has been the cued choice reaction time paradigm, where 
a participant is instructed to make a choice among multiple alternatives (usually 2) after the onset of 
stimulus trial cues. This has led to several models based on three fundamental assumptions: (a) evidence 
favouring each alternative is integrated over time, (b) the decision is made when enough evidence has 
accumulated, and (c) the process is stochastic (Bogacz et al., 2006). It is important, however, to distinguish 
between the decision mechanism and the decision goal. The decision mechanism is the way the perceptual 
information is gathered and used by the observer (e.g. the rise to threshold mechanism), and the decision 
goal is the aim of such process (e.g. maximizing reward). Only assumption (b) is related to the decision 
goal. Indeed, the traditional diffusion model and its variants (Ratcliff and Smith, 2004) have focused on the 
underlying mechanism, and only recently has the decision goal been considered (Simen et al., 2009; Bogacz 
et al., 2010). In our view, the distinction between mechanism and goal has been neglected for far too long, 
mostly because the cued choice reaction time paradigm confounds the two. We propose a new experimental 
paradigm where the decision goal can be investigated without making any assumption about the underlying 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
3. The Paradigm 
 
 In a cued RT experiment, a speed-accuracy trade-off emerges (Heitz, 2014): the longer a 
participant waits before responding, the more likely the response is correct. We can define this by a function 
p(t), which is the probability that a response made at time t is correct. A speed-accuracy trade-off implies 
that p(t) is a monotonically increasing function, and has often been construed as a Bayesian accumulation 
of evidence. However, it is difficult to disentangle how p(t) depends on the perceptual process (anticipatory 
and post-cue) and how it is used strategically to determine the actual time of response (and hence the 
probability of being correct). If we want to understand when “enough information is enough” without 
making any assumption about the process that collects information, we need to hard-code the information 
sampling mechanism in the experimental design. The rationale is as follows: instead of showing two or 
more stimuli and having the participant choose the correct one by an endogenous accumulation of 
information and subsequent increase of p(t), we present p(t) directly to the participant in a well-defined 
manner. The advantage of this approach is that we have a known p(t), instead of estimating it based on 
some assumed perceptual model, and it opens up the possibility of manipulating p(t) in a controllable way 
to understand the decision goal.  
To present p(t) directly to the participant, a horizontal gauge is displayed. There are no separate 
visual cue targets. During a trial the position of the gauge level is moved to the right corresponding to an 
increasing p(t) predetermined by the experimenter. Zero probability (no reward) corresponds to an empty 
gauge, and unit probability (reward certain) corresponds to a full gauge. At the beginning of the trial the 
gauge starts at p(0) (not necessarily zero), and at the end of the trial (t=T), the gauge is at p(T) (figure 1). 
The participant is fully informed of this relationship, and instructed to press a response button at some 
chosen time, t, to receive a reward with probability given by the position of the gauge, p(t). We can examine 
which value of p(t) is chosen by participants. 
 
Figure 1. (a,b) Example of the experimental design used to implement the suggested paradigm, showing how the 
gauge represents exactly the probability at time t assuming a starting point at 25%. On top there are two instances of 
the screen shown to the participants. The small red -1 or green +1 is the feedback for the previous trial (point earned 
or lost). The bigger numbers represent the total score for that condition. The “minutes left” refers to the minutes left 
for that condition (each condition lasts 3 minutes)  (a) the screen at the very beginning of the trial (t=0), (b) after one 
second (t=1).  (c,d)On the bottom there are the p(t) functions and the point corresponding to the probability of being 
correct at that time, at the beginning of the trial (c) or after 1 second (d).  
 
 
  
2. Method & Results 
 
To illustrate this new paradigm, we carried out a simple experiment. We defined p(t) to be a 
monotonically increasing function that asymptotically approached unity according to p(t)=1-(1- α)exp(-λt), 
where λ is a parameter that controls ease/difficulty of the trial (increasing λ will make the function steeper, 
meaning that less time is needed to reach a high probability of correct response), α is the value at t=0 (that 
is, the probability of getting a correct response at the beginning of the trial). We used 2x4 conditions: two 
starting points (α=0.25,0.75) and four different speeds of growing of the gauge (λ=0.166, 0.33, 1, 2, higher 
values indicates faster growing). There was a delay of 0.5s between trials, and each condition lasted 3 
minutes regardless of the participants’ responses. Twenty participants took part, and were given a training 
session to familiarise the task. Participants started with 25 points for each condition were  instructed to gain 
as many points as possible. 
 We averaged the response times across the 20 participants for each of the 2x4=8 conditions and 
plotted in figure 2. Clearly, for α =0.25, the participants were faster with increasing λ (F(136,3)=32.48, 
p<0.0001), as expected. The participants were slower when the starting point is lower (effect of α: 
F(136,1)=65.42, p<0.0001)). We fitted the data to 4 different models according to Bogacz et al.’s (2006) 
classification: Bayes Risk, Reward/Accuracy, Reward Rate, Modified Reward Rate (Harris et al., 2014), 
and found that the modified Reward Rate provided the best fit.  
 
Figure 2. Mean Reaction Time for all the 20 participants for the two starting point conditions (α) and the four gauge 
speed conditions (λ).Error bars are ± 1 standard error. 
  
4. Discussion 
 
 The participants adjusted their mean response times according to the values of λ and α, and in a 
way that was consistent with the decision strategy of maximizing reward rate. In varying the parameter λ 
for α =0.25, the responses were similar to that observed in typical reaction time experiments. For α =0.75, 
the dependence on λ was much shallower with a local maximum at λ =0.33. To our knowledge, this shape 
has never been observed in a force choice reaction time experiment, but is consistent with the Modified 
Reward Rate model (Harris et al., 2014). For the classic choice reaction time paradigm, this suggests that 
under some conditions (e.g. high α), the expected speed-accuracy trade-off will not be observed. We are 
now exploring this testable prediction. 
In conclusion, we propose a new paradigm in order to investigate human decision making without 
relying on perceptual accumulation of information models. We have shown that participants were 
responsive to this new paradigm, and that we can make reasonable and novel inferences about the decision 
goal. This paradigm can be applied to a great variety of experiments to investigate human decision making, 
and the results can be easily verified and generalized to more classic studies.  
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Short abstract.  
Human decision-making has been analysed from two viewpoints: 1) the 
perceptual process that allows observers to accumulate information; and 2) the 
decision rule that observers employ to decide when to stop collecting 
information and make a response. In a classic reaction time task the decision 
rule can only be analysed by assuming a particular perceptual process. We 
propose a new approach in which the accumulation of information is “hard-
coded” in the experiment, so that the researcher can make inferences on the 
decision rules without having to assume a particular perceptual process. We call 
this design the “EXogenous ACcumulation Task”, because the accumulation of 
information happens outside the participant’s mind. We show experimentally 
how this paradigm can be used to analyse decision rules. We also compared 
four different decision rules and show that the modified Reward Rate model fits 
data better than the Bayesian Risk, Reward Rate, or Reward/Accuracy models. 
We also show how several features of the response distributions, usually found 
in classic RT tasks and deemed as side-effects of the perceptual process, are 
also found with the EXACT and may therefore be explained by the decision 
rule alone. We hypothesize how Piéron’s Law, a psychophysical law that 
connects speed of response with stimulus intensity, may be the result of the 
decision rule adopted. We propose several ways in which the EXACT Paradigm 
could contribute to the understanding of decision-making mechanisms in 
humans.  
Long abstract. 
Background. The issue of optimal performance has fascinated researchers for 
decades. Several experimental paradigms have been used to investigate human 
decisions and to understand what criterion participants use to decide when to 
stop accumulating information and make a response. The usual approach 
consists of 1) collecting data from a classic reaction time (RT) experiment, such 
as random dot motion discrimination task,  2) assume a particular process 
underlying the perceptual mechanism, 3) examine different decision rules. The 
perceptual mechanism is fitted to the data as well, but rarely more than one 
process is compared.  Most importantly, the predictions of the decision rules 
depend on the perceptual mechanism itself (such as a diffusion process). We 
propose a different approach which we called the “EXogenous ACcumulation 
Task” (EXACT).   
The EXogenous ACcumulation Task (EXACT).  Every perception process 
assumes that a participants accuracy increases with time due to an endogenous 
accumulation of information, which generates a speed-accuracy trade-off.  We 
can define this relationship by a function 𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝑡), the probability of making a 
correct response at time t. To disentangle 𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝑡) with the underlying perceptual 
process, we use an exogenous accumulator perfectly known by the researcher 
(which is the reason behind the model name and acronym). We display 𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝑡) 
directly to the participant in the form of a visible horizontal gauge. At the 
beginning of the trial the gauge starts at some point, not necessarily zero, and 
then the gauge level ‘fills up’ to the right corresponding to an increasing 𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝑡) 
predetermined by the experimenter.  The participant is instructed to press a key 
to decide when to request a reward with probability equal to aas displayed by 
the gauge level.  
Methods. We chose 𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝑡)  to be a monotonically increasing function that 
asymptotically approached unity: 𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝑡) = 1 − (1 −  𝛼)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜆𝑡)  where λ is a 
parameter that controls ease/difficulty of the trial (increasing λ will make the 
function steeper, such that less time is needed to reach high probabilities of 
correct response), α is the value at t=0 (that is, the probability of getting a 
correct response at the beginning of the trial). We used 2x4 conditions: two 
starting points ( 𝛼 = 0.25, 0.75 ) and four different speeds of the gauge ( 𝜆 =
0.166, 0.33, 1, 2). There was a delay of 0.5𝑠 between trials, and each condition 
lasted 3 minutes regardless of the participants’ responses. Twenty participants 
took part, and were given a training session to familiarise the task. Participants 
started with 25 points for each condition and were instructed to gain as many 
points as possible. 
Results. We compared the average response time collapsed across participants 
for each of the 2x4=8 conditions. For 𝛼 = 0.25 the participants were faster with 
increasing 𝜆, as expected. The participants were slower when the starting point 
was lower. We fitted the data to 4 different decision rules (Bogacz et al., (2006): 
Bayes Risk, Reward Rate, Modified Reward Rate (Harris et al., 2014), and 
Reward/Accuracy and found that the Modified Reward Rate provided the best 
fit. We found a peculiar non-monotonic shape for the 𝛼 = 0.75 condition which 
is predicted by the Modified Reward Rate but has not been observed in classic 
RT tasks. We found that the relationship between average responses and 𝜆 for 
the 𝛼 = 0.25 condition followed a power law, commonly found in psychophysics 
experiments and referred as Piéron’s Law.   
Conclusion.  The EXACT Paradigm shows how it is possible to make 
inferences about the decision rule without having to rely on a particular model 
of the perceptual process. In our experiment, participants seemed to be 
maximizing the rate of reward. The fact that we observed Piéron’s Law for the 
low starting point condition suggests that we are tapping into the same 
mechanism as in the classic RT experiments. The EXACT Paradigm can be 
used to better understand decision-making mechanisms and it can be easily 
compared and generalized to a classic reaction time task. 
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Over the last 150 years, human manual reaction times (RTs) have been recorded countless
times. Yet, our understanding of them remains remarkably poor. RTs are highly variable
with positively skewed frequency distributions, often modeled as an inverse Gaussian
distribution reflecting a stochastic rise to threshold (diffusion process). However, latency
distributions of saccades are very close to the reciprocal Normal, suggesting that
“rate” (reciprocal RT) may be the more fundamental variable. We explored whether this
phenomenon extends to choice manual RTs. We recorded two-alternative choice RTs
from 24 subjects, each with 4 blocks of 200 trials with two task difficulties (easy vs.
difficult discrimination) and two instruction sets (urgent vs. accurate). We found that rate
distributions were, indeed, very close to Normal, shifting to lower rates with increasing
difficulty and accuracy, and for some blocks they appeared to become left-truncated, but
still close to Normal. Using autoregressive techniques, we found temporal sequential
dependencies for lags of at least 3. We identified a transient and steady-state component
in each block. Because rates were Normal, we were able to estimate autoregressive
weights using the Box-Jenkins technique, and convert to a moving average model using
z-transforms to show explicit dependence on stimulus input. We also found a spatial
sequential dependence for the previous 3 lags depending on whether the laterality of
previous trials was repeated or alternated. This was partially dissociated from temporal
dependency as it only occurred in the easy tasks. We conclude that 2-alternative choice
manual RT distributions are close to reciprocal Normal and not the inverse Gaussian.
This is not consistent with stochastic rise to threshold models, and we propose a simple
optimality model in which reward is maximized to yield to an optimal rate, and hence an
optimal time to respond. We discuss how it might be implemented.
Keywords: reaction times, latency, reciprocal Normal, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), speed-
accuracy trade-off, Pieron’s law, optimality
INTRODUCTION
Reaction times (response times, latency) (RTs) have been mea-
sured and discussed innumerable times since their first mea-
surements in the mid-19th century by von Helmholtz (1850)
and Donders (1969). RT experiments are so commonplace
that they have become a standard paradigm for measuring
behavioral responses, often with scant regard to any underly-
ing process. However, the mechanisms behind RTs are complex
and poorly understood. A common view is that RTs reflect
processing in the time-domain, where RTs are the sum of
independent sequential processes including conduction delays,
decision-making processes, and motor responses. We ques-
tion this very fundamental assumption and consider responses
in the rate-domain, where rate is defined as the reciprocal
of RT.
One of the most perplexing aspects of RTs is their extreme
variability from one trial to the next with some very long
RTs, even when the same stimulus is repeated and subjects are
instructed to respond as quickly as possible. As exemplified by
the saccadic system, why does it take hundreds of milliseconds
to decide to make a saccade, when the saccade itself only
takes a few tens of milliseconds to execute (Carpenter, 1981)?
Moreover, if we accept that point-to-point movements, such as
saccades and arm reaching are time-optimal (Harris andWolpert,
1998), should we not expect the RT also to be optimized? One
is then led to wonder how such long response times could
be optimal.
DRIFT DIFFUSION MODELS (DDM)
The most popular explanation for the variability of RTs has
revolved around the putative mechanism of an accumulator or
“rise to threshold” model. A signal, ρ(t), increases (accumu-
lates) in time until it crosses a boundary (“trigger level” or
“decision threshold”), θ(t), whereupon the response is initi-
ated (first-passage time; Figure 1A). Typically, ρ(t) is assumed
to be a stochastic signal reflecting the accumulation of “infor-
mation” for or against an alternative until a predetermined level
of confidence is reached represented by a constant θ(t) (Ratcliff,
1978) (Figure 1B). A simple reaction time is modeled by a sin-
gle boundary, and a two-alternative choice task is modeled by
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 418 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Harris et al. Reaction times in the rate domain
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of accumulator models: (A) general
first-passage scheme where a triggered event occurs when a signal
ρ(t) first crosses the trigger level θ (t). Note that crossing is a solution to
the equation ρ(t) = θ (t); (B) in the diffusion model ρ(t) increases
stochastically and triggers a response when it reaches a constant θ (t), or
“threshold.” The signal is assumed to be a Wiener process, and the first
passage time is a within-trial random variable (shaded curve) with an
inverse Gaussian distribution. In the rate domain (right column) the rate
distribution remains positively skewed; (C) the diffusion model for two
boundaries, where boundary θ1(t) determines correct responses, and
boundary θ2(t) determines error responses. In the rate domain, rate of
correct responses remains positively skewed. (D) In the deterministic
model, ρ(t) increases linearly and deterministically until the threshold is
reached. It is assumed that the slope of rise is a between-trial Normal
random variable and gives rise to a reciprocal Normal distribution. In the
rate domain, rate is distributed with a truncated Normal distribution.
two boundaries. A RT is then first-passage time for one of the
alternatives plus any other “non-decision” time such as senso-
rimotor delays (e.g., Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff et al.,
1999).
Typically, ρ(t) is assumed to drift with a constant mean
rate but is instantaneously perturbed by a stationary Normal
white noise process (Wiener process), so that within a given
trial and with one boundary, the time of crossing the thresh-
old is a random variable with an inverse Gaussian distribution
(Schrodinger, 1915; Wald, 1945). With two boundaries, the first
passage time for one boundary indicates the decision time for
a correct response, and an error response for the other bound-
ary; their probability density functions (pdf ’s) are computed
numerically (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002) (see
Table 1 for pdf ’s). For an easy choice task (i.e., high drift rate
toward the “correct” boundary), the pdf will approach the inverse
Gaussian distribution as error rate become negligible. Although,
there are numerous variations on this theme (e.g., Ratcliff and
Rouder, 1998, 2000; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006;
Ratcliff and Starns, 2013), they share the same basic stochastic
rise to threshold decision-making process in the time-domain.
It has been recently shown how the pure diffusion process
(without variability across trials) has an exact equivalent in
terms of Bayesian inference (Bitzer et al., 2014). As shown by
Bogacz et al. (2006), the DDM is optimal in the sense that for
a given boundary (decision accuracy) the decision is made in
minimal time.
Ratcliff (1978) also allowed the mean drift rate to fluc-
tuate between trials with a Normal distribution to reflect
“stimulus encoding” variability. This version has often been
called the extended DDM, which also includes variability in
the starting point of drift, and variability in the non-decision
component (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). The extended
DDM has been used to describe simple RT experiment
(Ratcliff and van Dongen, 2011) and choice RT (Ratcliff, 1978;
Hanes and Schall, 1996; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Schall, 2001;
Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Ratcliff et al., 2003, 2004; Smith and
Ratcliff, 2004; Wagenmakers et al., 2004; Ratcliff and McKoon,
2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008).
Although the multi-parameter extended DDM is claimed to
fit observations, a serious problem has emerged from the eye
movement literature, when we consider the distribution of the
reciprocal of RTs, which we call “rate.”
THE RECIPROCAL NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
Investigations into the timing of saccades for supra-threshold
stimuli have shown that the frequency distribution of simple RTs
(latency) is close to the reciprocal Normal distribution; that is,
rate has a near-Normal distribution. Small deviations from true
Normal are observed in the tails, but probit plots are typically lin-
ear between at least the 5th and 95th centiles (Carpenter, 1981).
The reciprocal Normal is not known to be a first-passage dis-
tribution for a constant threshold, and is easily distinguished
from the inverse Gaussian or the two-boundary pdf. Carpenter
has proposed the LATER model in which the rise to threshold
is linear and deterministic, but the slope of rise varies from trial
to trial with a Normal distribution (Carpenter, 1981; Carpenter
and Williams, 1995; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) (Figure 1D).
If Carpenter’s findings can be generalized beyond saccades, they
are equivalent to the extended DDM without fluctuation in the
rise of ρ(t) (i.e., no diffusion) and with only one threshold.
There is an obvious difficulty in how to explain a determinis-
tic rise to threshold based on a Bayesian update rule, which is
inherently stochastic. Moreover, if the rise is deterministic then
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Table 1 | Left column: mathematical expressions of the probability density functions (pdf’s) for RTs for a single boundary diffusion model, two
boundary diffusion model, and the reciprocal Normal.
Time-domain Rate-domain
Inverse Gaussian
IG(μ, σ 2) =
(
μ3
2πσ 2χ3
) 1
2
exp
[
−μ(χ − μ)2
2σ 2χ
] Reciprocal inverse Gaussian
recIG(μ, σ 2) =
(
μ3
2πσ 2χ
) 1
2
exp
[
2μ2 − μ/χ − χμ3
2σ 2
]
First passage time distribution for the boundary of the two
boundaries a and b for the pure DDM with diffusion constant, s
B(ξ, a, b, z) = πs
2
(a − b)2 exp
[
ξ (a − z)
s2
− ξ
2t
2s2
]
∞∑
k = 1
k exp
[
− k
2π2s2t
2(a − b)2
]
sin
[
kπ (a − z)
a − b
]
Reciprocal first passage time distribution boundary a of the two boundaries a
DDM
recB(ξ, a,b, z) = πs
2
t2(a − b)2 exp
[
ξ (a − z)
s2
− ξ
2
2ts2
]
∞∑
k = 1
k exp
[
− k
2π2s2
2t(a − b)2
]
sin
[
kπ (a − z)
a − b
]
see Ratcliff and Smith (2004)
Reciprocal truncated Normal
rectrN(μ, σ ) =
exp
[
− (1/t−μ)22σ2
]
√
2π
(
1 − φ (− μ
σ
))
σ t2
Truncated Normal
trN(μ, σ ) =
exp
[
− (t−μ)22σ2
]
√
2π
(
1 − ϕ (− μ
σ
))
σ

 = Normal cdf; ξ = drift rate; a = upper boundary; b = lower boundary; z = starting point. Right column: equivalent pdf’s in the rate (reciprocal RT) domain. See
Harris and Waddington (2012) for the mathematical relationship between the two domains.
the time to reach threshold is known at the outset, and any
competition among alternatives can be resolved very quickly—so
why wait?
The reciprocal Normal is a bimodal distribution with positive
and negative modes. In the time-domain this would imply very
large negative RTs, which would require the response to occur
long before the stimulus onset and violate causality. Therefore,
we need to consider the reciprocal truncated Normal distribution
(rectrN), (where the Normal rate distribution is left truncated at
or near zero; see Harris and Waddington, 2012). The question is
what happens at or near zero rate? For easy tasks where RTs are
low, the probability of rate reaching zero (i.e., RT approaching
infinity) is negligible and the problem might be dismissed as a
mathematical nuance. However, for difficult tasks, the probability
becomes significant, as we have shown (Harris and Waddington,
2012). A departure from the reciprocal Normal has been reported
for saccade latency to very dim targets, but this has been mod-
eled instead as an inverse Gaussian based on a diffusion process
(Carpenter et al., 2009). Clarification is needed on what happens
when rates are low.
It has long been known that sequential effects occur in man-
ual choice RTs (Hyman, 1953). In sequences of 2-alternative
choice RT experiments, RTs may be correlated with the previous
trial (first-order) and also earlier trials (high-order). Moreover,
this sequential dependency seems to be a function of whether
a stimulus is repeated or alternated (Kirby, 1976; Jentzsch and
Sommer, 2002). Sequential dependencies cannot be explained
by within-trial noise processes, such as the DDM, unless there
are between-trial parameter changes (changes in drift rate or
threshold values). If we assume a linear dependence on history
(autoregressive model) in the rate-domain, then it could in prin-
ciple lead to convergence onto the Normal distribution via the
central limit theorem.
THE RATE-DOMAIN
It is important, therefore, to identify RT distributions, but this
is a non-trivial problem. It is difficult to distinguish among
highly skewed distributions in the time-domain. The method
of moments is infeasible due to poor convergence (the recip-
rocal Normal has no finite moments; Harris and Waddington,
2012). Maximum likelihood estimation of parameters requires
vast amounts of data to distinguish betweenmodels (Waddington
and Harris, 2012). There is also the problem of under-sampling
at extreme values (Harris and Waddington, 2012) which is fur-
ther exacerbated by the tendency of many investigators to discard
“outliers.” It is easier in the rate-domain, although large data sets
are still needed. Distributions that are less skewed than the recip-
rocal Normal (such as the inverse Gaussian) remain positively
skewed in the rate-domain, whereas the reciprocal Normal does
not. Surprisingly, there have only been a few published examples
of manual reaction times in the rate-domain (Carpenter, 1999;
Harris and Waddington, 2012), and it is conceivable that sac-
cades are somehow “special.” For example, express saccades do
not appear to have an equivalent in manual tasks. Another impor-
tant issue is lack of stationarity, where the mean and variance
(and higher moments for non-Normal distributions) change over
time. Non-stationarity of the mean is particularly troublesome
because it smears out the observed distribution making the RT
distribution more platykurtic and heavy-tailed. Non-stationarity
is more likely in long recording sessions, as subjects become
fatigued and bored by the repetitive nature of RT experiments.
Using large sample sizes from prolonged recording sessions may
be counterproductive.
When a probability density function (pdf) is known in one
domain, the pdf in the reciprocal domain can easily be found.
However, it is important to recognize this is not true for
moments. For example, the mean of the rate distribution is not
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the reciprocal of the mean of the RT distribution (Harris and
Waddington, 2012). Thus, it is not possible to infer paramet-
ric statistics of rate from RT statistics. Raw data are needed.
Therefore, our goal in this study was to explore rate-domain anal-
ysis in a typical two-choice manual RT experiment. We imposed
two tasks (instruction set) and two levels of stimulus difficulty
(brightness difference) in order to explore the effects of trunca-
tion, and we used autoregression analysis and z-transforms to
examine sequential dependency. To minimize problems of non-
stationarity, we recorded only modest block sizes (200) from
many subjects (24) and collapsed after standardization. We show
that rate is indeed near-Normal and not the reciprocal of the
inverse Gaussian. Sequential dependency is evident, but not the
cause of the near-Normality. In the discussion we propose a rate
model as an alternative to first-passage time models.
METHODS
REACTION TIME RECORDING
Subjects were 24 adults aged between 18 and 45 years old selected
through the Plymouth University paid participant pool as an
opportunity sample. Subjects were naïve to the experimental pro-
cedure. Based on self-report, all participants were required to have
normal or corrected-to-normal vision with no known neurologi-
cal conditions. This study received ethical approval from the local
ethics committee.
Stimuli consisted of two solid colored rectangles of different
luminances arranged horizontally and displayed on a computer
monitor (Hanns-G HA191, 1280 × 1024, at 60Hz). Both rect-
angles were displayed in the same green color in Red-Green-
Blue (RGB) coordinates against a gray background of luminance
37.1 cd/m2. Each rectangle subtended a visual angle of 5.5 hor-
izontal and 6.6◦ vertically, and the inner edges were separated
horizontally by 9.6◦. Viewing distance was 0.5m. Subjects were
instructed to respond to the side with brighter stimulus by press-
ing the “z” or “2” key. In the easy task (E), rectangle luminances
were 37.6 and 131.6 cd/m2, and in the difficult task (D), they were
37.6 and 37.8 cd/m2. Calibration was made with a KonicaMinolta
LS-100 luminancemeter. All luminances and ambient room light-
ing were held constant for all subjects. The luminances in the (E)
and (D) tasks were chosen to yield low and high error rates of 1%
and 24% for these tasks respectively based on a pilot study. Two
task instructions were used and displayed at the beginning of a
block. In the “Urgent” (U) task, the instruction was to “respond
as fast as possible,” and in the “Accurate” (A) task, to “respond as
accurately as possible.” Each subject was presented with 4 blocks
of 200 trials each. Within a block each trial consisted of the same
combination of stimulus and task, either AE, AD, UE, or UD.
There were 24 different permutations of blocks, and the order was
balanced such that each of the 24 subjects had a unique order. We
refer to the “easy” tasks as AE and UE, and the “difficult” tasks as
AD and UD.
On each trial the subject was prompted to press the space
key to commence the trial and a cross appeared in the cen-
ter of the screen for 500ms. Subsequently, the two rectangles
appeared after a constant foreperiod of 500ms. For choice reac-
tion time experiments (unlike simple reaction time experiments),
constant and variable foreperiods have similar effects (Bertelson
and Tisseyre, 1968). We chose constant to avoid introducing
additional variability into the decision process (see Discussion).
Stimulus onset was also highly salient, even in the difficult tasks,
due to the highly visible colored rectangles. The stimuli remained
on screen until a response was made or until a time-out of 60 s
occurred (see Harris and Waddington, 2012 for a discussion on
the importance of a long time-out). For incorrect responses, feed-
back was provided in the form of a black cross, which remained
on screen for 500ms. A rest break occurred between blocks.
Reaction times (RTs) were measured from the onset of the
stimulus presentation and recorded to the nearest millisecond.
Rates were computed by taking the reciprocal RT. Taking recip-
rocals of integer RTs magnifies the effect of the quantization and
can lead to artifactual “clumping” and “gaps” in the rate fre-
quency histograms at high values of rate. We eliminated this by
using a dithering technique, where we added a uniform float-
ing point random number between −0.5 and +0.5ms to each
RT before taking the reciprocal (see Schuchman, 1964). This has
no statistical effect in the time-domain. RTs less than 0.15 s (i.e.,
rate >6.67 s−1) were considered anticipatory and not analyzed.
MOMENTS
Sample central moments (mean, standard deviation, skewness,
and excess kurtosis) and medians were estimated for each block
for RT and rate. Note that moments of RT and rate are not recip-
rocally related, but depend on the underlying parent distribution.
However, median rate is the reciprocal of median RT (see Harris
and Waddington, 2012).
We also estimated themean and standard deviation in the rate-
domain assuming the underlying distribution was Normal. The
underlying mean and standard deviation of the Normal distri-
bution will differ from the sample mean and standard deviation
depending on how much of the underlying Normal distribution
is truncated. We therefore obtained maximum likelihood esti-
mates (MLEs) of the underlying Normal parameters from each
dataset using themle.m function. This function applied a simplex
search algorithm to find the parameters that maximized the log
likelihood of the probability density function:
f (x;μ, σ, a) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ [(x − μ) /σ ]
1 − 
 [(a − μ) /σ ] a ≤ x < ∞
0 x < a
where x is the observed rate, μ is the mean of the underlying (un-
truncated) Normal distribution, σ is the standard deviation of the
underlying distribution, a = 1/60 = 0.0167 s−1, ϕ is the standard
Normal probability density function (pdf), and 
 is the standard
Normal cumulative distribution function (cdf).
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
The partial autocorrelation function (PACF) was computed using
the parcorr.m Matlab function. The first 10 trials on each block
were omitted to avoid contamination from initial transients. The
coefficients for the firstm = 20 lags were computed for each block
and averaged across blocks. An autoregressive model (AR) was
assumed to be of the form:
rn = a1rn− 1 + a2rn− 2 + · · · + amrn−m + un (1.1)
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where ri is the response on the ith trial, aj, 1 < j < m are con-
stant weights, and ui is a stochastic input on the ith trial (negative
indices were assumed to have zero weights). The autoregres-
sive weights, aj and input ui are unknown and were estimated
using the Box-Jenkins maximum likelihood procedure. We used
the estimate.m function and an autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) model with only an autoregressive polynomial
(i.e., no non-seasonal differencing or moving average polynomi-
als). We assumed the distributional form of ui to be Normal with
constant mean and variance.
An AR model can be converted to the equivalent moving aver-
age (MA) series using the standard z-transform method. The
z-transforms Z(.)of (1.1) is
R(z) = a1z−1R(z) + a2z−2R(z) + · · · + amz−mR(z) + U(z)
where R(z) = Z(r), U(z) = Z(s). This can be viewed as a discrete
time MA system with
R(z) = B(z)U(z)where the system response of orderm is
B(z) = 1
1 − a1z−1 − a2z−2 − · · · − amz−m
To find B(z) we took a partial fraction expansion:
B(z) = ∑mi= k ρk1 − λkz−1
where λi are the roots and ρi the residues Taking the inverse z-
transform, we then have:
rn = b0un + b1un− 1 + b2un− 2 + · · · (1.2)
where uk is the stochastic input on trial k and independent of
other trial inputs, b0 = 1, and bi = ∑mi= 1 ρkλik, 1 ≤ i < ∞, and
was computed in Matlab using the roots.m and residue.m func-
tions. Note that (1.1) and (1.2) describe the same system, but
(1.1) is a feedback description, and (1.2) is the feed-forward
description. We chose 6 roots, as this encompassed the obviously
larger PACF coefficients. The roots were all within the unit circle
indicating stability and the existence of a steady-state.
STEADY-STATE TRANSFER
From (1.2) we can relate the pdf of rate (output), pr(r) to the
pdf of the input where ui are identical independent random
variables with pdf pu(u), u ≥ 0. From basic probability theory,
(Papoullis and Pillai, 2002) the steady-state output pdf is given by
the convolution sequence:
pr(r)=
[
1
|b0|pu
(
u
b0
)]
⊗
[
1
|b1|pu
(
u
b1
)]
⊗
[
1
|b2|pu
(
u
b2
)]
⊗· · ·
(1.3)
where ⊗ is the convolution operator. If pu(u) is Normally dis-
tributed then so is pr(r). If pu(u) is not Normal then pr(r) may
or may not converge to Normal depending on pu(u) and the
coefficients bi. We computed (1.3) numerically for the truncated
Normal (see Results).
Consider the case where pu(0) = c where c > 0 which
corresponds to the case of truncation and when the
RT distribution has no finite moments (see Harris and
Waddington, 2012). For one term, we have pr,1(0) = c/ |b0|.
However, with two terms (one convolution) we have
pr,2(r) = 1|b0||b1|
∫∞
0 pu
(
r − x|b0|
)
pu
(
x
|b1|
)
dx. For r = 0
and c < ∞, pr,2(r) = 0. Similarly, for all terms we must have
pr(r) = 0, so that truncation is lost and the RT distribution will
have a finite mean (but not necessarily higher moments).
RESULTS
Subjects’ RTs were clearly sensitive to the task and stimulus
manipulations, as shown by the example in Figure 2A (left col-
umn). When stimulus discriminability was easy, RT distributions
were brief with low dispersion (AE and UE), but when difficult,
they became longer and much more dispersive (AD and UD).
In the rate-domain (reciprocal RT) difficulty resulted in a shift
toward zero, but the dispersion remained similar (Figure 2A right
column). For the difficult tasks, the rate distributions appear to
approach zero and possibly became truncated. The difficulty was
also evident by the number of errors (∼25% in this example).
Similar patterns were seen in all subjects, as can be seen
from the plot of medians of RT for all subjects in Figure 2B.
Again there was much more inter-subject variability for the dif-
ficult tasks, but in the rate-domain the variability was more even
(Figure 2C). Non-parametric testing (Wilcoxon test) showed that
the medians differed significantly between the difficult and easy
discriminability (AD∪UD vs. AE∪UE: p < 0.001), and between
task instructions (AD∪AE vs. UD∪UE: p < 0.001).
We computed the sample central moments (mean, stan-
dard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis) in the time- and
rate-domains (Figure 3) for each task for each subject. In the
time-domain (left column), the moments were strongly interde-
pendent, as expected from skewed distributions. Standard devi-
ation increased and skewness and excess kurtosis decreased with
the mean (note that skewness and kurtosis are normalized with
respect to standard deviation). In the rate-domain (right col-
umn), however, the interdependence was much weaker (note the
difference in ordinate scales).
Because of possible left truncation, we estimated the mean and
standard deviation of the putative underlying Normal rate distri-
bution using MLE (see Methods). We set the left truncation to
0.0167 s−1 corresponding to a time-out of 60 s (Figure 4). When
the sample coefficient of variation (CV) was less than 0.4 (z-
score = 2.5; line in Figure 4) the MLE estimates (circles) were
seen to agree closely with sample moments (crosses). For higher
CVs the MLE moments estimates were shifted from the conven-
tional estimates (shown by up-left lines). These shifts in MLE
moments are expected from left truncation, and are consistent
with, but not definitive of an underlying truncated Normal dis-
tribution. Therefore, we next grouped blocks according whether
their truncation was severe, “truncated” blocks (CV > 0.4), or
negligible, “untruncated” blocks (CV < 0.4).
GROUP DISTRIBUTION
In the untruncated blocks, we standardized the rate for each trial
into a z-score based on the ML mean and standard deviation of
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FIGURE 2 | (A) An example of an individual subject’s frequency
distributions of RT (left column) and rate (right column) for the 4 different
blocks (AD, accurate and difficult; AE, accurate and easy; UD, urgent and
difficult; UE, urgent and easy; see Methods). In the easy tasks, RTs are
brief with few errors (block size was 200 trials). For the difficult tasks RTs
are much more variable with about 25% error rate. In the rate-domain,
dispersion is similar for all blocks with a shift to lower rates for the difficult
tasks. Note that the shift approaches zero (arrows) suggesting possible
truncation. (B) Median RTs for all subjects showing longer RTs for difficult
blocks and more inter-subject variability. (C) Same as (B) but for median
rates showing similar inter-subject variability for all blocks.
its block, and then collapsed all trials into one group. The dis-
tribution of the untruncated group was very close to Normal
between the 5th and 95th percentile, as seen from the probit plot
(Figure 5A). There was a slight deviation in the tails. As a check
on this method, we created simulated data sets using the true
reciprocal Normal distribution with the same ML moments and
sample sizes as the empirical data. Carrying out exactly the same
analysis, the rate distribution was a perfect Normal—as expected
(Figure 5B). As a further check, we also simulated the inverse
Gaussian. Here there is no truncation issue, so we used sample
moments and sample sizes to generate the simulated data. As seen
in Figure 5C, the reciprocal distribution of the inverse Gaussian
is skewed and does not fit the Normal—as expected (Harris and
Waddington, 2012). Thus, we are confident that near Normality
is not an artifact, but reflects the underlying distribution of the
empirical rate distributions.
For the truncated blocks, we standardized as above using the
ML mean and standard deviation and collapsed into one group.
However, we only considered positive z-scores because any puta-
tive truncation would lead to under representation for negative
z-scores (we included the one block that had a slightly negative
ML mean, see Figure 3, but had no discernable effect on the plots
when excluded). As shown in Figure 6A, the collapsed distribu-
tion was close to Normal with a slight deviation above the 95th
percentile. Simulation with a true reciprocal Normal showed half
a Normal distribution, as expected (Figure 6B), and the inverse
Gaussian was not close to the truncated Normal (Figure 6C).
Thus, we conclude that at least the right half of the truncated
group are close to Normal, but not the inverse Gaussian. However,
this does not address necessarily what happens near zero rate for
each block (infra vide).
SEQUENTIAL DEPENDENCY
Temporal effects
The sequence of RTs during a block was clearly not statistically
stationary as RTs were typically longer in the first few trials than
later. This transient lasted less than 10 trials, after which a steady-
state seemed to prevail, best seen by averaging across blocks in the
time- or rate-domain (Figure 7). The transient was clearly more
pronounced for the easy than difficult tasks.
We excluded the first 10 trials of each block in order to examine
the steady-state component. The Pearson correlation coefficient
between consecutive RTs was 0.20 with 63% of these being signif-
icant at p < 0.05. In the rate-domain this increased to 0.25 with
76% being significant.
A 1-lag correlation would be expected to lead to autocorre-
lations with a geometric fall-off at higher lags. Therefore, we
examined the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) to explore
explicit dependencies up to lags of 20 (see Methods). The PACF
of rate was positive and a smoothly decreasing function of lag
with no obvious cut-off (Figure 8A filled circles). As a check, we
shuffled trials randomly within each block and found no signifi-
cant dependencies (Figure 8A open circles).When plotted against
reciprocal lag, the PACF coefficients plot was approximately linear
(Figure 8B; solid circles).
We next considered a stationary autoregressive (AR) relation-
ship of the form: rn = a1rn− 1 + a2rn− 2 + · · · + amrn−m + un
(see Equation 1.1 in Methods), where ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are con-
stant coefficients, un is a stochastic input on trial n, which we
assumed stationary and Normal, andm is the order of the process
(see Methods). We used the Box-Jenkins maximum likelihood
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FIGURE 3 | Sample moments for RTs (left column) and rate (right
column) plotted against mean for standard deviation (top row),
skewness (middle row), and excess kurtosis (bottom row). Each symbol
represents the moment for each block for each subject: AD- open circles; AE-
crosses; UD- open squares; UE- asterisks). Note different in ordinate scales
for RTs and rate moments.
estimation procedure (see Methods) to estimate the ai for the
first 6 lags. We only included “untruncated” blocks (CV < 0.4).
Combining all such blocks revealed that only the first 3 weights
were significantly different from zero and decreased roughly lin-
early with reciprocal lag a1, 2, 3 = {0.222, 0.104, 0.076}. The 4th
weight a4 = 0.016 was borderline (Figure 8C). We also exam-
ined the difficult and easy tasks separately, but found negligible
difference [AD∪UD: a1, 2, 3, 4 = {0.212, 0.100, 0.078, 0.016};
AE∪UE: a1, 2, 3, 4 = {0.227, 0.105, 0.076, 0.037}]. Henceforth,
we used the first 3 weights of the combined tasks.
It is possible to invert the AR process to find the input,
since from (1.1) we have un = rn − a1rn− 1 + a2rn− 2 + · · · +
amrn−m, and the resulting un should have no sequential depen-
dency. To test this, we estimated the un sequence from each block
and re-computed the mean PACF (Figure 8B open symbols).
Clearly, sequential dependency was eliminated on average with a
mean lag 1 correlation of 0.032. However, the number of blocks
that had a significant lag 1 correlation also dropped from 61 to
10%—which is close to that expected by chance. This implies that
most blocks were driven by a similar AR process.
The AR model in (1.1) has a step response which reflects the
underlying dynamics behind the steady-state response. It is easily
computed (curve in Figure 8D) and clearly similar to the empir-
ical average transient response at the beginning of each block
(grand average from Figure 7B). Thus, the transient response is
consistent with the steady-state dynamics.
Using the single-sided z-transform, we converted (1.1) to a
moving average (MA) formulation in terms of a discrete series
of independent stochastic inputs uj 1 ≤ j ≤ n (see Equation 1.2
in Methods): rn = b0un + b1un− 1 + b2un− 2 + · · · . The weights
are the feed-forward impulse response function and are plotted
against lag in Figure 9A. As can be seen, there is modest but pro-
longed dependence on input value history implying considerable
“memory.”
Assuming stationarity, one effect of the sequential dependency
is to scale the moments of the input (see Methods). Based on the
AR weights, the mean of rate was r¯ = 1.67u¯. The effect on stan-
dard deviation was small σr = 1.05(σu), and on higher moments
it was negligible. For an untruncated rate distribution, the effect
of sequential dependency was to shift the rate distribution to
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 418 | 7
Harris et al. Reaction times in the rate domain
FIGURE 4 | Plot of standard deviation vs. mean of all blocks in the
rate-domain. Crosses indicate conventional sample moments (same as
top-right panel in Figure 3). Circles indicate maximum likelihood estimates
(MLE) of same blocks assuming a left truncated Normal. Line is SD =
Mean/2.5. To the right of line sample moments coincide with rectrN MLE
moments; to the left MLE moments shift to higher standard deviations and
lower means (connecting lines).
the right with minimal changes to the shape of the distribution.
Thus, we conclude the observed near-Normality of untruncated
rate distributions is not a manifestation of the central limit the-
orem arising from the sequential dependency, but must reflect
the near-Normality of the input distribution itself. Therefore,
assuming the pdf of the input pu(r) to be Normal, the output
pdf pr(r) can be computed numerically from the convolution
sequence in (Equation 1.3) (see Methods). For an “untrun-
cated” Normal input there is a shift to higher rate with neg-
ligible change in variance, as illustrated in Figure 9B. For an
input truncated at zero, there is not only a shift in the mean,
but the sharp truncation at zero is smoothed and eliminated
(which can also be demonstrated analytically; see Methods).
Remarkably, this smooth shape can also be fit very well by a recip-
rocal inverse Gaussian (dotted curve) when the tail is excluded
(see Discussion).
Spatial effects
Previous studies have shown that mean RT can depend on the
sequence of the laterality of previous trials (see Introduction),
in particular whether laterality was repeated (R) or alter-
nated (A). Thus, the sequence RRRR indicates that the stim-
ulus and the previous four stimuli were all on the same
side (i.e., all left LLLLL or all right RRRRR), whereas the
sequence AAAA means that each stimulus alternated sides
from the previous (RLRLR or LRLRL) (note the last symbol
is the current trial). Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) examined
sequences with 4 lags and showed a significant dependence of
RT on a binary weighting of the AR sequence, where R was
binary “0” and A binary “1” (e.g., RRRR = 0, RRAR = 2,
AARA = 13, AAAA = 16). We used the same scheme for
comparison.
For the easy tasks (AE and UE), averaging across all blocks
showed a significant dependence on the AR sequence [F(15, 645) =
4.58; p < 0.001] when all trials in a block were considered. In par-
ticular the sequences AARR, RRRA, RRRA, were associated with
high RTs (arrow in Figure 8), and remarkably similar to Jentzsch
and Sommer’s results. The inverse pattern was more clearly seen
in the rate-domain, with smaller and more even standard errors.
For the difficult tasks (AD and UD), there was no significant
pattern in the time- or rate-domain.
DISCUSSION
These data clearly show that when the task is easy (AE and UE
blocks), RT distributions are close to reciprocal Normal, and
not close to the inverse Gaussian distribution. Moreover, we
have demonstrated this using practical block sizes (n = 200) col-
lapsed across 24 subjects after standardization, unlike previous
studies which used very large data sets recorded from only a
few subjects. We emphasize that this near-Normality of rate was
not an artifact from collapsing across subjects, as this does not
invoke the central limit theorem, but simply combines the under-
lying distributions—as confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations
(Figure 5B). We conclude that 2-alternative choice manual RT
distributions are very close to the rectrN distribution, similar to
the simple reaction experiments with saccades (Carpenter, 1981;
Carpenter and Williams, 1995; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) and
the few studies of simplemanual reaction times (Carpenter, 1999;
Harris and Waddington, 2012). In simple RT studies it is neces-
sary to introduce a variable foreperiod to prevent anticipation for
the stimulus onset. In choice RT study, a foreperiod may increase
“preparedness,” but randomization is not essential, as a choice
cannot be made with confidence until the discriminative stimu-
lus appears, and Bertelson and Tisseyre (1968) have shown similar
effects for constant or random foreperiods in choice experiments.
We chose a constant foreperiod to reduce the amount of extrin-
sic variability introduced into the decision process (see Methods).
We can conclude that near-Normality in the rate domain is not
a consequence of foreperiod randomization, and by implication
presumably neither in simple RT experiments. However, this does
not eliminate a possible role of a subject’s intrinsic variability in
judging foreperiod durations (i.e., Weber’s law), and whether or
how this affects the rate distribution remains to be explored.
It is difficult to reconcile the rectrN with a pure Wiener diffu-
sion process, where within trial drift noise is Normal (Figure 1B),
as this would yield an inverse Gaussian distribution in the time-
domain, or a reciprocal inverse Gaussian in the rate-domain.
Monte Carlo simulation using the reciprocal inverse Gaussian
with moments from our subjects did not yield near Normal rates
(Figure 5C). Ratcliff (1978) considered the compound inverse
Gaussian where drift rate fluctuated between trials with another
Normal distribution. This would fit the reciprocal Normal if there
were no drift noise, which is consistent with Carpenter’s LATER
model. This strongly suggests that the underlying RT process
operates in the rate-domain, rather than in the more intuitive
time-domain. It also explains why RTs are so variable—modest
symmetric fluctuations in rate can lead to asymmetric and very
high changes in RT, especially when rate becomes small as occurs
in difficult tasks.
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FIGURE 5 | Untruncated group rate histograms (left column) and
rate probit plots (right column). (A) Empirical rate from
“untruncated” blocks (c.v. < 0.4) showing near Normal distribution
over 5–95% interval with slight deviation in the tails (B) Simulated
data using reciprocal Normal for RT distribution (see text) showing
almost perfect Normal rate distribution. (C) Simulated data using
inverse Gaussian for RT distributions showing obvious deviations from
Normal rate.
Temporal sequential dependency among trials has frequently
been observed in choice reaction experiments (Laming, 1979).
Clearly, any inter-trial correlations affect between-trial fluctu-
ations, but they have been ignored in recent models of RT
distributions. Using autoregressive techniques, we have shown
explicit dependency of rate output for at least the 3 previous tri-
als, very similar to Laming’s original finding in the time-domain.
Converting to a MA representation, this “memory” extends even
further in terms of stimulus inputs (Figure 9A). We also found a
transient response at the beginning of each block lasting less than
10 trials, which was similar to the predicted step response of the
steady-state dynamics (Figure 8D). The simplest explanation is
that the rest time between blocks allowed the memory “trace” to
decay. However, this needs further exploration since we did not
manipulate block intervals, and it was not possible to distinguish
between sequential dependencies that are based on absolute time
or based on trial number.
Based on moments, the main effect of this temporal depen-
dency was to scale the mean response rate to higher values (i.e.,
shorten RTs) with little change in variance or higher moments
(Figure 9B). One could view this as improving signal-noise ratio,
or that previous trials/stimuli provide some information about
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FIGURE 6 | Truncated group rate histograms (left column) and
rate probit plots (right column), shown only for positive
z-scores (see text). (A) Empirical rate from “truncated” blocks
(c.v. > 0.4) showing near Normal distribution over 50–95%
percentiles; (B) simulated data using reciprocal Normal RTs
showing near perfect Normal distributions (as expected). (C)
Simulated data using inverse Gaussian RTs showing obvious
deviations from Normal rate.
the upcoming stimulus (prediction), hence allowing a faster
response. Because higher moments are negligibly affected by the
MA process, we can also conclude that the temporal sequential
dependency does not cause rate to be Normal via the central
limit theorem, and we deduce that the input must already be
near-Normal.
We also found a sequential dependency that was related to the
sequence of stimulus laterality for the easy tasks. Using Jentsch
and Sommer’s binary weighting system, we found a remarkably
similar result to theirs for the easy tasks with RRRR and AAAA
having the highest rates (shortest RTs) and AAAR, RRRA, ARRA
having the lowest rates (longest RTs) (Figure 10). The weight-
ing scheme of Jentsch and Sommer’s extends backward for 4
lags and assumes binary (power function) weighting. From the
temporal viewpoint, our results suggest that the 4th lag is ques-
tionable and that weightings should follow an approximately
hyperbolic decrease. Using this scheme, the dependency becomes
even more pronounced (not shown). It is tempting to argue that
the temporal and spatial dependencies are manifestations of the
same process. Jentsch and Sommer have assumed the depen-
dency reflects a decayingmemory trace, as this would explain why
higher-order dependencies tend to be weaker when the trials are
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FIGURE 7 | Non-stationarity of responses in (A) the time-domain and
(B) the rate-domain. Means are computed across all subjects for the first
20 responses in each block; grand mean across conditions shown by thick
line. Note initial transient lasting less than 10 trials, which is more
pronounced for the AE and UE blocks.
longer in absolute time. Indeed, we found that the spatial depen-
dency was absent in the difficult tasks (Figure 10). Surprisingly,
the temporal dependency was still present and virtually identi-
cal to the easy task AR process. The reason for this is unclear at
present, but suggests that temporal and spatial dependencies can
be dissociated.
We emphasize that we have examined sequential dependency
in the rate-domain. In the rate domain, a sequence of responses is
a well-behaved stochastic process because of its near-Normality,
and this permits the wide range of standard analysis techniques
(moments, autocorrelations, spectral analyses, etc). In the time-
domain this is not necessarily the case because taking the recipro-
cal of rate is a non-linear operation. Trials with low rates become
disproportionately magnified in the time domain, which can lead
to “spikes” with very long RTs. In particular, there is the possibility
that artefacts may arise in power spectra as these spikes have high
spectral energy, and we advocate caution interpreting power spec-
tra based only on time-domain analyses (e.g., 1/f noise: Thornton
and Gilden, 2005) subject to further exploration.
TRUNCATION
Strictly, the Normal distribution has infinite extent and includes
zero and negative rates, but this is not possible in RT experiments,
so we need to consider the left-truncated Normal and the corre-
sponding reciprocal truncated Normal (Harris and Waddington,
2012). We observed that when the task became more difficult
(AD and UD), there was a leftward shift of the rate distribu-
tion (i.e., longer RTs) (Figure 2A) suggesting that left-truncation
FIGURE 8 | Sequential dependency based on blocks without transients
(first 10 trials omitted). (A) Mean partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of
all blocks (filled symbols) showing smooth decay. Lines are ± 1 standard
error. Open symbols show PACF for the same data after random shuffling
leaving no sequential dependency. (B) PACF is plotted against reciprocal of
lag showing a roughly linear increase (filled symbols). After de-correlation
(see text) PACF coefficients become negligible (open symbols). (C)
Maximum likelihood estimation of autoregressive coefficients (Equation 1.1)
using the Box-Jenkins methods (see Methods) showing linear increase with
reciprocal lag. (D) Comparison of step response function of autorgressive
model (solid curve) with observed initial transient from grand mean in
Figure 7B.
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FIGURE 9 | Moving average (MA) model (Equation 1.2) computed from
autoregressive coefficients using z-transform method (see Methods).
(A) MA coefficients show extended dependency on lag indicating memory
of input. (B) Effect of MA on a Normal input distribution with minimal
truncation. Input (μ = 2, σ = 0.3) (dashed curve) is shifted to higher rate
(solid curve) with little change in shape; (C) Input is Normal (μ = 0, σ = 0.3)
truncated at 0. Note truncation is eliminated by smoothing. Resulting pdf
could be mistaken for a reciprocal inverse Gaussian distribution (dotted
curve).
may have occurred. Because moments are sensitive to trunca-
tion, we used MLE to find the underlying Normal that fitted
each block the best, and this showed that truncation was occur-
ring (Figure 4). Collapsing across these subjects showed that the
untruncated right half of the distribution was also very close to
Normal (Figure 6A). This is a novel finding, and is evidence that
task difficulty can lead to truncated Normal rate distributions.
This has not been considered in previous models but has some
far-reaching implications.
Truncation leads to very long RTs, which could theoreti-
cally approach infinity. Such responses would not usually be
observed because either the experimenter imposes a maximum
trial duration (time-out), or because the experiment is of finite
duration in time or in number of trials. Thus, practically,
rate will appear bound at some non-zero minimum, depend-
ing of the experimental design (see Harris and Waddington,
2012 for further discussion). For easy tasks, this will have min-
imal effect since long RTs are rare, but as the task becomes
more difficult, the effect of truncation becomes increasingly
important.
Interestingly, it has been proposed that the latency distribu-
tion of saccades departs from reciprocal normal for low stim-
ulus contrasts, and that the inverse Gaussian is a better model
(Carpenter et al., 2009). However, could this instead be due
to truncation of the reciprocal Normal? Consider the theoreti-
cal example in Figure 9C, where we have set the rate standard
deviation to 0.3 s−1 with left truncation set by a mean of 0.
The effect of temporal sequential dependency is to smooth out
the truncation, which reduces the probability of very long RTs.
The resulting pdf could easily be mistaken for the reciprocal
inverse Gaussian (Figure 9C dotted curve). Thus, in the time-
domain, it is plausible that studies using the inverse Gaussian
may have overlooked the reciprocal truncated Normal with
sequential dependency as a more parsimonious and unifying
explanation.
NON-HOMOGENEITY
In this experiment we have used homogenous and stationary
blocks, where the same stimuli were used in each trial of a
block, and the laterality was random. However, many RT experi-
ments are not homogenous, and the stimulus value changes on
trials within a block. Generally, we expect that rate would no
longer be reciprocal Normal. We distinguish between discrete and
continuous non-homogeneity.
In the discrete case, a block contains a small number of
different but known stimuli that are typically randomized or
counterbalanced within the block. Assuming independent tri-
als, the observed rate on each trial would then be a single
sample from the Normal distribution associated with that stim-
ulus. The overall rate distribution would then be a mixture of
Normal distributions depending on the value and relative fre-
quency of each stimulus. Since the stimulus is known on each
trial, responses could be segregated and the rate distributions
computed. Clearly, any sequential dependency should be reduced
before segregation.
The continuous case is more problematic. It typically occurs
when task difficulty and/or stimulus value vary on every trial in
an unknown way. The rate on each trial can still be considered
as a single sample from a Normal distribution, but the mean
of the rate distribution (and possibly the standard deviation)
are continuously variable leading overall to a compound Normal
distribution, which can take on a wide range of positively or neg-
atively skewed shapes. Whether de-convolving a putative Normal
distribution is useful remains to be explored on real data.
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FIGURE 10 | Mean response time and rate plotted against the laterality
sequence of previous 4 trials: R, laterality repeated; A, laterality
alternated (after Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002). Means were computed
across all AE and UE blocks; error bars are ± 1 within standard error. Filled
symbols show means for all trials in each block; note the significant increase
in RT for RRRA sequence (row). A similar picture is seen in the rate-domain.
RATE AND OPTIMALITY
As posed in the introduction, why RTs are so variable and
whether, or under what circumstances, they could be optimal
are longstanding questions that have been asked or assumed to
be answerable by time-domain analysis (e.g., Luce, 1986; Bogacz
et al., 2006). However, our and Carpenter’s data are highly
suggestive that there exists a preferred rate, r∗, for a given set
of experimental conditions, and that rate fluctuates according to
a Normal random process from trial to trial around r∗. Clearly,
modest symmetrical variations in rate can lead to very large and
highly asymmetric fluctuations in the time domain, especially
when r∗ is small—as occurs in difficult discriminative tasks. Also
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r∗ is easily recognizable as the modal rate, but there is no obvious
landmark in the time domain: t∗ = 1/r∗ does not correspond to
the mode in the time-domain. Moreover, the rectrN is a strange
distribution without finite moments (Harris and Waddington,
2012), whereas the Normal distribution is a common basic dis-
tribution. This strongly suggests that we should be considering
rate as the more fundamental variable than RT, even if it seems
counter-intuitive.
It seems that if we accept a rise to threshold model, then we
require a deterministic drift rate that fluctuates between trials
with a truncated Normal distribution, as originally proposed by
Carpenter (1981). It is conceivable that there is still a stochas-
tic rise to threshold, but it would need to be almost completely
masked by the inter-trial variability (this needs future modeling),
and rate is still the dominant variable. However, it is impor-
tant not to conflate proximal with ultimate explanations. At the
proximal level, there must be some physiological mechanism for
triggering an all-or-none response, and an accumulator process
seems physiologically plausible. However, even if true, it only
explains how rate could be represented mechanistically, and there
is a myriad of ways in which an accumulator could be con-
structed/evolved as a trigger (e.g., linear vs. curvilinear signal rise,
deterministic vs. stochastic signal, fixed vs. variable trigger level;
Figure 1A). It does not explain why rate is important.
Rate of response may be fundamental for an organism. For
example, in the study of natural foraging, it is widely assumed
that animals seek to maximize the rate of nutrient intake, rather
than quantity per se. This has led to the marginal value theo-
rem (Charnov, 1976) which predicts the time spent by animals
on patches of food. In the study of animal learning, Skinner
introduced his famous cumulative plots as a way of visualiz-
ing the stationarity of an animal’s rate of response (Skinner,
1938; Ferster and Skinner, 1957). There is an obvious paral-
lel between RT and operant behavior. When a subject presses a
button (“operant”), she presumably derives a reward if the but-
ton press is a “correct” response, and a loss if “incorrect.” The
onset of lights acts as a “discriminant” or “conditioned” stim-
ulus that provides information about the probability of reward
(Skinner, 1938). It is well known that response times decrease
with increasing reward but also increasing intensity of the condi-
tioned stimulus (Mackintosh, 1974). Similarly, numerous studies
have shown RTs decrease with increasing reward (Takikawa et al.,
2002; Lauwereyns and Wisnewski, 2006; Spreckelmeyer et al.,
2009; Milstein and Dorris, 2011; Delmonte et al., 2012; van Hell
et al., 2012; Gopin et al., 2013) or increasing stimulus intensity
(Cattell, 1886; Piéron, 1914). This leads us to consider the pos-
sibility of maximizing expected rate of reward or utility as an
explanation for our observations (also considered by Gold and
Shadlen, 2002).
For each trial, we define the gain in subjective utility for a cor-
rect response by U+ > 0, and the loss by U− > 0. Objectively,
utility would be maximized by responding to the correct stimulus
any time after the stimulus onset. The stimulus value depends on
the temporal response of the visual system, and will also increase
in time due to any temporal integration and/or Bayesian update
of priors. We therefore denote p(t) as the subjective probability
of making a correct response given that a response occurs at t
(measured relative to some origin; see below). We assume that
p(t) is a concave function (Figure 11A), where for two alternatives
with no prior information, p(0) = 0.5.
The expected gain in utility Gˆ(t) for a response at time t is
(curve in Figure 11B):
Gˆ(t) = U+p(t) − U− (1 − p(t)) = (U+ + U−) p(t) − U−
(1.4)
It can be seen that expected gain will be negative when t < tmin,
where p(tmin) = 1/
(
U+/U− + 1). In this case, it does not pay to
respond at all, but there will always be a positive gain as p(t) → 1
and maximized by responding as late as possible. Expected rate of
gain is Rˆ(t) = Gˆ(t)/t. When rate of gain is positive, there may be
an optimal time to respond given by t∗ = argmax
t
Rˆ(t), which is
the solution to:
t∗ = Gˆ(t
∗)
Gˆ′(t∗)
(1.5)
where the dash refers to the derivative with respect to t
(Figure 11C). The conditions for a positive maximum are com-
plicated, but it occurs under quite broad conditions and is easily
visualized geometrically in Figure 11B, since from (1.4) the opti-
mum is given by the tangent of Gˆ(t) that intercepts the origin.
Thus, depending on the utility payoff ratio U+/U−, and p(t),
there is an optimal time to respond. Responding as quickly as pos-
sible is generally suboptimal—it pays to wait for a specific time to
respond.
We can make some general deductions. First, any
increase/decrease in the utility payoff ratio, U+/U−, will
reduce/increase t∗ for a concave p(t). Thus, increasing reward
will reduce t∗, as empirically observed (vide supra). In our
experiment, asking subjects to respond accurately as opposed to
quickly required “caution” by reducing the ratio and increasing
t∗ (Figure 2).
Faster/slower rise in p(t) will also reduce/increase t∗ similar
to, but not in precisely the same manner as manipulating pay-
off. For example, increasing the number of alternatives, n, will
reduce p(t) since p(0) = 1/n (given no other prior information)
and hence increase t∗. Whether there is a logarithmic relationship
between n and E[t∗] (Hick’s law) depends on the precise form of
p(t) and remains to be explored. On the other hand, any prior
information will decrease the rise-time of p(t) and reduce t∗, as
has been reported in some experiments with random foreperiods
(see Niemi and Näätänen, 1981).
Stimulus intensity has a strong inverse relationship on t∗, but
this depends on p(t). The simplest way to parameterize p(t), is to
assume that p(t) depends on a single parameter, ε, that accelerates
time so that pε(t) = p(εt). We assume that εˆ is an unbiased esti-
mate of ε and distributed Normally across trials. It follows that
Gˆεˆ(t) = Gˆ(εˆt) and Gˆ′εˆ(t) = εˆGˆ(εˆt). Then (1.5) becomes
Gˆ′(εˆt∗) = Gˆ(εˆt
∗)
εˆt∗
(1.6)
so it follows that the optimal solution t∗ is given by:
t∗ = t1
εˆ
(1.7)
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FIGURE 11 | Rate model. (A) p(t) is subjective probability of being correct
given a response is made at time t, and is assumed to be concave. Initial
value of p(t) assumes guessing with no prior information, and final value is
assumes that response will be correct given infinite time. (B) Gˆ(t) is the
expected gain in utility (Equation 1.4) for a response made at time t. Note
that gain may be negative (i.e., loss) for t < tmin (dashed curve) and no
response is optimal. (C) Rˆ(t) is the expected rate of gain in utility (Equation
1.5) which has a maximum at t∗, and can be visualized geometrically as the
point where the tangent touches Gˆ(t) in (B,D) shifting the time origin back
by γ increases t∗ by γ ′ (see text).
where t1 is the solution to (1.6) evaluated at εˆ = 1. Thus, if
each trial is optimized based on the estimate εˆ, then the optimal
time to respond is distributed with the reciprocal of the distri-
bution of εˆ and hence has a reciprocal Normal distribution, as
observed.
Since only one reward can occur per trial, we would expect trial
duration to be the more relevant epoch for response rate, rather
than decision time per se. Including an additional non-decision
time TND (foreperiod, sensorimotor delays, etc.) in the compu-
tation of estimated rate: Rˆ(t) = Gˆ(t)/(t + TND) yields the more
general equation for t∗
t∗ + TND = Gˆ(t
∗)
Gˆ′(t∗)
(1.8)
As shown in Figure 11D, including TND increases optimal
response time (relative to stimulus onset). In other words,
decision time depends on the amount of non-decision time.
FIGURE 12 | (A) Effect of scaling factor εˆ on optimal decision time t∗ for
different non-decision time TND = {0,10,100,1000} (see text). Note that t∗
and hence RT increases with TND , although asymptote is zero (not shown);
(B) same as (A) but on log-log axes (base 10) showing near power function
t∗ ≈ aε−k with k = {0, 0.82, 0.83, 0.87} and a = {25.1, 25.1, 39.8, 63.1}
from linear regressions; (C) linear plot of optimal rate r∗ vs. εˆ. Although
strictly a power function, relationship is locally quasi-linear.
Returning to the parametric model: Gˆεˆ(t) = Gˆ(εˆt), we note that
εˆ
(
t∗ + TND
) = Gˆ(εˆt∗)
Gˆ′(εˆt∗)
(1.9)
The solution is not the same as for (1.6), and requires an explicit
form for p(t). For the purposes of illustration, we assumed a sim-
ple exponential form of p(t) = 1/2 + (1 − exp ( − εˆt)) /2 and
plotted t∗ against εˆ with U+ = 1, U− = 5 and parametric in
TND (Figure 12A). As can be seen, t∗ decays with increasing εˆ but
also increases with TND. Although we did not manipulate “non-
decision” time here, others have shown that increasing foreperiod
increases RT in both simple (Niemi and Näätänen, 1981) and
choice RT (Green et al., 1983).
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For TND > 0, the relationship is still very close to a power law
with t∗ ≈ aε−k where k ≈ 0.8 (Figure 12B). In terms of rate, we
can see that as TND increases, r∗ decreases but the relationship to εˆ
is still locally close to linear even for very large TND (Figure 12C).
Thus, if εˆ is Normally distributed r∗ will also be very near Normal.
If we add sensorimotor delays γ to decision time, then we
have RT = aεˆ−k + γ which is clearly similar to Pieron’s law:
E [RT] = αI−β + γ , where α,β and γ are constants for a given
experiment and I is objective stimulus intensity. Piéron’s law was
originally found for simple RT experiments, but also holds for
choice RTs (van Maanen et al., 2012). If we assume that εˆ is
subjective estimated stimulus intensity, then we require εˆ ∝ Iβ/k
which is plausible from Steven’s power law (Chater and Brown,
1999).
MECHANISM
How optimal rate could be controlled is open to speculation. We
can see that the mechanism in Figure 1A could act as an equa-
tion solver since the time of crossing is the solution of ρ(t) = θ(t)
[more formally: the lowest real positive root of ρ(t) − θ(t)], and
when equality is reached, the behavior is triggered in real-time.
This can be mapped onto (1.5) in an infinity of ways. A simple
possibility is that a deterministic linear rise to threshold behaves
as rate-to-time converter (Figure 1C). The input Rˆ(t) is inte-
grated in time to yield a rising deterministic ρ(t) which triggers
the response when then a threshold is reached. Gold and Shadlen
(2002) proposed that an optimal decision time could be found
by an adaptive process (trial-and-error) that varies the threshold.
In this case, the distribution of decision times would be given by
the distribution of thresholds (for a fixed ρ(t)), but this hardly
explains why RTs have a near-rectrN distribution. A more par-
simonious model would be that the optimal ρ(t) is found for a
fixed threshold (i.e., Carpenter’s original model). Normally dis-
tributed estimates of ρ(t) would then yield RTs with the observed
rectrN distribution. It is possible that both threshold and ρ(t)
are variable leading to a ratio of distributions for decision time
(Waddington and Harris, 2013), although we have no evidence
for this in this experiment.
Taking a different perspective, we can draw a correspondence
between rate (responses per second) and frequency (cycles per
second), and consider control by underlying banks of oscillators
in the Fourier domain. It is conceivable that repetitive nature
of RT experiments entrain oscillator frequencies, possibly with
phase resets from the stimulus onset to allow some degree of
prediction. Our observed temporal and spatial sequential depen-
dencies could reflect this entrainment (phase-locking), and the
Normal distribution of rate could reflect sampling of subpopula-
tions of oscillators. This is speculative, but not discordant with the
known correlation between RTs and alpha brain waves (Drewes
and van Rullen, 2011; Diederich et al., 2012; Hamm et al., 2012).
SUMMARY
For 2-alternative manual choice RTs, distributions are close to
the reciprocal Normal but not close to the inverse Gaussian
distribution. This is not consistent with stochastic rise to thresh-
old models, and implies that between-trial rate (reciprocal RT)
is a fundamental variable. There are significant between-trial
temporal and spatial sequential dependencies extending back
about 3 lags. When tasks become difficult, the rate distributions
shift to the left and becomes truncated near zero. We deduced
true truncation could not occur due the sequential dependency,
but rate distributions are still close to the truncated Normal.
Responding to back-to-back sequences of hundreds of almost
identical RT trials is not a natural behavior. Nevertheless, it does
reflect decision-making when there is time pressure. We propose
that when gain in utility is an increasing concave function of
time (speed-accuracy trade-off) there emerges an optimal time
of response when time is a penalty. We propose that response
rate reflects such a process and argue against the longstanding
assumption of rise-to-threshold.
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In the decision-making field, it is important to distinguish between the perceptual
process (how information is collected) and the decision rule (the strategy governing
decision-making). We propose a new paradigm, called EXogenous ACcumulation Task
(EXACT) to disentangle these two components. The paradigm consists of showing a
horizontal gauge that represents the probability of receiving a reward at time t and
increases with time. The participant is asked to press a button when they want to
request a reward. Thus, the perceptual mechanism is hard-coded and does not need
to be inferred from the data. Based on this paradigm, we compared four decision rules
(Bayes Risk, Reward Rate, Reward/Accuracy, and Modified Reward Rate) and found that
participants appeared to behave according to the Modified Reward Rate. We propose
a new way of analysing the data by using the accuracy of responses, which can only
be inferred in classic RT tasks. Our analysis suggests that several experimental findings
such as RT distribution and its relationship with experimental conditions, usually deemed
to be the result of a rise-to-threshold process, may be simply explained by the effect of
the decision rule employed.
Keywords: optimal performance, reward rate, speed-accuracy trade-off, perceptual choice, decision rules
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making can be broken down, at least conceptually, into two components: a perceptual
process and a decision rule. We define the perceptual process as the mechanism that accumulates
information in order to decide between alternative responses. It does not include all the
perceptual information an observer is experiencing during a decision/experimental task, but
only that which affects the ultimate decision. We define the decision rule as the quantity being
optimized during the task, which will therefore establish when enough information has been
gathered and a decision can be made. A great amount of work in the decision-making field
has focused on the perceptual process implemented in the brain, resulting in several models
that can account for a wide variety of data (e.g., LaBerge, 1962; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978;
Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Ratcliff
et al., 2004a,b). In most cases, these models assume a noisy accumulation of information toward
one of two alternatives, until a decision threshold is reached, whereupon a response is made
(e.g., drift diffusion model: Stone, 1960; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and Rouder,
2000; linear ballistic accumulation: Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model:
Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993). There is, however, a growing interest in the decision rule
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per se, which affects how participants set their decision
thresholds, that is when to stop collecting information and make
a decision (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Bogacz et al., 2006; Holmes
and Cohen, 2014; Moran, 2014).
The usual approach to investigating decision rules consists of
(1) collecting data from a classic reaction time (RT) experiment;
(2) assume a particular perceptual process, usually the drift
diffusion model; (3) based on the perceptual process assumed,
test different decision rules (for example, see Simen and Cohen,
2009; Bogacz et al., 2010). This approach has serious drawbacks:
the predictions of the decision rule depend on the perceptual
mechanism assumed, and there are a variety of possible
perceptual mechanisms (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 1999; Ratcliff and
Smith, 2004; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). When considering more
than two alternatives, there are even more approaches which
differ in behavioral and neurobiological assumptions (Krajbich
and Rangel, 2011). This leads to a problem when fitting decision
rules: which perceptual process should one assume? Moreover,
should a decision rule not fit the data, would that be due to
the decision rule itself or to the perceptual process assumed?
Hypothetically, this issue could be solved by comparing different
perceptual processes with different decision rules, but this is
rarely done in practice. Even in this case, it is not possible to
know if the sample of perceptual processes tested comprises the
one used by human participants. This is a serious limitation when
the focus of the investigation is on the decision rule, and not the
perceptual process. There is also a second limitation of applying
perceptual process in testing decision rules: the commonly used
perceptual models are employed in case of fast decisions (average
RT < 1 s) (Voss et al., 2013) but their applicability for longer
decision remain untested, even though real-life decisions may
take several seconds.
We believe that there is a need for a new paradigm which
will allow researchers in the decision-making field to reduce
the interdependence of the perceptual and decision processes.
We propose a new paradigm, called EXACT (EXogenous
ACcumulation Task) which allows the decision rule to be
investigated without the need of making any assumption about
the underlying perceptual process.
The perceptual process affects the decision rule by defining
a certain relationship between time of response and accuracy
of response: ACC(t), where t is the time taken to make a
response. ACC(t) defines the speed-accuracy trade-off: it is the
probability of being correct at time t, and it is assumed to
increase with time so that the slower the response, the more
accurate it is (Heitz, 2014). The particular shape of this function
depends on the perceptual model assumed. To understand
the decision rule without making any assumption about the
perceptual process, we need to hard-code ACC(t) itself into the
experimental design. Instead of showing two or more stimuli and
having the participant choose the correct one by an endogenous
accumulation of information and subsequent increase of ACC(t),
the ACC(t) can be presented directly to the participants who are
asked to make the decision based on this exogenous ACC(t). We
call this paradigm EXACT, because the speed-accuracy trade-
off function is presented exogenously to the participant, instead
of being an endogenous process. In this task, we are assuming
that the perceptual accumulation of information is separable
from the decision rule, such that if we replace the perceptual
accumulation exogenously, we can observe the decision rule in
a meaningful way.
To present ACC(t) directly to the participant, a horizontal
gauge is displayed. There are no separate visual targets. During
a trial, the position of the gauge level is moved to the right
corresponding to an increasing ACC(t) predetermined by the
experimenter. Zero probability corresponds to an empty gauge,
and unit probability corresponds to a full gauge. At the beginning
of the trial the gauge starts at ACC(0) (not necessarily zero).
The participant wins X reward tokens with probability ACC(t)
when they press a button at time t, and loses Y tokens with
probability 1 − ACC(t). After the response, a new trial starts.
The experimenter can specify a delay between trials. Figure 1
(top) shows an example of the monitor screen shown to the
participants. On the bottom panels the corresponding ACC(t)
(an exponential function, as discussed below) is shown (not seen
by participants). The axes are inverted so that the horizontal axis
corresponds to the direction of the gauge movement.
For an illustrative experiment with the EXACT paradigm, we
chose an exponential ACC(t):
ACC (t) = 1+ (α − 1) exp (−λt) (1)
so that:
t(ACC) = −ln
(
(ACC − 1)
α−1
)
/λ (2)
where λ is a parameter controlling how fast the function grows,
and α is the value at t = 0. In the EXACT paradigm, λ
corresponds to the speed of the gauge, and α is the gauge level at
the beginning of the trial, that is ACC(0). This choice of ACC (t)
was based on ease of mathematical tractability, capability of
capturing different aspect of the task, and similarity to theACC(t)
produced by widely used models1. However, other functions
could be used to test decision rules. The main point is that the
function is completely known by the researcher and not derived
from an assumed perceptual process.
The EXACT paradigm can be easily compared with a classic
RT task. The λ parameter controls the speed of the gauge, which
can be compared to manipulating the trial difficulty (for example,
by changing stimulus intensity, stimulus contrast, etc. . . ). When
the task is difficult, the rate of accumulation of evidence is
smaller, and ACC(t) grows slower. Similarly, changing α, the
gauge level at the beginning of the trial corresponds to the
number of alternatives: α = 0.5 represents a 2AFC, α =
0.25 a 4AFC. With the EXACT paradigm it is also possible to
explore more complicated designs, such as α = 0.75, which
1For example, consider the ACC (t) resulting from a drift diffusion model with two
boundaries (that is, two alternative forced choice task): ACC(t) = 1− φ
(
− Ac
√
t
)
,
where A is the drift rate, c is the standard deviation of the process and φ is
the normal standard cumulative function (Bogacz et al., 2006). Notice that this
function is monotonically increasing, concave, and asymptotically approaches
unity, similarly to our function. However, the function does not allow us to model
different starting points, because the drift diffusion model can be only used in case
of two alternative forced choice tasks, and the difficulty of the trial is controlled by
two parameters instead of one of our function.
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FIGURE 1 | Top Panels: Example of the experimental design used to implement the EXACT paradigm, showing how the gauge represents the
probability at time t assuming a starting point at 25% during a hypothetical trial. The small green +1 displays the feedback from the previous trial
(point won/lost). The number below represents the total current score for that condition. The “minutes left” refers to the minutes left for that condition. (A) Top:
the screen as seen by the participant at the beginning of the trial (t = 0) and (B) after 1 s, assuming λ = 1. Bottom: the ACC(t) functions with different λs,
representing the probability of getting a reward with time. The gauge on the top panels is only referred to the function with λ = 1. The other functions show
how the accuracy would change in time for different λ. For example, with λ = 2.5, after 1 s, the accuracy is equal to ∼0.95 (the gauge would be almost
completely full).
corresponds to a task with three correct alternatives out of four
possible choices. Conceptual differences from the classic RT task
and limitation of the EXACT paradigm are addressed in the
discussion (Limitations of the EXACT paradigm).
By knowing the shape of ACC(t), it is straightforward to test
possible decision rules. Four decision rules have been proposed
frequently in the literature (Bogacz et al., 2006; Simen and Cohen,
2009; Harris et al., 2014; see Materials and Methods for further
details):
Bayes Risk (BR). This rule was first used by Wald and
Wolfowitz (1948) in proving the optimality for the Sequential
Probability Ratio Test. It assumes that decision makers seek to
minimize a cost function that is the weighted sum of the time and
the error rate, without taking into account the total length of the
trial. The optimum response time depend on the ratio between
the subjective weights of time and error rate.
Reward Rate (RR). It is defined as the proportion of correct
trials divided by the average duration between trials (Bogacz et al.,
2006). According to RR, responses should not depend on the
payoff matrix used in the task.
Reward/Accuracy (RA). This has been proposed by Bogacz
et al. (2006) by formalizing the COBRA theory of Maddox and
Bohil, 1998). It is a weighted difference of RR and accuracy, in
which the optimum response depends on the punishment/reward
ratio and on the total length of the trial.
Modified Reward Rate (RRm). This rule has been proposed
by Bogacz et al. (2006) and Harris et al. (2014). It describes a
situation where a correct response corresponds to a subjective
reward, and an incorrect response to a subjective punishment,
and participants are trying to maximize the rate of gain (Harris
et al., 2014). The optimum response does not depend on the
absolute values of punishment and reward, but only on their
ratio. RR only takes into account the correct responses (a
better definition for RR would be Success Rate, but we use RR
to be consistent with the literature), whereas RRm considers
both correct and incorrect response and their relative weight.
Furthermore, RRm is the optimal strategy in paradigm with fixed
task duration (seeMaterials andMethods; e.g., Simen and Cohen,
2009; Bogacz et al., 2010). Harris et al. (2014) have hypothesized
that the RRm may also account for the observations that response
times have a reciprocal normal distribution (Carpenter, 1981).
As it will turn out, the distributions resulting from the EXACT
paradigm, with the current design, does not appear to be
reciprocally normally distributed, so this point will be considered
more deeply in the discussion.
The purpose of this study was threefold. First, we were
interested to see how participants responded to this novel
paradigm. In particular, we explored whether participants would
choose a response time RT and a response gauge position
ACC(RT) that depended systematically on our manipulation of
the ACC(t) parameters α and λ. Second, we asked whether the
data could allow us to distinguish among the four decision rule
models. Third, we use the results from the paradigm to explain
patterns of behavior that have usually been explained with a
rise-to-threshold accumulator process.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
At the beginning of each trial, a gauge was shown on a
monitor screen (Figure 1). The gauge started at a predetermined
level and “filled up” according to ACC(t) (Equation 1). The
participant pressed the CTRL key to request a reward. Reward
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and punishment were in form of points. When the participant
requested a reward, 1 point was awarded with probability given
by the level of the gauge (i.e., ACC (t)), or 1 point was taken
away with probability 1 − ACC(t) (punishment/reward ratio
q = 1). After every response, a text saying “Please Wait”
appeared for 0.5 s (delay d). When a reward was awarded, “+1”
in green appeared on the screen, and “–1” in red appeared for
a loss (Figure 1). Each participant started with 25 points at the
beginning of each condition. During each condition, the screen
also displayed how many minutes were left as well as the current
total accrued points. Each condition lasted 3 minutes regardless
of performance (no participant lost all their points), so that faster
responses would lead to more trials (and possibly more profit).
Participants were instructed to win as many points as possible.
They were informed on the relationship between the gauge level
and the probability of getting/losing a point, and were given a
practice session.
This study was approved by the Faculty of Health and Human
Sciences Ethics Committee at Plymouth University, with written
informed consent from all participants. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Procedure
We recruited 17 female and 3 male Psychology students to take
part in the study. To increase motivation, they were informed
that the participant who won the most points would receive
a £10 Amazon voucher. Each participant underwent 2 × 4
conditions. The starting point of the gauge was set to either
α = 0.25, or 0.75, and the speed of the gauge was set
to λ = 0.166, 0.33, 1, or 2. This means that at the
very beginning of the trial the chance of receiving a reward
was equal to α and the chance of receiving a punishment was
equal to 1 − α. After that, the chance of receiving a reward
increased according to the ACC(t) (the chance of getting a
punishment decreased accordingly). Higher values of λ indicates
faster increase. Sequences were randomized across participants,
except that each participant was tested on all the speed conditions
for a particular starting point, before being tested on the other
starting point condition. The participants performed an initial
training session to make sure they understood the task (α =
0.5, λ = 1). They were then given another training session at
the beginning of each starting point condition (in the training we
set α equal to the starting point for that condition and λ = 1).
They were allowed to take a break between conditions. There was
no response deadline.
Decision Rules Predictions
Each decision rule generates different predictions based on the
assumed ACC(t). The mathematical formulation of the four
decision rules is similar to the one in Bogacz et al. (2006),
with few minor differences: firstly, they use the parameter
“Error Rate” (ER(t)) instead of ACC(t). The parameterization
in terms of ACC(t) was found to be more convenient for the
experimental design employed here (ER (t) = 1 − ACC(t)).
Conversely to Bogacz et al., the additional penalty delay following
an error was ignored, since it is not used in our experiment
and it is not common in classic RT paradigms. We also did
TABLE 1 | Summary of decision rules with associated optimum response
time t* for the exponential ACC(t) in Equation (1).
Decision rule Optimum response (t*)
by assuming ACC (t) = 1+ (α − 1)exp (−λt)
BR = −
[
t+q
(
1−ACC (t)
)]
t*
BR
= −
ln
(
1
λq(1− α)
)
λ
RR = ACC(t)/(t+ d) t*
RR
= −d −
W−1
(
exp (−λd − 1)
α−1
)
+1
λ
RA = RR− q
d
(
1− ACC (t)
)
No explicit form
RRm =
ACC (t)− q
(
1− ACC (t)
)
t+ d t
*
RRm
= −d−
W−1
(
exp (−λd−1)
(α−1)(q+ 1)
)
+1
λ
not separate decision time (the time in which the information
is accumulated and therefore accuracy increases) from non-
decision time (sensory and motor processing), because in the
EXACT paradigm any time spent on the trial increases accuracy.
The mathematical formulation of the decision rules with the
corresponding optimum response time t∗ is shown in Table 1. In
these formulae d is the delay across trials, t is the time from the
beginning of the trial to the participant’s response, q is the weight
of accuracy relative to the speed of reward (Bogacz et al., 2006)
and it is assumed to be subjective and dependent on individual
differences.
We derived the optimum time of responding t∗ (right column
of Table 1) by setting the derivative of the decision rule to 0
and solve for t (see Appendix in Supplementary Materials for
details). Figure 2 shows both the optimum t∗ as a function
of λ for different parameters value (how long a participant
should wait before responding, left panel), and the ACC(t∗)
value (what accuracy level is reached upon responding, right
panel), assuming the exponential ACC(t) in Equation (1). For
most models, the optimum response t∗ goes to 0 when λ goes
to 0, which means that when the accumulation of evidence
in time is too slow (because the trial is difficult, the stimulus
is dim, etc. . . ), then it is not convenient to spend long time
accumulating information. This is not true for the RRm model
with some combination of parameters α and q. In particular, the
optimum t∗ goes to infinity when λ goes to 0 given that α < qq+1
(see Figure 2, bottom panels, and Appendix in Supplementary
Materials for derivation) and goes to 0 when α <
q
q+1 . The RRm
model is particularly relevant because it is the only criterion
that actually maximizes the gain for a task (including but not
limited to the EXACT paradigm) with a fixed task duration
(in subjective utility value, see Harris et al., 2014)2. For RRm
the parameter q can be interpreted as the punishment/reward
ratio. The experimenter can try to affect this parameter (by using
2To show why this is true, note that c1ACC (t)− c2 (1− ACC (t)) (the numerator
in RRm) is the average gain of a subject for a trial, where c1 and c2 are the
subjective utility (reward and punishment). For an experiment lasting l min,
the subject will be able to perform n = l/(t + d) trials, where t is the
response time of the subject, d the other delay of the trial. Therefore to get as
many points as possible for an experiment, the participants should maximize
[c1ACC (t)− c2 (1− ACC (t))] lt+d , which maximum correspond exactly to t∗RRm ,
with q = c2/c1.
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FIGURE 2 | Optimal response time, t* (left column) and ACC(t*) (right column) vs. λ for the four decision rules, with different parameters q and d.
ACC(t*) indicates the optimum level of accuracy that has to be reached upon responding. The arrows indicate how the shape changes when the d or q parameter is
increased. The q parameter represents the subjective punishment/reward ratio; the d parameter represents the length of the trial, excluding the reaction time.
Increasing q or increasing d corresponds to an increase in the optimum response time (t*) and a consequent increase of ACC(t*). For the Modified Reward Rate
(bottom panels), two very different t* shapes are produced with different combinations of q and α (the starting point of the gauge).
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monetary reward, sound feedback, instruction set, etc. . . ), but
other characteristics may be more relevant for the participants,
such as intrinsic loss avoidance.
Statistical Analysis
Due to small sample size (sometime less than 15 responses)
obtained in some conditions (especially with small λ), we
aggregated the data by calculating the median response for
each participant. We fitted the three decision rules (BR, RA,
RRm) response predictions (the condition-dependent t
∗ shown
on the right side of Table 1) to the aggregated median responses
by an optimization procedure that minimizes the least squares
(MATLAB fminsearch). RR did not need to be fitted because it
is parameter free (d is assumed to be known by the participant
to be equal to 0.5). For BR, RA and RRm, the parameter q was
estimated with two different approaches: by leaving q free to vary
across the two α conditions or by fixing it to be equal for the two
α conditions. The value of q was bounded to be positive.
To analyse how RT and ACC(RT) changed within a particular
condition, the responses were binned for each participant and
each condition according to the time elapsed from the beginning
of the trial. This was made in order to have the same dataset
size for each participant, regardless of the number of responses
produced. For the λ = 0.166 and λ = 0.33, bins of 10 s were
used and for λ = 1 and λ = 2, bins of 5 s were used. The
difference in bins was due to generally slower RTwith smaller λ in
the α = 0.25 condition, and longer bins were needed to include
enough datapoints for reliable statistics. The mean and standard
deviation were calculated for each bin, resulting in two time series
for each participant and each condition.We computed two linear
regressions (mean against time and standard deviation against
time) for each dataset, and the resulting slopes were analyzed
with a Two-way repeated measure ANOVA and a multiple
comparison test.
To understand the sequential dependency along trials,
the average partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for each
participant and each condition was computed. This function
returns the autocorrelation between a response RTt and RTt+lag
removing the dependency through RTt+1 and RTt+lag−1. We
used a maximum lag of 10. The average PACF across all
participants was computed by averaging the individual PACF
values for each condition.
Participants’ RTs were grouped in order to have a single
distribution for each condition by using the Vincentizing method
(Ratcliff, 1979). To calculate the response in the rate domain, we
computed the rate for each response (1/RT), then standardized
the data into z-scores for each participant and each condition,
which allowed us to collapse all the data together (Harris et al.,
2014).
Any ACC(RT) distribution must be truncated because
ACC(RT) is bound to lie between 0.25 or 0.75 (depending
on the α condition) and 1. We wanted to check whether
the ACC (RT) distribution generated by each participant was
close to a truncated Normal. This was complicated by small
individual samples, and by the fact that aggregating truncated
Normal with different moments makes it ambiguous whether
the original distributions were truncated Normal or not. We
excluded the conditions where truncation was severe, that is
when the sum of mean and two standard deviations was
over one and the difference between mean and two standard
deviations below α (the truncation point). The value of two
for the standard deviation was chosen as a balance between
excluding truncated datasets and not excluding too many data
points (see Harris et al., 2014). The remaining distributions were
standardized into z-scores and collapsed together. By excluding
the most severely truncated distribution and aggregating the
remaining standardized distributions, we expect to obtain a
normal distribution with a milder truncation, if the original
distributions were truncated Normal.
RESULTS
The examination of the total score gained (points at the end
of each condition) can be used to understand how participants
responded to the task. Their score can be compared to the
optimum average score (expected amount of point at the end
of each condition, given that participants were actually trying to
maximize the amount of point earned). The optimum expected
score was computed by finding the maximum points that could
be won for a fixed task duration (RRm with q = 1 and d =
0.5) (Figure 3, solid circles). For α = 0.25, the total score
increased systematically with λ (Figure 3A, open circles), and
clearly demonstrates that participants were sensitive to the speed
of the gauge. As the gauge level increased it was possible to
obtain more points in the available 3min, and although there was
variability among participants, some were close to the optimum
performance.
For α = 0.75, the optimum response is t∗= 0 for all values of
λ, and the maximum score was always 205 points (filled circle in
Figure 3B). Participants scores were more variable than before
and depended on λ, with an increasing mean and decreasing
variance with λ. Even though participants could not possibly
reach a RT = 0, they should have had the same average RT for
the four λ conditions when α = 0.75, if they were maximizing
RRm with q = 1 and d = 0.5.
Figure 4 shows responses for one representative participant in
terms of RT (blue lines) and positional responses along the gauge,
ACC(RT) (orange lines). The positional response ACC(RT) were
variable but typically showed an increasing trend with higher
λ. Positional responses were lower for α = 0.25 than 0.75.
This participant was selected because his/her responses followed
quite closely the trend found in aggregated data for all the
conditions.
Note that high variability in RT does not always correspond
to high variability in ACC(RT) because RT depends on on the
speed of the gauge [see Equation (2)]. For example, in Figure 4,
when λ = 0.16 and α = 0.75, RTs vary widely across trials, but
corresponds to only a slight variation in ACC(RT).
We next examined median response times mdRT and
median positional response ACC(mdRT), across all (aggregated)
participants for each condition (Figures 5A,B). For each
participant and condition, the first 10 responses were omitted
to avoid contamination from any potential adaptive/learning at
the start of a condition. There was a significant effect of both
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FIGURE 3 | Open circles: total score for each participant for the low (A) and high (B) starting point condition. For clarity, each circle is plotted with a
random horizontal offset. Filled circles: expected score with optimum performance for the four speed conditions and the two starting points conditions.
FIGURE 4 | Participant 1 responses in terms of RT (blue lines) and ACC(RT) (orange lines) for each λ and α condition. The black dot indicates that a
punishment has been given on that trial. On average, ACC(RT ) increases with λ and is usually lower for the α = 0.25 condition. Note that the different number of trials
depended on the condition (which always lasted 3 minutes). For example, when α = 0.25, λ = 0.16, the gauge grew more slowly, participant’s RT were slower, and
less trials were made. Note that high variability in RT does not always correspond to high variability in ACC(RT ). Compare this plot with Figures 5A,B, for the grouped
RT and ACC(RT ) across participants. Note that the two α conditions have two different scales.
the starting point α and speed λ on mdRT (Two-way repeated
measures ANOVA; for λ: F(3, 152) = 24.61, p < 10−12; for α:
F(1, 152) = 53.2, p < 10−10, and for the interaction α × λ:
F(3, 152) = 10.84, p < 10−5).
For α = 0.25, mdRT decreased monotonically with λ.
We were able to capture these data by a power law function
mdRTi = γ + kλ−βi for i = 1, 4 (yellow line in Figure 5A).
The estimated values were γ = 203ms, k = 1.45, β = 0.80,
with R2 = 0.997, indicating an excellent fit. This implies an
equivalence between λ and conventional stimulus intensity in
classic Piéron’s law (see Discussion). For α = 0.75, mdRT was
much less than for = 0.25, and did not follow a power law.
Moreover, mdRT was not monotonic and exhibited a small peak
at λ = 0.33.
Similarly ACC(mdRT) clearly depended on α and λ. This
means that participants were actually adjusting their positional
response for different conditions and not responding to a fixed
position along the gauge independently of λ and α.
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Median RT across the 20 participants for four speed conditions and two starting point conditions. A power (Piéron) function was fitted for the low
starting point condition (α = 0.25). Median RT appear to be dependent both on λ and α and on their interaction. In particular, when α = 0.75 the mdRT were not
monotonic with a peak at λ = 0.33. (B) ACC(mdRT ), showing how participant adjusted their positional response along the gauge based on both α and λ.
Fitting the Models to the Aggregate Data
The mdRT were fitted with the optimum t∗ predictions from
four decision rules: Bayes Risk, Reward Rate, Reward/Accuracy,
Modified Reward Rate (Figure 6). We minimized the residual
least squares by allowing q to vary and to be fixed across the
two α conditions (this does not apply to RR which does not have
free parameters). The plots when q is allowed to vary are shown
in Figure 6 and the residual least squares in Table 2. When q
was allowed to vary across α conditions, the only model that
could provide a reasonable fit was RRm. The estimated q (showed
in Figure 6) clearly differed from the two α conditions (see
Discussion). When the parameter qwas fixed the resulting curves
did not seem to be able to capture the different shape between the
two α conditions. In particular the residuals for α = 0.25 were
similar for the two fitting methods, but they were higher with
fixed q in the α = 0.75 condition (see Table 2). Note that with
α = 0.75, a residual value of 2.32 corresponds to a horizontal
zero line.
Time Series Analysis
We examined sequential dependencies of RT by calculating
the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) averaged across
participants and conditions (see Materials and Methods). The
mean PACF with lag one was 0.457, and with lag two was 0.090.
Higher order lags were negligible. Thus, responses depended
explicitly on the previous two responses. To explore this further,
we examined how this sequential dependency depended on the
reward/punishment on previous trials. We computed differences
between consecutive RT responses depending on whether the
previous response had been punished or rewarded. These
differences were averaged across participants and conditions.
For a punishment, the mean change in RT was an increase of
345.92ms (SE: 97.95) and for a reward, a decrease of 61.88ms
(SE: 30.32ms). For two punishments in a row, the mean increase
was 583ms (SE: 139.26), and for two rewards in a row, the
mean decrease was 94.01ms (SE: 28.62). For three or more
rewards/punishments in a row, there was little additional change,
consistent with the PACF results. Repeating the analysis for
ACC(RT) showed a similar pattern. After one punishment there
was a mean increase of 0.0218 (SE: 0.0058), and after two
punishments in a row, a mean increase of 0.048 (SE: 0.0082).
After a reward there was a mean decrease 0.0038 (SE: 0.0022),
and after two rewards a decrease of 0.0066 (SE: 0.0020). We
also analyzed how the 1st order changes depended on λ and α.
The size of RT adjustment after a punishment became larger for
smaller λ, but with no obvious dependency on α (Figure 7A).
However, the change in ACC(RT) showed the opposite pattern,
with strong dependency on α and a weaker dependency on λ
(Figure 7B).
The time course of participants’ responses during a condition
showed variability and small trends. The mean and standard
deviation for each participant’s response during a condition was
computed by dividing the total duration (3minutes) into bins of 5
or 10 s depending on the condition (see Materials and Methods),
and then we performed a linear regression against time. There
was little difference between RT and ACC(RT), so here we
consider only RTs. Considering the changing in RT mean across
condition duration, we found that the slope was significantly
affected by both λ and α conditions (Two-way repeated measure
ANOVA; for λ:F(3, 152) = 10.49, p < 10−13, for α:F(1, 152) =
12.15, p < 0.001). However multiple comparison tests on
the slopes of the fitted regression model showed that the only
significantly different condition (at 0.01 critical level) was found
for α = 0.25 and λ = 0.16, which corresponded to an average
increase of 13.5ms for second (99% CI [9ms, 17ms]). None
of the other slopes were significantly different from zero. An
analysis on the slope of standard deviation of RT vs. time revealed
no significant differences from zero for any of the λ and α
conditions.
Distribution Analysis
The resulting distributions collapsed across participants are
shown in Figure 8. The distributions are right skewed (apart
from the condition λ = 0.16, α = 0.25). We used the estimated
q values found with the aggregated data (shown in Figure 6) to
plot for each condition the four decision rules functions (colored
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FIGURE 6 | Fitting the four decision rules to the data by minimizing the least squares. RR does not have any free parameter, whereas for the other decision
rules the free parameter q had to be estimated. In the figure, the parameter q is allowed to vary across the two α conditions. The best fit was provided by RRm. The
two estimated q values were largely different between the two α conditions.
TABLE 2 | Residual least squares for each decision rule and the two
starting point conditions.
α = 0.25 α = 0.75
q free q fixed q free q fixed
BR 3.43 3.53 1.08 1.55
RR 55.56 2.32
RA 36.64 36.64 2.04 2.32
RRm 0.29 0.29 0.0009 2.32
Models were fitted by fixing q across α conditions or by allowing it to vary (this does not
apply to RR, which does not have any free parameter). A residual least square value of
2.32 for α = 0.75 corresponds to a horizontal zero line. Fixing q resulted in consistently
poor fit with the α = 0.75 conditions. The best fitting decision rule was RRm. When q was
allowed to vary, RRm provided an excellent fit of empirical data for both the α conditions
(see Figure 6).
curves), representing the expected gain for that decision rule (the
equation for each decision rule function is shown in Table 1,
left column). If a participant is trying to maximize a decision
rule, she should always respond precisely at t∗ (filled circles in
Figure 8). With time estimation error, temporal uncertainty, and
other source of sensory/motor noise, participants might respond
according to a distribution that roughly follows the shape of the
decision rule function, with the maximum point slightly ahead of
the distribution mean (see Section Asymmetricity of the decision
rule and optimization algorithm for further discussion). In our
data RRm is the only decision rule that follows this pattern (the
only exception being for α = 0.75 and λ = 0.16).
The distribution in the rate domain was analyzed by using
the standardization approach (see Materials and Methods). The
distributions did not appear normal as observed in choice RT,
but were positively skewed. Figure 9 shows the standardized rate
distributions collapsed across all the participants and conditions
(there was no significant difference between different conditions).
We also examined the distributions of ACC(RT). Because
of the possible left truncation at 0.25 and 0.75 for the two α
conditions, and right truncation at 1 for both conditions, we
excluded severely truncated dataset (see Materials and Methods).
The remaining 89 out of 160 (20 participants×2× 4 conditions)
mildly truncated datasets were standardized and collapsed
across subjects. Figure 10 shows the original, standardized and
aggregated distributions (in blue) and the modified standardized
and aggregated distributions (in black). As a comparison, a
normal distribution is fitted to the modified dataset. Note that for
most of the conditions, excluding the truncated datasets does not
have a big effect, and both distribution pre- and post-exclusion
are approximately truncated Normal. The two exceptions are the
distributions in the α = 0.75 and λ = 0.16, 0.33 conditions,
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 288
Biscione and Harris The EXACT paradigm
FIGURE 7 | (A) Size of the adjustment in ms after a punishment and after a reward for α and λ.The adjustment is larger after a punishment, and seems to be
dependent on the conditions itself. (B) Size of adjustment in terms of ACC(RT ). As before, the adjustment is larger for punishment. Contrary to what shown in (A), the
plot reveals that the size of adjustment is dependent on α and more weakly on λ. It is plausible that participants were adjusting their accuracy by a certain proportion,
and in so doing changed RT depending on λ.
FIGURE 8 | Response Distributions for each condition obtained by averaging the quantiles across each participant and each condition (Vincentizing).
The distributions are scaled so that the area of each one is unity. The distributions appear to be skewed on the right side and their shape depends on λ and α. The
colored lines refer to four decision rule functions. Note that with respect to the decision rules, the vertical axis corresponds to the expected gain given that particular
decision rule. To increase visibility we shift the BR function up by subtracting to the function its maximum value (which was negative) and adding 0.5. In this way the
maximum of the BR is always 0.5, but the shape is unchanged. Note that the absolute value of the function is not important for the distribution shape, but the
time-depending shape of the decision rule function is. Therefore, shifting the function up or down does not have any theoretical implication for the distribution shape.
which were skewed and clearly not normal before processing.
These two conditions also contained the highest number of
severely truncated distributions (only 7 and 8 datasets remaining,
see Figure 8). These results are in accord with the hypothesis
that accuracy of responses is normally distributed and with most
severe truncation with when λ is small and α is high (see Section
Accuracy is normally distributed).
DISCUSSION
Participants’ responses to the trials clearly indicated sensitivity
to the paradigm. Participants did seem to be attempting to
win points, as can be seen in Figure 3. Their median response
positions along the gauge depended systematically on the
accuracy function ACC(t) (Figure 5A). When the gauge level
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FIGURE 9 | Standardized Rate Distributions obtained by collapsing the
standardized rate for all participants and all conditions (see Materials
and Methods). The distribution is clearly not normal. Similar shapes were
found when analysing each condition separately.
moved faster (higher λ), participants’ RT decreased, and they
selected a position further along the gauge [increasingACC(RT)].
This implies that participants were not simply choosing some
fixed or idiosyncratic position for all λ and α conditions, which
would correspond to a decreasing RT but equal ACC(RT), but
they were actually changing strategy for each λ condition.
Their response also depended on the starting point. When
α was lower, participants on average waited longer, and
their accuracy decreased. The dependence on λ was strongly
dependent on the starting point. Participants slowed their
response when α = 0.25 and λ = 0.16 (very slow gauge speed).
However, the same did not occur with α = 0.75 and a slow
gauge speed. In this condition, most of the participants realized
that slowing their response would not correspond to a significant
increase of accuracy, and therefore their response was faster.
Comparison of the aggregated data to models supported the
RRm decision rule. The fitting with RRm, when the parameter q
was allowed to vary, was better than the other models (Figure 6).
For all the models, included RRm, fixing q resulted in a worse
fit. The q parameter, when compared with experimental reward
and punishment, can be interpreted as a measure of risk attitude.
Thus, risk aversion/seeking corresponds to observed q being
greater/lower than actual punishment/reward ratio (1 in our
experiment). In our experiment, estimated values of q were
quite dissimilar for the two starting point conditions, with
significantly higher q for the a = 0.75 condition. This suggests
that participants changed their subjective punishment/reward
ratio and become more cautious with increasing α. This is
consistent with the “fourfold pattern of risk attitudes” in prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), according to which risk-
averse behavior (in our terminology, setting a high q) are more
common when gains have high probability (like in our α = 0.75
condition). Balci et al. (2011) found that the estimated q values for
the RRm decision rule decreased with training, to∼0.2. The short
session duration in our experiment did not allow us to perform
the same analysis, but is in principle possible to with the EXACT
paradigm.
There may also be a gender difference in the decision rules
in the distribution of parameters. Bogacz et al. (2010) found
a clear difference in male and female performance, female
responses being less optimal (more risk averse) with respect
to the RR strategy. The EXACT paradigm could be similarly
(and, we believe, more conveniently) used to investigate whether
difference in attitude across gender may be captured by a
different estimation of the q parameter and hence risk aversion.
Unfortunately, this analysis is not possible in the current work
due to the severe imbalance between female and male, which
reflects the female-male ratio in Psychology classes in our
University.
Even though RRm is the decision rule that maximizes the rate
of gain for any task with a fixed duration (Harris et al., 2014), it
has been found (Bogacz et al., 2010) that for some participants,
RA may be a better model than RRm. However, Bogacz et al.
assumed the drift diffusion model. This assumption constrained
the set of predictions generated by the decision rule. For some
participants the drift diffusion model may not be a good model
of the perceptual process, which may affect the goodness of fit
of the decision rule. By using the EXACT paradigm, the current
work overcomes this problem.
The EXACT paradigm can be considered as an abstract
version of a classic RT task, in which more factors are controlled
(more specifically, all the accumulation usually performed by the
perceptual process is artificially manipulated by the researcher).
We believe it is important to compare this paradigm with the
classic RT design. Disentangling the perceptual process from the
decision rules mean that is possible to understand which features
of the experimental data are due to one or the other part of
the decision mechanism. For example, the right-skewness of the
distributions that we observed in our dataset is usually deemed
to be the result of a rise-to-threshold diffusion process. There
is no reason why they should emerge in our paradigm because
ACC(t) is exogenous. However, this does not mean that assuming
a rise-to-threshold mechanism is unnecessary in a classic RT
task. The ACC(t) in a perceptual task has to emerge from a
process that accumulates information, and a rise-to-threshold
model seems plausible. Nevertheless, these distribution features
can be explained by an alternative process implying that the rise-
to-threshold model may be modified/re-interpreted differently.
The results along conditions for an individual participant
(Figure 4) and the size of adjustment after a punishment or a
reward (Figure 7) show an important point about the EXACT
paradigm: the possibility to analyse the result not only in terms
of RT, but also in terms of ACC(RT). This is not possible
in the classic RT paradigm because ACC(RT) is not known
by the experimenter, unless a particular perceptual process is
assumed. The analysis of ACC(RT) gives additional information
about the strategy employed by the participants. For example,
by analysing the size of adjustment in terms of RT after a
punishment/reward, we would have concluded that participants
adjusted their response based on the speed of the gauge itself.
However analysing the data in terms of ACC(RT) reveals that
participants may be focusing on adjusting the positional response
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FIGURE 10 | Standardized positional response along the gauge: ACC(RT). The blue lines represent the original standardized and collapsed distributions; the
black lines represent the standardized and collapsed distributions after eliminating the datasets with severe truncation. N represents the number of remaining datasets
(out of a total of 20 participants) after eliminating severely truncated distributions. A normal density is fitted to each modified distribution.
along the gauge, trying to increase or decrease their accuracy at
the same proportion for different λ.
The EXACT paradigm has some similarities with the “Beat
the Clock” task (Simen et al., 2011), in which a participant
earns a reward that is an exponential function of time. If the
participant responds after the deadline the reward is zero. In our
task, waiting increases the probability of getting a reward, but
not the reward itself. Furthermore, in our paradigm participants
know perfectly the function shape, as it is shown on the monitor
screen, whereas in the “Beat the Clock” they have to infer it.
Finally, Simen et al. did not fix the condition’s length, which
is part of our paradigm. Generally, “Beat the Clock” seems
more suited for investigating temporal discrimination, whereas
the EXACT paradigm is more suited for analysing decision
rules.
Piéron’s Law
We found that a power law provided an excellent fit for themdRT
in the α = 0.25 condition:mdRTi = γ+kλ−βi . In psychophysics,
a similar power law describes the relationship between stimulus
intensity and mean RT, (Piéron’s Law). During the last century,
the law has been reported to match observed data in numerous
sensory modalities and experimental paradigms (e.g., brightness
detection: Piéron, 1914; color saturation: Stafford et al., 2011;
taste signals: Bonnet et al., 1999; simple and choice reaction times:
Pins and Bonnet, 1996). Obtaining a Piéron’s function with the
EXACT paradigm strongly supports the idea that λ corresponds
to stimulus intensity in a classic RT paradigm. We estimated
these parameters to be γ = 203 ms, β = 0.8, and k = 1.45.
These values are consistent with the literature for Piéron’s law
(Luce, 1986). Within this new framework, β can be interpreted as
being dependent on the relationship between λ and the physical
stimulus intensity.
Recently, it has been proposed that Piéron’s Law is a necessary
consequence of rise-to-threshold decision making (Stafford and
Gurney, 2004; Donkin and Van Maanen, 2014). However, as
shown inHarris et al. (2014), the RRm decision rule automatically
generates a range of optimum responses which follow a power
law. Of our 4 tested rules the RRm is the only decision rule that
admits both a Piéron shape and a non-Piéron shape depending on
α and q (see Figure 2 andAppendix in SupplementaryMaterials).
For the RRm model, a Piéron’s function is obtained only when
α < q/(q + 1). In a 2AFC, which is the classic paradigm used
in studying with Piéron’s law, α = 0.5 which requires that
q > 1; that is, the punishment must have a higher subjective
magnitude than the reward for the function to follow Piéron’s
law. On the other hand, the non-Piéron’s shape that we have
observed for α = 0.75 requires α > q/(q + 1). This shape has
never been observed in classic RT experiments. However, for a
2AFC experiment (α = 0.5), it would require q < 1; that is,
punishment would need have a lower subjective magnitude than
reward. Thus, it is conceivable that the non-Piéron function may
emerge in a 2AFC experiment, if the experimenter could augment
the subjective reward over the punishment by manipulating
the obtained gain or by verbal instruction. We are currently
exploring this.
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Time Series Analysis
The PACF showed that responses were dependent on the
previous trials with a lag of one and weakly with a lag of two.
We found that the change in response depended on whether the
previous trial was rewarded or punished, and was particularly
sensitive to punishment. A similar phenomenon is found in
classic RT task, where trials following an error are usually
substantially slower and more accurate than trial following a
correct response (post-error slowing, e.g., Rabbitt, 1966; Laming,
1968; Brewer and Smith, 1984; Jentzsch and Dudschig, 2009;
Strozyk and Jentzsch, 2012), and has been interpreted as a
strategic adjustment of a response criterion (e.g., Brewer and
Smith, 1984; Botvinick et al., 2001; Jentzsch and Leuthold,
2006). It is interesting to note that feedback does not give
further accuracy information than the gauge, but may provide
information on the rate of subjective reward (RRm) which is
not easily calculated from ACC(t). It is possible that post error
slowing arises the same mechanism, and may therefore reflect a
reward rate maximizing algorithm.
Investigating the relation between the size of the adjustment
and λ and α revealed the importance of examining ACC(RT)
as well as RT. RT clearly changed based on λ, but not on α.
But ACC(RT) depended on α but only weakly on λ. It is not
possible to know exactly whether participants were adjusting
their strategy based on RT orACC(RT), but the latter seems more
likely. Is it conceivable that participants adjusted their accuracy
by a certain proportion, and in so doing changed RT via its
dependence on λ (Equation 1). The dependency on α may be
explained by noticing that, when α = 0.25, participants’ range
of adjustment is higher, because the gauge starts on a lower level,
and therefore they have a larger range for adjustment than in the
α = 0.75 condition.
We also examined responses as a time series in order
to explore possible strategies (or algorithms) used by the
participants to maximize their subjective gain (e.g., exploration
vs. exploitation). However, we found little evidence for a learning
algorithm. The only significant trend between mean RT and
condition duration was found for the condition α = 0.25 and
λ = 0.16. In this case, participants appeared to increase on
average their response by 13.5ms. We were not able to explain
this trend, and why none of the other conditions showed a
significant trend. Change in standard deviation could underpin
a gradual switching from an exploratory to an exploitatory
phase, as seen in reinforcement learning. However, we found
no significant trends. This may suggest that participants are not
using a learning algorithm with adjustable exploration factor, or
that 3 minutes are not enough to detect any change in their
strategy.
Normality in the Rate Domain
We have found that response distribution is not normal as seen
in manual choice RT task (Harris et al., 2014) and saccades
(Carpenter, 1981). This may be because participants are using a
different decision mechanism than in a classic RT task. However,
a different explanation can be offered. The reason for normality
in the rate domainwas explained as fluctuation in the relationship
between response time and accuracy across trial, due to sensory
noise in the stimulus (Harris et al., 2014). However, in our
experiment this noise is drastically reduced, since ACC(t) is
always the same within a block. The response distribution could
be a mixture of an optimization algorithm (see next section)
and a fluctuation in ACC(t). In classic RT experiment, the latter
may usually mask the optimization algorithm. With the EXACT
paradigm, it is possible to design an experiment in which ACC(t)
fluctuates across trials and test for normality in the rate domain,
similarly to what predicted by Harris et al. (2014), but has yet to
be tested.
Effect of Conditions on Distributions
We found that, in all conditions (except with α = 0.25,
λ = 0.16), the RT distributions were skewed on the right,
similarly to what has been found in classic RT tasks. Also,
increased mean resulted in increased the standard deviation
of the distribution. These results are both observed in classic
RT task (Luce, 1986). Within the framework of diffusion
models, these results are explained by taking into account
the geometry of the perceptual process. Most rise-to-threshold
processes will in fact produce a right-skewed distribution which
will generate less spread out distributions with more difficult
conditions (higher mean RT; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998). The
explanation in terms of diffusion process does not seem to
hold in this paradigm, since the participant is not accumulating
information about a particular stimulus within a single trial,
as usually assumed. We propose two alternative explanations
for these results. Both explanations are for now speculative
and clearly require more investigation. They both aim to
describe what may be the underlying process that generates
the distributions’ shape observed without relying on a rise-to-
threshold model.
Asymmetricity of the Decision Rule and Optimization
Algorithm
The right-skewed distributions and the effect of different λ and α
may be due to the way the participants search for the optimum
t∗, and in particular may be due to the asymmetry of the decision
rule functions (see Figure 11, red lines, for the RRm decision
rule, with a simulated dataset of responses). This might happen
because responses that were too fast (t < t∗), would incur more
cost than responses that were too slow (t > t∗) (for a given
magnitude of error). Thus, any search strategy that was sensitive
to the reduction in optimal reward rate would tend to err to
the right side of the optimum t∗. Since the asymmetry of the
decision rules depends on λ and α, this could also explain the
relationship between distribution shape (e.g., standard deviation
and skewness) and experimental condition found in our data
(Figure 8). For example, when λ is small (slower gauge speed)
or α is small the RRm decision rule function becomes more
symmetric and more flat, which implies that participants’ gain in
terms of RRm would not change much, even with high response
variability: the distribution would become less skewed and more
spread out (compare the simulated distribution in Figure 11
with our empirical results in Figure 8, upper left panel). On
the other hand, as λ increases, the RRm function becomes
asymmetric, which would lead to a skewed and less disperse
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distribution. This distribution would also be biased on the right
side of t∗ (red circles in Figures 8, 11). In our data, most of the
distributions follow for the RRm decision rule, but not for the
other decision rules. A peculiar exception is found with λ = 0.16
and α = 0.75, but this could be partly due to the maximum
point being close to zero, which would force the participant to
produce a skewed distribution regardless of the smooth RRm
function.
This idea is an extension of an approach already presented
by Bogacz et al. (2006) and Balci et al. (2011). In the latter
work, empirical thresholds for the drift diffusion model were
consistently found to be higher than the optimal threshold, which
was deemed to be due to the asymmetry of the RRmcurve. To
our knowledge the same reasoning has not been applied to
RT distributions or to the relationship between experimental
conditions and distribution shapes.
Taking the asymmetry of the decision rule into account also
means to slightly change the predicted t∗ when fitting the data:
all the prediction should be slightly slower than the one used
now. We did not consider this, but suggest it as a possible future
direction.
Accuracy is Normally Distributed
An alternative explanation could be that participants’ responses
are actually distributed such that their accuracy is normally
distributed around ACC(t∗), where t∗ is the optimum point
according to the decision rule used by the participants and
the standard deviation can be interpreted as the individual
precision parameter. ACC (RT) cannot be analyzed in classic
RT task because the accuracy of each single response is not
known, whereas in the EXACT paradigm we can translate
RT in ACC (RT) by Equation (1), and ACC in RT(ACC) by
Equation (2).
Note that we should actually consider a truncated normal
distribution in the accuracy domain (upper truncation is always
one, and lower truncation is α in our experiment and 0.5 in
2AFC). The probability density is found to be equal to
RT
(
t; t∗, λ, α
)
=
φ
(
1+ (α − 1) exp (−λt) ,ACC
(
t∗
)
, σ
)
(1− α) λ exp (−λt)
8 (1,ACC (t∗) , σ)−8 (α,ACC (t∗) , σ) (3)
Where φ is the normal probability function and 8 is the
cumulative normal probability function. Figure 12 shows some
examples of this distribution with different λ and α parameter.
This generates an interesting relationship between the number
of alternatives (1/α), and the trial difficulty (λ). By increasing
λ or α the distributions of RT become less spread out and the
mean decreases, corresponding to faster responses. This is similar
to what we empirically found with this paradigm and what is
normally found in the classic RT task (Luce, 1986). This model
does not take into account a sensory motor delay, but adding it
would not drastically change the predictions.
In our dataset, most accuracy distributions were
approximately Normal. However, this was not the case with
small λ and high α (see Figure 10). Normality may be masked
by severe truncation of the original datasets. In fact, as predicted
by our model (Figure 12), the condition with small λ and high α
contained the most severe truncated distributions. By excluding
the most severely truncated distributions the remaining dataset
appear less skewed but the deviation from Normality is still clear.
This may be due to the small sample remaining after eliminating
the seemly truncated distributions. It would be interesting to test
whether accuracy of response distributions follow a near-Normal
shape in classic RT tasks.
Limitations of the Exact Paradigm
The EXACT paradigm has some limitations and differences from
the classic RT task. First, in the EXACT paradigm, the total time
between the beginning of the trial and the participant’s response
FIGURE 11 | Illustration of the hypothesized optimum distributions for the RRm decision rule. The two RRm functions (in red) for two different gauge speeds
(different λ) are maximized by responding precisely at t*. However, if the response is noisy, the asymmetry of RRm make more profitable in terms of reward rate to err
on the right side of t* than on the left. The asymmetry effect is diminished with low gauge speed (small λ): the distributions are less skewed and more spread out. This
also entails that the difference between distribution mean (yellow dotted lines) and t* is greater with high gauge speed. Compare these simulated distributions with the
empirical data in Figure 8.
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FIGURE 12 | Illustration of ACC(RT) distribution and corresponding RT distribution if ACC is normally distributed with truncation at 1 and at various
α’s. The mean of ACC(RT ) is t*RRm and the standard deviation is set to 0.1 for illustration, which can be interpreted as a precision parameter. (A) ACC(RT )
distributions for three α conditions with λ = 1. The dashed vertical lines correspond to the truncation point. (B) Corresponding RT distributions. By increasing α, which
corresponds to decreasing the number of alternatives in a classic RT task, the distribution is less spread out and the mean decreases (faster responses). (C) ACC(RT )
distributions for three λ conditions with α = 0.5 and (D) corresponding RT distributions. By increasing λ, which corresponds to change the trial difficult in a classic RT
task, the distribution become less spread and the mean decreases (faste responses).
corresponds to an increase in reward probability and includes the
motor response time. It is not clear if participants take the motor
response time into account and decide to respond accordingly.
If not, desired accuracy would always be slightly lower than
obtained accuracy. On other hand, in the classic RT experiment,
most rise-to-threshold models assume motor response time to be
an additional component to the accumulation time (Ratcliff and
McKoon, 2008). We designed our experiment so that expected
RTwere of the order of seconds—much longer than typicalmotor
response times so that any overestimation would be minimal.
However, this remains to be further explored.
A second point is that the decision rule may differ
between the EXACT and classic RT paradigms. Similarities in
RT distribution, relationship between distribution shape and
experimental condition, and the emerging of a Piéron’s shape
function lead us to deduce that participants are indeed using
the same decision rule across different paradigms. However, the
critical test would be to obtain the non-Piéron function in a
low punishment classic RT experiment, which we are currently
exploring. However, if this turned out not to be the case, it
would still be interesting to understand why. Is the decision rule
inherently entangled with the perceptual property of the task, or
could it be due to other aspects of the task (different time scale,
different instructions, etc.)?
The final limitation concerns the incentivisation scheme
used. In our experiment we incentivized participants’ with
a prize for the overall best performance, but other schemes
could be used. For example, earned points could be exchanged
for money. We do not think this was important in the
present experiment, since the amount of points earned/lost
was the same for each condition, but it would be important
in an experiment with reward/punishment manipulation. It
is conceivable that different schemes may result in different
decision rules, and future research could explore this possibility.
Indeed, the EXACT paradigm may be a useful procedure
for isolating the decision rule for different incentivisation
schemes.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the decision strategy used by humans has been
constrained by the analysis of the perceptual process underlying
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the decision itself.We designed an experiment, called the EXACT
paradigm, which allows us to analyse participants’ decision rules
and responses based on the accuracy of their response. Instead of
relying on a particular model based on a specific type of sampling
process, the accumulator that substitutes the perceptual process
is exogenously showed to the participant on a computer screen.
This design allowed us to know in advance the relationship
between response time and accuracy of response, ACC(t). In this
way it was possible to directly compare different decision rules,
and found that RRm provided the best fit. We suggest some
innovative way to analyse the dataset that can be easily applied to
classic RT tasks. Most importantly, we found relevant similarities
between our distributions and distributions found in classic
RT tasks: the distributions were generally skewed to the right
and their shape depended on the trial difficulty. Two different
models, one algorithmic and the other based on the accuracy
of response, are proposed to explain the distributions shape
and their dependency on experimental conditions. Both of these
models establish a clear separation from the classic viewpoint of
distributions as a result of a rise-to-threshold mechanism.
This new paradigm opens up new ways to explore the human
decision-making process that are difficult or impossible using
the classic RT paradigm including: exploring the behavior for
unusual ACC(t) functions (e.g., not-increasing, non-monotonic),
easily manipulation of the number of alternatives (α), also by
mimicking unusual setups (α > 0.5), exploring subjective pay-
off (q), and exploring the “algorithm” used by participants use to
find the optimum response time (t∗).
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnbeh.
2015.00288
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